Bilal Abdullah
- The outline of the initiative by the UN Secretary-General’s envoy to Libya, Abdoulaye Bathily, suggests that it aims to broaden political participation to resolve the Libyan crisis. Bathily wants to include other stakeholders, end the monopoly of current players over the conflict’s potential outcome, and control the path toward a final settlement.
- Bathily was keen to avoid possible accusations by some Libyan political actors that he sought to impose external solutions. He also stuck to the international support for his initiative to face down the usual skepticism of these Libyan actors.
- There are early signs about the likely failure of Bathily’s initiative, whether because of the difficulty of holding the five-party meeting or the other difficulty of reaching compromises to resolve outstanding issues if the meeting is held.
- The chances of ending Libya’s political stalemate are modest. However, continuing the political process, preserving achieved gains, and limiting the local players’ ability to do more harm are important priorities.
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On November 23, 2023, the United Nations Secretary-General’s envoy to Libya, Abdoulaye Bathily, introduced an initiative to end the political deadlock in the country and achieve some settlement. The initiative quickly faced objections, suggesting its chances of reviving a political solution are modest.
The Initiative’s Content
According to the text published on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) website, the main points of the proposed initiative include the following:
- It starts with working to ensure that the political process remains inclusive. It said Bathily would conduct focused consultations with a broader spectrum of Libyan stakeholders, such as the Presidential Council (PC), the House of Representatives (HoR), the High Council of State, and the Government of National Unity (the Tripoli government). The stakeholders include political parties, military and security actors, elders and notables, cultural and linguistic components, academics and youth representatives, women, and civil society.
- Official actors are the “initiative’s core” who would negotiate the final compromises on resolving outstanding issues and pave the way for elections. Bathily will consult with unofficial actors – not specifically named – to present their views to institutional actors authorized to reach final agreements with binding results.
- Bathily has requested the five foremost leaders to designate representatives to participate in a preparatory meeting (to be determined) to discuss the date, venue, and agenda. They will also identify the outstanding issues that need to be resolved to make it possible for the High National Elections Commission to begin election preparations based on the laws passed by the HoR.
- Another point stressed the national character of the Libyan-led, state-owned political process. The UN envoy only plays a facilitating role based on the UNMIL mandate while calling upon the international community to fully support the envoy in implementing this mandate.
- Several remarks can be raised regarding the content of this initiative:
- Its outlines were revealed nine months after its initial announcement during Bathily’s brief at the Security Council in February. During this period, the initiative changed. This is why the “unveiling” showed new things not in the initial announcement and the subsequent media statements. Initially, the initiative was called a “higher steering committee” in which all concerned actors participate. However, in the final version, it turned into almost one central meeting for official actors, besides other meetings on the sidelines of the main one. This means the true power in negotiating outcomes will lie in the hands of the prominent leaders who do not want to leave the political scene and benefit from prolonging the transitional period.
- The initial version of the initiative suggested that it aimed to broaden participation to include other stakeholders, end the monopoly of current actors over the political playing field, and control the path leading to the settlement. Giving up in favor of a summit-like meeting, instead of the time-consuming committee that may go nowhere, can be interpreted as the initiative not offering something new through a final settlement. Instead, it looked like an attempt to balance the two camps while preventing overlapping tracks.
- In terms of balance, the five institutions invited to the meeting can be viewed through the 2+2+1 formula. The HoR and General Command represent eastern Libya, the Tripoli government represents western Libya, and the High Council of State and the Presidential Council are considered neutral institutions open to all parties. Choosing these institutions mainly reflects the desire to have the most influential players on board. For instance, the government of Osama Hammad in eastern Libya cannot be viewed as a political actor of its own will, independent of the HoR or the General Command, because it has no international recognition. Moreover, the General Command is not matched with a military representation from western Libya to avoid overlapping this track and the 5+5 Joint Military Committee (JMC).
- Bathily was keen to emphasize that the electoral laws legislated by the HoR and officially received by the High National Elections Commission form the basis of negotiation without going back to questioning the legitimacy of the laws in line with the Security Council resolution number 2702 in 2023. Since the failure to hold the December 2021 election, Libya – for the first time – has a legal and constitutional framework for elections. The meeting of the five leaders aims to discuss outstanding issues to enable elections based on existing laws.
There is ambiguity about a possible conflict between recognizing the laws and how binding the agreed-upon outcomes. As has become repeatedly clear, any agreed-upon outcomes in the past have been reneged on later by one party or another with no shortage of pretexts to invoke. This is because the HoR tends to introduce amendments to the negotiated deals without checking with the parties.
What adds to this ambiguity is Bathily’s reliance on the good intentions of negotiating parties to solve the outstanding issues. This means that the consensus required to amend some articles in the two laws will remain less binding, thus opening the way for the HoR to renege on any agreement or repeat previous practices regarding unilateral amendments. The only advantage of this situation is guaranteeing the minimum achieved gains from existing laws supported by the Security Council resolution.
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