Constantinos Filis
The maritime delimitation agreement signed between Turkey and Libya in November 2019 did not come like a bolt from the blue for the Greek diplomatic establishment. The foreign minister at the time,
Nikos Dendias, had actually raised the issue with his EU and US counterparts in the summer of that same year. Nevertheless, Athens was unable to prevent the illegal and baseless (according to the Law of the Sea) agreement – which, it is worth noting, was drafted by Turkey’s Defense Ministry rather than its Foreign Ministry – chiefly because, just a few months earlier, Ankara had prevented Khalifa Haftar from taking Tripoli, a development that would have shifted the balance of power in Libya’s civil war.
Turkey then decided to cash in the favor of saving the internationally recognized government in Tripoli by seeking an agreement that would uphold its outrageous positions on maritime zones in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean.
Greece’s decision to expel the Libyan ambassador in Athens (in December 2019) was a rash move that severed all communication with Tripoli, all the more so since the diplomat went on to become his country’s prime minister.
At the same time, Greece invested in the organization that controls eastern Libya, the seat of the country’s parliament, ostensibly strengthening our arsenal of arguments with the fact that the agreement had not been ratified by the legislative body – a situation that may soon change. However, support for Haftar proved to have its limitations, as Greece did not have the tools – unlike Turkey – to give him incentives to advance Greek positions alongside his own interests.
Engagement in an ongoing civil war, in a country that is ethnically diverse, required means with which the Greek side is not familiar. We bankrolled the construction of a pier at the port of Benghazi and appointed a special envoy – a position that needs to be paid and, most importantly, redefined in terms of the scope of its purview.
In the meantime, Turkey has been strengthening its military, diplomatic and economic foothold in Libya, while also securing the tolerance of European countries with sway in the region, like Italy. Rome is one of the top investors in Libya; it depends on it to contain migrant flows and for some huge energy deals with Tripoli, which it obviously wants to maintain and expand.
France and Egypt tried, to some degree, to back Greek efforts by siding with eastern Libya, but Paris’ waning influence in Africa and the challenges being faced by the government in Cairo prevented any meaningful interventions beyond ensuring Haftar’s survival. Qatar has weighed in financially on Tripoli’s side, while the Americans pulled out after the debacle of the 2011 NATO intervention and relied on Turkey for most of their information concerning developments in the North African country.
Greece’s response to the Turkey-Libya deal was a partial exclusive economic zone delineation agreement with Egypt and the Irini operation, which was established by the European Union to implement the UN arms embargo on Libya.
Given Egypt’s role, Greece could also call and establish a tripartite meeting between Athens, Cairo and Eastern Libya, as well as another between Athens, Rome and Tripoli, so it can keep abreast of developments and intervene where necessary.
The upheaval in Libya (and the prospect of the 2019 deal being ratified by a parliament that was elected in June 2014) demands that Athens starts thinking – and moving – outside the box. And given that the US presence appears to be returning in Libya via energy contracts, the need for communication with any American – or other – companies active in the area between Crete and Libya is a given.
The Greek side must take the initiative to bring all parties involved to the table, especially in light of the strong likelihood that business agreements will precede any delimitation of maritime zones. We must make smart use of the European funding tools available to us – not only in relation to migration – to apply steady and strategic pressure.
As far as Turkey is concerned, Libya is a pivotal partner because it helps create a corridor of influence stretching from the central Mediterranean all the way to central Africa, offering a point of penetration into the Sahel.
Historically, moreover, the Turks still haven’t come to terms with the loss of Libya to the Italians in 1912. Given also that efforts to strengthen the Muslim Brotherhood’s foothold in Egypt failed, while Algeria and Tunisia are pursuing goals that do not coincide with Turkish ambitions, Ankara’s investment in Libya is part of a long-term strategic plan.
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Constantinos Filis is an associate professor at the American College of Greece and director of its Institute of Global Affairs.
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