The denial of democratic opportunities, the rise of successful violent movements, and the shifting regional and Islamist contexts make it likely that the coming period of Islamist politics will be dominated by non–Muslim Brotherhood organizations.
The Regional Domain
The Muslim Brotherhood has also become more deeply implicated in regional power politics than in previous eras. Brotherhood organizations are more trans-nationalized, more dependent on state sponsors, and more affected by external events.20
The evolution of each national Muslim Brotherhood branch cannot be understood outside of the transforming regional environment.
For several years after 2011, the Brotherhood was caught up in the regional cold war between Qatar and Turkey on the one side and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates on the other. Qatari and Turkish support for Brotherhood networks offered access to crucial financial and media resources during the transitions but left them increasingly vulnerable to the perception that they served a foreign agenda.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates mobilized anti-Islamist forces across Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia—and after the Egyptian coup led a global effort to label the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization. In recent years, this regional constellation has evolved, with tensions easing between Qatar and Saudi Arabia amid a heightened focus on Iran and sectarian conflict.
The Arab uprisings have tilted the balance of the Muslim Brotherhood’s preoccupations from the national to the regional dimension in important ways. Egypt’s coup, by crushing the Muslim Brotherhood’s leadership and forcing many leaders into exile, transnationalized the organization in ways not seen since the 1950s. This created an external leadership far less organically embedded in the country’s politics and culture, which had a considerable impact on Brotherhood affiliates everywhere else. Regional support for the Syrian uprising has, similarly, activated transnational networks of Islamists working in Syria and regionally to raise funds and promote the cause of the Syrian rebels, while also advancing their own political fortunes at home.
The Arab uprisings have tilted the balance of the Muslim Brotherhood’s preoccupations from the national to the regional dimension in important ways.
The direct and indirect effects of the Muslim Brotherhoods’ evolving transnational perspective have been underappreciated. Egypt’s coup is the most obvious example. The success of the coup emboldened anti-Islamist forces while alarming Islamists in other countries such as Libya and Tunisia. The Egyptian outcome likely pushed Tunisia’s Ennahdha into a more cautious posture in which ideology was downplayed in favor of inclusion.21
The crisis in Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood, similarly, could not be separated from that of Egypt’s Brotherhood.22 After the Egyptian coup, Morocco’s Justice and Development Party took steps toward conciliation, including ceding key ministries to pro-regime parties.23 In the face of the Kuwaiti regime’s support for the coup, the Islamic Constitutional Movement and popular Islamist figures such as Tareq al-Suwaidan found themselves under increasing duress, given the strong support they had shown for Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood.24
Successful strategies also attracted attention as sources of emulation. Tunisian Islamists carefully studied the achievements of Morocco’s PJD. So did some Egyptians. As Egyptian Muslim Brother Izzat Nimr marveled, “Why is [the PJD] succeeding where other political Islam is failing? How after four years in power has [it] retained its popularity?”25
Nimr located the PJD’s appeal in its focus on municipal elections, which allowed the party to build a strong performance record without challenging the national political system.
This sort of learning from the experience of other Islamist parties was more typical than any direct transnational organizational control. Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood members, too, were looking for inspiration, yearning for their own Ghannouchi—a strong leader able to steer the organization through a confusing environment.26
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood learned from the ability of their Libyan counterparts to integrate into a Western-backed armed opposition. Personal and organizational contacts facilitated such learning, as did the reporting and arguments on shared online and broadcast media platforms connecting mainstream Islamists across the region.
Transnational Arab media also affected the broader political environment within which these parties operated. The media actively shaped both positive and negative regional attitudes toward the Muslim Brotherhood. Media outlets controlled by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and their allies relentlessly vilified the party, helping heighten the polarization and demonization that took such a toll on its popular reputation.
Pro-Muslim Brotherhood media, such as the Qatari Al Jazeera Mubasher Misr, played a similarly divisive role, this time in promoting a contrary narrative of Islamist virtues and the evils of their non-Islamist opponents.
