By Lisa Watanabe

Executive Summary:

pears largely due to a failure to appeal either a more moderate Islamist audience or a large enough ultra-conservative constituency. In particular, their message has been lost on ultraconservative youth.

Quietist Salafi actors, who usually shun political engagement, could make gains at the expense of Salafi political parties, especially in Libya. Quietist Salafis have been under pressure in Tunisia since the start of the political crisis in 2013, which has limited their capacity to expand and institutionalize their networks.

This could result in more ultra-conservative youth gravitating towards jihadi Salafism. In Libya, by contrast, nominally quietist Salafism, notably Madkhalism, has been gaining a greater foothold. The GNA in the West and General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) in the East both rely on Madkhali brigades. This could eventually lead to their integration into future police and security structures, thereby boosting Madkhali influence in state structures.

Madkhalis have also increased their presence within the religious sphere in eastern Libya, providing Madkhali clerics with channels through which to expand their support base in this already more conservative part of the country that has traditionally been a hotbed of radicalization.

While much attention has thus far understandably been focused on jihadi actors in Libya and Tunisia, other Islamist actors, who are not focused on armed jihad, deserve greater scrutiny. The latter emerged as key actors in the post-uprising environments of these countries.

In the immediate transitional period, mainstream Islamist actors, such as the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and Construction Party (JCP) and Ennahda in Tunisia were, along with their allies, able to exert considerable influence, bringing them into conflict with non-Islamist actors.

How they now adapt and position themselves within their national contexts will be important for stability in a postconflict Libya and for the democratic transition in Tunisia, both of which are not only essential for regional stability, but also for European security, given the myriad of security challenges that fragile and conflict afflicted countries can generate.

Though the environments in which Islamists in Libya and Tunisia operate are considerably different, some similarities may be observed. Mainstream Islamists in both countries have lost ground since 2012, though they remain politically relevant.

While the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya has seen its influence diminish significantly since the outbreak of civil war in mid-2014, the UN political process has provided channels of continued, albeit reduced, political influence.

Moreover, the movement’s association and potentially shared agendas with powerful brigades that support the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) may also provide it and its party with sympathizers in Libya’s future security structures.

The influence of Ennahda in Tunisia has also contracted since the 2013 – 14 political crisis that shook the country. Its continued importance is largely due to a further recognition of the secular nature of the Tunisian state and a recognition that its continued political sway depends on its acceptance by non-Islamist political parties and societal forces.

If mainstream Islamists may still be considered significant political actors, the same cannot be said of the conservative Salafi political actors. The latter have failed to gain any real political relevance in their own right.

In Libya, several Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)/Libyan Islamic Movement for Change (LIMC) veterans formed Salafi political parties, though their almost complete absence in Libya’s first elected parliament, the General National Congress (GNC), radically circumscribed any political ambitions they might have had.

Nevertheless, their links to important brigades do give them influence on the ground in several parts of the country. Salafi parties in Tunisia have also fared poorly. Whilst they enjoyed the support of Ennahda early on in the transition, Ennahda has since distanced itself from them, increasing their political isolation.

Their lack of political traction appears largely due to a failure to appeal either a more moderate Islamist audience or a large enough ultra-conservative constituency. In particular, their message has been lost on ultra-conservative youth.

Quietist Salafi actors, who usually shun political engagement, could make gains at the expense of Salafi political parties, especially in Libya. Quietist Salafis have been under pressure in Tunisia since the start of the political crisis in 2013, which has limited their capacity to expand and institutionalize their networks.

This could result in more ultra-conservative youth gravitating towards jihadi Salafism.

In Libya, by contrast, nominally quietist Salafism, notably Madkhalism, has been gaining a greater foothold. The GNA in the West and General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) in the East both rely on Madkhali brigades.

This could eventually lead to their integration into future police and security structures, thereby boosting Madkhali influence in state structures. Madkhalis have also increased their presence within the religious sphere in eastern Libya, providing Madkhali clerics with channels through which to expand their support base in this already more conservative part of the country that has traditionally been a hotbed of radicalization.

