Archive - November 2025

The Sentry

The End of NOC Bartering

In February 2025, shortly after taking office, incoming NOC chairman Masoud Suleiman announced the end of the oil barter system, effective March 1, 2025. The NOC had conducted billions of dollars in crude-for-fuel swaps annually between 2021 and 2024, apparently without transparent accounting. With his announcement, Suleiman committed the NOC to using public tenders to sell crude oil and purchase fuel through separate transactions — a policy he said aimed at achieving better governance.

This decision was an acknowledgment that the barter system used between 2021 and 2024 under two successive NOC chairmen lacked both transparency and competitiveness. The possibility that the NOC gave away excessive national wealth via these swaps underscores the need for a full investigation into the barter process used during that period. In fact, data from high-volume years like 2023 and 2024 suggests that the NOC paid far above prevailing market rates in its fuel-for-crude swaps, with economically unjustifiable overpayments potentially reaching nearly $1 billion annually.

An inquiry must determine exactly why the NOC overpaid, and, crucially, it must identify the actors who profited from these overpayments. Formally ending the oil barter system isn’t enough to solve Libya’s fuel smuggling problem, however. Although the NOC’s fuel imports from January September 2025 decreased by about 8% compared to the same period in 2024, their volume remains far above the country’s legitimate needs.

These excessive fuel imports continue to feed a resilient smuggling sector. Efforts are required to reduce imports further and increase transparency, including regarding how fuel imports are funded. In response to The Sentry’s request for comment about the transparency of its barter transactions from 2021 through 2024, the NOC stated that pricing committees had overseen the process. The NOC added that these committees determined prices based on internationally recognized global bulletins and that the competition for the barter transactions was conducted transparently with major international companies submitting bids.

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Illegally Reexported Fuel

Every day, millions of liters of imported fuel are illegally reexported via maritime routes to Malta, Albania, Italy, Turkey, and beyond. While some of that activity takes place in western Libya, it is far more extensive in the east—particularly through ship-to-ship transfers.

In a typical example, the NOC legally imports fuel into Benghazi’s modern port, but illicit actors load it onto a vessel at the city’s old harbor. At sea, the fuel is transferred to another ship, which then delivers it to its final destination.

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Major Fuel Depots in Western Area

1- Zuwarah’s fuel depot

In the mid-2010s, Zuwarah—a coastal city near the Tunisian border—served as a major hub for reexporting subsidized fuel by land and sea. In 2023, an incident involving a ship called Serdar revealed that the city’s seaport was still being used for illegal fuel exports. Despite security changes at the Ras Jdir border crossing in 2024, local sources told The Sentry that smuggling through Zuwarah continues, albeit at a lower rate than before.

2- Misrata’s fuel depot

located just south of the commercial port and connected to the sea by an underground pipeline, is one of the largest in Libya. From there, the product is transported by trucks to municipalities in the immediate vicinity, as well as to towns and cities in southwestern Libya. Smuggling networks tap into this transport network to move fuel into sub-Saharan African markets, such as Chad and Niger.

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The LAAF Network in Eastern Area

This network profits from moving Libya’s subsidized fuel to the southern borders in two main ways: First, its brigades impose taxes at checkpoints along north-south routes, collecting fees from small-scale smugglers, including large makeshift trucks driven by Tubu actors. Second, the LAAF diverts officially distributed fuel; by restricting operating hours at legitimate stations, it ensures that surpluses are rerouted south for illicit gain.

Tubu smugglers drive the non-official fuel truck across the southern border under Haftar coalition protection, official fuel trucks head south. A large portion of the foreign-refined fuel delivered to Benghazi’s port is kept at a storage facility located in the northern outskirts of the city.

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The 101st Infantry Battalion

This Battalion is a unit of the LAAF’s Brigade Tareq bin Ziyad, suppresses popular activism and perceived opposition across southwestern Libya. Known in this region as the long arm of Saddam Haftar, the battalion enforced a QR code system that allowed each civilian car owner to buy subsidized fuel only once every five days.

This is one of several mechanisms that the LAAF has used to control both the legal distribution and illicit diversion of fuel. As fuel shortages grew more acute and public complaints mounted across southwestern Libya, Saddam Haftar eliminated the QR code system in the southern region in October 2025, a decision likely motivated by a desire to restore his deteriorating popular standing.

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A $6.7 Billion per Year Issue

Independent maritime data service Kpler indicates that in 2024, Libya imported an average of about 234,000 barrels of fuel per day, equating to roughly 37.2 million liters daily. In addition to the imported fuel, another 13.8 million liters a day is produced domestically.

Electricity generation in Libya, which relies on natural gas, crude oil, and fuel, requires about 5.8 million liters of fuel each day. Beyond electricity generation, heavy industry, and transport activities — such as manufacturing, steel plants, agriculture, maritime, and aviation — likely consume 2.4 million liters per day.

Aside from these categories, Libya has about 3.5 million motor vehicles, which consume roughly 15.7 million liters per day, assuming that each vehicle travels 20,000 kilometers per year on average. All in all, the combined fuel consumption for electricity generation (5.8 million liters), other industrial activities (2.4 million liters), and motor vehicles (15.7 million liters) stands at around 23.9 million liters per day.

Given the availability of roughly 50.9 million liters per day, this leaves 27 million liters per day likely diverted. The fuel imports of 37.2 million liters per day cost the NOC $9.46 billion worth of crude oil per year, which works out to be $0.70 per liter. As for the fuel produced domestically by the NOC, its fair valuation is $0.62 per liter, based on average Mediterranean market prices in 2024. From these elements, one can deduce that approximately $6.7 billion worth of fuel was smuggled out of the country in 2024.

This means that the national wealth presently lost to fuel smuggling would be sufficient for Libya to more than triple its spending on both healthcare and education. In fact, the cost to the Libyan population is even higher, given that many legitimate consumers in peripheral areas must pay inflated prices for what should be subsidized fuel — markups not reflected in any official statistics.

Plus, even in cases where legitimate consumers do access the subsidized fuel and pay 0.15 dinars ($0.03) per liter, most of the collected payments end up unaccounted for, leaving the state with virtually no revenue from fuel sales. In response to a request for comment, the NOC denied The Sentry’s estimate of diverted fuel, adding that the NOC is not responsible for managing land or sea ports.14

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Justyna Gudzowska

International firms should address graft before participating in a deeply compromised sector.

International oil companies are lining up to reenter Libya’s oil sector. Libya is currently rolling out its first bid round for new oil exploration and development in nearly two decades, and there appear to be many takers from around the globe, including U.S. companies.

