Federica Saini Fasanotti
Rome’s migration deals with Tripoli may unravel as militia influence grows and stability deteriorates.
In a nutshell
- Italy’s deals with Libya rely on militia-controlled governance structures
- Realpolitik compromises threaten Rome’s credibility and regional influence
- Meloni slowed migration, but challenges in Tripoli could undo the gains
Since her rise to power in 2022, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has displayed a strong focus on foreign policy – at times even overshadowing her own foreign minister, Antonio Tajani. Among the top priorities of her international agenda is Africa, and more specifically, Libya. In light of the energy crisis triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the increasingly political (rather than purely demographic) nature of migration flows, Libya has regained strategic relevance for Rome.
Prime Minister Meloni’s vision was clearly laid out in the “Mattei Plan for Africa,” an international cooperation project officially launched at the end of 2023 and inspired by Enrico Mattei, founder of Italian petrochemical giant Eni. It envisions an equal, mutually beneficial partnership between Italy and Africa. The plan is divided fundamentally into six areas of investment: energy (renewables, gas, rural electrification), infrastructure (ports, roads, water networks), health (hospitals, medical training), education and vocational training, agricultural development and food security, and, of course, migration management.
Key Italian companies cooperating with Rome on the African engagement plan include Eni, national aerospace champion Leonardo and natural gas system operator Snam. The primary beneficiary countries are Libya, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Ivory Coast, Kenya and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
What deserves attention now is Italy’s approach in one of these target countries: Libya, where violence is on the rise, short shrift is paid to human rights by those holding power and making deals, and an unraveling of existing power structures is possible.
What Italy has achieved with Libya
Italy – through Eni – in January 2023 signed an agreement worth 8 billion euros with Libya’s National Oil Corporation and the Government of National Unity in Tripoli, chaired by Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibeh. Over the ensuing two years, the Libyan Coast Guard has been strengthened through the supply of Italian patrol boats, while detention centers for illegal migrants on Libyan territory continue to operate and are run by local militias. These efforts have resulted in a sharp drop in illegal immigration to Italy; last year migrant arrivals were down 60 percent compared with the previous year.
In October 2024, the Italy-Libya Business Forum took place in Tripoli, during which agreements were concluded in strategic sectors such as energy, fishing, healthcare, infrastructure and professional training. The countries also announced resumption of direct flights between Italy and Libya.
Italian Premier Giorgia Meloni (left) welcomes Libyan Government of National Unity’s Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Mohammed Dbeibeh at the Italy-Africa conference at the Italian Senate in Rome in January 2024 to announce the Mattei Plan. © Getty Images
While these agreements appear reliable, it must be noted that dealing with the current Libyan leadership presents significant problems of various kinds. Since the fall of Muammar Qaddafi in 2011, Libya’s governance has been unstable and the country is split in two, each half under the control of a rival administration.
In the west is the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli, which is aligned primarily with Turkey and enjoys support from the United Nations, Qatar, Algeria and Pakistan. It stands accused of maintaining ties to Islamist extremism and the Muslim Brotherhood.
The Government of National Stability (GNS), located in the country’s eastern city of Benghazi, is led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar with support of the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, along with the Libyan National Army and foreign powers such as Egypt, Russia and the United Arab Emirates.
The militia problem
While the GNU − with whom Rome has made agreements to stem northward migration − ostensibly holds power in the country’s western half, the reins of power are contested. At a political meeting in Tripoli on May 12, Abdul Ghani al-Kikli, leader of the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA), one of western Libya’s strongest militias, was shot dead at the headquarters of another important militia, the 444th Brigade, which in turn is commanded by Mahmoud Hamza, who is also director of military intelligence for the GNU. Leading figures from the GNU’s security establishment as well as leaders from the Misratan Brigades, which is one of the country’s largest armed factions, were all present at the meeting.
The bold assassination paints a stark picture of who really holds power in Tripoli: Al-Kikli was shot dead in the presence of a deputy defense secretary and an interior minister. After the killing, the city descended into chaos before calm returned. Yet since then, mass graves have been uncovered, indicating that the Libyan regime that Rome cooperates with turns a blind eye to torture and extrajudicial killings.
February 22: A demonstration in Naples against the cooperation of Italian Prime Minister Meloni with Osama Almasri Najim, a suspected Libyan warlord. © Getty Images
Additionally, as power is contested, another large militia, the Special Deterrence Force (RADA), has entered the fray. This group is commanded by Abdurrauf Kara, a person linked to Osama Almasri Najim, who was at the center of an international scandal. Mr. Najim was arrested in Turin on an International Criminal Court arrest warrant for war crimes and crimes against humanity, but in January he was released from Italian custody and returned to Libya on an Italian state flight.