Introduction

Islamists have emerged as key actors in the post-uprising environments of Libya and Tunisia. Their agendas and relative importance are likely to have implications for the evolution of the political landscapes and stability of these countries.

Tunisia’s democratic transition remains fragile and vulnerable to tensions between Islamist and non-Islamist political forces. Post-Qaddafi Libya has yet to fully emerge from the civil war that broke out in mid-2014, itself partially caused by polarization between Islamist and non-Islamist actors.

How Islamist actors adapt to and position themselves within their new and evolving environments will be vital to the success of the democratic transition in Tunisia and stability in a post-conflict Libya, both of which are essential for regional stability, as well as security in Europe.

The latter, not least because fragile and conflict-afflicted contexts provide opportunities for the growth of violent extremism and can contribute to acute irregular migratory flows.

Libyan Islamist actors, notably the Muslim Brotherhood and the now fragmented Libyan Islamic Movement for Change (LIMC) – formerly the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) – had played a significant role in the uprising against the Qaddafi regime.

After Qaddafi, they became involved in the political transition process, either through the establishment of political parties – the Muslim Brotherhood established the Justice and Construction Party (JCP) and former leaders of the LIFG/LIMC set up the Salafi parties Al-Watan and Al-Umma Al-Wasat – or through their members’ involvement in transitional governance structures.

When the second civil war broke out, the Muslim Brotherhood, the JCP, the Salafi parties and Salafi-leaning independents aligned themselves with the General National Congress (GNC) and its government in Tripoli, forming the Libya Dawn coalition.

The less organized and supposedly quietist Madkhali Salafis found themselves on both sides of the conflict, some aligning themselves with the GNC and its government and others with the House of Representatives (HoR) and its government in Bayda/Tobruk.

While some of Libya’s Madkhalis are still aligned with General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), who is close to many politicians in the HoR, others cooperate with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), headed by Fayez Al-Sarraj.

While Tunisian Islamists did not play a significant role in the removal of Ben Ali, they have played an important role in the transitional process, with the Muslim Brotherhood-derived Islamist party Ennahda emerging as a major political actor and participating in successive governments. Ennahda has even attempted to remodel itself in order to be more acceptable to non-Islamist political forces and the population at large.

Following the departure of Ben Ali, a small percentage of Salafis also established political parties, notably Jabhat Al-Islah, Hisb Ut-tahrir, Al-Asala and Al-Rahma.

Quietist Salafis also adapted their behavior to the altered domestic situation in Tunisia, operating more openly, engaging in preaching and charitable work, forming associations and even lobbying politically for issues of concern to them, tough they have come under pressure since 2013.

The contexts in which Libyan and Tunisian Islamists operate is very different, therefore. In Libya, Islamists are struggling to ensure their place in the country’s future, without the parameters of a sustainable political settlement having been finalized and in a situation in which armed groups continue to wield influence in the absence of strong governance structures.

How they and associated brigades are positioning themselves will, consequently, affect their future influence in the country.

In Tunisia, by contrast, Islamists are working within the established political parameters of a fledgling democracy.

How Islamists actors relate to the young democratic order will affect their survival within the political system and their traction within society as a whole.

To-date, much attention has understandably been on jihadi Islamist actors in Libya and Tunisia, who seek to impose their views about the centrality of Islamic practice for social and political life through violent means.

However, Islamists, who are not focused on armed jihad, deserve greater scrutiny. The latter are likely to help shape the future of Libya and Tunisia.

This study looks at several types of key Islamist actors. Among the political Islamists, it examines mainstream Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya and Ennahda in Tunisia, who have gone the furthest in terms of accepting democratic norms and principles, and are the most pragmatic with regards to the application of sharia law.

Within the more conservative Salafi current, it looks at post-Jihadis, some of whom have embraced political Islam, even though they remain more conservative in their approach to politics and religion than mainstream Islamists, as well as quietist Salafis, who generally eschew political engagement and reject armed resistance against Sunni Muslim regimes.

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To be continued
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Lisa Watanabe – Senior Research Fellow at the Department of Humanities, Social and Political Studies, Institute of Security Studies, Zurich. Specializes in the issues of North Africa and the European Mediterranean.

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