INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP
A second unresolved issue concerns the structure of military authority. According to several sources close to the Tripoli camp, negotiators are exploring a structure pursuant to which the armed forces’ general command, or qiyada amma, now headed by Khalifa Haftar with Saddam as his deputy, would be jointly led by Saddam and a representative of the Tripoli-based military establishment (possibly Undersecretary of Defence Abdelsalam Zoubi).
Other options under discussion include abolishing the general command altogether and appointing Zoubi as defence minister with responsibility for all military affairs; or, alternatively, dividing the country into three military regions, each with its own commander.
All these options would require Haftar’s camp to make significant concessions. Informed Libyan and foreign sources have come away from conversations with senior Haftar-linked officials with the impression that they have yet to accept any of these compromises.
Indeed, for the past decade Haftar and his allies have insisted that all military authority be centralised under a unified chain of command, rather than shared among competing institutions or personalities.
Tellingly, a 16 June statement by the Haftar-led general command expressing support for the Boulos effort made no reference to any proposal that would reduce its authority, let alone get rid of the institution completely.
Washington also has been working on economic and military reunification, which it sees as complementary to its political efforts. On the economic front, U.S. diplomats and U.S. Treasury officials helped facilitate negotiations on a unified national budget to consolidate the expenditures of Libya’s rival governments.
In April, Boulos announced that the two camps, one represented by a member of the Benghazi-based parliament and the other by a member of the Tripoli-based High State Council, had reached an agreement whose content remains confidential.
While a U.S. official described the effort as a “good step”, not even the Benghazi-based parliament – which is supposed to ratify the budget – has yet received a copy.
In theory, if applied alongside other oversight mechanisms, a unified budget could help curb parallel spending, slow inflation, reduce pressure on the Libyan currency, the dinar, more evenly allocate development funding, finance higher oil production and kickstart desperately needed non-oil development projects.
As of late July, however, the budget was still bifurcated and Libyans continued to face severe financial hardships due to cash shortages and deterioration of the exchange rate.
On the military front, in early 2025 the U.S. supported changes to the UN Libya sanctions regime, authorising foreign governments to provide technical assistance and training to forces from both camps. The stated objective was to advance “the process of unification of the Libyan military and security forces”.
This step paved the way for members of the rival military coalitions to participate in the two-week Flintlock exercise, the flagship U.S.-led multinational special operations training program, which was held in Sirte in April.
The event represented a modest but meaningful confidence-building measure and improved cooperation between officers from the two camps, though it fell well short of genuine military unification.
Neither the economic nor the military steps generated significant domestic controversy, though the opacity of the proposed unified budget, coupled with the absence to date of tangible economic benefit, attracted criticism.
Far more polarising has been the political component of these U.S.-led efforts, specifically the proposed power sharing arrangement. It has pitted those who see it as a pragmatic path toward reunification against those who view it as an attempt to entrench the country’s existing power structure.
Broadly speaking, the U.S. proposal is a classic post-conflict arrangement pursuant to which former adversaries agree to share formal authority in a manner that reflects their actual power. For many Libyans, however, such a bargain would be a betrayal of a promise made for years by the UN and various foreign powers: that reunification would occur as a result of general elections and popular selection of a new leadership.
Fulfilling that promise has proven arduous, despite years of UN-backed mediation, encumbered by disagreements over what elections should be held (presidential, legislative or both), in what sequence and under what governing framework.
Behind these unresolved legal disputes lies the fact that the current rulers are loath to hold elections that they might lose. By upsetting the status quo, elections could trigger a resumption of armed conflict, in the event that one faction or the other contests the results.
Instead of pursuing that elusive and potentially destabilising path, Boulos has opted with his plan to cement the existing balance of power by giving it the world’s blessing.
III. The View from the Initiative’s
Supporters
Support for the proposed arrangement partly reflects how its expected political benefits would be distributed. It is no surprise that Saddam Haftar has emerged as the strongest backer: the deal would both raise him to Libya’s highest political office and bestow the international legitimacy that so far has eluded his family.
Individuals close to Saddam say making him president would merely mirror reality, noting his steady rise within the military hierarchy, authority within its eastern power base and status as most influential of Khalifa Haftar’s sons.
They also largely dismiss the risk that dissatisfied western constituents might violently oppose the deal.
Within the Dabaiba camp, opinions are more nuanced. Tripoli-based insiders say the initiative’s biggest champion is not Prime Minister Abdelhamid Dabaiba but his nephew, Ibrahim, who privately maintained contacts with Saddam Haftar and reportedly considers an agreement with the Haftar camp the sole realistic means of preserving his family’s hold on power.
In this view, only a U.S.-backed power sharing settlement could provide the international support necessary to keep Abdelhamid in office.
As one Tripoli-based politician put it: “The Dabaibas are much weaker than the Haftars, so they need this alliance to persuade foreign capitals – and Washington in particular – to keep Dabaiba on. Abdelhamid, however, is not entirely convinced and is buying time”.
The prime minister’s doubts reportedly include distrust of Saddam Haftar: he is concerned the young military commander might seek to sideline him once the agreement is in place. So far, he has refrained from commenting publicly on the U.S. initiative.
Support for the initiative also comes from Libyans unaffiliated with either camp. Several politicians and analysts argue that, despite its shortcomings as an elite pact, and while it warrants closer scrutiny, the emerging deal offers the best opportunity to reunify the country’s divided institutions.
In the words of one such person: “Libya needs pragmatic realism, not aspirational fantasies. Right now, [the proposal] is more a framework than an actual process, but even if it produced an imperfect unified authority, that would still be a net positive for Libyans”.
From this perspective, even modest improvements would be preferable to maintaining today’s political arrangements indefinitely. Some are looking forward to elections, others to improved security, a more favourable business environment or stable power supply; what they share is hope that the deal might be an important first step toward ending the country’s prolonged political impasse.
Finally, these supporters do not appear to take seriously concerns that the deal could trigger armed opposition. As one put it, “a dog that barks does not bite”.
__________________
