Youssef M. Sawani
Conclusion
This report shows that for any dialogue to succeed in realizing a sustainable resolution to the Libyan crisis, it must be transformative and adaptive. This goal may be achieved with clearer and solid commitments to end foreign meddling and by designing a broader inclusive national dialogue that puts reconciliation at the forefront.
The interviewees, despite their different political and social orientations, all agree that the LPA process has actually deepened the crisis without being able to resolve anything and has led to extensive delays in the peace process in Libya, with more fault lines and divides occurring, even within each of the original two sides UNSMIL sought to reconcile.
A truly genuine national dialogue is a constructed political process on its own. This implies that dialogue must achieve the meaningful result of moving the country and the society beyond conflict.
This challenge was more acute as the LPA actually originated from the talks between a group of people UNSMIL had hand-picked, even though most of them had no clear legal status – or rather a legal status was bestowed upon them by the institutions they were supposed to represent giving them legitimacy, that was actually nullified as they acted against their mandate – as interviewees indicated.
This was another testimony that the LPA would not produce any sustainable political settlement and why the resultant institutions of the LPA were unable to gain consensus or legitimacy to serve as constituting bodies.
For any dialogue to succeed in realizing a sustainable resolution to the Libyan crisis, it must be transformative and adaptive. This goal may be achieved with clearer and solid commitments to end foreign meddling and by designing a broader inclusive national dialogue that puts reconciliation at the forefront.
The LPA was not able to generate legitimacy either in the process or its outcomes. Talks were not open to the public and this undermined the LPA’s ability to be a tool for making conflict resolution possible, at the grassroots or societal level, by shifting the existing polarised conflict.
Consequently, the same dividing narratives that dominated the Libyan conflict, such as Islamists vs non-Islamists, revolution vs counter revolution, Azlam vs revolutionaries, and many others, are still prevalent.
The LPA and its results have been exploited in these contending narratives and have been exploited in political propaganda.
As the increase in hate speech and the propaganda war in the Libyan media, especially social media, indicates, the LPA created a context in which Libyans are even more divided than before while new issues of contestation have been added.
The process failed to evolve into a transformative national dialogue that includes a change in public attitudes and the creation of an environment where there is an openness to ideas that make change possible and cause it to be sought after.
The public must be willing to accept these new ideas and play a decisive role in helping them transform into a sustainable reality. This is not the case, however, and the conflict in Libya is becoming more entrenched. The LPA was not able to generate legitimacy either in the process or its outcomes.
Talks were not open to the public and this undermined the LPA’s ability to be a tool for making conflict resolution possible, at the grassroots or societal level, by shifting the existing polarised conflict.
Despite the recent jubilation regarding the formation of a new PC and GNU that resulted in the conclusion of the LPDF talks, disagreements are still standing in the way, and, as interviewees indicate, the UNSMIL process faces serious challenges and consensus is difficult to realise.
The adoption by the LPDF of a majoritarian formula for voting on proposals has also proven problematic. While hopes of achieving tangible success are mounting, many obstacles remain in the way of consensus. Issues like the appointment to senior state roles, e.g. that of the Central Bank of Libya’s (CBL) governor, the constitutional rules, federalism and the rights of regions, and the distribution of resources are the subjects about which agreement is difficult to reach.
Moreover, foreign interventions, reconciliation, and the unification of the military forces remain the toughest obstacles.
On the ground, armed militias continue to dominate and control capabilities and resources, with a major part of them opposing any dialogue and threatening war again.
While the interviews confirm what analysts have been positing – that is that the Libyan powerbrokers have been the main obstructers of the peace process, and the realising of its objectives – they also identify foreign interference to have negatively affected the UN and other mediation activities.
As a matter of fact, some interviewees completely attribute the Libyan crisis to foreign interests and interventions that have, ever since 2011, prevented peace and reconciliation.
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Youssef M Sawani – Academic with long teaching and research experience. Independent Researcher. , Faculty Member with University Of Tripoli.
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