At first glance, this might appear to be a promising development for the Libyan people. The country desperately needs reconstruction, political stability, and investment. But new oil deals are unlikely to provide these benefits. Libya suffers from an entrenched system of predatory graft through which the country’s oil riches have been siphoned off by a corrupt elite. The result is to drive up fuel prices for everyday Libyans and leave them struggling.

To avoid perpetuating this corrupt network, policymakers and executives in Britain, Europe, and the United States should proceed with caution. While new commercial opportunities may deliver short-term gains for Libya, they will offer little long-term benefits so long as leaders in Tripoli and Benghazi continue to line their pockets while excluding the Libyan people from the country’s vast natural wealth. Only an effective, transparent, and accountable Libyan state can be the partner international companies require.

A major new investigation has revealed a massive expansion of gasoline and diesel smuggling from 2022 to 2024 via Libya’s fuel subsidy program. According to our research, this cost the Libyan state almost $20 billion in three years.

In 2021, Libya’s National Oil Corp. (NOC) began to directly swap Libyan crude oil for refined fuel from abroad. Previously, the proceeds from all sales of crude went to Libya’s central bank, which would in turn provide funds to the NOC to purchase fuel in line with budgetary allocations. But unlike allocations from the central bank, swaps did not register on the public balance sheet. This meant the NOC was able to increase its fuel imports without any increase in reported state spending. The result was that, in just three years, Libya’s fuel imports more than doubled, reaching about 41 million liters per day by late 2024.

Why did imports skyrocket? The Libyan authorities suggest that the increases were needed due to shifts in the gas supply chain and the growing need for fuel to power Libya’s electricity grid. But the amounts imported are far above what Libya’s legitimate economy could reasonably consume. The reality is that more than half of this fuel is smuggled back out of the country, by sea or by land.

Saddam Haftar, the ambitious son of Khalifa Haftar—who rules much of eastern Libya as head of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF)—was the primary force behind this escalation. Saddam has used his role as heir apparent in the LAAF to consolidate control over both maritime smuggling operations and crucial overland routes into sub-Saharan Africa. As a result, he was instrumental in bringing smuggling to unprecedented levels. Benghazi’s old harbor serves as Libya’s principal channel for reexports, using doctored papers and “dark” vessels to move millions of liters per voyage. LAAF officer and Saddam subordinate Ali al-Mashay acts as the main gatekeeper.

While Libya remains politically divided, everyone got a cut of the illicit profits. The recent surge may have been orchestrated by Haftar’s family, but they were operating in tacit conjunction with figures linked to the Tripoli-based government of Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh. Culpability also extends to northwestern Libya, where local warlords such as Zawiya’s Mohamed Koshlaf and Misrata’s Omar Bughdada (who is aligned with Prime Minister Dbeibeh) move fuel by sea and by land. Large volumes head south, where Haftar’s forces take over.

Many of the international backers of Libya’s civil war are involved as well. This multibillion-dollar heist was orchestrated with quiet assistance from Russia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. As a result, Libyan citizens must often cough up 40 times the official subsidized price for fuel while many of their leaders illicitly sell the fuel to foreign networks in Libya and neighboring countries.

The Haftar coalition, for example, diverts subsidized diesel, gasoline, and jet fuel to Russian military personnel entrenched at several air bases in Libya, who in turn ship the fuel to other Russian missions in sub-Saharan Africa. The Haftar coalition has also been a strategic fuel supplier to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) throughout the ongoing civil war in Sudan, enabling the paramilitary group’s atrocities in Darfur. Neither the fall of El Fasher in late October nor the horrific massacres of civilians that followed have changed that arrangement: The Haftar family continues to provide fuel to the RSF.

By 2024, almost $7 billion in subsidized fuel—about 15 percent of total public spending—was stolen annually. This is billions of dollars in public wealth that should fund hospitals, schools, and other essential infrastructure. The scheme has deprived the central bank of the hard currency needed for essential imports such as food and medicine, driving consumer price inflation and the Libyan dinar’s depreciation. In an ironic twist, citizens of one of the world’s richest oil nations are often forced to wait in long lines at petrol stations and pay inflated black market prices for fuel. Early this year, the NOC said it was ending crude-for-fuel swaps. Even so, fuel import volumes remain unjustifiably high, and large-scale smuggling persists.

International oil companies and Western policymakers are clearly hoping that there are profitable deals to be made in Libya’s oil sector. They are not wrong about the fundamentals: Libya’s geology, both onshore and offshore, remains rich with untapped reserves, and the NOC is, by and large, staffed by a cadre of skilled hydrocarbons professionals. But foreign companies would be wise to consider how sustainable their new projects are likely to be. As the Libyan state is hollowed out by vested interests, the risk of social unrest and renewed conflict rises. A new round of war, particularly one that rearranges the country’s political leadership, could quickly put any new deals at risk.

So, what can the United States and like-minded states actually do about this? Quite a lot. Libya’s oil sector is wedded to the U.S. dollar. This provides a means of applying direct pressure and dictating the terms on which international companies can reenter Libya’s market.

Libyan leaders are currently negotiating with ExxonMobil and Chevron, for example. Rather than leaning on informal deals to facilitate these companies’ reentry, the Trump administration should be looking to bolster the Libyan NOC as a technocratic institution capable of sustaining reliable and lasting contracts. For U.S. companies to pursue long-term investments, they need a better degree of lasting security than the kleptocrats can provide. To this end, U.S. senior advisor Massad Boulos is believed to be pursuing a fixed budget for Libya’s NOC to help limit the potential for off-book expenditures. Yet such a push will be rendered entirely futile if the issue of rampant fuel smuggling is allowed to persist.

Policymakers in the United States and other like-minded countries should send a firm message that the NOC must remain independent. Investigating and sanctioning key players such as Mashay for their plunder of Libya’s public funds would help do so. Sanctions have not been used against Libya’s most corrupt actors and their enablers; changing that would go a long way toward deterrence. Similarly, the United States could issue a business advisory warning U.S. firms about the illicit networks of merchants, brokers, intermediaries, and transporters exploiting Libya’s fuel subsidy program.

As part of its Libya policy, the Trump administration has stated that it seeks to pursue trade over aid. Public messaging has also emphasized the importance of reunifying Libyan state institutions and the critical role played by the NOC, in particular. As economic dealmaking continues, the latter two conditions cannot be forgotten. It would be a mistake for policymakers in Washington and other foreign capitals to assume that corruption is inevitable in Libya and thus deals must be done with individuals such as Haftar or Dbeibeh rather than the NOC.