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood media outlets based in Turkey were equally controversial, with some members complaining that they were too doctrinaire and inflammatory in their calls for revolutionary action. Others, however, viewed such outlets as an essential component of political behavior, given the limitations of mobilization under repressive conditions.27
Beyond the Gulf, Turkey’s policy has been a critical factor in these regional dynamics. As prime minister and then as president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan supported the Muslim Brotherhood in critical ways across multiple domains.
Turkey hosted many Brotherhood refugees from Egypt, and its media adopted a fiercely critical stance against the coup and aggressively advanced the martyrdom narrative surrounding the August 14, 2013, massacre of Muslim Brotherhood members by the Egyptian security forces at Rabaa al-Adawiya Mosque. Turkey also worked closely with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood within Syrian opposition circles.
The July 2016 Turkish coup attempt could have profoundly disrupted these Muslim Brotherhood networks and strategies had Erdoğan been removed. While he reasserted control, his narrow escape highlighted the vulnerability of a movement increasingly led from abroad and dependent on unpredictable foreign patrons.
The Intra-Islamist Domain
Less attention has been paid to the significance for mainstream Islamist parties of the dramatic changes of the past five years in intra-Islamist politics. After the Arab uprisings, it seemed the Muslim Brotherhood’s political approach had been vindicated at the expense of al-Qaeda’s rejection of democratic change. Since Egypt’s military coup and the rise of the Islamic State, this narrative of the merits of democratic political participation and the discrediting of jihadism has been reversed.
Egypt’s coup had devastating effects on the strategy of democratic inclusion. In turn, Syria’s civil war has empowered ever more extreme sectarian Salafi and Salafi-jihadi trends, to the detriment of the Muslim Brotherhood’s traditionally cautious pragmatism. The emergence of the Islamic State and the failure of democratic politics have transformed the Brotherhood’s terrain.28
In the year after the emergence of the Islamic State, the Egyptian scholar Khalil al-Anani argued that “the Islamic State is seizing the current moment to present itself as a role model for young Islamists around the globe, pushing them to adopt its ideology and emulate its tactics and strategy.”29
This bid for ideological hegemony rested in large part on the Islamic State’s stunning military and political successes, though its military setbacks in Iraq since then have dulled its appeal. But the Islamic State is only one of many violent jihadi groups now active across the Arab world that seek to recruit fighters among disgruntled young Muslims.
The war on terror against al-Qaeda after the September 11, 2001, attacks against the United States seemed simple and predictable compared to today’s complex landscape.
Over the past three years, not only have Salafi-jihadi groups risen and democratic aspirations been frustrated, but also a virulent new form of sectarianism and massive public mobilization has emerged in support of the Syrian uprising. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s past statements on political participation and nonviolence seem quaint at a time when democratic transitions have failed.
In conflicts such as Syria’s, especially, the views of the Arab mainstream appear to have moved at least partially in favor of armed struggle, particularly when defined in sectarian terms. The newly urgent imperative to combat the Islamic State’s appeal, meanwhile, offers new opportunities for Islamist parties to present themselves once again as useful barriers to more extreme movements.
Rather than positioning itself as the successful mainstream avatar of Islamist politics, the Muslim Brotherhood is now competing with more extreme Islamist rivals from a relatively ineffectual and inarticulate moderate position.
This weakness poses profound questions about the ability of the Muslim Brotherhood to appeal to new recruits, or even to hold on to its current members.
If it cannot attract new recruits, or can do so only by resorting to violence, this will make it difficult to position itself in favor of political renewal once conditions change.
Egypt’s coup had devastating effects on the strategy of democratic inclusion.
