Filippo Sardella
The seizure of the Sudan-Libya-Egypt triangle by the RSF is not just a military fact. It is the turning point of a conflict that is regionalizing, getting out of hand and turning into a platform for trafficking, proxy wars and out-of-control humanitarian crises.
Logistics line and RSF reinforcement
The conquest of the border triangle between Sudan, Libya and Egypt represents for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) not only a military success on a territorial level, but a decisive qualitative leap on a strategic level. In a conflict increasingly marked by the logic of proxy warfare, the control of this geographical crossroads – known to be a historic hub of smuggling and armed trafficking – allows the paramilitary group led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemetti”) to build a real external military logistics line.
Libya as an armed rear
The axis with eastern Libya controlled by General Khalifa Haftar is consolidating. Militias linked to the Libyan National Army (LNA), and in particular the Subul al-Salam Brigade based in Kufra, act as facilitators of the logistical network.
The latter, historically involved in the trafficking of weapons, fuel and migrants, operates under the umbrella of Haftar’s power, and is suspected of receiving direct funding from the United Arab Emirates – a key element in the triangulation of weapons to the RSF.
Operational effects
The corridor allows the direct supply of ammunition, light armored vehicles and tactical drones, bypassing the central areas still controlled by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).
In addition, the north-western Sudanese border becomes a safe rear, capable of accommodating training camps, fuel depots and evacuation corridors.
There is a growing risk that the RSF could host Libyan or Chadian mercenaries in exchange for opportunistic compensation or alliances.
The Emirates-Libya-RSF triangulation
The UAE, already suspected of supporting Haftar in Libya and the RSF in Sudan, seem to be pursuing a strategy of “proxy dominance” in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa.
Through an opaque triangulation (Dubai → Benghazi → Kufra → Darfur), weapons and capital reach the heart of Sudan, eluding international controls and fueling a system of perpetual war.
Military implications
The logistical superiority now available to the RSF could overturn the balance of forces in the medium term, especially if access to the border with Chad were to be consolidated.
The presence of drone warfare, tactical satellite support and new mercenary recruitment lines contributes to a “decentralized militarization” that challenges the containment capacity of Sudanese regular forces and regional partners.
Foreign involvement: Libya, UAE, Egypt,
and Turkey
The Sudanese conflict has now gone beyond national borders, turning into a regional arena where the strategic interests of different actors intersect, often indirectly but decisively. The seizure of the tri-border corridor by the RSF has further heightened the concerns of neighbouring countries, which are involved — directly or by proxy — in the ongoing conflict.
Libya (Haftar’s LNA)
Eastern Libya, under the control of the Libyan National Army led by Khalifa Haftar, represents a central node in the logistical reorganization of the RSF. Although Haftar’s command denies any direct involvement, the evidence of logistical, military and territorial collaboration with Sudanese militias leaves room for strong suspicions. Control of eastern Libya allows the RSF access to a stable rear through which weapons, vehicles and personnel can transit. The ambiguous relationship between Haftar and the RSF is indicative of a dynamic in which political and military support can be exercised without official statements, while maintaining a margin of strategic deniability.
United Arab Emirates (UAE)
The Emirates represent an extra-regional but highly influential player, with a well-established posture of strategic projection in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. The logistical and financial support offered to Khalifa Haftar in Libya has paved the way for an indirect triangulation in favor of the Sudanese SFRs. The possible supply of war material through opaque channels and non-state intermediaries strengthens the operational capacity of the RSF, allowing them to maintain pressure on the ground and expand their zones of influence. The UAE’s objective appears to be twofold: to contain the influence of Islamist actors in the region and to consolidate its role as a Middle Eastern power capable of influencing African conflicts.
Egypt
Cairo has historically maintained a strategic alliance with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), by virtue of geographical contiguity, bilateral military cooperation and a common aversion to radical Islamist movements. The advance of the RSF towards the Egyptian border represents a direct threat to Egypt’s national security, both in military and migratory terms. The risk of destabilization of the Egyptian South, combined with the possibility that armed non-state actors gain control of the traffic routes to the Mediterranean, could lead Egypt to become more involved in the conflict, even if only in the form of logistical support or intelligence in favor of the SAF.
Turkey
Ankara adopts a strategy of regional influence based on support for moderate Islamic parties and electorally legitimized governments in the context of the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. The expansion of the RSF — perceived in some Turkish circles as spurious military entities, backed by regional rivals — raises concerns about the possibility of Salafist groups or anti-Turkish extremist networks strengthening their position in the Libyan and Sudanese theaters. Although Turkey is not directly involved in the Sudanese conflict, the overlapping of interests with Egypt, the Emirates and Libya could push it to take a clearer position if the Sudanese civil war threatens its strategic assets in north-east Africa or its economic interests in the Red Sea.
Regional security and cross-border crime
The Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) control of the border triangle between Sudan, Libya and Egypt introduces a critical variable in the regional security balance. This area, characterized by poorly controlled territories and a long tradition of illicit trafficking, represents one of the main nodes of instability in the Eastern Sahel. The acquisition of this space by a paramilitary actor outside state control risks multiplying the threat vectors for neighboring states and for the entire Mediterranean region.
Organised crime and informal networks
The border triangle has historically been associated with established networks of smuggling fuel, small arms, goods and, above all, human beings. The ability of the RSF to exercise effective control over these routes can result not in an interruption, but in an informal and militarized regularization of criminal activities. The militias, in fact, could exploit these networks to obtain funding, strengthen their local alliances and consolidate territorial control through forms of economic and social co-optation.
Unregulated migration flows
The absence of recognized state control over the Sudanese desert corridor opens new channels of irregular migration to the north. The Sudan-Libya-Europe route becomes particularly exposed to an increase in illegal passages, both for economic reasons and to flee violence. This dynamic could accentuate the pressure on the Egyptian and Libyan borders, and subsequently on the European ones, making the migration containment strategies implemented by the countries on the northern shore of the Mediterranean more complex.
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