Youssef Mohammad Sawani
The Libyan political landscape remains static due to entrenched power struggles, the accumulated failures of the U.N.-backed roadmap and its rejection by key actors. The crisis is fundamentally rooted in a struggle for control, worsened by divergent roadmap interpretations and a lack of genuine national will or meaningful international support for reconciliation. A shift is needed that prioritizes an inclusive, Libyan-led solution over externally defined terms. Specifically, the United States must reassess its strategy, as prolonged engagement based on short-term security interests or economic opportunism risks perpetuating the conflict.
The U.N. Special Envoy to Libya, Hanna Tetteh, presented a roadmap to the U.N. Security Council on Aug. 21, aiming to resolve the crisis and hold presidential and parliamentary elections within 12 to 18 months. The plan, requiring approval from influential Libyan political forces, has three pillars: preparing a technically sound electoral framework; unifying institutions under a new government; and conducting a structured, broad Libyan dialogue on important issues to foster a conducive environment for elections.
Despite its sequential structure and overarching timeline, Tetteh’s plan mirrors previous U.N. roadmaps, featuring recycled jargon and lacking concrete technical details on implementation. These issues raise questions about its viability, especially given past failures. For example, the absence of specific dates indicates a tactic to prevent spoilers from exploiting missed deadlines but risks the impression that the plan lacks a clear strategy.
Though the major Libyan players formally welcomed the roadmap, their actual stances may be rejection. The Benghazi-based House of Representatives is divided while its counterpart, the Tripoli-Based High Council of State, wants to re-write the roadmap to safeguard its interests—preserving the status quo to prevent action. Ultimately, elections threaten their objective of keeping their ally, the Government of National Unity (GNU), in office.
Tetteh, addressing the UNSC on Oct. 14, warned that the country’s political transition is paralyzed, blaming rival institutions for failing to resolve differences over election laws and key appointments. She told the Security Council that while there was progress on the U.N.-backed roadmap, divisions between the House of Representatives and the High Council of State continue to block national elections. “The two institutions have yet to achieve this objective,” Tetteh stated, stressing that consensus on the constitutional and legal framework for elections is urgently needed, adding, “Libya cannot afford continued delays or disruptions.”
However, the most influential actors still block meaningful change. They include Khalifa Haftar, commander of the eastern-based Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF)—controlling over 70% of Libyan territory and natural resources—and Prime Minister Abdelhamid Dbeibah of the internationally-recognized GNU, with tenuous control of the west.
Dbeibah held recent meetings with figures like Mohamed Takala, head of the High Council of State, and Mohamed Al-Menfi, head of the Presidential Council, demonstrating a shift toward institutional entrenchment through integration and a unified front. This strategy deflects pressure for elections, depicting the GNU’s authority as a functioning, stability-maintaining government. It also helps stymie calls for a new, unified national executive. Concurrently, Dbeibah has resisted elections, calling them a “major gamble” while proposing comprehensive constitutional and institutional reforms to prolong his mandate and avoid removal.
Meanwhile, Haftar’s new “National Initiative” urges Libyans to define their future without external dictates, asserting that “a map whose threads have been woven behind borders cannot build a free, fully sovereign state.” His rhetoric, like Dbeibah, confirms that Libya’s crisis is not a constitutional dispute but a conflict over power. Both Haftar’s LAAF and Dbeibah’s GNU seek to maintain influence, utilizing delay tactics and skilfully leveraging mistrust. As such, their rejection of the U.N. roadmap’s core tenets is a calculated move to obstruct stability, reconciliation and democratic transition.
Lasting peace and national unification remain distant goals despite the 2020 ceasefire, which is regularly challenged by the existence of parallel governing bodies, a surge in armed groups and deeply entrenched criminal networks. Therefore, the objection to the roadmap and reluctance to hold elections are not solely political tactics. They are inextricably linked to security and economic concerns, with critical challenges impeding progress. While many observers believe that the GNU’s ongoing presence is the primary obstacle to stability, the security environment remains volatile, with any attempt to force elections under today’s circumstances risking renewed conflict.
In this context, Tripoli and the western region already face a severe security breakdown marked by armed clashes, robberies and thefts, signalling the state’s loss of control. This chaos, exacerbated by ongoing military mobilization and a lack of legal deterrence, has transformed some of the capital’s neighborhoods and the city of Zawiya into flashpoints, with western Libya’s rising crime rate largely attributed to the GNU and its security agencies’ failure to perform basic duties.
Although the UNSC and major international powers welcomed Tetteh’s roadmap, interest-driven contestation and a limited understanding of Libya’s complex dynamics have fostered resistance. Regional and global interference is a symptom and a driver of Libya’s domestic rifts, with external states fuelling the conflict by supporting competing groups to advance their respective agendas.
Disputes over maritime exploration rights in international waters involving Turkey, Egypt and Greece, alongside Libya’s huge oil and gas potential, continue to define this context. Critically, the U.S. approach—demonstrated by Massad Boulos’s efforts—prioritizes economic stability over pressuring the de facto actors blocking meaningful change. This effort sidelines any prospect for inclusive national reconciliation. Securing control over the Libyan economy through stabilization measures and the role and independence of the National Oil Corporation and Central Bank of Libya reveal a willingness to focus on short-term security and economic stabilization over a genuine political transition.
This approach, under the “U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability: 10-Year Plan for Libya,” is fundamentally flawed. While economic stability and security coordination are undoubtedly important, they cannot be achieved without addressing the underlying political divisions fueling the conflict. Washington’s apparent disinterest in the electoral file—evidenced by the State Department’s dismissal of the issue—impedes progress.
These diverging international priorities hinder any comprehensive resolution to Libya’s crisis. As such, all parties must work towards fostering a genuine political consensus capable of legitimizing democratic processes, producing lasting peace and stability.
The international approach to Libya must shift from externally-defined, prescriptive solutions toward facilitating dialogue and confidence-building through Libyan-led initiatives. The United Nations should prioritize empowering Libyan actors, bolstering institutions and engaging all key groups via a multi-track diplomatic approach that respects Libyan diversity. Concrete steps, including security sector reform, are required to build trust.
Washington and the international community must acknowledge Libya’s agency and embrace national reconciliation as the primary path for democratic transition. Many share a responsibility for Libya’s crisis since the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 2011 intervention. Thus, they must foster cooperation among Libyan factions, promoting an environment conducive to dialogue and compromise while refraining from using Libyan actors as proxies.
U.S. officials should also re-evaluate their 10-Year Plan for Libya, recognizing that short-term security gains will fail without addressing underlying political challenges. Washington must pressure key stakeholders—including Turkey, the UAE, Qatar, Egypt, Italy and France—to foster cooperation and mutual trust-building initiatives between Libyan factions. Similarly, diplomatic engagement with Russia must ensure that any political solution prioritizes Libyan interests over external considerations.
One of the recommendations of the UNSMIL Advisory Committee is Option 4, which calls for adopting a temporary constitution, initiating a comprehensive political reset demanding the dissolution of all existing institutions. It recommends replacing them with a temporary, impartial Constituent Assembly—established via Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) dialogue—to draft a provisional constitution, set electoral laws and unify state institutions.
Option 4 constitutes necessary political shock therapy, offering the most decisive path to break institutional deadlock and achieve a credible democratic transition. As adherence to outside agendas will perpetuate conflict, only a genuinely inclusive, Libyan-led approach can secure a stable future for Libyans.
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Youssef Mohammad Sawani is Professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of Tripoli in Libya.
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