Jihadi movements understand the challenge posed by the Muslim Brotherhood. Not long ago, the Islamic State devoted the cover story of its online publication, Dabiq, to a denunciation of Brotherhood “apostasy.”30
It could have appeared in any al-Qaeda publication of previous years. While such reactions should open up new vistas for the Brotherhood to reclaim its place in the mainstream, the failure of democratic political participation has deeply undermined the Muslim Brotherhood’s position against the Islamic State.
In Jordan, for instance, the nationalist outrage over the Islamic State’s burning of captured pilot Moaz al-Kasasbeh forced the Muslim Brotherhood into an unfamiliar defensive posture, caught between the regime and those sympathizing with the jihadists.
Protestations by the Islamic Action Front’s then-leader, Zaki bin Rashid, that the appeal of the Islamic State only reinforced the importance of the Muslim Brotherhood’s “moderate alternative” fell flat amid the reality of Salafi-jihadi mobilization and the regime’s relentless cultivation of anti-Islamist sentiment.31
Yet the Muslim Brotherhood again rushed to condemn the assassination of Jordanian nationalist Nahed Hattar in September 2016 by a Salafist, over his posting on Facebook of a cartoon viewed as offensive to Islam. Such persistence demonstrates the importance to the Brotherhood of being perceived as a moderate Islamist force and loyal opposition within the Jordanian spectrum.
Syria’s conflict has, similarly, shifted the center of Islamist politics.
Syria’s conflict has, similarly, shifted the center of Islamist politics. Mohamed Morsi’s June 2013 speech endorsing jihad in Syria shocked many Egyptians, who portrayed it as a radical departure from previous statements. In fact, Morsi’s position reflected not movement toward extremism but an accommodation with the new direction in Islamist expression, especially in the Gulf. During the first half of 2013, fundraising and public mobilization on behalf of the Syrian rebels became ever more sectarian and militant.
Islamist public figures across the Gulf competed to articulate the strongest religious appeals for supporting what they referred to as the “Syrian jihad.” At the time, the adversaries of the Bashar al-Assad regime came to be dominated by a wide range of Salafi-jihadi factions other than the Islamic State (which was formally established in April 2013)—from the al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (now Jabhat Fatah al-Sham) to powerful groups such as Ahrar al-Sham, which enjoy strong support from regional powers.
The war in Syria has blurred the distinctions between Islamist groups and pushed the center of Islamist politics toward endorsing violence. Morsi’s fateful June 2013 speech actually lagged behind the standard rhetoric of Gulf Islamists, which revealed less about the Muslim Brotherhood’s new extremism than about the ever more radicalized Islamist public arena.
The general radicalization of Islamic politics in the region over the past several years has had especially significant implications for movements and parties that aspire to occupy the middle ground. Most Islamist parties have continued to position themselves as nonviolent alternatives to Salafi-jihadi organizations.
This positioning has typically proved politically useful, both with the public and inside the organizations. If this cultivated moderation fails to pay political dividends, however, Islamist parties may well be tempted to shift toward the new, more extreme and sectarian, middle ground.
The Evolution of Islamist Parties
Islamist parties have proven that they, like other parties, adapt to their political and institutional context, sometimes effectively, sometimes less so.32 As Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood member Hazem Said has put it, “The Muslim Brotherhood slogan is ‘prepare’—so we must be ready because conditions may change.”33
Such calls for flexibility cannot detract from the fact that there is a clear ideological component to the Muslim Brotherhood’s political thought and practice, which is instilled into its members and which permeates both its public rhetoric and private conversation.
However, there is little reason to believe that Islamists are exceptionally ideological when compared to other political actors. While Islamist ideas do define the goals and identities of Islamist organizations, the concrete implications of those ideas have been challenged quite intensely in recent years, by both external critics and those on the inside. Indeed, Islamist political behavior tends to exhibit a great deal of strategic flexibility rather than a single, static form of politics.
