Fehim Taştekin
This is a full-blown crisis.
The ongoing division in Libya is prolonged by this dynamic: while the Government of National Unity (GNU) leverages its international legitimacy to control oil sales, the valves are in the hands of eastern forces.
Militias controlling regions, cities, neighborhoods, and even government institutions siphon off the Central Bank’s resources as much as their weapons allow. Salaries account for 78.4% of the Central Bank’s expenditures. Of the 26 billion dinars spent by the bank, 20.4 billion dinars go to salaries, 3.6 billion to subsidies, and 1.1 billion dinars to operational expenses.
In Libya, a country of 7 million people where hardly any proper services are provided, 2 million people receive salaries. Besides salaries, there are other revenue streams for militias.
The Libyan National Oil Corporation sells oil it cannot export or store on the domestic market at prices far below market value. Militias, leftovers from the 2011 uprising, buy this cheap oil and smuggle it to neighboring countries, filling their coffers.
Chaos benefits those with guns.
Who cares about elections, the will of the people, transparency, or a shared national future?
The standoffs weren’t limited to the Central Bank and oil maneuvers. On August 18, in retaliation for the House of Representatives’ memorandum, Presidential Council Chairman Mohammed al-Menfi held a meeting with commanders and intelligence chiefs in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces—a first of its kind.
On August 23, Dbeibeh made a move he could not follow through on, attempting to bring militias in the capital under control. He established a “high security committee” headed by Interior Minister Imad al-Traboulsi, ordering all militias to vacate government buildings within 24 hours. Did anyone comply? No.
Dbeibeh likely experienced a surge of confidence, thinking that after gaining control of the Central Bank, he was the one writing the militias’ paycheck. He even made enemies within his own hometown. The forces in Misrata, which led the 2011 overthrow of Gaddafi, raised their heads once more and backed Kabir against Dbeibeh. In the meantime, he also clashed with Egypt.
The reason?
Egyptian Intelligence Chief Abbas Kamel, who somehow found time amidst his Gaza mediation efforts, visited Benghazi in the second week of August for meetings. According to reports, Kamel tried to convince Haftar, Saleh, and Hammad to establish a transitional government without the involvement of current political actors. Arab sources suggest the goal was to lead Libya, bogged down by familial, clique, and militia interests, to elections and restore stability with a national government.
From Cairo’s perspective, it would be easier to secure Egypt’s interests if a national parliament and government were formed through elections. Egypt has been troubled by Turkey maximizing its interests through confrontational means under abnormal circumstances. Ignoring objections, the Egyptian administration even invited Hammad to Cairo.
Interpreting Kamel’s initiative as a move to oust the Dbeibeh government, the Tripoli side declared two Egyptian diplomats persona non grata on August 12. Amid all this, the AKP, which often reacts to everything, remained unusually quiet and passive. Clearly, the importance of the “new chapter” with Egypt was significant. Finally, on September 5, National Intelligence Organization (MİT) Chief İbrahim Kalın flew to Tripoli. He held important meetings—what came out of them is anyone’s guess!
It’s likely that while Dbeibeh was trying to gain control of the Central Bank to boost public support through populist spending and buy the loyalty of militia forces, he did not take Ankara’s preferences into account. He not only disregarded Ankara but also fell out with Cairo. Had the rival parties remained in the previous alignment, the opposite would have happened.
Forty-eight hours before Kalın’s visit, the House of Representatives and the Tripoli-based High State Council agreed to appoint the Central Bank’s governor and board members within 30 days. It’s hard to predict the outcome, but this decision sends a message to the Menfi-Dbeibeh duo: “The game is over.”
The uncertainty at the Central Bank is throwing Libya’s “pirate” economy into a deeper crisis. Although the government managed to pay last month’s salaries with existing reserves, this is little more than a one-time fix. In summary, the future of divided Libya remains bleak. The roadmap set by the 2015 Skhirat Agreement was squandered for personal interests. The same goes for 2021. Throughout these processes, Turkey tried to play a leading role. It made deals with one side of Libya, whose legitimacy was disputed, to shape the political process and gain military bases and ports. Despite its assertive stance, Turkey’s capacity to influence developments appears to be severely limited.
While Turkey is normalizing relations with Egypt and the UAE, actors with whom it clashed over Libya, it is experiencing fluctuations with Russia. Egypt, Russia, and the UAE are in a position to say “yes” or “no” to Turkey’s membership in BRICS. And everyone expects Turkey to adopt more cooperative policies. Here comes another test run. In foreign policy, the saying “We’ve boarded a vehicle bound for disaster” continues to resonate.
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Fehim Taştekin is a graduate of Istanbul University, Political Sciences Faculty. He started journalism in 1994 as a reporter.
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