Summary
Armed groups in Libya have achieved an unprecedented level of influence over State institutions. In the west, this influence affected the ability of State institutions to implement their mandates outside the interests of armed groups. In the east, Government of National Stability bodies were used as a cover for the absolute control of the Libyan Arab armed forces (LAAF) over the governance functions in that part of Libya.
Saddam Haftar affirmed his control not only over the LAAF land force but also in relation to the external relations strategy and economic interests of LAAF.
In particular, armed groups considerably increased the amount of revenue that they generated from diesel smuggling by using the General Electric Company of Libya in Tripoli and the facilities in the old harbour in Benghazi to divert a considerable amount of diesel, and by influencing the National Oil Corporation and the Brega Petroleum Marketing Company.
Despite the absence of terrorist attacks in Libya during the reporting period, terrorist elements remained active in southern Libya, using cross-border illicit activities for financing and recruitment. LAAF leveraged the deteriorating security situation along the southern borders with neighbouring countries to strengthen its wider influence as a key regional actor with an oversight of cross-border movements, especially through security cooperation with Chad and the Niger. The armed conflict in the Sudan directly affected the security and stability of Libya.
The joint military force under the 5+5 Joint Military Commission failed to materialize due to political divisions and fragmentation within the country’s security sector. The presence of foreign fighters and private military companies further destabilized the national security landscape.
Five Libyan armed groups were responsible for systematic violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, including arbitrary detention, murder, torture and the destruction of civilian property, which they committed through institutionalized retaliatory systems designed to target civilians perceived as threats to their political and economic interests in Benghazi and Tripoli.
Human rights defenders and journalists were particularly vulnerable to abduction, enforced disappearance and intimidation. International human trafficking and smuggling networks, in collaboration with Libyan armed actors, utilized Libyan territory as a transit hub for operating 17 identified international trafficking routes.
Migrants and asylum-seekers, including children, were regularly subjected to rape and other sexual violence, mistreatment and extortion along these routes.
The Panel uncovered three well-developed Libyan trafficking networks, led by elements of armed groups, that expanded their operations in scale and complexity to increase funding for their illegal activities. The arms embargo did not prevent armed groups from obtaining equipment, both military and what the Panel considers dual-use. Sophisticated military equipment was acquired by armed groups in Misratah.
LAAF displayed its newly acquired equipment and extensive arsenal through its large-scale military exercise and parade. LAAF also grew its maritime assets significantly, by seizing two armed naval vessels and procuring through private companies dual-use vessels that were militarized after transfer.
The number of foreign naval vessels entering Libya more than doubled. Military equipment was transferred to Libya during one such visit.
The arms embargo remained ineffective where Member States controlled the logistical flow and supply chains to armed actors in Libya.
Some Member States became more open about the type of military cooperation they had implemented with western and eastern armed actors. This included an increased number of military training sessions provided by Member States and by a private entity inside and outside of Libya.
The National Oil Corporation underwent internal restructuring that now facilitates the access of armed groups to lucrative service agreements. The first private Libyan oil company, under an agreement approved by the Government of National Unity, has exported crude oil valued at around $460 million since May 2024.
Systemic issues in the estimation of fuel needs and in the supply chain facilitated the import of large surplus amounts of diesel to Libya, which was subsequently illicitly exported by armed groups.
The Panel identified the General Electric Company of Libya as the main source for such surplus diesel used in illicit exports. The Panel identified networks responsible for having exported around 450,000 tons of diesel from the Benghazi old harbour. In total, the Panel identified 185 illicit diesel exports from that location since March 2022, amounting to an estimated export volume of 1.125 million tons of diesel.
Ten Member States and 16 financial institutions were found in repeated non-compliance with the asset freeze. Some of these instances of non-compliance caused the erosion of the frozen assets. Inconsistent practices in charging negative interest and management fees, carrying out active asset management and crediting income on frozen funds persisted, in disregard of the relevant resolutions.
The Panel found the Libyan Investment Authority’s investment plan lacking in comprehensiveness, transparency and data consistency, resulting in inflated uninvested assets and overstated opportunity losses. The Authority’s frozen assets have grown since the imposition of the asset freeze, contrary to its claim of asset depletion due to the freeze.
Given this situation and considering the associated risks of misuse and misappropriation, the Panel provided its recommendations, including possible adjustments to the asset freeze to allow the Authority to reinvest frozen liquid assets with suitable safeguards pursuant to paragraph 15 of resolution 2701 (2023).
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