Gregory Aftandilian
Talks last month in Cairo between representatives of Libya’s two rival governments raised hopes over progress in resolving the country’s 10-year political impasse. The talks discussed the formation of a unified government with the authority to supervise long-overdue nationwide elections.
Although the two sides agreed on the need to forge such a coalition, and committed to forming a “technical committee” to iron out their differences, most Libya observers remain deeply skeptical that political unification will move forward anytime soon. Entrenched political and economic interests of the two factions, plus the support they receive from outside powers, make the chances for success exceedingly slim. Meanwhile, Libya faces mounting challenges. The country is dealing with the fallout of last September’s devastating flood in the city of Derna, high rates of poverty, militia activities that include illicit economic rackets, and human trafficking by some of these same militias exploiting migrants seeking to reach Europe.
Libya’s Deep Divisions
Libya has been deeply divided for more than a decade. The internationally-recognized government based in Tripoli in the west, called the Government of National Unity (GNU) in its most recent incarnation, controls about a third of the northern part of the country. A rival government in the east, under the House of Representatives (HoR) based in Tobruk, controls the remaining two-thirds of this northern area (the rest of the country is mostly sparsely-populated desert). The Tobruk-based government is supported by the self-anointed Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar and his large militia force, the Libyan National Army (LNA). The GNU, meanwhile, is supported by various militias in the west.
The internationally-recognized government in Tripoli controls about a third of the northern part of the country.
Militias loyal to the GNU, aided by elements of the Turkish military and its allied Syrian Arab mercenaries, halted a 2020 attempt by Haftar to take over the western part of the country by force. A ceasefire, put in place in October of that year, has held despite occasional outbursts of violence between rival militias.
United Nations-supported national elections, which were hoped to end Libya’s division, were scheduled for December 2021 but were postponed indefinitely over issues related to the eligibility of candidates and election rules. In the aftermath of this postponement, interim Prime Minister Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah vowed to stay in power until new elections were held, while the government in the east, charging that Dbeibah’s term had ended, named a rival prime minister, former interior minister Fathi Bashagha. The latter was replaced last year by Osama Hamad, Bashagha’s own finance minister.
Over the next couple of years, the UN Special Representative for Libya, Abdoulaye Bathily, tried to get the elections back on track but came up short. The plan now is to first create a temporary unified government that will supervise preparations for a nationwide election. But bringing about such a unified government is far from easy.
Pessimistic Report by the UN Envoy
On February 15, prior to the Cairo meeting, Bathily addressed the UN Security Council in what can only be described as a pessimistic message. Despite various meetings and tentative agreements, he stated, “key Libyan institutional stakeholders appear unwilling to resolve the outstanding politically contested issues that would clear the path to the long-awaited elections in Libya.” He underscored that the status quo “seems to suit” these stakeholders.
Bathily noted the following challenges:
— The HOR Speaker, Aguila Saleh has said that he would only support a unified government as the “sole legitimate authority”in charge of elections.
— Muhammaed Takala, president of the High Council of State (which is independent of the two governments), has rejected the election laws issued by the House of Representatives.
— Al–Dbeibah has insisted that only the GNU should supervise the electoral process.
— Haftar has insisted that both governments be parties to unity government talks or both be excluded from them.
Bathily called on “all Libyan institutional actors” to engage in a dialogue without preconditions.
Meeting in Cairo
Although Cairo has long supported Haftar and the secular HoR faction, largely to prevent Muslim Brotherhood members and Islamist terrorists from Libya infiltrating Egypt, it has hosted talks between the two factions. The most recent discussions were held in Cairo on March 10 under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the Arab League, Egyptian diplomat Ahmed Aboul Gheit. Participating were Saleh of the HoR, Takala, and Mohammed Menfi, President of Libya’s Presidential Council (the latter two are usually associated with the GNU).
The three Libyans reportedly agreed to form a technical committee aimed at resolving disagreements and to establish a “single government body responsible for overseeing Libya’s electoral process and delivering essential services to citizens.” After the meeting, Menfi
said that the gathering was a “very important beginning” that would “live up to the ambition of Libyans to hold elections.”
And a Veiled Threat from Haftar
While this all sounds positive on paper, it is far from clear that such a unified, temporary government can be formed. Only four days after the Cairo meeting, Haftar gave a speech in which he said the political process “has been given more opportunities than necessary,” adding that his forces have reached a “high level of preparedness and readiness” and would not hesitate to “issue bold decisions and strict orders to confront with utmost strength anyone that would tamper with the fate of the people and the country.” Haftar made these threatening comments while attending his forces’ military maneuvers in the coastal city of Sirte, very close to GNU-controlled territory.
Why Haftar made such threats is unknown, especially since his ally, Saleh, participated in the Cairo meeting. Haftar may have sought to ensure that he would be part of the unified government negotiations to put the HoR faction in a better bargaining position.
Regardless of Haftar’s motive, Bathily traveled to the eastern Libyan city of Benghazi on March 21 to meet with Haftar, perhaps to convince him to desist from making such threats. After the meeting, Bathily wrote on X.com (formerly Twitter) that participants had agreed to coordinate initiatives to enable elections and work toward a political settlement among the major actors.
Two days later, members of the Preparatory Committee for National Reconciliation (who represent Haftar’s forces), criticized its chairman Abdullah Al-Laf for failing to include the kin of dead fighters from these forces in the General Authority for the Care of Martyrs’ Families. These Haftar loyalists charged Al-Lafi with bias and said he was undermining the effort to achieve national unity. It is probable that Haftar had a hand in this matter.
Entrenched Interests
As Bathily noted in his UN address, both factions have a stake in maintaining the status quo because it serves their interests. Corruption is seen as widespread in both governments, and billions of dollars in oil revenues are reportedly unaccounted for. Militias supporting the factions have been engaged in oil smuggling. Libya’s National Oil Corporation estimates that up to one-third of petroleum and diesel provided by the state is smuggled. And like a Mafia organization, money is then kicked up to the top. As one prominent Libya analyst, Alia Brahimi, noted: “The political impasse in Libya can be interpreted as the result of a tacit bargain among elites to prolong their tenure in power. Both sets of politicians want to ensure continuing access to legitimate and illicit state resources.” In addition, many militias are involved in the smuggling of people and drugs.
***
Gregory Aftandilian is a Nonresident Fellow at Arab Center Washington DC. He is a Senior Professorial Lecturer at American University where he teaches courses on US foreign policy. He is also an adjunct faculty member at Boston University and George Mason University, teaching courses on Middle East politics. Previously, he worked for the US government for over 20 years in such capacities as Professional Staff Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Middle East Analyst at the US Department of State. He holds degrees from Dartmouth College, the University of Chicago, and the London School of Economics. Aftandilian is the author of Egypt’s Bid for Arab Leadership: Implications for U.S. Policy.
_______________