This decision sparked outrage within Italy, with critics accusing the Meloni government of bypassing international justice and collaborating with criminal militia networks in Tripoli.
Mr. Najim, notably, at that time served as head of Libya’s Judicial Police. Ironically, it was not Italy’s Justice Minister Carlo Nordio but Libya’s Prime Minister Dbeibeh himself who, on May 15, made a surprise announcement accepting the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and pledging to hand over Mr. Najim and other non-compliant militia figures. Mr. Dbeibeh’s televised statement was unequivocal when he claimed that certain militias “had grown excessively, to the point of controlling the entire political, financial, economic, and even social landscape.” This marked a turning point in GNU internal politics and has complicated Ms. Meloni’s efforts in northern Africa.
Italian connections and a realpolitik
dilemma
What makes the situation more problematic for the Italian government is that al-Kikli was spotted in Rome as recently as March, two months after the Najim affair. He was accompanied by Ibrahim Dbeibeh, the prime minister’s advisor and nephew. They went to visit Libya’s Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs Adel Jumaa, who was admitted to the European Hospital in Via Portuense after being injured in a gun attack in Tripoli.
This public appearance sparked outrage in Italy’s opposition and highlighted the controversial ties between the Italian government and Libyan warlords. Historically, al-Kikli played a key role in the “Volcano of Rage” military campaign defending Tripoli against the 2019 offensive led by Field Marshal Haftar. Al-Kikli’s SSA militia, originally approved by the Presidential Council, had been integrated into Tripoli-based institutions such as the interior ministry. He gradually extended control over areas west and east of Tripoli (Gharian and Zliten), arguably becoming too powerful.
Many observers interpreted his elimination as the first major shift in Tripoli’s security dynamics since August 2022. This underlines the fundamental issue faced by the Meloni government: how to engage with Libyan authorities and militias without undermining Italy’s credibility.
Since the 2017 Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding (initiated by then-Interior Minister Marco Minniti), successive Italian governments – left and right – have partnered with local militias to curb smuggling and migration. While migrant arrivals dropped, so did Italy’s moral standing, with accusations of strengthening militias at the expense of Libya’s institutional stability. Today, under Prime Minister Meloni, Italy appears to be making similar trade-offs – once again in the name of realpolitik.
The issues at stake now are similar to those of the past: namely, the control of migration routes, which are a strategic node in human trafficking toward Italy and are currently overseen by the militias named above. The fragility of local interlocutors consistently undermines the durability and effectiveness of any agreement between Italy and Libyan decision-makers. Rome’s approach has been marked by ambiguity, as it has engaged both with Prime Minister Dbeibeh’s Tripoli-based GNU and with the eastern-based authorities in Tobruk, including General Haftar.
This dual-track diplomacy has weakened Rome’s leverage in the eyes of more assertive players such as Turkey and Russia – recently joined, at least rhetorically, by Belarus. The results speak for themselves. Moreover, the endemic instability of Libya, as well as that of other countries of the Mattei Plan (notably Ethiopia, but also the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique), threatens to undermine the very foundations of Italy’s long-term cooperation strategy in Africa.
Scenarios
Italian political engagement with Libya in the years since the death of strongman leader Qaddafi have been characterized by a conflict between pragmatism and ethics. Consequently, the real question is whether Prime Minister Meloni will be able to navigate a medium- to long-term strategy that is economically productive, reduces migration and at the same time is respectful of human rights.
Unlikely: Meloni succeeds as a power player by reducing migration
The most challenging scenario, albeit the most appealing, sees Italy rise to the role of true international mediator, accompanied by progress in the internal political dialogue in Libya, an improvement in migration flows and in the conditions of the exiles themselves. However, such progress would require significant stabilization in Libya, which currently resembles more a “proto-state” – fragmented and feudal – than a functioning democracy. As such, this outcome is unlikely.
Likely: Meloni fails to realize her vision and migration may soar again
The more likely outcome is that despite a superficial calm in Tripoli, the risk of renewed violence is real. If Mr. Dbeibeh’s government collapses under militia pressure, which is a real possibility, existing migration agreements would unravel. That would leave a power vacuum that might be filled by General Haftar – forcing Italy to renegotiate deals under less favorable terms and risking further reputational damage.
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