Kaan Devecioglu
Russia’s reduction of its military presence in Syria and its focus on Libya points to a new power struggle in both the Middle East and North Africa. Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) advance in Syria and the fall of the Assad regime have caused Moscow to reassess its positions in Syria. Russia’s termination of its military presence in Tartus and its transfer of its naval elements to Libya can be interpreted as part of Moscow’s efforts to protect and expand its strategic interests in the Mediterranean and Sahel regions.
Russia’s Decision to Withdraw
from Syria and Its Geopolitical Agenda
The changes in the course of the civil war in Syria have been influential in Russia’s decision to reduce its military presence in the country. HTS’s successful operations have become a threat to Russia’s naval assets at its Tartus base. In addition, the Bashar Assad regime’s failure to re-establish control after the civil war has increased concerns that Russia will not be able to recoup its investments there. In this context, it is understood that Moscow has decided to move its military and logistical assets to a more secure and strategic location, considering the increasing costs of maintaining its presence in Syria.
Another important motivation for Russia in this process is to maintain its influence in the Mediterranean, which is critical for international maritime transportation and energy security. While the Tartus Base is an important center supporting Moscow’s logistics and military operations in the region, the fact that this base is at risk has led Russia to seek alternatives.
However, the recent statement by the Ahmed Sharaa administration stating that they do not want Russia to withdraw from Syria in a way that would negatively affect bilateral relations, and the Russian delegation’s visit to Damascus, as well as the Port Sudan administration’s visit to Moscow within the scope of the planned Russian naval base on the Red Sea coast of Sudan, reveal the Putin administration’s security-centered geopolitical agenda, which extends from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Red Sea and from there to the Indo-Pacific region.
Another important motivation for Russia in this process is to maintain its influence in the Mediterranean, which is critical for international maritime transportation and energy security. While the Tartus Base is an important center supporting Moscow’s logistics and military operations in the region, the fact that this base is at risk has led Russia to seek alternatives.
However, the recent statement by the Ahmed Sharaa administration stating that they do not want Russia to withdraw from Syria in a way that would negatively affect bilateral relations, and the Russian delegation’s visit to Damascus, as well as the Port Sudan administration’s visit to Moscow within the scope of the planned Russian naval base on the Red Sea coast of Sudan, reveal the Putin administration’s security-centered geopolitical agenda, which extends from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Red Sea and from there to the Indo-Pacific region.
Libya: The New Geopolitical Center
Russia’s move to Libya is an extension of Moscow’s strategic interests in the Mediterranean. Tobruk in eastern Libya (al-Qadim and al-Jufra – both former outposts of the Wagner Group) and Maaten al-Sarra Base in the south offer Russia an opportunity to make up for the strategic advantages it has lost in Syria. As a coastal region on the Mediterranean, Tobruk could allow Russia to control energy and shipping routes. Maaten al-Sarra, on the other hand, is strategically located on the border of Libya, Sudan and Chad and could serve as a logistics center for operations in the Sahel region. In fact, satellite images reflected in open sources also prove this development.
Russia’s deployment of paramilitary elements such as the Wagner Group (now known as the African Corps ) to Libya and the Sahel highlights Moscow’s efforts to consolidate its military presence there. The Wagner Group, in cooperation with Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), undertakes the task of protecting and expanding Russia’s interests, particularly in the Cyrenaica region. These steps reveal that Russia sees Libya as a base not only for military purposes but also for energy and geopolitical competition.
Russia’s efforts to reduce its presence in the Tartus Naval Base in Syria and establish a naval base in Tobruk, eastern Libya, are aimed at protecting and strengthening Moscow’s long-term strategic interests in the Mediterranean. Tartus was an important logistics and operational hub for Russia. However, the fall of the Bashar Assad regime in Syria, which Moscow supports, has jeopardized the security of Tartus.
Therefore, establishing a base in a more secure location such as Tobruk would strengthen the door for Russia to establish a stronger presence in a region close to NATO’s southern flank. The geopolitical importance of the Mediterranean is evident as it is the intersection of energy corridors and international trade routes. The planned naval base to be built in Tobruk would provide the Russian navy with operational flexibility in the Mediterranean while also allowing Moscow to increase its strategic pressure on NATO and Europe. This move could also be considered a step towards increasing Russia’s visibility as a global naval power.
Libya is also in a strategic position in the energy competition, as it has one of the largest oil reserves in Africa and plays a critical role in European energy security. By controlling energy resources in Libya, Russia aims to both expand its economic interests and create strategic pressure on European countries. While the European Union obtains a significant portion of its energy needs from Russia, it has developed policies aimed at reducing its dependence on Russia following the Ukraine War.
In this context, efforts to turn to alternative energy suppliers such as Libya have come to the fore. However, by controlling the energy infrastructure in Libya, Russia may have the opportunity to undermine Europe’s strategic diversification goals. Russia’s increasing interest in energy fields in the Cyrenaica region, which is controlled by Khalifa Haftar, is part of this strategy. Moscow’s use of paramilitary forces such as the Wagner Group to ensure the security of energy infrastructures supports Europe’s aim of taking control of the energy supply chain while strengthening its presence in Libya.
On the other hand, Russia’s goal of expanding its military presence in Libya to the Sahel region is part of a long-term strategy aimed at increasing Moscow’s influence on the African continent. The Maaten al-Sarra Air Base in southern Libya plays a key role in this context.
The base is strategically located on the border of Libya, Chad and Sudan and is considered an ideal center for providing logistical support to the Sahel region. Considering the Wagner Group’s activities in countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Sudan, it is clear that this base could make significant contributions to Russia’s military operations in the region.
Indeed, the power vacuum created by France’s reduction of its military presence in the Sahel creates new opportunities for Russia. The relations developed with the junta regimes in the region and the security support provided are important indicators of Moscow’s increasing influence in the Sahel.
In addition to supporting Russia’s operations in the Sahel, the Maaten al-Sarra base could provide direct military and logistical supplies to regional countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Sudan. The deployment of Syrian soldiers and Russian technicians to rebuild the base shows how much importance Moscow attaches to the project. The base is becoming a critical hub for expanding Russia’s presence in Africa and filling the gap left by France’s decline.
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