Laila Wyatt
Challenges to the Potential Pivot
Libya’s prospects as a launchpad for Russia’s African operations have downsides beyond logistical concerns. Assad’s international isolation allowed Russia to operate more freely in Syria. While Russia is Haftar’s primary backer, the general retains a good relationship with France, complicating Russian negotiations and theoretically requiring a more conditional presence in comparison to Syria. Further complications abound due to the sheer number of other international players in Libya, including Italy, the UAE, Qatar, and Egypt.
Türkiye retains a presence in Libya, intervening in support of the GNU to secure resources and favorable maritime boundaries in the eastern Mediterranean. Türkiye agreed with the GNU in November 2019 to extend Turkish maritime boundaries to Derna and Tobruk, complicating a potential Russian permanent presence and resulting in a wary coexistence in a sensitive strategic area.
Despite their agreement, the GNU resents Türkiye’s presence, leading to Turkish troops rarely leaving bases and maintaining a lighter footprint. Russian troops reportedly do the same. In December 2023, an official ceremony was held by a Haftar-controlled unit at the Russian al-Qardabiyah airbase to give the impression it was under LNA control.
Russia will have to operate in a much more covert manner in Libya than in Syria, and Libya cannot be a stronghold of Russian geopolitical strength and influence projection like Syria. Libya’s political instability limits the space for an unobstructed Russian presence. GNU Prime Minister Abdul Hamid al-Dbeibeh voiced resistance to a heightened Russian presence in December 2024. If Haftar accepts an improved relationship with Russia, his relationship with France could deteriorate, though his position could be strengthened with increased Russian materiel support.
A larger Russian military presence could further destabilize Libya, especially with the pass-through presence of natural resources Russia is extracting out of Africa, particularly gold. Russia extracted $2.5 billion worth of gold from Africa from 2022 to 2024, which is likely to have helped fund its war in Ukraine. Gold provides the Kremlin with a portable, easily laundered, vital backstop for the Russian Central Bank amid sanctions and currency pressures. In Niger, Russia was attempting a form of energy blackmail by blocking France’s access to Niger’s uranium mines. About a fifth of France’s uranium used in nuclear energy is imported from Niger.
Moreover, increased engagement from Russia could encourage Türkiye to strengthen its presence in western Libya, potentially escalating the conflict to civil war levels. However, Sadam Haftar, the son of the general, met with senior Turkish officials in early April, signaling a potential step toward reconciliation. Despite the possibility of deepening competition by foreign actors, shifting troops to Libya remains viable for Russia in case it loses influence in Syria.
Russia could also simply stay in Syria. Comments made in February by Syrian Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra indicated Russia could retain its bases if it would benefit Syria. This statement could be motivated by Israeli incursions into southern Syria after the collapse of the post-2018 deconfliction mechanism between Russia and Israel that prevented this.
The new interim government lacks any capacity to defend against Israeli strikes, due in part to earlier Israeli strikes on Syria’s key military hardware. Israel, Assad, and local forces had previously formed a delicate security arrangement in 2018, partly ensured by Russia.
This agreement limited the Golan Heights to Syrian forces and specifically banned Iranian or Hezbollah troops from having a presence there, disincentivizing Israel from invading further into the Golan Heights and beyond. Recently identified documents, known as the “Moses Documents” showed close coordination between an Israeli operative code-named “Mousa,” former Syrian Defense Minister Lt. Gen. Ali Mahmoud Abbas, and former National Security and Military Advisor to Assad Ali Mamlouk.
This mechanism became obsolete following the fall of Assad. However, a continued Russian presence at a base close to the border could regain such a deterrent. This could lead to Russia retaining a presence in Syria, diminishing potential American outreach. Furthermore, an Islamic State resurgence is likely in the probable event of a full U.S. withdrawal from Syria. U.S. President Donald Trump has called for the Syrian government to take over Islamic State detention camps, despite doubts that the government possesses the necessary security capacity.
Conclusion
The U.S. has been losing ground to Russia and China in the Sahel, predominantly due to a lack of engagement under former U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration and the more recent USAID cuts. Groups like al-Shabaab are poised to exploit vacuums created by both the cuts to health care funding in Africa and reduced service of AFRICOM.
The Trump administration is additionally considering merging AFRICOM with the U.S. command in Europe, potentially fueling vacuums of instability. Therefore, an expensive and time-consuming move to Libya by Russian forces could challenge Russian influence in not only Syria but also Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Russia retaining its presence in Syria would hamstring American security considerations both in Syria and across Northern Africa.
The lifting of U.S. sanctions on Syria would lead to increased resources at the Syrian government’s disposal, but a further delay could destabilize the security situation and push Al-Sharaa into reliance on Russian forces. The U.S. should engage the new Syrian regime to counter Russia and enhance stability across the region. This aligns with the Trump administration’s priority of detangling U.S. forces from regional conflicts, and removing Russian forces from Syria would undermine Russian influence across Africa and the Middle East through strategic diplomacy rather than direct military confrontation.
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Laila Wyatt is an analyst researching on the Middle East and Northern Africa, particularly concentrating on Russian private military and mercenary structures in regional states.
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