Khaled Mahmoud
Local and external factors have pushed Libya into a phase of political and institutional failure to rebuild the state that collapsed in 2011. As of 2024, the situation of disorder and insecurity shows no signs of abating. Ordinary Libyans bore the brunt of the chaos, highlighted by two major events that struck the country.
Introduction
Amid rising political and military divisions, the ousting of the governor of the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) Siddek Elkaber in August 2024 led to a temporary halt in oil production, a lifeline of the economy. Despite the appointment of a new governor a month later, uncertainties remain over disagreements on how to handle Libya’s oil revenues through the CBL.
This chaos and sustained insecurity are part of the political disorder and the absence of a unified state. Late 2023, a natural disaster struck the country, the aftermath of which reflected this disunity. Meanwhile, the situation on the ground suggests that fighting could erupt at any moment in Tripoli between rival armed militias and Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s forces, who seeks control of the country and make an end to the chaos.
Emerging from the Shadows
In 2022, Libya remained trapped in the same confusion and turmoil it had experienced since the fall of Gaddafi’s regime during the 2011 NATO-backed popular uprising. Abdul Hamid al-Dbeibeh, head of the Government of National Unity (GNU), strengthened his hold over Tripoli and the western region, despite efforts by the House of Representatives (HoR), based in Tobruk, to remove him from power.
Meanwhile, the HoR placed its hopes on Fathi Bashagha, known as “the tyre-man” among Libyans, and appointed him as prime minister of the rival Government of National Stability (GNS) in February 2022. Bashagha was a former member of the Misrata Military Council, which rose to prominence during the conflict against Gaddafi.
Bashagha presented himself as a veteran politician, having previously served as minister of Interior in the Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Fayez al-Sarraj. He resisted Sarraj’s attempts to remove him and aimed to convince the public of his seriousness in dismantling the militias controlling Tripoli. Bashaga’s promises were never realised.
Bashagha, whose family is of Turkish origin and, like Dbeibah, hails from Misrata, shifted from fighting Haftar’s forces in their failed 2019 attempt to control Tripoli to allying with him. Bashagha believed that Haftar’s backing would enable him to seize power, not as a minister but as the head of government.
After being appointed by the HoR, which had stripped Dbeibah’s government of its powers due to delays in holding the 2021 presidential and parliamentary elections, Bashagha planned his entry into Tripoli. He aimed to prove to the international community that whoever controls the capital is the most powerful. Bashagha infiltrated the city, relying on the loyalty of the Nawasi Brigade. He claimed to have entered the Brigade-guarded gates of Tripoli, in civilian cars without any incidents and without guards.
Prime minister Bashaga, now a rival to Dbeibah based in Tripoli, attempted to win over the militias that Dbeibah depended on to maintain his government. He reached an agreement that he thought could pave the way for his entry into Tripoli. The Nawasi Brigade (the Eighth Force) announced the entry of Bashagha’s government into Tripoli, but violent clashes soon followed with forces loyal to Dbeibah’s GNU.
Despite Nawasi Brigade’s defection to the rival prime minister, Dbeibah retained the loyalty of other armed factions, allowing him to thwart the infiltration of Tripoli. After around seventeen hours in the city, Bashagha was forced to leave, sneaking out with his aides and a small force of militants, claiming that he wanted to “prevent bloodshed.”
Dbeibah quickly reaffirmed his authority by visiting the sites of clashes, describing Bashaga’s infiltration as an “outlaw armed group sneaking in under cover of darkness to spread fear and chaos.” He praised the security forces for “handling the situation with professionalism.”
Victim of Haftar’s Ambition
After the military confrontation ended, Bashagha lost favour with Haftar and the HoR, who realised he was not the right man for the job. They realised that depending on him to control Tripoli was just as unrealistic as Haftar’s failed 2019 war.
The Tobruk-based parliament abandoned Bashagha following his failure and called for his investigation, effectively ending his political career as quickly as it had started. Bashagha “the tyre-man,” who once proudly spoke of his expertise in the car tire trade, became another victim of Haftar’s relentless ambition to control Tripoli.
Haftar, who remains in good shape despite his age, understands that staying in his base in al-Rajma near Benghazi is not enough to fulfill his dream of making history by becoming Libya’s president. In his political and military moves, Haftar misjudged both Dbeibah, head of the GNU, and Mohamed al-Menfi, head of the Presidential Council. Both were brought to power in October 2020 by a UN-backed agreement following the ceasefire in Tripoli.
Emerging from the Shadows
The end of the war in 2020 had marked the start of a new phase, where the UN mission briefly regained control, overseeing the political and military situation through a troika composed of Dbeibah’s government and al-Menfi’s Presidential Council. This new leadership seemed to be made up of men who had suddenly been thrust into power like footballers charging forward to score.
Neither al-Menfi nor Dbeibah were widely known before being selected in Geneva by a 75 member UN-appointed committee during the political dialogue. Despite concerns of bribery and financial corruption surrounding the Geneva process, Haftar and his ally Aguila Saleh, the speaker of the HoR, in the presence of al-Menfi and Dbeibah reluctantly accepted the fait accompli imposed by the Geneva dialogue.
As a result, Haftar, a veteran military leader, found himself saluting the civilian Mohammed al-Menfi, who had never served in the military, but now served as the new supreme commander of the Libyan army. Egypt advised Haftar and Saleh not to oppose the new authority.
Haftar met al-Menfi once, but it was not a positive experience, and they never met again. Dbeibah also distanced himself from Haftar and refused to meet him, even though he took the oath before the HoR as head of the new government in March 2021, until that brief cooperation soon ended.
By the end of 2022, Dbeibah still controlled Tripoli as the head of the internationally recognised government (GNU), while Bashagha’s weak parallel government, the GNS, only operated in areas controlled by Haftar’s forces in the east and south. Throughout 2022, many oil fields and ports were shut down due to local conflicts and pressure by armed groups, severely affecting oil exports, the backbone of Libya’s economy.
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