Filippo Sardella
Risks to state stability
The rise of armed groups such as RSF in key areas of cross-border networks can threaten the authority of sovereign states in the region. Egypt, in particular, is exposed to a potential increase in infiltration, illicit trafficking and instability in its southern provinces. Libya, still without a unified central authority, risks a new destabilization in the southern areas already marked by military fragmentation. More generally, the multiplication of non-state power centers undermines the ability of governments to exercise a monopoly of force and to manage cross-border dynamics.
Intersection of war and crime
The overlap between armed conflict and criminal networks transforms the area into a hybrid of war and illegal business. The RSF could take advantage of the strategic position to combine military control with illicit economic activities, creating a de facto system of governance that escapes any institutional regulation. This hybridization of militia and crime poses a long-term threat to regional security, hampering peacemaking and institutional reconstruction efforts.
Humanitarian and local instability
The progressive territorial expansion of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), particularly in the border region between Sudan, Libya and Egypt, aggravates a humanitarian crisis that is already classified among the most serious in the world. The ongoing armed conflict has generated an extremely high number of internally displaced persons and external refugees, in a context already marked by economic fragility, the collapse of civilian infrastructure and the absence of a functional state authority.
Increased pressure on displacement
With more than 13 million people already forced to flee their homes due to the violence, the strengthening of RSF in strategic areas risks producing further waves of displacement. Access to escape routes through the northern borders can encourage forced migration to Egypt, Chad and Libya, with destabilizing effects both on the logistical level (refugee camps, health and food management) and on the political level, for the destination states. In particular, poorly equipped border regions are at risk of collapsing under sudden demographic pressure.
Compromise of humanitarian access
The instability generated by the armed presence of the RSF and the progressive emptying of state structures significantly reduces the ability of humanitarian agencies to operate safely. Supply corridors are being disrupted, food warehouses looted and hospitals occupied or destroyed. Widespread insecurity also undermines the distribution of essential goods, such as drinking water, medicines and foodstuffs, especially in rural areas and secondary urban centres.
Food crisis and famine risk
Many of the conflict-affected areas are already acutely food insecure. Agricultural activities are severely reduced or completely stopped, local markets dysfunctional and galloping inflation has made primary goods inaccessible for most of the population. The expansion of hostilities to new production and trade transit zones could aggravate a pre-existing crisis, pushing some regions over the threshold of famine. In the absence of coordinated action and lasting stabilisation, the material condition of the population is likely to deteriorate further in the short term.
Fragmentation of the social fabric
In addition to material impacts, war contributes to a deep fragmentation of the social fabric. Ethnic, tribal and territorial divisions are sharpening, fueled by the dynamics of forced recruitment, local revenge and survival logics that encourage the widespread militarization of communities. The RSF, operating as a de facto force in many areas, can establish parallel forms of government which, while able to guarantee apparent order, are often based on coercive practices and the subordination of the civilian population to military commands.
Role of the African Union and IGAD
The evolution of the Sudanese conflict and the expansion of the involvement of external actors greatly complicate the work of African regional bodies, in particular the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Both organizations have historically assumed a central role in the management of continental crises, but in the Sudanese case they find themselves progressively marginalized by geopolitical dynamics that surpass them in operational capacity and political influence.
Erosion of African diplomatic centrality
The growing presence of regional and extra-regional powers in the Sudanese theatre reduces the room for manoeuvre of African actors, who appear unable to impose an autonomous or binding negotiating agenda. The diplomatic initiatives promoted so far have proved to be fragmented, lacking a unified vision and often lagging behind the speed of events on the ground. The lack of coercive instruments and adequate financial resources prevents AU and IGAD from exerting a concrete influence on the parties to the conflict.
Conflict between neutrality and influence
The principle of non-interference, a pillar of post-colonial African diplomacy, clashes with the growing reality of a war in which the main African powers are already deployed, directly or through an intermediary. Egypt, a member of the AU, openly supports the Sudanese Armed Forces; at the same time, other countries in the Horn of Africa, albeit in a more discreet way, are ambiguous in their position. This heterogeneity of interests undermines the effectiveness of multilateral initiatives and places the AU in an ambivalent position: on the one hand it promotes peace, on the other it is unable to guarantee the equidistance necessary to manage the negotiations.
Risk of diplomatic substitution
In the absence of strong and legitimate regional leadership, the negotiating space tends to be occupied by external actors, often animated by divergent strategic interests. The real risk is that diplomatic processes will be moved outside the African sphere and entrusted to global multilateral platforms or bilateral agreements decided by Middle Eastern or Western powers. This scenario would further reduce Africa’s political sovereignty in managing its internal conflicts, paving the way for externally imposed solutions that are potentially unsustainable in the long run.
Need for reform and strategic
repositioning
To regain a central role in the management of the Sudanese crisis, AU and IGAD should undertake a structural reflection on their operating methods. Greater integration between preventive diplomacy and the capacity for political pressure would be needed, accompanied by a professionalization of the negotiating bodies and a strengthening of cooperation with the European Union and the United Nations on an equal basis. Without a renewed protagonism, the risk is that the continental institutions will become mere observers in a crisis that is played out on their own territory.
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