Nebahat Yasar
Ankara hedges its bets in Libya, combining security cooperation, reconstruction projects, and diplomacy to secure a foothold across rival factions.
Few foreign policy pivots are as bold, or as fraught with risk, as betting on both sides of a civil conflict. Yet, that is precisely what Turkey appears to be doing in Libya. Having established military and political influence in western Libya, most notably through its decisive military intervention in support of the UN-backed Government of National Unity (GNU) against Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) in 2019–2020, Ankara is now extending olive branches to the east—to the very actors it once sought to marginalise.
The pace of this shift is striking. Turkey is reportedly preparing to expand security cooperation, including providing military training and arms sales, with LNA, commanded by Haftar. The Tobruk-based House of Representatives has formed a commission to review—and potentially ratify—the 2019 maritime and security agreements. In August, a Turkish naval vessel docked in Benghazi, followed by high-level talks between Intelligence Chief İbrahim Kalın and eastern Libya’s military leader Khalifa Haftar in Benghazi. Taken together, these developments signal how rapidly Ankara is repositioning itself on Libya’s eastern front, seeking new security footholds to complement its growing economic presence in the last couple of years.
Why is Turkey recalibrate in Libya
At the core of this pivot lies the recognition that exclusive reliance on Tripoli has its limits. Tripoli’s deteriorating security environment has become particularly problematic. Prime Minister Dbeibah’s power consolidation strategy has deepened intra-militia rivalries and triggered repeated armed clashes. While Turkey maintains its backing of the GNU, its personnel and assets remain vulnerable to the volatility of localized violence. The 2020 ceasefire may have frozen hostilities between east and west, but it remains precarious—offering little assurance against future escalations that could threaten Turkey’s position.
Compounding this is the continued fragmentation of Libya’s institutional architecture, which undermines Ankara’s legal and operational foothold. Key agreements—including the 2019 maritime MoU and a 2022 hydrocarbon exploration deal—face challenges not only from rival factions but from Western Libya’s judiciary as well. The 2019 maritime MoU—signed with the GNU but geographically anchored in Eastern Libya’s coast—has been challenged by eastern courts and remains unrecognized by the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR). Similarly, a 2022 hydrocarbon exploration agreement between TPAO and the NOC was suspended by Tripoli’s own judiciary. These developments highlight the legal and operational fragility of Ankara’s engagements in a divided Libya, where executive authority is both contested and constrained.
Meanwhile, the slow pace of political transition and security sector reform has stalled Ankara’s original objectives. Under the 2019 Military Training and Cooperation Agreement, Turkey aimed to transform western-aligned militias into a unified security force. While notable efforts have been made in command restructuring and training of core units, the lack of political consensus and the continued presence of rival armed formations make this goal increasingly unrealistic. Without a broader reconciliation process, Turkey’s role risks being confined to one side of a permanently fragmented state.
Strategic lessons from the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria—though ultimately advantageous for Ankara have also influenced this recalibration. In Syria, Assad’s departure created a vacuum that momentarily sidelined Turkey’s rivals, notably Russia and Iran, giving Ankara significant maneuvering space. However, this experience also exposed the risks of reactive posture and overreliance on geopolitical luck.
In Libya, where the conflict has remained largely frozen and the balance of power is precarious, Ankara appears determined not to leave outcomes to chance. The fragility of the current status quo, coupled with the potential for rapid shifts on the ground, has pushed Turkey to adopt hedging strategies, as well as leveraging military, diplomatic, and economic tools to shift Libya’s deadlocked equilibrium in its favor before rival actors can consolidate an alternative order.
What enables Turkey’s eastern outreach
Ankara’s recalibration in Libya is driven not only by these constraints and mounting strategic risks, but it is also equally enabled by a permissive regional and global environment. Regional de-escalation has played a central role. Since 2021, Turkey’s normalization with key regional powers—Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia—has removed several of the political barriers that once confined its Libya policy. Egypt’s pragmatic posture toward Turkey and the UAE’s military drawdown have diminished the intensity of proxy competition, transforming Libya from a battleground of ideological rivalries into a theatre of transactional diplomacy.
In this context, Ankara has reframed its engagement with eastern Libyan actors—no longer as adversaries but as potential partners in infrastructure, energy, and security ventures. This approach mirrors Turkey’s broader turn toward elite-level diplomacy and commercial engagement across the region.
At the same time, Russia’s overstretch, exacerbated by its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s perceived abandonment of other strategic partners, such as Armenia and Syria, has raised doubts about its long-term reliability, while opening window of opportunity for Turkey. Against this backdrop, Turkey’s perceived consistency and operational agility seems to contribute its image as a viable alternative for eastern elites looking to hedge their bets without alienating Moscow entirely.
Turkey’s growing presence in the Sahel and Horn of Africa has reinforced its image as a regional actor and further enhances its position. As Western influence has receded in the aftermath of military coups in Sahelian countries, and Russia has filled some of that vacuum, Turkey has advanced through security cooperation agreements, arms exports, and targeted investments, particularly in the mining and energy sectors.
In the Horn, Turkey has capitalized on shifting dynamics, aligning with Ethiopia during the Tigray conflict, positioning itself in Sudan’s evolving civil war, and mediating between Ethiopia and Somalia. These engagements reinforce Ankara’s credentials as a pragmatic and adaptable partner, capable of delivering material outcomes. This emerging credibility enhances Turkey’s appeal in Libya, where its model of military-industrial engagement resonates with actors seeking alternatives to both Western restraint and Russian dependency.
Together, these dynamics have created a strategic window of opportunity. Turkey’s objectives in Libya—securing access, protecting investments, and expanding maritime influence—have remained consistent. What has evolved is the environment: regional détente has eased former constraints, Russian overreach as alongside its eroded reliability and Western retreat has enhanced Ankara’s value as a pragmatic and reliable interlocutor.
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Nebahat Tanriverdi Yasar – Freelance Researcher & Policy Analyst.
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