Christopher M. Blanchard
Key Takeaways:
Libya Remains Deeply Divided and Unstable: Fifteen years after the 2011 uprising and NATO intervention, Libya is split between rival eastern (LAAF/Haftar) and western (GNU) factions, with postponed elections, foreign-backed militias, and disputes over oil revenues, institutions, and security preventing a unified transition.
U.S. Engagement Focuses on Institutional Unity: The Trump Administration is actively promoting a new inclusive executive authority, unified national budget, and security/financial reforms through high-level visits and diplomacy, while supporting UN efforts and balancing relations with competing Libyan actors.
Key Challenges Include Terrorism, Foreign Influence, and Migration: Libya continues to face terrorism risks, Russian and other foreign military presence, and serves as a major transit route for irregular migration to Europe, with ongoing U.S. sanctions and oversight concerns shaping congressional and executive policy.
Fifteen years after a 2011 uprising and U.S.-backed military intervention that toppled longtime authoritarian leader Muammar al Qadhafi, Libya has yet to make a transition to stable governing arrangements. Elections and diplomacy have produced a series of interim governments, but militias, local leaders, and subnational coalitions backed by competing foreign patrons have remained powerful. Rival networks in western and eastern Libya have competed for national control.
After the eastern Libya-based Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF, alt. Libyan National Army) coalition attempted to seize the capital, Tripoli, in 2019, UN-backed diplomacy halted fighting and produced a Government of National Unity (GNU). Planned elections were postponed in 2021, and Libyans have remained mired in confrontation, with a rival government re-emerging in the east.
A lack of national consensus over electoral and constitutional arrangements and factional disputes over energy, financial, and security issues have prolonged Libya’s instability.
The Trump Administration has attempted to help Libyans unify security, financial, and administrative institutions, reportedly proposing the creation of a new, inclusive executive authority to govern until elections can be held.
Senior Adviser to the President for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos, Chargé d’Affaires Jeremy Berndt, and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) officials have visited Libya repeatedly since 2025, encouraging agreement in April 2026 on Libya’s first unified national budget in over a decade and promoting bilateral and intra-Libyan security cooperation.
Successive U.S. Administrations have sought to prevent Libya from serving as a permissive environment for transnational terrorist groups while managing the consequences of Libya’s internal divisions and interventions there by other countries.
The increased presence and influence in Libya of Russian officials and security actors since 2020, paired with the effects of ongoing conflict and political instability to Libya’s south, have appeared to motivate successive U.S. Administrations to seek to unify Libyan institutions.
Hurdles have included deep-seated Libyan animosities and lingering international and local concerns about the behavior, legitimacy, and intentions of prominent actors in eastern and western Libya.
In 2025, the Trump Administration made changes to U.S. foreign aid programs and implementing agencies, resulting in changes to or termination of some U.S. assistance efforts in Libya, including programs under the Global Fragility Act (GFA, Title V of Division J, P.L. 116-94).
Since 2024, Congress has provided funds to support additional U.S. diplomatic engagement in Libya and to enable the future reestablishment of a full-time U.S. diplomatic presence.
War, Ceasefire, and a Deferred Election
After Qadhafi’s ouster and killing, Libya’s 2012 election produced governing arrangements that devolved into conflict in 2014, effectively dividing the country along ideological, geographic, and institutional lines.
Conflict re-erupted in 2019, when the LAAF, a coalition of eastern Libya-based armed groups led by Qadhafi-era military defector Khalifa Haftar, attempted to seize Tripoli from the then-internationally recognized government. Russia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, and leaders of Libya’s House of Representatives (HOR, an interim parliament elected in 2014) backed the LAAF. With Turkish military support, anti-LAAF western Libyan militias forced the LAAF to withdraw.
Libya has remained effectively divided since, with foreign forces still present, and opposing coalitions separated by a line of control west of Sirte.
A UN mission supports implementation of an October 2020 ceasefire. Haftar’s forces have asserted more influence and security control in southern Libya, partnering with local forces in the southwest toward Algeria and south toward the remote borders with Niger, Chad, and Sudan.
In 2021, the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL, established by the UN Security Council) backed a Libyan-led process that selected a three-member Presidential Council and Government of National Unity (GNU), with a mandate to serve until elections or through June 2022.
Abdul Hamid Dabaiba was chosen as GNU Prime Minister. Elections were postponed indefinitely amid disputes over electoral laws and sequencing. Dabaiba has remained in power in Tripoli, challenged by an LAAF-backed government in the east, led by Osama Hamad.
To break the deadlock, UNSMIL has proposed a roadmap and convened dialogues on electoral arrangements and other national issues. Libyan political bodies in June 2026 set a 2027 target for presidential and parliamentary elections.
Intense Libyan competition for control over the National Oil Corporation (NOC) and Central Bank fueled confrontation and crises through 2024; these institutions govern the oil operations, revenues, and public sector payments on which most Libyans (and both rival governments) rely.
The UN Panel of Experts for Libya reported in March 2026 that leaders from the west and east have colluded with NOC officials and others to provide “an umbrella of impunity” for large-scale irregular financing schemesthat have drained state coffers.