Unless the United States and its allies deal with the appropriate Libyan institutions rather than its ruling families, corruption will continue. First and foremost, this will hurt the Libyan public. But as the likelihood of violence and political disruption increases, it will harm international investors as well. If Washington wants U.S. companies to succeed in Libya in the long term, it must help rein in Libya’s kleptocrats. Their massive fuel smuggling operation is the place to start.

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Justyna Gudzowska, the executive director of The Sentry.

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Hafed Al-Ghwell

In Libya, the language of state-building is often just a dialect of theft. While political leaders publicly champion sovereignty and institutional reform, their private battles are waged over control of money flows, government contracts, and the influence these bring. This unseen war has hollowed out the state, creating a system where public institutions function as private treasuries for armed factions and their political sponsors.

The recent power struggles in western Libya are the logical outcome of an operating model where corruption is not a side effect but the central purpose of governance.

Under the Government of National Unity in western Libya, this model was perfected. The real governance occurred not in ministerial meetings but through shadowy networks where security figures placed loyalists across ministries and state-owned companies. For years, Abdulghani Al-Kikli, known as Ghneiwa, was a titan of this system. As head of the Security Support Apparatus, he installed allies in key offices to manipulate payrolls, secure kickbacks, and launder money. His power was built on turning public agencies into instruments of personal enrichment. But in a system with finite spoils, every alliance has an expiration date.

Ghneiwa’s growing dominance alarmed his partners. In May 2025, a coalition led by the 444th Brigade lured Ghneiwa to his death and dismantled his militia. The operation was framed as a move to strengthen state control. In reality, it was a hostile takeover, a violent reshuffling of the deck that changed the players but not the game.

Into the power vacuum stepped Deputy Defense Minister Abdulsalam Al-Zoubi, a former ally of Ghneiwa. Al-Zoubi’s rise exemplifies the fluid loyalties of Libyan politics, where partnership is fleeting and power is permanent. He quickly absorbed much of Ghneiwa’s network, establishing himself as the new face of western Libyan security. His primary source of influence was control over the Administrative Control Authority and, crucially, the Contracts Review Office. This office is the nexus of the system; it approves every major government contract, allowing its controller to demand bribes for approval, block rivals, and push through lucrative deals for allies.

Al-Zoubi and Ghneiwa had previously exploited this office with impunity. One brazen example involved the General Electricity Company of Libya. They approved a contract to import electricity meters at a grossly inflated price, pocketing the difference. In another scheme, they authorized the illegal export of scrap metal to Turkiye through a company owned by Al-Zoubi’s brother. This was not governance; it was a heist administered by a government office.

The linchpin of accountability, however, proved to be Audit Bureau chief Khalid Shakshak. He successfully challenged the law that handed the Contracts Review Office to Al-Zoubi’s authority, with Libya’s Supreme Court eventually ruling the move unconstitutional. This judicial decision was a direct blow to Al-Zoubi’s revenue stream, cutting him off from the lifeblood of his power. The current stalemate is, therefore, highly volatile.

Al-Zoubi is unlikely to accept this loss passively. Any attempt by him to forcibly retake control of the Contracts Review Office from Shakshak could easily trigger another round of street fighting in Tripoli. Furthermore, in this environment, today’s allies are tomorrow’s rivals. Just as Al-Zoubi betrayed Ghneiwa, his own partners may soon see him as the next obstacle to their ambitions.

This self-cannibalizing cycle in the west is mirrored by a more consolidated kleptocracy in the east. Khalifa Haftar and his sons have transformed their territorial control into an economic empire with no oversight. Their dominance is built on similar pillars: commandeering public budgets and orchestrating illicit revenue streams. A primary example is the massive fuel-smuggling scheme orchestrated by Saddam Haftar.

By exploiting Libya’s bloated fuel subsidy program, his network siphons off billions of dollars annually, selling subsidized diesel on the black market and depriving the state of crucial hard currency. This starves the national economy and fuels inflation, hurting ordinary Libyans. To date, the Haftars have industrialized corruption, using their armed dominance to coordinate smuggling routes by land and sea, with the proceeds strengthening their grip on power and even fueling conflicts in neighboring countries such as Sudan.

The international community often misreads this chaos. Figures like Al-Zoubi are frequently treated as stabilizers and reliable partners. World powers, including the US, France, and Turkey, engage with them as bridges between east and west or as bulwarks against terrorism. This engagement is a fatal miscalculation. It mistakes a temporary strongman for a foundation of stability. By granting these figures legitimacy and diplomatic cover, the international community removes any incentive for reform.

It rewards the very behavior that perpetuates the crisis. The recent illegal detention of Mohammed Mensli, head of Libya’s Asset Recovery and Management Office, is a case in point. Just as Mensli was on the verge of recovering billions in stolen state assets, he was arrested and held without trial. His imprisonment is widely seen as an effort by corrupt networks to seize control of those assets or silence a threat. The muted response from many international capitals in the face of such acts speaks volumes.

Libya is thus trapped in a feedback loop of predation. The western system constantly collapses in on itself as rivals battle for a larger share of a shrinking pie. The eastern system feigns as a disciplined criminal enterprise, extracting wealth with brutal efficiency. Both models are sustained by foreign powers that prioritize short-term security cooperation or commercial contracts over genuine stability.

The pattern is not new, but its consequences are becoming harder to ignore. Libya keeps recycling the same elites, each claiming to secure the state while fighting over the same revenue streams. The system collapses not from lack of capacity but from the way capacity is intentionally repurposed. Every office becomes a prize. Every alliance has an expiry date. Every attempt at reform becomes a redistribution of rents dressed as governance.

Until this calculus changes, Libya will remain a country consumed by its leaders, a nation where the fight to build a state is lost to the endless, unseen war over who gets to loot it. Libya’s instability is, therefore, not driven by ideology, foreign actors, or structural weakness alone. It is driven by a competition for money, contracts, and influence that has replaced the state itself — leaving the country to continue feeding on its own institutions, as the ruling elites mistake the pursuit of personal gain for political strategy.

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Hafed Al-Ghwell is a senior fellow and executive director of the North Africa Initiative at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC.

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Tom O’Connor

At the Crossroads of Crises

Risks posed by Libya’s fractured state and the presence of foreign actors are compounded by instability in neighboring nations—some of which can be traced back to the initial shock of Qaddafi’s sudden downfall and the subsequent vacuum of power.

The collapse of Libya in 2011 sparked a major influx of arms and fighters through the Sahel, with ethnic Tuareg fighters who once fought on both sides of the Libyan Civil War staging a 2012 uprising in Mali. This was followed by an explosion of Islamist insurgency, including groups linked to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, that is spreading across the region today.