The Brotherhood’s adaptation to local realities has been formalized in the doctrine of wasatiyya, or centrism.34
This approach is designed to allow the Muslim Brotherhood to seize the mainstream of Islamist politics—though not of the broader public sphere. Wasatiyya has dictated a patient, long-term strategy of societal transformation through political participation, cultural shaping efforts, and organizational development. This particular configuration of ideas stemmed from a series of critical junctures shaped by Egypt’s Sadat-era political and economic opening and the emergence of violent competitors, which encouraged the Muslim Brotherhood to embrace political participation and gradualism.
These ideas took hold internally because they seemed to work well as an overarching political and ideological framework in the decade prior to the Arab uprisings. It positioned Islamism within a mainstream political center that appropriated popular issues such as Palestine, opposition to the U.S. occupation of Iraq, and demands for democracy. Because this centrism was both ideologically sympathetic to the organization’s self-image and politically effective, the Muslim Brotherhood’s leaders were able to hold together its different internal religious and political strands without needing to make difficult choices.
The current regional political context, particularly the developments in Egypt, seems destined to push Islamist parties away from participatory and nonviolent paths. Since the military coup, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has been locked in an existential struggle in which both the organization and the regime have adopted uncompromising and increasingly forceful postures.35
This requires little by way of ideology or unique organizational qualities to understand. The embrace by some Islamist youths of armed resistance is precisely what would be expected after the Rabaa al-Adawiya massacre and the sweeping repression that followed. For some time, this anger could be channeled into persistent protests to sustain internal morale and offer some outlet to furious members.36 But when this approach failed to generate popular support or achieve political gains, the argument for more radical, violent action became more compelling.37
However, other regional trends are pushing Islamist parties in more participatory directions. As we have seen, the possible alternatives are many. However, as these parties have considered their options, four major areas in which they have been evolving and adapting are in their organizational coherence, the relationship between party and movement, democratic participation, and the use of violence.
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood had long been defined by its meticulous internal organization.38 The core of the Brotherhood’s organizational success was its elaborate cell structure and high degree of internal socialization, which protected the movement to some degree against state repression. It relied on a rigid hierarchy to transmit instructions from the leadership to the rank and file, while holding regular internal elections to offer some form of accountability to members. This distinctive structure lay behind its successful political mobilization. The Brotherhood’s internal organization allowed for an exceptionally high degree of indoctrination, surveillance, and internal discipline. When it came time to manage political campaigns or fight street battles, the Muslim Brotherhood could quickly and effectively activate large numbers of supporters to work in a coordinated fashion.
The current regional political context seems destined to push Islamist parties away from participatory and nonviolent paths.
The Egyptian Brotherhood was especially known for its organizational coherence and ability to avoid major factional splintering. Incidents of internal dissent—such as the formation of the al-Wasat Party, which emerged from a rift in the Brotherhood in 1996, or the disciplining of young Brotherhood bloggers in the late 2000s for challenging the official leadership by openly discussing internal affairs—ultimately affected only a tiny minority of the membership.
The few hundred departures, even if by well-known figures, had little serious impact on an organization of its size. However, the period leading up to the Arab uprising had been unusually contentious internally. The Brotherhood elections of 2009–2010 concentrated power in the hands of a conservative faction, driving away many top reformist leaders.39
The Egyptian crackdown took a particularly significant toll on the Muslim Brotherhood’s organizational capacity.40 Thousands of its members were imprisoned, some 500 nongovernmental organizations affiliated with the organization were legally shuttered, the assets of its leading members were confiscated, its public presence was obliterated, and its lines of internal communication were disrupted. The Brotherhood leadership has been unable to maintain effective control in the face of radical reactions of youth cadres and incitement from members abroad.
While it seems that some families continue to meet, especially outside of Cairo, and the skeleton of the Brotherhood remains intact, the leadership has been largely decimated by arrests, killings, and exile. The remaining leaders are struggling among themselves over control, while the connections between the Brotherhood’s numerous cells and the leadership have been severed.41
Even when Brotherhood leaders have tried to sustain a nonviolent approach, they lack the organizational ability to enforce their doctrines on rebellious and angry members.42
As scholar Abdelrahman Ayyash has put it: “The period since Morsi’s overthrow has been an unprecedented state of disarray which has in effect created a new organization.”43
This disarray complicates any form of coherent, long-term action by the organization or its ability to maintain discipline among the ranks. Even if the leadership today opted for reconciliation with the regime, it would face great difficulty in compelling members to go along with such a decision.
