Tim Eaton
The Abu Hamyra axis
Zawiya’s second axis of power is generally seen as being built on the Abu Hamyra tribe. Key players in the city are drawn from this tribe, notably the Abu Zariba and the Khushlaf families.
In both of these families, three brothers have divided power, influence and positions among themselves. The two sets of brothers are cousins. Yet these groups should not be considered purely tribal because recruitment into them has not been limited to family or tribal connections.
Zawiya’s second axis of power is generally seen as being built on the Abu Hamyra tribe. Key players in the city are drawn from this tribe, notably the Abu Zariba and the Khushlaf families.
Ali, Essam and Hassan Abu Zariba have steadily accumulated power and influence in Zawiya since the overthrow of the regime. They formed the Abu Surrah Martyrs’ Brigade in 2012, and the group has been seen as controlling southern Zawiya. Its strategic partnership with the Nasr Brigade (which is also from the Abu Hamyra and controls the Zawiya refinery) allowed the Abu Surrah Martyrs’ Brigade to dominate some local trading markets.
The Abu Hamyra’s competition with rival Awlad Saqr armed groups is seen as having become more violent, particularly since the campaign against the LAAF drew to a close and fresh disputes over central government emerged.
The Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) was established by a resolution of the Presidency Council of the GNA in January 2021, at the request of a coalition of the Abu Hamyra and the Tripoli-based Abu Slim Security Unit.
These groups pressured the GNA to form a joint force that would bring together armed groups from Tripoli and Zawiya. The GNA’s resolution included appointing Hassan Abu Zariba, the commander of the Abu Surrah Martyrs’ Brigade, as the deputy head of the SSA.
Hassan Abu Zariba was responsible for establishing and overseeing a branch of the SSA in the cities west of Tripoli, from Zawiya to al-Ajaylat. He also incorporated other armed groups within the SSA, under the Abu Surrah Martyrs’ Brigade: among these were the al-Ajaylat Martyrs’ Brigade and the 55th Infantry Brigade, which controlled the municipalities of al-Zahra, Ma’amoura and al-Mayi in neighbouring Warshefana, southwest of Tripoli.
As a result, the Abu Surrah Martyrs’ Brigade became the main force from which the SSA was established. From the end of 2021, Hassan Abu Zariba expanded his network of alliances in Zawiya and began to build an alliance between the SSA and the Nasr Brigade, with which the Abu Zariba family has been aligned for years.
However, a rift subsequently emerged between the Abu Zaribas and the commander of the SSA’s Tripoli elements, Abdel Ghani Belkacem al-Kikli (known as Gneiwa).
Their conflicting stances became clear in May 2022, when the Abu Zaribas and their coalition split off to support the GNS, which had been appointed by the House of Representatives. Essam Abu Zariba was appointed minister of the interior in the GNS, and Ali Abu Zariba, a member of the House of Representatives, became close to Fathi Bashagha, the GNS prime minister.
Gneiwa sided with the GNU, led by Abdel Hamid al-Dabaiba. The SSA is said to have received more than LYD130 million from the GNU.
Later that month, when Bashagha sought to enter Tripoli, elements of the SSA fought on opposite sides. Gneiwa supported the GNU, and the Abu Zaribas sent armoured vehicles to support the GNS.
The Abu Zaribas’ support for Bashagha has limited their opportunities to gain a different legal standing that would enable them to give up the SSA name.
While the above-mentioned GNU bombing campaign in Zawiya claimed that the strikes targeted criminals in these areas, their initial focus within Libya was seen as political. The targeting was interpreted as messaging to the Abu Hamyra axis on the risks it was running in its continued opposition to the GNU.
Subsequent to the strikes, in addition to the GNU placing the West Coast Military Zone in formal charge, the attorney-general announced that the commander of the Support Unit (the official name for the Nasr Brigade under its formal affiliation with the Petroleum Facilities Guard) had been detained pending investigation for ‘facilitating fuel smuggling’.
At the time of writing, however, there is no evidence to suggest that Mohamed Khushlaf, the Nasr Brigade commander, was detained or remains in detention.41 These developments indicate that Zawiya’s security space will continue to be contested, with no clear resolution in sight.
Zintan’s security apparatus: expansion and protection of local interests, and varying interpretations of the revolutionary cause
From a unified position in favour of the revolution in 2011, Zintan’s security landscape has since fractured, with parallel processes of integration with eastern- and western-based authorities. Such affiliations have been largely determined by the political positioning of key Zintani commanders and their networks as part of a process of deal-making.
This has led to a fragmented and confused security apparatus. Based on their current affiliations, Zintan’s armed groups can be broadly divided into four factions: pro-GNU, pro-LAAF, groups loyal to the former Gaddafi regime, and neutrals. However, there is overlap among them.
Some groups have taken pro-LAAF and pro-Gaddafi positions simultaneously, while others remain technically part of GNU-affiliated forces even though they do not recognize the GNU. The degree to which these affiliations have fluctuated illustrates the weakness of the groups’ ties to governing authorities.
The fragmentation of Zintan’s security sector after 2014 reflects the distinctive political positioning of the city. Zintan was a bulwark of the 2011 revolution, but it has also been willing to engage with former regime elements and take a softer line on the return of state officials, in contrast with the hardline constituencies of Misrata and Zawiya. Consequently, seeking to dissect the Zintani security services along ideological lines is imperfect. Zintani armed groups might be described as pro- or counter-revolution, and Islamist or non-Islamist.
Yet the pro-revolutionary groups have entered a coalition of sorts with the LAAF, which is dominated by counter-revolutionaries. The Madkhali-Salafists,42 meanwhile, have consistently opposed the Muslim Brotherhood’s political project.
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Tim Eaton – Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme.
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