To the southeast, Haftar’s troops have been accused of aiding the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces against the Sudanese Armed Forces in the civil war that first erupted in Sudan in 2021. The Government of National Unity has further alleged that Haftar supported the Rapid Support Forces with fuel transfers backed by the United Arab Emirates, though UAE officials have repeatedly rejected direct involvement in Sudan’s civil war.

The conflict in Sudan is considered to be the world’s worst humanitarian crisis today, driving millions of people out of the large African nation. Many of these refugees from Sudan and others fleeing conflicts and harsh conditions elsewhere in Africa find their way to Libya, taking advantage of the country’s disunity and unpatrolled borders to embark on a treacherous trip across the Mediterranean to Europe.

Nearly 60,000 people survived the journey and another 1,500 are known to have perished in 2025 alone, according to the European Union’s Frontex border security agency, which identifies Libya as the primary departure point. The total number of those who fled from Libya by sea since 2011 is believed to at least be in the hundreds of thousands, with potentially more unreported.

“Europe has a big problem with the immigrants who come with ships,” Sahad said. “Why do we have these immigrants? Because we could not control the borders, our southern borders. We cannot control them. We need help in that regard. We need technology.”

“We cannot control the vast borders in the south, but with technology, you can, and Europe is not giving us that help,” he added.

Yet there’s hope Washington may be able to step in here, as Sahad believes this is “another thing the United States can help us with,” and do so with a promise of reciprocal benefits.

“We’re not saying that we are demanding or asking, but also Libya will give the United States the energy, and we will give their states the stability of that region,” Sahad said. “If Libya is stable, then there are big advantages for Northern Africa, for Africa.”

Alftise reiterated this point, arguing that, while the Government of National Unity has so far been able to keep the threat of Islamist militant resurgence in the west at bay, the lack of control over the southern border and growing jihadi infiltration of nations such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger meant U.S. support was necessary not only for safeguarding Libya, but far beyond as well.

“It’s not only for the sake of Libya,” Alftise said, “it’s the sake of Africa and the sake of southern Europe.”

Unity First

As the 15th anniversary of the uprising that toppled Qaddafi nears in February, uncertainty prevails over the nation of roughly 7.5 million people once considered one of the richest nations in Africa that has still yet to rebound from its pre-2011 economic performance.

Alftise said that “there is still a big hope that things will be okay,” though he acknowledged a wave of nostalgia for Qaddafi’s rule, fueled largely by social media and foreign outlets. In response, he said, “we’re trying to tell the people that era has more bad things than good things.”

And while the cautious calm that continues to hold has produced some positive growth in the economy and social development in recent years, so much potential is hindered by the still-unwavering split between the opposing governments.

In the east, Haftar continues to entrench his position, promoting at least two of his sons, Saddam and Khalid, to senior military positions and a third, Belqasim, as his top political adviser. Critics accuse of him emulating Qaddafi in his dynastic tendencies and strongman persona that overshadows Government of National Stability Prime Minister Osama Hammad.

In the west, Dbeibah faces not only the rival government in Tobruk and its foreign backers but also a complex array of internal factions, including Islamist forces who seek to push their own vision of Libya in backing the Government of National Unity. His leverage is further challenged by incessant clashes over Libya’s oil and gas infrastructure, a backbone of the national economy that has been sapped by the dual power rivalry and rampant fuel smuggling.

Nevertheless, Dbeibah’s administration continues to enjoy international recognition and his outreach to the White House has not gone unnoticed. Trump’s senior adviser on Africa affairs, Massad Boulos, traveled to Tripoli in July to hold talks with Dbeibah that reportedly included a Libyan offer to forge a $70 billion economic partnership with the U.S.

But Libya has also caught the eye of the administration on another matter often tied to Trump’s diplomatic efforts in the Middle East and North Africa. In April, Trump’s special envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, named Libya as among six nations that could potentially join the Abraham Accords, a series of agreements through which the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco established diplomatic ties with Israel in late 2020 and early 2021.

The deals marked the first Arab-Israeli normalization pacts since those struck by Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994, save for Mauritania’s short-lived recognition offered in 1999 and rescinded amid a war in Gaza a decade later. Like the rest of the Arab world and many Muslim nations, Libya has never recognized Israel and has consistently expressed support for Palestinians, once constituting a major source of Palestinian militia funds and arms throughout the Qaddafi era.

Even years from Qaddafi’s ouster, the Israeli-Palestinian issue remains a sensitive one for Libya. Both Alftise and Sahad said unifying and stabilizing the nation remained the first order of business before such decisions could be taken.

“The important thing for us at the moment is to revive Libya as a as a country with a civil government, with democracy, so we can have our country in a sovereign situation, and it could take whatever decisions built on, one, the sovereignty of the nation, and, two, the agreement of the people, because that’s democracy,” Sahad said. “So, this is what we are facing.”

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Tom O’Connor – Senior Writer, Foreign Policy & Deputy Editor, National Security and Foreign Policy

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The Sentry

To maintain dominance over eastern and southern Libya, the Haftar family relies on Russia’s military support and the UAE’s political backing. Although other countries also assist, these two stand out. In return for their crucial assistance, the Haftars grant them numerous concrete advantages, including the systematic diversion of subsidized fuel to Russian personnel in Libya and to the Emirati-backed RSF in Sudan.

Inside the Russian entrenchment in Libya Since 2020, Russia has maintained a significant military presence at four air bases in Libya: al-Khadim, east of Benghazi; al-Jufrah, in central Libya; al-Qardabiyah, near Sirte; and Brak al-Shatti, in the south western province. There, hundreds of Russian personnel operate radar installations and air-defense systems.

Such an arrangement enables Moscow to enjoy a degree of operational autonomy while helping the Haftar family reinforce a de facto demarcation line between Haftar-held territories and northwestern Libya, where Turkish troops remain entrenched.

Field Marshal Haftar and his family view these Russian-operated air defenses as indispensable in protecting their territory against any potential advance from northwestern Libya, officials from France, the US, and Egypt told The Sen try. It is within this context that the Russians receive fuel supplies from the LAAF.

In mid-2022, Saddam Haftar’s Brigade Tareq bin Ziyad and Hassan Zadma’s Brigade 128 ramped up fuel deliveries to Russian forces beyond what was needed for local operations. This arrangement, which has benefited Russian-controlled air bases such as al-Jufrah and Brak al-Shatti, has included deliveries of jet fuel in volumes that align with the operational needs of Russian helicopters and aircraft stationed there.

Distinct from that, the quantities of diesel and gasoline supplied surpass what might be used locally by the Russians. The surplus fuel is then directed toward two distinct activities.

