Emadeddin Badi and Wolfram Lacher
Prime Minister Abdelhamid Dabeiba has set off a series of events destabilizing western Libya, but the structural forces behind the country’s wider stalemate remain strong.
On May 13, Libya’s prime minister, Abdelhamid Dabeiba, and his closest allies were triumphant. The night before, Abdelghani “Ghnewa” al-Kikli, the city’s most powerful militia leader and, until recently, a key pillar of Dabeiba’s rule, was shot dead at a meeting with government officials. Within hours, Ghnewa’s forces collapsed, his lieutenants fled Tripoli and units aligned with Dabeiba seized his territory.
For a fleeting moment, it looked like Dabeiba had eliminated a key rival and taken a major step toward consolidating control in Tripoli. The next day, Dabeiba’s hold on power was at its weakest since taking office in 2021. Heavy fighting had engulfed the capital overnight, and Dabeiba was widely held responsible.
Libya’s capital has seen endless twists and turns since the demise of the Gadhafi regime in 2011. But this dramatic reversal was extraordinary even for Tripoli. In its wake, a fragile ceasefire took hold that could easily break down again. Dabeiba’s authority has been shaken to the core.
He long sought to present himself as the guarantor of stability and security in the capital. Indeed, clashes became increasingly rare after he warded off initial challenges to his rule. Now, the image he cultivated lies in tatters, and he is the focus of popular anger. Could the unintended consequences of Dabeiba’s power grab finally undo Libya’s political stalemate?
Until he was shot in the back of the head at the Tekbali military base on May 12, Ghnewa was among the biggest beneficiaries of Dabeiba’s rule. Dabeiba had been appointed as head of a unity government under a U.N.-led process in March 2021, ostensibly to oversee an interim period until elections that were scheduled for December of that year.
When those elections were canceled, Dabeiba’s western Libyan opponents allied with the warlord Khalifa Haftar, based in the eastern part of the country, to form a new government. But Dabeiba prevailed in Tripoli, confining the rival administration’s sway to Haftar’s territory. He did so by exploiting fears of Haftar taking power and by buying the loyalties of western Libyan armed groups. Key to this was Ghnewa, a former baker who had formed a militia in 2011 and gradually turned it into a major force. Ghnewa’s territory just south of Tripoli’s city center was a mere stone’s throw from the seat of the prime minister.
In exchange for their support for Dabeiba, Ghnewa and a handful of other militia leaders received more than lavish funding. They gained unprecedented sway over state institutions by appointing figureheads to oversee the plunder of funds in ministries and state-owned companies. Alongside Dabeiba’s nephew Ibrahim Dabeiba — widely seen as the real power-broker behind the prime minister — they also built direct ties with Haftar’s sons and routinely brokered arrangements over key positions and institutions.
Relations among the key players in Tripoli were not devoid of tensions. But most shared an interest in the survival of a government that enabled them to accumulate power and wealth. This required keeping the peace in the capital, allowing the prime minister to claim that he had delivered Tripoli from the recurrent clashes it had seen for years. Meanwhile, the city’s militias tried to build a reputation as professional security forces, with some succeeding more than others.
For several years, the Dabeibas juggled competing demands from Haftar and western Libyan militia leaders, allowing Ghnewa’s associates to take over security institutions such as the domestic intelligence service. As Ghnewa’s power grew, managing him became increasingly difficult for the Dabeibas and their allied commanders. In August 2024, Ibrahim Dabeiba relied on a force led by a Ghnewa lieutenant to oust the long-serving central bank governor.
But that force subsequently monopolized control of the central bank and protected the new governor, bringing him under Ghnewa’s influence, much to the Dabeibas’ dismay. Ghnewa also made outsized demands to place his proteges in key ministerial positions, threatening to throw his support behind the formation of a new government. Meanwhile, he aggressively expanded his share of spoils from fraud in sectors ranging from imports of medicine to oil and telecommunications.
As Ghnewa’s relations with the Dabeibas soured, he mended ties with another major force in Tripoli: the Special Deterrence Force (SDF), headed by Salafi-leaning commander Abderrauf Kara. The SDF and its affiliates controlled the capital’s airport and vast swathes of eastern Tripoli, and exerted considerable influence within state institutions. Kara had played a key role in helping Dabeiba retain power at critical junctures, but he grew increasingly alienated over time, frustrated by what he perceived as meager returns for his support.
The Dabeibas had begun favoring leaders of other factions. Ghnewa was among them, as were Abdesselam Zubi of Brigade 111 and Mahmoud Hamza of Brigade 444 — the latter a former Kara lieutenant turned bitter rival. And these groups had begun to curb SDF influence, most drastically at the central bank, where the SDF had for years maintained a strong presence.
The turning point came when Ghnewa compelled the SDF’s withdrawal from the central bank to assist the Dabeibas in ousting the governor. Ironically, that episode’s aftermath brought Kara and Ghnewa into an uneasy alliance, forged by their respective roles in derailing the Dabeibas’ bid to assert control over the central bank. By late 2024, the two had found a common purpose: to guard themselves against threats from the Dabeibas and their closest allies.
In April, the joint force from Dabeiba’s native Misrata began sending convoys of armed vehicles toward Tripoli. Its objective remained unclear, and rumors suggested it had prepared an attack on the SDF. Yet many dismissed the idea that Dabeiba would initiate hostilities and thereby shatter the capital’s tranquility he so cherished.
But in early May, tensions between Ghnewa and the Dabeibas escalated when Ghnewa’s men abducted two top executives at Libya’s state telecommunications holding, a cash cow that Dabeiba had used as a slush fund. In the following days, convoys began converging on Tripoli from Misrata, Zawiya and Zintan, foreshadowing an imminent escalation.
