By Greg Shapland
EU and African leaders meeting at a mini-summit in Paris have announced new measures to tackle the migrant crisis in the central Mediterranean.
Attempts by migrants to reach Europe via Libya have slowed somewhat but the relationship between Libya, Italy and NGOs acting to rescue migrants have become more complicated.
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On Monday 28 August, in Paris, the leaders of the four European countries most affected by trans-Mediterranean migration (President Macron of France, Chancellor Merkel of Germany, Prime Minister Rajoy of Spain and Prime Minister Gentiloni of Italy) met the leaders of three similarly-affected African countries, namely, Prime Minister Serraj of Libya, President Deby of Chad and President Issoufou of Niger.
At the end of this meeting, Macron announced that the leaders had agreed a short-term plan of action. The plan “involves tackling people smugglers, improving stability in Libya and increasing aid to the transit countries”.
The mini-summit follows efforts by individual European countries, especially France, Italy and the UK, to restore stability to Libya – a necessary condition for any effective effort to suppress illegal attempts by migrants to cross the Mediterranean in a sustainable fashion, as well as to counter terrorism.
In July, Macron hosted Serraj (who heads the internationally-recognised government of Libya) and General Haftar (de facto military commander in eastern Libya) and secured their commitment to a cease-fire. (We looked at this development, which was not welcomed in Rome, in our post of 27 July, “Libya: Macron grabs the wheel.” )
The UK was not represented at the meeting in Paris. But the British government’s interest in Libya remains strong. Last week, on his second trip to Libya in four months, British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson met his counterpart, Mohamed Tahir Siala, in Tripoli, where he also visited UK naval officers training the Libyan coastguard. Johnson announced an aid package of £9 million for Libya, including £1.3 million for food and healthcare for refugees.
He then travelled to Benghazi for talks with Haftar, with the aim of promoting reconciliation between the latter and the government in Tripoli. (In passing, Johnson took the opportunity to have a dig at his own Prime Minister by noting that elections need to be carefully prepared and advising the Libyans not to rush into them.)
For its part, the Italian government has been taking measures aimed directly at reducing the number of migrants crossing the Mediterranean. (Some 600,000 migrants have reached Italy by sea from Libya and other North African countries since 2014 – over 12,000 have died trying – and the question has become an important one in Italian politics.)
Italy has supported the Tripoli government’s efforts to control people-smuggling by providing financial support and training for the Libyan navy and coastguard. In late July, in response to a request from the government in Tripoli, it agreed to send two naval vessels to Libyan waters to intercept migrant-smuggling boats.
Amid accusations that one NGO has been collaborating with people-smugglers, Italy has also imposed a code of conduct on NGOs engaged in rescuing migrants from unseaworthy boats. Some NGOs have accepted the code; others have rejected it.
The dispatch of warships from Italy, the former colonial power, prompted angry reactions from Libyans on social media. General Haftar, no doubt seeking to capitalize on these feelings by posing as more nationalist than his rivals in Tripoli, ordered Libyan naval vessels to oppose any incursion of Italian naval vessels into Libyan waters that was not authorized by the army (Haftar styles himself Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan armed forces.) However, none of the forces under his command is geographically in a position to move against the Italian warships, so the threat is any empty one.
Meanwhile, a mixed group of Libyan civilians and security personnel in Sabratha (50 miles west of Tripoli), a major embarkation port for migrant boats, has been taking steps to prevent sailings.
The Sabratha force has been holding intercepted migrants in a detention centre. According to one media source, “armed groups are receiving payoffs to stop the boats leaving Libya, in exchange for aid, aircraft hangars and large sums of money”, the implication being that the cash is coming from Italy.
The present author has not found any corroboration of this assertion. However, according to The Economist, Italy “has offered funding to tribes in southern Libya to block the flow of economic migrants and political refugees.”
Whatever the precise cause or causes, the number of people reaching Italy from Libya by sea dropped by nearly 70% in July and August compared with the same months last year.
With the central Mediterranean route becoming progressively more difficult for migrants, some appear to have decided to try the western Mediterranean route, from Morocco to Spain.
While the numbers are not large, there has been an increase in the number of migrants attempting to enter Spain from Morocco. Since the beginning of this year, some 8,000 migrants have reached Spain by crossing the Mediterranean, compared to 2,500 for the same period in 2016.
Others have tried to enter the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on the Moroccan coast, with a sharp increase in such attempts over the last month or so.
There does not seem to have been a similar increase in attempted crossings to Europe from Egypt (there were losses of life in 2016), perhaps because of intensified efforts on the part of the Egyptian security forces, combined with legislation passed last year to punish people-smugglers. One such attempt (seemingly the first for several months) was made earlier this month but was foiled.
Libya and the EU have had some success in reducing the flow of migrants across the central Mediterranean. However, without more solid progress towards the stabilisation and re-unification of Libya, not to mention sustained action to tackle the enormous challenges of insecurity, oppression and lack of opportunity in the countries from which the migrants are coming, it is unclear how long this improvement will last.