First, the Russians sell a portion of it to local traffickers for profit, which likely assists the Russians in covering their day-to-day expenses, such as food and other basic needs, in dinars.

Second, there are regular cargo flights transporting fuel from al-Jufrah and al-Khadim to Gao Airport in Mali, a known Russian-controlled facility.

Moreover, in the past, fuel was also sent by truck from al-Jufrah to Wagner units, which were active in Darfur until their exit in autumn 2023. These Russian-to-Russian transfers of fuel occurred through the greater al-Kufrah area under the protection of the LAAF.

In 2023, the Russian Ministry of Defense asserted more direct control of the military mission in Libya previously implemented by the Wagner Group. Its intelligence directorate, the GRU, replaced the semi-private mercenary company and now coordinates operations directly with the Haftar family.

This shift saw Russian state forces take over and bolster existing Wagner-dominated bases and tighten up direct ties with select LAAF brigades, reflecting a more formal, Russian state-directed presence. Another such strengthening phase unfolded in Libya after the December 2024 collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria.

Amid this expansion of the Russian presence in Libya, the LAAF has carried on delivering fuel for Russia’s benefit. The Russian Federation did not respond to a request for comment. The UAE, the Haftars, and the RSF Since the start of Sudan’s civil war, the Haftar camp has been a key fuel supplier to the RSF. This persistent flow of diesel and gasoline has enabled the RSF’s mobility in Darfur and, therefore, its tactical operations there.

By supplying fuel and other aid to the RSF amid the Sudanese war, the Haftar family has tightened its command structure and strategic control in southeastern Libya. The transfer of fuel to the RSF reflects the Haftars’ deep loyalty to the Emirati government, a crucial backer of the paramilitary force.

Because of the UAE’s extensive ideological, diplomatic, financial, and political support for the Haftar family since 2014, the Emirati government occupies a privileged position in the eyes of Haftar’s forces, leaving them beholden to Abu Dhabi.

Between 2014 and 2019, the UAE was the most consequential foreign actor in Libya, intervening heavily on Haftar’s behalf. To this day, it remains vital to the Haftar family, continuing to offer political and diplomatic backing and providing a banking platform for illicit financial flows. Because of this legacy, the UAE wields sway over the family.

When the war in Sudan broke out in April 2023, the UAE used its influence over the Haftar family to ensure that they supplied RSF forces with support, including fuel. Neither the UAE nor the RSF responded to requests for comment. Soon after fighting erupted in Sudan on April 15, 2023, Saddam Haftar traveled to southeastern Libya’s Kufrah district, a long-standing hub for illicit activity, to oversee efforts to secure fuel supplies for the forces of RSF leader General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, or “Hemedti.”

In addition to reinforcing security, Saddam Haftar asserted personal command over the local LAAF-affiliated Battalion Subul al Salam, even though it had previously shown a preference for business dealings with the RSF. The wartime context demanded more direct oversight by the LAAF leadership to transform existing commercial relationships into reliable wartime supply channels.

To maintain uninterrupted shipments of fuel and other goods across the border, Saddam’s Brigade Tareq bin Ziyad increased its manpower and equipment in the Kufrah area by bringing in additional forces from Benghazi and Ajdabiya. This buildup enabled tighter control over key assets, most notably Kufrah airport, which served as a critical ground hub.

Beyond supervising the flow of fuel, Saddam Haftar’s forces also coordinated occasional arms transfers to the RSF in Darfur as part of a broader support policy that included regular deliveries of ammunition. Due to concerns about potential ground incursions or air strikes from the Sudanese Armed Forces and its allies — and the treacherous conditions along the sand routes from Kufrah to Sudan — the LAAF required RSF-linked drivers to handle the final leg of fuel transportation.

Distinct from Subul al-Salam, other LAAF units play a role in the transfer of fuel to the RSF. They include Battalion 129 and other Tubu armed groups spearheaded by senior commander Mohammed Ali Sida, who is based in Rebiana, a Tubu-majority municipality near Kufrah. Formally reporting to Khaled Haftar since 2022, these Tubu forces are responsible for the Sarir refinery, located near the oilfield of the same name in the middle of eastern Libya.

The Sarir refinery operates almost exclusively for south ward smuggling purposes, with a current capacity of about 8,000 barrels (1.3 million liters) per day. Under the LAAF’s increased control, part of the refinery’s output is diverted to illicit channels, bypassing the NOC’s regular circuit. As part of its pro-Emirati policy of supporting the RSF, the LAAF also protects the passage of military resources supplied by the UAE via eastern Libya and provides training camps for Hemedti’s men in the greater Kufrah area.

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The Source: INSIDE JOB: Libya’s Fuel Smuggling Escalation by the Sentry (November 2025)

Tom O’Connor

As a divided Libya lies between two deepening crises in Africa and the porous southern flank of Europe, representatives of the nation’s internationally recognized government told Newsweek they were looking to President Donald Trump to strike a deal that could have profound effects across two continents.

The appeal from the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity that controls much of Libya’s northwest involves seeking U.S. support in pressuring countries—namely Russia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt—accused of aiding the rival Government of National Stability that controls much of the rest of the nation, including Libya’s second city of Benghazi, and is backed by the military support of influential Libyan National Army chief Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar.

In exchange, the Government of National Unity envisions boosting business and investment ties—particularly regarding Libya’s vast reserves of oil—with an administration known for its deal-based transactional foreign policy. The Libyan authorities also aim to solidify security ties that may bolster NATO’s position in the Mediterranean, curb the free flow of fighters and arms to conflicts raging in the neighboring Sahel region and Sudan while also easing the large-scale migration of African refugees to Europe.

“We would like to have the involvement of United States. And, especially with this government, they are always looking for deals, there are a lot of deals that we can do, and we keep mutual interests,” Mahmoud Ahmed Alftise, economic adviser to Government of National Unity Prime Minister Abdul-Hamid Dbeibah, told Newsweek. “Of course, we have our sovereignties, but we would like to have a good friend, a strong friend.”

“We would like to have a friend’s mutual interest, so we can go ahead and move, so people have their prosperities,” Alftise said, “because the Libyan people are really suffering from this regional interference in Libya.”

Libya’s Fracture

The roots of Libya’s schism can be traced back to a 2011 rebellion against longtime leader Muammar al-Qaddafi. Qaddafi, who had ruled the nation since seizing power in a 1969 coup against the monarchy and later adopted the titles of “brotherly leader” and “King of Kings” of Africa, had for decades molded a seemingly invincible cult of personality bolstered by grand infrastructure projects and iron-fisted suppression of dissent until widespread unrest swelled around the Arab Spring movement.