This situation has produced an intense degree of factional discord and internal argumentation over strategy, leadership, and organizational decisions. The disagreements track across several dividing lines. An enduring generational divide has become ever more salient as older Brotherhood members hearken back to their survival strategies during earlier eras of fierce repression, while younger members agitate for confrontation with the Egyptian regime.
Another enduring divide that has taken on new significance is between politically focused Muslim Brotherhood leaders and the more religiously focused rank and file. There is also a divide between different branches of the leadership in exile and an emergent leadership inside the country.
This struggle for control between the leadership faction in Egypt and the other in exile has divided the Egyptian organization in ways deeply unfamiliar to it.44
The splits are partly logistical, with senior leaders in prison and middle-ranking leaders dispersed among multiple countries, making coordination very difficult.45
But they also reflect real differences over political strategy and ideology. In place of the consensus strategy of years past, Muslim Brotherhood factions today are sharply divided over the legitimacy of dialogue with the state, the formation of a government in exile, ongoing calls for protests, the use of violence, and even how leaders should be chosen.
Rather than basing their selection of leaders on traditional qualities, such as long service within the organization or relationships with existing leaders, many Brotherhood members now want the standard to be one’s current activism. In that way they have rejected internal despotism while demanding genuine organizational democracy.46
Younger members are openly hostile to the traditional demands for obedience to leaders they view as having failed. In these internal power struggles, the old guard has financial resources and international connections but lacks strong support among young members in Egypt who make up the residual strength of the movement.
The competition has played out not only within the secretive and closed circles of Muslim Brotherhood politics, but also across online platforms and social media. For instance, several figures, including the pseudonymous Mohammad Muntasir, have claimed the status of official spokesman for the Brotherhood.
In late May 2016, a website belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood’s banned Freedom and Justice Party went online, over the objections of the party’s best-known leaders. Statements issued by official Muslim Brotherhood platforms are now routinely contradicted and denied by others. Such divisions highlight the breakdown of the organization’s hierarchy and discipline, long considered among its most vital attributes.
Muslim Brotherhood factions today are sharply divided over issues like the legitimacy of dialogue with the state and the use of violence.
The organization has worked to overcome these differences through a series of internal reform initiatives. The Muslim Brotherhood has always had a relatively democratic process for the selection of its leadership, with members of the Shura Council and the Guidance Office directly elected from within the organization’s ranks. In 2009, anger over the perceived manipulation of those processes in the election of a new Guidance Office triggered a wave of resignations by top leaders. Youth activists, with the support of some leaders such as Mohamed Kamal and Mohamed Wahdan, began pushing in February 2014 for new elections to bring people active on the ground into the formal leadership structure.47
Such elections were discussed throughout 2015, without achieving a consensus that could reconcile the factions. The traditional leadership, mostly in exile, resisted this challenge to their authority, but by spring 2016 had moved toward accepting internal elections.
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood is not the only branch to experience a fundamental organizational rupture. Over the past year, as noted, Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood has been the target of an unprecedented challenge to its organizational coherence. Long-simmering internal disagreements came to the surface in October 2013 with the so-called Zamzam Initiative, led by reformist leaders in the party, mostly of East Bank origin. The Zamzam leaders were expelled by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Shura Council in February 2014.
A year later, the government approved an application from a group including Zamzam leaders to form a licensed charity under the name the Muslim Brotherhood Society. What began as internal momentum for reform evolved—with regime support—into a major split.