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The Western Mediterranean route
The western Mediterranean migration route from Morocco to Spain is less heavily trafficked than its central/Libyan counterpart. But the numbers are increasing.
Morocco, having become a destination as well as a transit country, has changed its policy towards migrants accordingly.
In 2017, up to the end of August, it accounted for nearly four out of every five irregular migrants crossing the Mediterranean. Geographical position does not explain this predominance: the distance between the Libyan coast and the island of Lampedusa, the nearest part of Italy, is 300 kms (184 miles).
Rather, the attraction of the central Mediterranean route is the lack of any unified central authority in Libya which could work with Italy and other European states to restrict the departure of migrant boats.
The western Mediterranean route is in these respects a mirror image of its central/Libyan counterpart. Geographically, Morocco is very close to Spain: only 14 kms (9 miles) separate the Moroccan and Spanish coasts at the Straits of Gibraltar, and there are land borders between Morocco and the Spanish territories of Çeuta and Melilla on the Mediterranean coast of Morocco.
In contrast to Libya, however, Morocco is a strong state with effective security agencies which cooperate closely with their Spanish counterparts. Moreover, for many would-be migrants, Morocco is further away and harder to reach than Libya.
As a result, the western route is much less heavily trafficked than the central route: in 2017, up to the end of August, only 11% of the irregular migrants attempting to enter the EU by crossing the Mediterranean used the western route. (The balance – also around 11% – consisted of people crossing from Turkey to Greece.)
This represented just under 10,000 people crossing by sea and just under 4,000 illegally entering Çeuta and Melilla. Pro rata, the level of fatalities on the western route (1.44%) is lower than on the central route (2.24%), which is not surprising given that the sea crossing is so much shorter.
What the two routes do have in common is that the majority of those using them are from sub-Saharan Africa. Irregular migrants trying to enter the EU via Libya come from East as well as West Africa (and Bangladesh – the second largest single source after Nigeria).
Those travelling via Morocco are predominantly West African, with just three states (Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire and The Gambia) making up half the total number. Just over 10% are Syrians. (Earlier this year, a group of Syrians became entangled in the habitual Algerian-Moroccan shin-kicking and found themselves stranded on the border between the two countries for seven weeks, before Morocco allowed them in.) Moroccans themselves form a sizable proportion of those making the crossing – almost one in 10.
Although the number of migrants crossing the Mediterranean by the western route is small relative to the central route, the figures for 2017, to date, represent a three-fold increase on the equivalent period in 2016.
This perhaps reflects the emergence of additional obstacles in Libya (as set out in our post of 30 August). So far this year, there has been no overall increase in the numbers entering Çeuta and Melilla, probably due to the strengthening of the border fences by the Spanish authorities.
There are now two or three parallel fences, each six metres high, topped with razor wire and equipped with alarms. However, migrants trying to enter the two enclaves have shown both determination and athleticism: some have climbed over the border fences while others have swum or sailed in dinghies around them; still others have been smuggled in under vehicles.
In one incident in early August, around 300 migrants rushed a border post at Çeuta, taking the Moroccan and Spanish border guards by surprise; 180 made it into the enclave. (There have been previous incidents of this kind, which suggest a degree of organisation, including a major attempted incursion in January this year.)
For those who do gain entry into Çeuta or Melilla, life is not necessarily pleasant or straightforward. Some are taken to over-crowded holding and processing centres, whence they may in due course to be allowed to travel on to mainland Spain or are returned to their countries of origin; others live on the streets.
Those who fail to make it onto Spanish soil and have given up trying (many migrants make multiple attempts) have the choice of returning to their countries of origin or remaining in Morocco.
Many have taken the latter course, rather than return to their poorer and less stable countries of origin. Moreover, staying in Morocco has become more attractive than it was, following a softening of government policy four years ago towards those who had entered the country illegally. This policy shift, announced in September 2013, followed a report by Morocco’s National Human Rights Council (CNDH) which recognised that Morocco had become a host as well as a transit country and recommended that it meet its obligations in that regard.
Part of the Moroccan government’s response was to institute a process for “regularising” migrants’ status. For successful applicants, this provided legal residency status for at least a year (the permits are renewable): about 25,000 migrants have benefitted from this measure . In terms of nationality, the largest groups to have benefitted are Senegalese (over 6,000) and Syrians (over 5,000).
The Moroccan authorities still have some way to go, however, before they can claim to have attained the lofty goals set out in the royal decree of 2013, as local and international human rights organisations have continued to document the widespread ill-treatment of migrants. Whatever their status, tens of thousands of African migrants have settled in cities such as Casablanca, Rabat and Fès on a semi-permanent basis, where they find jobs in the informal service sector, domestic service, petty trade and construction. Those who have not managed to find work can often be seen begging on the streets.
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Greg Shapland – He is a writer on politics, security and resources in the MENA region. He was Head of Research Analysts in the FCO from 2010-13 and is now an Associate Fellow at Chatham House.
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