On the evening of May 12, the news that Ghnewa had been shot dead spread like wildfire across Tripoli, along with pictures of his blood-stained body. It quickly emerged that he had been killed at the headquarters of Brigade 444, during a meeting to which Hamza had invited him. Hamza has since suggested that his killing happened after Ghnewa’s men raised their weapons at their hosts.
But the speed with which Brigades 444 and 111 took control of Ghnewa’s stronghold in the Abu Salim district right after the killing clearly indicates a well-planned operation. Dabeiba himself lauded the campaign for its success in speedily routing Ghnewa’s forces with minimal immediate harm to civilian lives or property.
The ease with which they had eliminated a major rival must have surprised the operations’ architects themselves. The next day, they sought to build on the momentum to move against the SDF. To that end, Dabeiba issued a series of decrees dissolving units affiliated with both Ghnewa and the SDF. Among those targeted was the Judicial Security Apparatus, a powerful SDF affiliate led by Osama Njeem, who faces an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court.
Other units were integrated into the Interior Ministry headed by Emad Trabelsi — a close Dabeiba ally from the town of Zintan. The Ghnewa associate heading the domestic intelligence service was replaced by an appointee from Zintan and a deputy from Misrata. For Kara’s SDF and other armed groups in greater Tripoli, the message was clear: Dabeiba was centralizing control and empowering Misratan and Zintani actors at their expense.
Even as Dabeiba and his allies touted their victory against what they now described as rogue militias, a different picture took shape. Clips of looting in Ghnewa’s former stronghold of Abu Salim spread on social media. Many of the worst excesses were the work of the General Security Apparatus, a Zintani-led force commanded by the interior minister’s brother. The same force later looted Tripoli’s port and even attempted to break into the vaults of the central bank. Its acts galvanized public outrage and shattered Dabeiba’s narrative.
This combination of overreach and misconduct directly strengthened the position of the SDF. Kara seized the opportunity to widen his coalition, reaching out to factions in several Tripoli districts as well as the neighboring city of Zawiya. Although most stopped short of open military engagement, many began hedging, positioning themselves to join the fray should momentum shift away from the government.
Instead of consolidating control, Dabeiba’s moves ignited urban warfare. Tensions came to a head on the evening of May 13, during the attempted handover of positions previously held by the Judicial Security Apparatus to Mahmoud Hamza’s Brigade 444. The transfer was a highly sensitive matter, as both forces had heavily clashed before, and Hamza’s long-standing animosity toward Kara was no secret. Fighters affiliated with the Judicial Security Apparatus backtracked on the agreement to surrender their positions, triggering localized clashes that quickly escalated across Tripoli.
The SDF began targeting Brigade 444, which was left to fend off its advances with little support from Dabeiba’s other key allies — Brigade 111 and the Misrata joint force. Within hours, Tripoli plunged into chaos: Street battles erupted in densely populated and affluent neighborhoods, improvised drone-borne explosives struck military camps, and the SDF and 444 rampaged throughout the capital. Forces from Zawiya entered Tripoli from the west, drawing Dabeiba-aligned forces into a defense on multiple fronts.
For a brief moment, the fighting looked like it could escalate into a protracted urban war. But by noon the following day, a fragile ceasefire had been brokered, halting the clashes as suddenly as they had erupted. The shifts on the battlefield revealed a mixed picture. The SDF had defended its exposed bases in southern Tripoli but had been compelled to retreat from key positions in the city center, including the port. However, not all of the SDF’s lost territory was now held by forces loyal to Dabeiba. Neutral forces from Misrata had deployed to separate the opposing coalitions in some of the most critical locations, including around the central bank.
Far more consequential than the shifts in territorial control during the fighting was the latter’s political fallout. The sudden throwback to the capital’s worst days shocked Tripoli’s residents. Public dismay focused on Dabeiba and on Brigade 444, which had previously cultivated a reputation for disciplined security provision, but now bore the brunt of the blame for the clashes’ excesses.
On Friday, two days after the ceasefire was reached, protests erupted on Martyrs’ Square. They reflected a volatile blend: genuine civic frustration with state failure and militia impunity, mixed with the calculated presence of provocateurs aligned with Dabeiba’s political rivals. For much of the day, the demonstrations remained peaceful and focused. But by dusk, the mood shifted. Provocateurs directed protesters toward the seat of the prime minister and attempted to storm it. They were dispersed with live ammunition. Meanwhile, ministers associated with the SDF and other anti-Dabeiba armed groups resigned, their announcements timed to trigger a domino effect that failed to materialize.
The crackdown on protesters was a turning point. On the one hand, it provoked another wave of public anger against Dabeiba. On the other, it allowed Dabeiba to portray the unrest as coordinated subversion. Clearly, however, the line between grassroots mobilization and factional manipulation had been crossed. With these events, the conflict shifted into a new phase — a battle of narratives.
For a moment after the protests, there appeared to be an opening, a chance to challenge Dabeiba’s power with both political initiative and popular credibility. But the moment slipped. The protests lost momentum, and the rival camp’s chronic weaknesses resurfaced. Divided by geography, ambition and deep mistrust, the opposition lacked the unity and the legitimacy to present a compelling alternative.
Dabeiba’s greatest strength lies not in the alliance backing him, but in the incoherence of those seeking to replace him.
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Emadeddin BadiEmadeddin Badi is a consultant and senior fellow with the Atlantic Council and the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime
Wolfram LacherWolfram Lacher is a senior associate at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs and the author of “Libya’s Fragmentation”
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