As Qaddafi’s forces attempted to extinguish the uprising, NATO intervened directly with a crushing air campaign in support of the rebels, leading to the Libyan leader’s downfall and ultimate slaying at the hands of opposition fighters.

Libya’s initial post-Qaddafi steps appeared hopeful as the temporary National Transitional Council handed the reigns to the elected General National Congress in 2012, marking the nation’s first-ever peaceful transfer of power. But new elections held in 2014 produced the first major crisis as political feuds and opposing interpretations of the nascent constitution led to the establishment of the House of Representatives to rival the General National Congress as Libya’s legislative body.

Haftar, a former close Qaddafi confidant and commander who fled to the U.S. in the 1990s to begin orchestrating efforts to oust his ex-ally, emerged as a powerful military figure in support of the House of Representatives. As head of the Libyan National Army, he declared a military operation against the General National Congress, and Libya thus devolved into a second civil war, this time with no clear victor.

The conflict continued for six years until a 2020 ceasefire that once again inspired cautious optimism toward a political solution, with the establishment of the Government of National Unity as the new Tripoli-based authority aimed at unifying the nation. But the House of Representatives rejected the Government of National Unity’s mandate the following year, leading to the creation of the Government of National Stability in the east and entrenching the dual power system that continues to divide Libya to this day.

Sporadic clashes also persist, sometimes among internal factions of the two major governments that claim legitimate authority in Libya, such as occurred between military and militia units in Tripoli in May. Without a mutually agreed framework for Libya’s unification and a United Nations road map left sidelined, both parties remain locked in their feud, though Alftise argued the Government of National Unity remained more open to a negotiated solution.

“Our government is more flexible, there are even some thoughts that maybe we can merge the two governments in order to have an election, and then we will have, of course, parliamentary elections, and then we have a presidential election, or maybe together,” Alftise said.

“But what happened is the House of Representatives is under the control of Mr. Haftar,” he added. “They cannot say something that he does not like.”

Foreign Intrigue

While a return to large-scale fighting has thus far been avoided, fears loom over such a scenario plunging the country into another period of civil strife. Alftise suggested the decision of peace and war may ultimately be influenced by the whims of foreign powers, who have increasingly spread their influence in Libya.

And elsewhere on the continent itself, he predicted that inaction on Russia’s projection of influence through the deployment of personnel in regions like the Sahel could precipitate a broader geopolitical shift for Africa at a time when many nations have already abandoned ties with Europe.

“The Russian presence in Libya is not only controlling Libya. No, they are controlling Africa,” Sahad said. “They are sending troops to other African countries, and they want to be in control of them. And if this continues, if we allow that to continue, they will find one time that Africa will come to the other side.”

The Kremlin’s interest in Libya is deep-rooted as NATO’s intervention prompted a severe backlash from Russian President Vladimir Putin, who went on to double down on back for another Soviet-era ally facing an Arab Spring revolt, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Assad’s downfall at the hands of an Islamist-led rebel offensive last year has reportedly been followed by an uptick in contacts with Haftar, who met Putin in May at Russia’s 80th anniversary World War II Victory Day parade.

It’s not just Moscow or even adversaries of Washington that the Government of National Unity suspects of seeking a lasting piece of Libya. Sahad argued that the United Arab Emirates had thrown its weight behind Haftar in a bid for port access and other shares of the country.

“The UAE has this sickness of wanting to control harbors. They came to buy New York Harbor one time,” Sahad said. “The control of the Libyan harbors, some of them is to be part of the Libyan oil industry, and to be part of the financial sector, especially the banks, and there are other things, and I have no doubt that they have this ambition, and I have no doubt that Haftar agrees with that.”

Egypt, too, has expressed its ambitions to stake control over parts of eastern Libya, according to Sahad, who cited Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s 2020 remarks calling any attack by the Government of National Unity’s forces against the Government of National Stability-held coastal city of Sirte a “red line” that would result in direct Egyptian military intervention.

Russia and the UAE have rejected allegations that they provided direct support for the Libyan National Army during its westward offensives, while Egypt has framed its stance as necessary for maintaining security along its border with Libya.

Still, Sahad argued that addressing runaway foreign influence was key to unlocking progress on other fronts, including reconciling the split nature of Libya’s governance and paving the way for U.S. investment in Libya’s resource industry.

“If we put an end to this interference, our situation will be better,” Sahad said. “Maybe it will be easier for us to reach an agreement and unify the institutions. A lot of things could happen by then. But with this interference we have, we have real big problems in that regard. The U.S. can help a lot”

“Another sphere is our oil industry faces a lot of problems because of a lack of experts,” he added. “The American companies started the oil industry in the 50s, now we have a lot of fields not explored yet. I think United States companies have a big interest there. And it’s not only oil, we have other minerals.”

To address the growing presence of foreign actors, Sahad called on the U.S. to crack down on the nations suspected of playing destabilizing roles in Libya. While he said he was encouraged by moves such as the Libyan Stabilization Act that passed the House of Representatives in 2021 but was never signed into law, he argued he has not “seen any real effort from either this administration, nor the administration before, to put some pressure on the United Arab Emirates or Egypt to stop their interference in Libya.”

Attention to foreign influence in Libya has also sparked some acknowledgment within the Government of National Unity regarding Turkey’s growing role, particularly after Ankara began fostering closer dialogue with the House of Representatives as part of what Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan referred to in August as a step in line with his nation’s “multidimensional diplomatic efforts.”

“Of course, the Turks always like to have some existence in the area, because they feel they are a power in the area. And nowadays they are,” Alftise said. “They were, of course, in the Ottoman Empire, and now they are trying to have a new history there.”

***

Tom O’Connor – Senior Writer, Foreign Policy & Deputy Editor, National Security and Foreign Policy

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The Sentry

Haftar’s Southwest Grab: A Hub

of Convergence

Armed groups affiliated with Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, mainly Saddam Haftar’s forces, exploit their control over strategic checkpoints and petrol stations across southwest Libya. They oversee the diver sion of subsidized fuel into a parallel market that extends into the neighboring countries of Niger, Chad, and Sudan. Imperfect rule over greater Sabha Since 2021, Saddam Haftar has been increasing his control over the security sector in the Sabha area and, with it, the fuel smuggling operations in southwestern Libya.

Prior to that time, Sabha, a city of 130,000 and southwestern Libya’s largest, harbored a disparate array of armed actors: some nominally pro-Haftar yet operating with autonomy from Benghazi’s general command, others openly hostile to the Haftar family’s dominance. This fractured makeup, rife with ten sion and petty criminality, made Sabha difficult to govern. Various armed groups stubbornly guarded their illicit revenues and resisted the Haftar family’s attempts to assert supremacy in the city.