The Zamzam Initiative risked fragmenting the Muslim Brotherhood along one of its long-standing divides, namely the relationship between the Jordanian organization and Hamas. The Brotherhood had been split among multiple constituents for over a decade.48
The divide was both ethno-national and political. East Bankers resented the role of Palestinians in the organization and the focus on Palestinian affairs at the expense of domestic Jordanian politics. Organizational hawks advocated a more confrontational approach toward Jordan’s government. Zamzam leader Ruheil al-Ghuraybah explained that “the root cause of the divisions is demographic, since Hamas penetrated the group in Jordan for many years and forced its own agenda.”49
When the new Muslim Brotherhood Society received official recognition from the Jordanian state, the old Muslim Brotherhood found itself stripped of legal recognition, while significant portions of the organization’s material and financial resources were transferred to the new organization. In doing so, the Jordanian regime triggered an existential battle over the Brotherhood’s identity, organization, and purpose.50
The palace understood that removing the Muslim Brotherhood completely would be dangerous because it would eliminate one of the major channels through which Islamist-oriented youths could participate in politics. So, instead, it moved to create an alternative organization more amenable to its political goals.
This unique government approach of creating a new official Brotherhood and transferring to it the resources of the original organization generated profound uncertainty.
The new Muslim Brotherhood Society commanded legal recognition and financial resources but had virtually no legitimacy among the Muslim Brotherhood’s broader membership or the public. Four different Islamist parties entered the 2016 parliamentary elections, but, tellingly, it was the candidates affiliated with the traditional Brotherhood organization who succeeded.
The organizational crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood organizations in Egypt and Jordan posed a sharp challenge to their established strategy of using the provision of social services for political and organizational outreach. The effect has been to radically circumscribe, if not end, the opportunity for such social service provision.51
How the absence of such opportunities will affect the long-term position of Islamist parties is a major question with which its leaders are grappling.
Marc Lynch, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Middle East Program
20 Kristin Smith Diwan, “The ‘Third Image’ in Islamist Politics,” in“Evolving Methodologies in the Study of Islamism,” POMEPS Studies 17, ed. Marc Lynch, Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS), March 2016.
21 Monica Marks, “How Egypt’s Coup Really Affected Tunisia’s Islamists,” Monkey Cage (blog), Washington Post, March 16, 2015, http://goo.gl/SQWEXu.
22 Mohammad Abu Rumman, “The Crisis of the Brotherhood. What Was Before It and What Comes After” (in Arabic), Al-Ghad, December 17, 2015, http://goo.gl/nsIIFH.
23 Masbah, “His Majesty’s Islamists.”
24 Courtney Freer, “The Rise of Pragmatic Islamism in Kuwait’s Post-Arab Spring Opposition Movement,” Brookings Institution, August 2015.
25 Izzat Nimr, “The Morocco Election: Lessons and Indications” (in Arabic), Egypt Window, September 9, 2015, http://goo.gl/eyD57y.
26 Mohammad Abu Rumman, “Jordan’s Ghannouchi” (in Arabic), Al-Ghad, May 11, 2016, http://goo.gl/KWYtcm.
27 Mohammed al-Shabrawy, “Questions About Media Legitimacy and Rejecting the Coup” (in Arabic), Egypt Window, October 5, 2015, http://goo.gl/2EhMjs.
28 Marc Lynch, ed., “Islamism in the IS Age,” POMEPS Studies 12, POMEPS, March 17, 2015, http://goo.gl/6nOEgu.
29 Khalil al-Anani, “The ISIS-ification of Islamist Politics,” Washington Post, January 30, 2015, http://goo.gl/3aPD7p.
30 Dabiq (no. 14), April 2016, https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2016/04/the-islamic-state-22dacc84biq-magazine-1422.pdf.
31 Bin Rashid’s statement differentiating the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic State as reported by Al-Ghad, July 26, 2014.
32 Thomas Carothers and Nathan J. Brown, “The Real Danger for Egyptian Democracy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 12, 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Carothers_Brown-Nov.pdf.
