Fehim Taştekin
As Turkey normalizes its relations with Egypt and the UAE—with whom it has clashed over Libya—it experiences fluctuations in its ties with Russia. All these actors are in a position to approve or reject Turkey’s membership in BRICS. And everyone expects Turkey to adopt more cooperative policies.
As the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government pursued its goal of joining BRICS by employing a strategy of leveraging tensions between global South and North blocs, Turkey faced escalating challenges in the regions where it had embarked on new ventures. In Syria, Turkey’s allies began to turn on each other, and in Libya, the situation grew increasingly out of control.
Last week, the country focused on the newly opened chapter marked by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s visit to Ankara. However, during this time, the main topic on the agenda with Egypt—Libya—was witnessing conflicts that exceeded Ankara’s capacity to resolve. Despite their rivalry in Libya, Turkey and Egypt found themselves in a stalemate, forcing them to keep an eye on each other.
The actors in Libya did not maintain consistent relationships with the foreign powers involved in the country, leading to a complex and unpredictable web of alliances. As alliances continuously shifted, the chaos escalated to a point where no external power could control the situation alone.
To understand the current dynamics, it’s important to look back.
In 2019-2020, the Egyptian, UAE, and Russian-backed Libyan National Army, led by Khalifa Haftar, attempted to capture Tripoli. Turkey’s intervention thwarted this effort. However, when the Tripoli forces attempted to advance eastward, they were stopped at the Sirte-Jufra line. Turkey’s support was insufficient to push further.
In February 2021, under the auspices of the UN, a roadmap was adopted to establish the Presidential Council and the Government of National Unity (GNU), with the aim of leading the country to elections and unifying institutions. This roadmap, coupled with the ongoing deadlock, prompted the rival parties to reposition themselves. Egypt established bridges with Tripoli, while Turkey did so with Benghazi.
Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, who was elected to lead the GNU, was supposed to guide the country to elections by December 24, 2021. However, not only did he fail to fulfill this obligation, but he also clung to power beyond his term, using Turkey’s support to consolidate his position. He struck new deals with Ankara and disregarded domestic objections and criticisms.
As the situation in Libya continued to evolve rapidly, former Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha, who had been a close ally of Ankara during Turkey’s intervention, was appointed head of an alternative government by the Tobruk-based House of Representatives in 2022, which did not recognize Dbeibeh’s legitimacy.
Bashagha’s attempt to march on Tripoli was unsuccessful, and he stepped down in 2023. Meanwhile, Ankara took steps to de-escalate tensions with House of Representatives Speaker Aguila Saleh and Haftar.
Cairo also began working with the Dbeibeh government. While the UAE maintained its support for Haftar, it also assisted Dbeibeh’s oil and gas projects in Ghadames as a country that had normalized relations with Turkey.
After the death of Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russia restructured its militia presence in the region under the name “African Legion” and adjusted its relationship with Haftar. The visit of Russia’s Deputy Defense Minister, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, of Ingush origin, to Benghazi confirmed that Russia would not withdraw from the Libyan game.
In response, the United States, which had entrusted Libya to its “project partner” Turkey after the assassination of Ambassador Chris Stevens by jihadist allies in Tripoli in 2012, re-entered the scene to balance Russia. A private military company, Amentum, working with the Pentagon and the State Department, was deployed to unify the militia forces in and around Tripoli.
In recent weeks, U.S. Special Envoy for Libya Richard Norland and Chargé d’Affaires Jeremy Berndt increased their engagements with local actors, while AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley visited both Tripoli and Benghazi.
While a scenario of unresolved but relative stability continued, the situation suddenly escalated in August. Haftar’s forces began advancing southward, targeting Ghadames and aiming to expand control toward the Algeria-Tunisia border, while Turkey—typically the “protector” of Tripoli—remained notably silent.
Meanwhile, Dbeibeh had been sharpening his stance against Central Bank Governor Sadiq al-Kabir since October 2023, as Kabir had been curbing the government’s uncontrolled expenditures. Dbeibeh sought ways to sideline Kabir, who had been working closely with the U.S., the UK, and Turkey.
Kabir had also angered Haftar’s camp by blocking Bashagha’s access to the Central Bank’s resources when he was head of the House of Representatives-affiliated government. However, Kabir occupied a unique position as the man overseeing the distribution of funds to rival factions in Libya. He had the backing of Western powers involved in Libya, which granted him a degree of immunity.
For the U.S., which masterminded the intervention that destabilized Libya, the most direct way to control the country was through the Central Bank.
Internationally, the sale of oil is monopolized by the Libyan National Oil Corporation, with the revenue deposited into an account at the Libyan Foreign Bank in New York. The authority to disburse these funds rests with the Central Bank of Libya, making Kabir the financial patron of both the Tripoli/Misrata and Benghazi/Tobruk-based political and military powers.
Dbeibeh increased pressure on Kabir by surrounding the Central Bank with militias. On August 12, Norland visited Kabir, showing American support against attempts to besiege the bank, forcibly remove him from office, and abduct its employees.
As pressure on the Central Bank intensified, the House of Representatives issued a memorandum on August 13, declaring that Dbeibeh’s government had ended and that the cabinet led by Usama Hammad was the sole legitimate government.
Additionally, Aguila Saleh was declared the Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Armed Forces, a decision supported by Haftar. In response, on August 18, Dbeibeh issued a decree from the Presidential Council calling for Kabir’s dismissal.
Resisting the decision, Kabir sought refuge in Istanbul, while militias kidnapped the bank’s IT director in an attempt to seize the Central Bank’s codes.
According to Kabir, the militias were threatening and intimidating bank employees, occasionally kidnapping their children and relatives to force compliance.
Although Abdulfattah Abdulgaffar, who was appointed acting governor of the Central Bank, gained access to dinar accounts, it was reported that he could not access the dollar reserves. Even though the new administration had access to SWIFT codes, it was predicted that the bank’s international relations would not normalize without the U.S.’s green light.
Following a warning from the U.S. Treasury, foreign banks refused to conduct business with the Central Bank of Libya until a clear leadership was established. Essentially, the U.S. was saying, “You cannot make changes at the Central Bank without my approval.”
Kabir also maintained a good relationship with Erdoğan, and it was reported that Turkey supported Kabir’s return to his position until a joint solution could be found.
In such crises, the opposing side is always prepared to make a move. Haftar immediately shut off the oil valves, signaling that “if Dbeibeh seizes control of the Central Bank, he will lose access to oil revenues.”
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Fehim Taştekin is a graduate of Istanbul University, Political Sciences Faculty. He started journalism in 1994 as a reporter.
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