Following the seizure by rival forces of a large cannabis shipment in spring 2021, Saddam Haftar stepped up his military assertiveness, dispatching personnel, armed vehicles, and equipment to the Sabha area from Benghazi and Ajdabiya. He used his main armed force, Brigade Tareq bin Ziyad, led by Brak al-Shatti native Omar Mrajae al-Maqarhi, to either subdue or co-opt local groups.

On the economic front, Saddam also used the National Development Apparatus, a recon struction agency under his tacit control, to oversee infrastructure projects, agricultural initiatives, and other endeavors. Until it was dismantled in early 2025, the LAAF’s Brigade 128 also played a major role in projecting the Haftars’ influence in the southwestern province, notably in Qatrun, Awbari, and Ghat.

As the LAAF has strengthened its security presence in southwestern Libya, it has come to control almost all fuel flows entering Libya’s southwest province, whether from the northwestern or northeastern coast. This consolidation has enabled the LAAF to dominate most fuel smuggling operations in the southwest ern province. To further capitalize on this control and increase the amount of fuel diverted into the parallel market, the LAAF issues QR codes, which limit each civilian’s vehicle to one tank refill every five days, and it restricts petrol stations’ opening hours. Thanks to this system, most tanker trucks appear to be delivering their cargo at genuine petrol stations, while legitimate buyers are indirectly prevented by the LAAF from accessing fuel from official outlets. As a result, most of the fuel intended for legal sale is in fact diverted to southwestern Libya’s parallel market at inflated prices.

The Umm al-Aranib municipality serves as the main transit point for fuel heading south through the greater Sabha area. In the town and its surroundings, checkpoints manned by LAAF units regulate the flow of millions of liters of fuel each day, fuel that travels along both official roads and sand tracks toward northern Niger and Kouri Bougoudi in northwestern Chad, a bustling gold-mining hub. Once near the border, the fuel typically sells for $1.20 to $2.40 per liter, and sometimes for even more.

Most of the profit from this wide margin goes to the LAAF. The Umm al-Aranib area, along with locations further south such as the strategic city of Qatrun near Chad’s border, is dominated by the Tubu community. In recent years — especially since 2020 — the Haftar family has shifted from an openly hostile stance to more pragmatic arrangements with this non-Ar ab community. Some of the Tubu’s local armed units have joined Khaled Haftar’s Security Units division within the LAAF, while others operate under a protection economy logic.

In exchange for allowing fuel convoys to pass safely through their territory, Tubu-majority militias capture a share of the sizable profits that the LAAF derives from facilitating the sale of Libya’s subsidized fuel at much higher prices abroad. Aside from Niger and Chad, some fuel leaving the greater Sabha area heads for Darfur via Chad’s northeastern corner, traveling yet another corridor protected by local militias working closely with the LAAF.

The Northwest’s Disingenuous Efforts

Against Smuggling

In addition to illicit maritime exports, northwestern Libya sends large volumes of fuel from the coast to the southwest, with a significant portion of fuel handled by Saddam Haftar’s brigades in charge of the southwest province. Haftar’s forces and other LAAF brigades then pass those deliveries of fuel into Niger, Chad, and Sudan, capturing a profit in the process. Some of the northwestern Libya actors en gaging in the illegal trade, such as Brigade 111, are directly linked to Prime Minister Abdelhamid Dabaiba, who has taken no genuine action to curtail their activities.

The northwestern quadrant of Libya, the most diverse province of Libya and home to more than two thirds of the country’s population, features a deeply ingrained web of smuggling routes linking it to Tunisia, southwestern Libya, and northern Mediterranean countries, including EU member states Malta and Italy. Faced with a reality in which distinct groups control their own territories and revenue streams through well-entrenched networks with deep social roots, Dabaiba and his government have been re luctant to engage in protracted confrontations in the northwestern cities of Zawiyah and Zuwarah.

Along the coast west of Tripoli, Dabaiba has disrupted smuggling networks on several occasions but has con sistently backed off before open conflict. Along the coast east of Tripoli, an area that includes Zliten, Khums, Misrata, and Abu Qrain, where local Dabaiba allies are strong, ever fewer measures have been taken against smuggling. In fact, in Misrata and its surroundings, the attitude of the Tripoli government is best described as active complicity. Northwestern Libya’s fuel smuggling operations differ from those overseen by the LAAF in the east and south. In the northwest, no single faction possesses the capacity to impose itself as a near-hege mon — unlike in the east and south, where the Haftar family dominates.

Leveraging their quasi-monopo ly on the use of force, the Haftars devote substantial resources to protecting, regulating, and overseeing both legitimate and illicit fuel supply chains across the vast territories under their purview. In contrast, the area stretching from Tripoli’s western outskirts to the Tunisian border is home to multiple rival armed factions. Yet, despite the absence of a dominant party capable of policing the area, these actors essentially cooperate to maintain revenue streams from illicit activities. This seemingly paradoxi cal cohabitation among rival groups underlines a classic protection economy model in which smuggling thrives despite tribal differences and socio-political enmities.

Zawiyah: No Cop on the Beat

When it comes to fuel, Zawiyah — a fractious tribal city of around 250,000 inhabitants located about 45 kilometers west of the capital — serves as the main distribution hub for both the surrounding area and more distant parts of the country. Inaugurated in 1974, the city’s energy complex houses a large refinery and, more significantly, a maritime terminal that receives more than a billion dollars’ worth of imported fuel each year.

Since 2013, a local armed group leader named Mohammed Koshlaf has exercised de facto control over the Zawiyah energy complex, even obtaining official recognition as head of a Petroleum Facilities Guard unit under Libya’s Defense Ministry. Despite being under international sanctions since 2018 for human smuggling, Koshlaf has, without interruption, maintained a tight grip on the inner workings of this strategic site. Thanks to his position, Koshlaf maximizes the throughput of subsidized fuel by selling it at prices above the official rate, capturing a modest margin that is multiplied by large volumes.

In practical terms, he delegates most of the distribution logistics and related security problems to an array of smaller smugglers, as well as to private distribution companies willing to participate in the illicit fuel market under rules largely established by Koshlaf and his associates. Although official records list roughly 750 petrol stations between western Tripoli and the Tunisian border, only around 300 can be physically verified, and of those, fewer than 200 are operational. In other words, the vast majority of these stations exist solely on paper; they provide a veneer of legitimacy to justify much larger allocations of subsidized fuel by Brega Petroleum for so-called “local” consump tion.