33 Hazem Said, “Peacefulness . . . and the Foundations of the Muslim Brotherhood Daawa” (in Arabic), Egypt Window, May 12, 2015, http://goo.gl/uyoQYg; Mohammad Abu Rumman, “The Brotherhood and the Suicide of the Peaceful Option” (in Arabic), Al-Araby al-Jadeed, July 13, 2015, http://goo.gl/6Juj42.
34 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamic Movement (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014); Raymond William Baker, Islam Without Fear: Egypt and the New Islamists (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).
35 Mokhtar Awad and Nathan J. Brown, “Mutual Escalation in Egypt,” Monkey Cage (blog), Washington Post, February 9, 2015, http://goo.gl/GPpc8R.
36 Steven Brooke, “Muslim Brotherhood Activism and Regime Consolidation in Egypt,” Washington Post (online), January 29, 2015, available at http://goo.gl/Sga2N4.
37 Mohammad Jamal Urfah, “Reasons for the Sharp Conflict Inside the Brotherhood and Its Implications,” Masr al-Arabiya, May 31, 2015.
38 Khalil al-Anani, Inside the Muslim Brotherhood (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
39 Khayri Amer, “Institutional Problems in the Muslim Brotherhood” (in Arabic), Al-Araby al-Jadeed, September 21, 2015, http://goo.gl/Ptlkl5.
40 Trager and Shalaby, “The Brotherhood Breaks Down.”
41 Ammar Fayed, “Those Who Fear for the Future Inside the Muslim Brotherhood” (in Arabic), Rassd News, December 17, 2015, http://goo.gl/V6ZOYA.
42 Rumman, “The Brotherhood and the Suicide of the Peaceful Option.”
43 Abdelrahman Ayyash, “The Middle Ikhwan Leaders,” Al-Malaf al-Masri 19 (Cairo, Egypt: Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, March 2016).
44 Mostafa Hashem, “The Great Brotherhood Divide,” Sada (blog), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2, 2016, http://goo.gl/hgypHX.
45 Manal Lotfi, “The Muslim Brotherhood and the Political Forces and the Egyptian State,” Al-Malaf al-Masri 19 (Cairo, Egypt: Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, March 2016).
46 For example, Essam al-Masri, “Dr Ghazlan and the Current Brotherhood Leadership” (in Arabic), Egypt Window, May 14, 2015, http://goo.gl/vCxBUC.
47 Mustafa Hashem, “The Muslim Brotherhood Towards Greater Division” (in Arabic), Rassd News, March 5, 2016, http://rassd.com/179018.htm.
48 Mohammad Abu Rumman and Hassan Abu Hanieh, The ‘Islamic Solution’ in Jordan: Islamists, the State, and the Ventures of Democracy and Security (Berlin, Germany: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, November 2013).
49 Quoted by Osama al-Sharif, “Defections Threaten Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood,” Al-Monitor, January 14, 2016, http://goo.gl/Z6d0Vd; personal interviews with Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood leaders Amman and Paris.
50 Mohammad Abu Rumman, “The State and the Muslim Brotherhood: New Rules of the Game” (in Arabic), Al-Ghad, June 8, 2015, http://goo.gl/XG23t4.
51 Steven Brooke, “Old Questions and New Methods in the Study of Islamism,” in “Evolving Methodologies in the Study of Islamism,” ed. Marc Lynch, POMEPS Studies 17, POMEPS, March 5, 2015, 27–30, http://goo.gl/D89GuU; Steven Brooke, “The Muslim Brotherhood’s Social Outreach After the Egyptian Coup,” Brookings Institution, August 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Egypt_Brooke-FINALE-2.pdf; Amr Darrag and Steven Brooke, “Politics or Piety? Why the Muslim Brotherhood Engages in Social Service Provision: A Conversation,” Brookings Institution, May 6, 2016, http://goo.gl/0CD9Ee.
To be continued