Libya holds the largest proven oil reserves in Africa, and its ~1.4 million barrel per day output provides nearly all state revenues.
Since 2024, the LAAF has improved its military capabilities (including drones) and strengthened its control in the east and south. Khalifa Haftar’s sons have assumed leadership roles in reconstruction and security bodies.
In May 2025, GNU forces killed a prominent militia figure, setting off violence and protests in Tripoli. In May 2026, militia fighting resumed in the western port of Zawiya. Major east-west fighting has not resumed since 2020.
Division, Unity, Elections, and U.S. Policy
U.S. engagement is expanding in a context shaped by continuing Libyan division and fragile security. U.S. naval ships have visited western and eastern Libya, and, in 2026, AFRICOM held part of its annual FLINTLOCK exercise near Sirte.
U.S. officials have engaged actors across Libya’s internal divides, travelling frequently to Libya and also hosting GNU and LAAF envoys in Washington, DC, including separate June 2026 visits by GNU Deputy Defense Minister Abdulsalam Al Zoubi and LAAF Deputy Commander Saddam Haftar (Khalifa’s son).
U.S. officials have promoted commercial ties, including 2026 oil and gas agreements with Chevron and a $20 billion production improvement deal with ConocoPhillips and TotalEnergies.
UNSMIL mediation is continuing in parallel, with Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) for Libya and head of UNSMIL Hanna Tetteh proposing and seeking Libyan and international support for a roadmap to elections and an end to Libya’s transition.
In June 2026, Tetteh briefed the Security Council on the recommendations of an UNSMIL-convened Structured Dialogue, which she said “call for the restoration of unified, effective, legitimate and accountable state institutions” and emphasize “the need for broad political consensus on credible national elections and through clear legal frameworks, with adequate resources and effective governance across institutions including the security sector.”
Boulos has described U.S. policy as “completely complementary” to UNSMIL’s efforts and a short-term initiative to stabilize the country in support of UNSMIL’s longer-term vision. Some observers argue U.S.-backed unity talks risk further entrenching fractious Libyan elites.
Terrorism and Foreign Military Forces
Terrorists killed four U.S. personnel in Libya in the 2012 Benghazi attacks, including U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens. UN and U.S. reports describe transnational terrorist threats in Libya as much reduced since peaking circa 2015-2016, when U.S. military strikes helped local forces defeat an Islamic State affiliate.
Egypt, Turkey (Türkiye), the UAE, Russia, France, and Italy all have pursued discrete interests, influencing the actions and positions of Libyan groups. U.S officials have balanced Libya goals with other priorities in bilateral relations with these countries.
Successive U.S. Administrations have sought to foster the departure from Libya of foreign military forces and mercenaries. U.S. officials have expressed concern about Russia’s presence in Libya since 2018, including reported transfers of Russian personnel and weapons systems to LAAF-controlled eastern and southern Libya.
Since 2024, Libya reportedly has been a growing logistical hub for Russian operations in North Africa and the Sahel. LAAF-controlled areas reportedly also have served as a conduit for support to the Rapid Support Forces in neighboring Sudan. Turkish military advisers have trained and assisted western Libyan forces, while cooperating at times with the LAAF.
UN Bodies and UN and U.S. Sanctions
The UN Security Council has authorized UNSMIL through October 2026. The Security Council has established an arms embargo on Libya and financial and travel sanctions on entities threatening peace there, undermining the political transition, or supporting others who do so.
Resolution 2819 (2026) addresses the arms embargo and illicit oil exports. In February 2026, President Trump extended for one year the national emergency related to Libya cited in Executive Orders 13566 and 13726 that provide for comparable U.S. sanctions.
UN sanctions have frozen tens of billions of dollars in Qadhafi-era state assets abroad, and Libyans have sought access and accommodations to enable fund management.
Migration
Libya remains a transit point for irregular migration to Europe, and migrants remain vulnerable to extortion, detention, sexual violence, and other abuses. In 2026, UN agencies have identified more than 936,000 foreign migrants, and nearly 113,000 refugees and asylum seekers in Libya, most of the latter of whom are new arrivals since 2023 from Sudan.
The State Department reported in 2025 that “armed groups, militias, and criminal networks infiltrated the administrative ranks of the government and engaged in illicit activities, including human trafficking.”
Issues in the 119th Congress
Congress appropriated funding for transition support, stabilization, security assistance, and humanitarian programs for Libya from 2011 to 2024. In 2025, the Trump Administration terminated some programs undertaken pursuant to a March 2023 10-year GFA plan for Libya. International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance has continued in support of efforts to promote unity among military officers affiliated with western and eastern forces.
Since 2014, U.S. officials have operated from a Libya External Office (LEO) at the U.S. Embassy in Tunisia. Congress has made funds available for an interim Diplomatic Travel and Support Operations Facility in Tripoli and to eventually resume embassy operations.
Congress may conduct oversight of and/or seek to shape the Administration’s policy, including on aid, engagement with the LAAF and others, security cooperation, commercial ties, frozen Libyan assets, and the U.S. diplomatic presence.
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Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
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