Across several regions, the United Arab Emirates is facing visible diplomatic and political friction with key Arab states. The developments span Sudan and Libya, extend to Yemen, and surface in the Maghreb, pointing to a period of strain for Emirati regional positioning, driven by conflicts where Abu Dhabi’s alignment has diverged from that of neighboring powers.
Sudan and the Libya Corridor
Since the outbreak of Sudan’s civil war in 2023, international scrutiny has focused on the Rapid Support Forces and the external networks sustaining them. UN expert reporting has documented the emergence of new RSF supply routes, including corridors passing through eastern Libya. These findings established Libya as a relevant logistical node in the conflict and intensified attention on external actors accused of enabling RSF operations.
Within this context, Emirati involvement has drawn particular scrutiny. The United States has imposed sanctions on RSF leadership, and major international media have consistently linked the RSF’s enhanced military capabilities to external financial and material support. While Abu Dhabi has denied wrongdoing, the cumulative effect has been to place the UAE at the center of sustained international criticism tied to Sudan’s war.
Libya’s eastern power center has become part of this picture. Khalifa Haftar, who controls much of eastern Libya and maintains longstanding ties with Abu Dhabi, is widely viewed as a potential conduit within these supply networks. Reporting in early 2026 described pressure from regional actors on Haftar to distance himself from UAE-linked RSF support channels. These accounts remain based on unnamed sources and have not been independently confirmed, but they align with broader regional efforts to curb RSF resupply.
Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s Strategic
Calculations
Egypt’s stake in Sudan’s stability is direct, given the shared border and Cairo’s backing of Sudan’s army. Saudi Arabia has also sought to position itself as a mediator while limiting destabilizing external interventions. Against this backdrop, both countries have shown signs of discomfort with Emirati policies that appear to cut across their own regional priorities.
Even where specific claims remain unverified, the strategic logic is clear. For Cairo and Riyadh, unchecked RSF empowerment threatens regional security, Red Sea stability, and their own diplomatic initiatives. The UAE’s perceived role in sustaining the RSF therefore complicates its relations with both capitals.
Yemen as a Precedent for Open Friction
The Saudi–Emirati divergence is more clearly documented in Yemen. In late 2025 and early 2026, Saudi-backed forces curtailed advances by the UAE-aligned Southern Transitional Council. Subsequent reporting confirmed an Emirati military drawdown and political setbacks for UAE-supported actors.
This episode demonstrated that Saudi Arabia is prepared to directly counter Emirati proxies when interests diverge. It also shows that the UAE’s regional partnerships are no longer insulated from pushback by fellow Gulf states, particularly when control of territory and influence is at stake.
Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Military
Realignment
Recent reporting from Bloomberg and corroborating media indicates that Saudi Arabia is negotiating a new military cooperation framework with Egypt and Somalia aimed at strengthening defense ties and Red Sea security. The proposed arrangement is presented by Saudi officials as part of a broader effort to balance Emirati regional influence amid ongoing strategic competition between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
Maghreb Tensions and the Algerian
Dimension
In North Africa, Algeria has emerged as one of the most vocal critics of Emirati regional behavior. Since 2024, Algerian official communications have referenced “hostile actions” by an unnamed Arab state, widely interpreted in regional coverage as the UAE. Algerian media close to state institutions have repeatedly accused Abu Dhabi of destabilizing activity in the Sahel and interference aligned with Morocco.
Although no formal rupture has occurred, the public nature of these signals marks a departure from earlier periods of pragmatic cooperation. The tension reflects deeper disagreements over Libya, Sudan, Sahel security, and broader questions of external influence in North Africa.
Assessing the Trend
What can be established from these developments is not a unified Arab consensus against the UAE, but a pattern of friction across multiple theaters. In Sudan and Libya, Emirati alignment has drawn sustained international and regional scrutiny. In Yemen, Saudi Arabia has openly constrained UAE-backed actors. In the Maghreb, Algeria has allowed disputes with Abu Dhabi to spill into the public domain.
The accumulation of documented disputes suggests that the UAE’s activist regional posture is encountering increasing resistance from states that view its interventions as destabilizing or misaligned with their interests.
For now, the UAE remains a central and capable regional actor. Yet the current phase is marked by open disagreement, signaling a more contested environment for Emirati influence across the Arab world.
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