What Benghazi’s reconstruction reveals
about Derna
The reconstruction process underway in Benghazi—also fully controlled by the Haftar family through the same institutional mechanisms as in Derna—provides a good indication of how Derna’s projects might unfold over the coming months.
Benghazi, a city of 800,000 residents, endured more than three years of intense urban warfare from 2014 to 2017, with reconstruction efforts finally commencing in 2022. Since then, the city has witnessed a surge in projects, and these construction initiatives have shaped the Haftars’ approach to infrastructure. Similar methods, including potential risks of abuse, are likely being applied in Derna.
In Benghazi, the Haftars’ infrastructure strategy often involves securing opaque deals with private companies, foreign and Libyan alike, via a process that lacks any public bidding.
The process typically begins with the allocation of an undisclosed amount of funds for a high-profile agreement with a foreign company that is chosen and publicly announced. Behind the scenes, however, the foreign company is often asked to partner with a private Libyan firm—one with informal ties to the Haftar family or their allies.
From there, roughly half the project’s nominal cost is reportedly paid out to the Libyan company, which contributes almost no value, while the remaining half goes to the foreign company, which performs the majority of the work.
This practice warrants concern: Officials who represent the Libyan state should not covertly control the Libyan contractors they hire for construction projects. Such conflicts of interest heighten the probability of financial misconduct and the likelihood that an enormous chunk of public wealth may be diverted.
When it comes to foreign partners, the Haftars have so far favored Egyptian and Emirati construction companies. Egyptian firms involved in Benghazi’s reconstruction thus far include Neom Real Estate Development, under the ownership of Ibrahim al-Arjani, a friend of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi; the Arab Contractors Company, linked to the Egyptian Council of Ministers; and the Wadi El Nile Company, known for its affiliation with Egypt’s General Intelligence Services.
In August 2024, Saddam Haftar’s National Development Apparatus awarded the major al-Marisa Free Trade Zone project to the UAE’s Global Contracting. Turkish companies, too, have secured contracts in Benghazi, suggesting they may find similar success in Derna.
Despite Ankara’s strong stance against Haftar during the 2019-2020 Tripoli war, Turkish diplomats—particularly since 2022—have made significant efforts to court the field marshal and his family, aiming to help Turkish firms win economic opportunities in eastern Libya.
Companies from China, France, South Korea, Canada, and other nations have also shown keen interest in contracts from the Haftar family, although their political connections likely rank lower than those of companies from Egypt, the UAE, and Turkey.
Moreover, some Western companies are wary of directly signing contracts with Belqacem Haftar’s Reconstruction Fund, owing to compliance concerns. Among the private Libyan firms most actively participating in construction projects in Benghazi are El Rayan Holding Company and Emaar Libya Holding Company. Both are linked to Haftar’s son Khaled, who serves as chief of staff of the Security Units, headquartered in Benghazi’s Qaryunis neighborhood.
In addition, Eabar al-Alam, with which the UAE’s Global Builders partnered to build a new Benghazi airport, is said to be tacitly controlled by Belqacem Haftar. A representative of Belqacem Haftar at the Libya Reconstruction Fund did not respond to requests for comment. El Rayan Holding Company, Emaar Libya Holding Company, and a spokesperson for the Haftar armed coalition did not respond to requests for comment.
The risks of a flawed recovery
Interviews with Derna natives and eyewitnesses have revealed that ongoing recovery efforts in the disaster-ravaged city appear to be more superficial than what was recommended by the World Bank.
Belqacem Haftar’s Reconstruction Fund never adequately communicated its plan for the city’s recovery, but its actions suggest that it may be prioritizing speed and cosmetics over safety. The World Bank’s “Libya Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment” report, which was issued following the 2023 floods, emphasizes the need for water, sanitation, and road infrastructure.
It also underscores the need to rebuild and upgrade electricity generators and water and sanitation systems, with an eye toward improved resilience against future extreme weather events; it urges the construction of flood-resistant bridges and roads using resilient materials and modern designs for durability and adaptation to climate change.
As for the dams, the World Bank recommends a comprehensive overhaul. After 12 months of outwardly impressive work in Derna, there is still no evidence that authorities have adhered to the World Bank’s recommendations. For instance, the plan for replacing the collapsed dams remains unclear, with no indication as to whether the new structures will meet recommended standards.
Rumors suggest that the Libya Reconstruction Fund may invest in an advanced overhaul that features the introduction of hydraulic systems, but local skepticism abounds. Some residents have also voiced concern over which companies ought to be given the task, highlighting a trust issue.
In the city itself, many Derna residents have welcomed the surface-level progress achieved so far, such as renovated schools, new children’s recreational facilities, and a new polyclinic. But more in-depth interviews with locals reveal that the recovery has been uneven.
Rehabilitation of al-Muzdawaj Darnes Club Street, for instance, has been thorough, covering sewage, drinking water, and electricity. But the effort in other parts of Derna is falling short of addressing issues that have been developing for decades in a city known for its lack of infrastructure.
For instance, two Derna residents told The Sentry that, despite announcements in March 2024 declaring a complete restoration of a key thoroughfare called al-Fanar Street, the actual work proved shallow, consisting of little more than cleaning and repainting.
A local source told The Sentry that the authorities had applied just a single layer of asphalt, and they expressed concerns that it would begin to crack in a few years. Another Derna resident, who lost two neighbors in September 2023, praised Belqacem Haftar’s repairs on a few of the main streets but pointed out that other vital arteries severely damaged by floods remained inhospitable as of October 2024.
Interviewees expressed their discontent with the condition of the alleys and smaller side streets, many of which are still cluttered with debris. Others also emphasized the ongoing lack of essential infrastructure such as electric and sewage systems in entire swathes of Derna.
The way the authorities have treated parts of Derna’s population shows signs of politically motivated neglect. Dozens of families from the flood-ravaged historical center—an area that previously took the brunt of Haftar’s 2018-2019 military campaign—seem to have been marginalized in the post-flood rehabilitation process.
As authorities carry out extensive demolitions in preparation for future reconstruction in those central neighborhoods, they have offered to buy some residents’ homes at prices significantly below fair market value.
In 2023, the Haftar family implemented a more aggressive version of similar policies in downtown Benghazi, and it led to the arbitrary and permanent displacement of numerous families. It is therefore possible that the Haftars are intentionally implementing an approach that would result in the forced dispersal of some families from downtown Derna, the tacit aim being to prevent the resurgence of political opposition there.
Moreover, compensatory money has not been evenly distributed thus far, adding to the risks of unfairness and lack of neutrality. Overall, the haste on display today in Derna’s reconstruction is typical of dysfunctional situations in which political leaders are driven by two misaligned incentives that detract from the population’s well-being.
First, the rulers exhibit a preference for bolstering their image through eye-catching announcements, rather than committing to the slow and meticulous implementation of projects.
Second, these leaders may give precedence to obtaining immediate financial gains via upfront payments, rather than dedicating resources to the high-quality realization of projects.
Such an approach runs counter to the recovery’s long-term success; it leads to the neglect of essential preparatory steps and the use of shortcuts that undermine the integrity of the eventual outcome.
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The Sentry
