It is unclear who is supplying these fake and cloned armoured vehicles to Libyan forces. The issue of fake and cloned armoured vehicles being supplied to Libyan forces is a serious one.

We have tracked at least two different armoured vehicles supplied to Libyan forces which have been confirmed to be fake or cloned versions of the real vehicles.

In the first instance, in November 2020, forces allied with the Libyan National Army (LNA), the Tariq Bin Ziyad Combat Group, a tactical unit of the LNA was discovered to be operating the UAE-made Inkas Titan-DS armoured vehicle. According to photographs which appeared on social media on 4 February 2020, at least three Titan-DS vehicles, with the unit’s insignia on them, were seen. The Titan 4×4 vehicles are designed and manufactured by the company Inkas Vehicles LLC. The Titan-DS was confirmed by the manufacturer Inkas to be a fake or cloned version and they did not sell any vehicles to Libya which was under a UN arms embargo at the time.

Both armoured vehicles may look exactly like the original except for the lack of any discernable logo or branding signage to indicate the manufacturer of the vehicles.

Secondly, in December 2023, another vehicle which initially appeared to look like the UK-made Jankel Fox long-range patrol vehicle was seen with the forces of the Government of National Unity (GNU), 166 Battalion. Similarly, Jankel denied supplying this vehicle to Libyan forces, and that it had not done business with Libya. On subsequent examination, the vehicles appeared to be Jordanian-made Al Thalab long-range patrol vehicles (LRPV). The Al-Thalab is a 4×4, high-mobility long-range patrol vehicle (LRPV) developed based on the rugged chassis of a Toyota.

A representative of both UK-based Jankel and also Jordan Light Vehicle Manufacturing told Military Africa that they did not sell armoured vehicles to Libya and that the vehicles were likely cloned copies.

The Al Thalab is a long-range patrol vehicle (LRPV) developed based on the rugged chassis of a Toyota. It was made by Jordan Light Vehicle Manufacturing (JLVM), a joint venture between King Abdullah II Design & Development Bureau (KADDB) and British Jankel Armouring, which was formed in 2003., and ended in 2015. JLVM operates as an independent commercial company and offers volume production of soft-skinned, protected and UK-engineered vehicles. The Al-Thalab LRPV was first produced in June 2005.

Although Jordan is known to support Libya financially and militarily, a representative of Jordan Light Vehicle Manufacturing told Military Africa that they did not sell the type to Libya and that the vehicles were likely cloned copies.

Recently, in October 2022, the European Union Naval Force’s Operation Irini intercepted a cargo ship ferrying dozens of BATT UMG armoured vehicles to Libya in violation of United Nations sanctions. At least 28 BATT UMGs armoured vehicles which look exactly like the original except they did not spot any discernable logo or branding signage to indicate the manufacturer of the vehicles were being transported by the MV Meerdijk to Libya in violation of the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2292 (2016).

The original BATT UMG armoured tactical vehicles are manufactured by UAE-based The Armoured Group.

These armoured vehicles may look exactly like the original except for the lack of any discernable logo or branding signage to indicate the manufacturer of the vehicles. It is unclear who is supplying these fake and cloned armoured vehicles to Libyan forces. The production and distribution of fake and cloned armoured vehicles pose a serious threat to legitimate vehicle manufacturers. Not only does it result in financial losses by depriving them of the revenue they rightfully deserve, but it also tarnishes their reputation. Furthermore, in the context of Libya being under a United Nations arms embargo, the presence of these illegitimate vehicles exposes the real manufacturers to unwarranted scrutiny and suspicion. Stakeholders and regulatory bodies need to take decisive action to prevent the proliferation of counterfeit armoured vehicles, safeguarding the integrity of the industry and ensuring compliance with international regulations.

During the last conflict, Libya continuously received various arms and ammunition from the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, Iran, and Qatar. The Libyan National Army (LNA), in particular, received different types of armoured vehicles, especially from the UAE and Egypt, while the Government of National Accord, the UN-recognized administration in Tripoli received arms and training from Turkey and Qatar. At the time, The Armored Group (TAG) and its Libyan partner Ismail Al-Shtewi supplied several Terrier LT-79 armoured vehicles to the Libyan National Army (LNA). At least eight Terrier LT-79 armoured vehicles were seen in a video the group released on 9 December during a parade by the 106th Brigade Special Operations unit. 

The issue of fake and cloned armoured vehicles being supplied to Libyan forces is a serious one. It is important that the international community takes steps to prevent the supply of such vehicles to Libya, and that those responsible for supplying them are held accountable for their actions. These incidents highlight the need for enhanced scrutiny and oversight of arms transfers to conflict-affected regions. International organizations and governments must work together to prevent the proliferation of counterfeit military equipment and ensure that legitimate forces receive the support they need to effectively carry out their duties. The consequences of fake or cloned armoured vehicles finding their way into military operations can be far-reaching and demand a coordinated response to mitigate the risks they pose.

The presence of such counterfeit vehicles not only undermines the effectiveness of the Libyan forces but also raises concerns about the intentions of those involved in the supply chain. The use of fake or cloned armoured vehicles not only jeopardizes the safety of the personnel operating them but also undermines the efforts to achieve peace and security in Libya. The discovery of at least two different armoured vehicles supplied to Libyan forces, which have been confirmed to be fake or cloned versions of the real vehicles, underscores the urgency of addressing this issue. Efforts to tackle this challenge should encompass not only the identification and interception of counterfeit equipment but also the investigation of the networks involved in their production and distribution. Only through a comprehensive and collaborative approach can the threats posed by fake armoured vehicles be effectively addressed, contributing to the broader goal of promoting stability and security in Libya.

According to a CBC News report, a Canadian-owned company continued to ship dozens of armoured personnel carriers into the chaos of Libya, despite being confronted in 2014 by United Nations investigators who said the sales violated the arms embargo against the war-torn country. The company met with international investigators during the writing of the UN evaluation in 2014 and insisted it had done nothing wrong. In the course of their interviews, the UN investigators privately raised concerns Streit’s activities in Libya constituted a violation of sanctions. But leaked shipping records and sales delivery schedules obtained by CBC News show the company didn’t heed the advice to stop its armoured car shipments to the troubled North African nation. At least 79 Typhoon and Spartan patrol vehicles were delivered to the effectively lawless nation in 2014, according to records obtained from highly placed sources.

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