From an accounting perspective, Brega Petroleum appears as though it is supplying legitimate outlets, when in reality, most of the fuel leaving Zawiyah’s energy complex is diverted to black markets rather than reaching bona fide pumps. From Zawiyah’s refinery, some smugglers move fuel westward, primarily to the coastal city of Zuwarah, an Amazigh municipality near the Tunisian border. In Zuwarah, actors connected to the city’s military council export the diverted fuel by land or load it onto vessels, which typically carry between 400,000 and 750,000 liters, to be shipped toward the northern Mediterranean.

Other actors transport fuel from Zawiyah’s energy complex into southwestern Libya — an inland journey that is complicated by fragmented territories and communities that are socially or politically opposed to one another. As a result, truck drivers sometimes must hand off their cargo mid-route if they belong to the “wrong” community for a particular stretch of territory, entrusting it to another driver for the next section. Every checkpoint requires payment to the militia or authority dominating that pocket of land.

These additional costs accumulate, pushing the final sale price higher by the time the fuel reaches southwestern Libya. Plus, drivers receive an extra bonus when the requested itinerary involves a clear deviation from official channels. Compared to makeshift transporters, the four authorized distribution companies enjoy added protection for their trucks, making their official convoys somewhat less vulnerable to extortion and checkpoint fees as they pass through rival-held zones.

Misrata Joint Force:

The PM’s protégé Misrata, a wealthy merchant city endowed with a major port, a free trade zone, and a vital fuel entry point, has long ensured the stable and sufficient distribution of fuel to itself and to neighboring cities such as Zliten and Khums. This stability has traditionally prevented major fuel shortages or disrup tions, creating an environment relatively free from fuel smuggling networks.

The situation worsened in 2021 when the Joint Force, a local brigade that had participated in Misrata’s 2016 war on the Islamic State in nearby Sirte, aligned itself with the newly appointed prime minister. When Dabaiba assumed office in March 2021, he struck a deal with Joint Force leader Omar Bug hdada, providing the armed group with access to Defense Ministry funds, equipment, and recognition. Empowered by its new status, the Joint Force assumed key security responsibilities in Tripoli, including guarding significant state facilities.

The alliance between Dabaiba and the Joint Force enabled the brigade to assert control over parts of Misrata’s airport and maritime port. Under the implicit protection of Dabaiba, the brigade expanded its involvement in illicit activities, including fuel smuggling. Joint Force smuggling ops The Joint Force and the smugglers that it protects acquire fuel from specific petrol stations near Misrata. The Joint Force network also purchases fuel from petrol stations in neighboring cities like Zliten, Khums, and Tawergha. To move this fuel, Joint Force members, often serving as fuel truck drivers, use their military identification to bypass checkpoints.

The Joint Force runs fuel smuggling operations through the Misrata Free Trade Zone and the port of Khums using several tactics: manipulating shipping documents, using hidden tank capacity, concealing fuel in regular cargo containers, and conducting nighttime offshore transfers between large and small vessels. Their control over the free trade zone enables them to manipulate documents to mask these activities. While fuel is officially documented for distribution to Zliten, Khums, and Tawergha, the Joint Force diverts much of it via tanker trucks to the Jufrah area through Abu Qrain and, to a lesser extent, to Shwayref via Bani Walid.

Once in these areas, the product is transferred further south by Haftar-aligned actors, including through official distribution networks. Collaboration with Haftar’s armed coalition, particularly in the Shwayref area, is a critical element in the transfer of fuel from Misrata to the south. However, the fluctuating state of relations between actors affects the fluidity and volume of fuel smuggling operations. When relations are strained, coordination weakens, leading to disruptions in these illicit activities.

An aura of legitimacy

Separate from fuel, the Joint Force has been suspected of facilitating the transit of illicit gold from sub-Saharan Africa through Misrata to destinations abroad, mainly Turkey, as well as permitting Ira nian vessels to access Misrata’s port for various illicit activities, including arms trafficking. Because Misrata seeks a reputation for legitimate commerce, some of the city’s business magnates resent the Dabaiba family. Yet Bughdada remains politically and technically shielded by Dabaiba, who pre serves a tight partnership with the Joint Force, lending it an aura of legitimacy despite scandals such as the May 2024 gold trafficking affair that pitted the Joint Force against the Attorney General’s Office.

The Joint Force is also present in Tripoli, where it has been securing the NOC’s headquarters since July 2022, when Dabaiba ordered it to expel then-chairman Mustafa Sanallah and install Haftar ally Farhat Benqdara. Though Benqdara was removed in January 2025, the Joint Force still controls the NOC’s security, thus retaining leverage over the oil and gas sector.

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The Source: INSIDE JOB: Libya’s Fuel Smuggling Escalation by the Sentry (November 2025)

The Sentry

Saddam Haftar and other actors aligned with the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) utilize their territori al control to tax flows of fuel smuggled by others and to transport their own illicit cargo, thereby capturing revenue from the large-scale diversion of subsidized fuel. The Haftar coalition also cultivates select tribal groups, further solidifying control over smuggling networks in eastern Libya, which since 2021 has displaced western Libya as the country’s epicenter of the illegal fuel trade.

Driving this shift is Saddam Haftar, operating through the LAAF, his father Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s armed coalition. The young lieutenant general has reshaped parts of the NOC and other state organs to maximize his sway over fuel smuggling and other illicit activities. This strategy has enabled the Haftar coalition to grow a fuel smuggling network within the NOC and other legitimate institutions, blur ring the lines between legitimate and illicit activities.

As Saddam Haftar’s Ground Forces division has strengthened, it has prioritized illicit profits, reducing the availability of subsidized fuel outside major eastern cities. For years, northwestern Libya had been the epicenter for fuel smuggling, where contending armed fac tions alternated between clashes and tense cohabitation. This lack of unity resulted in smaller-scale, less efficient operations. After Libya’s civil war ended in June 2020, the Haftar coalition concentrated on the eastern and southern regions, solidifying its hegemony there in ways unmatched in the more fragmented west.

The result: illicit fuel volumes in eastern Libya surged, hurting the country’s economy. Beyond immediate profits, Saddam Haftar’s big push in fuel smuggling since 2021 has yielded a self-reinforcing cycle that bolsters his sway on almost all fronts.

Maritime smuggling operations

Saddam Haftar wields extensive authority over northeastern Libya, both on land and at sea. His sway encompasses ports, roads, storage facilities, customs, border police, key parts of the NOC and Brega Petroleum, and maritime operations ranging from authorizing ships to leave port to issuing official doc uments via administrators under his influence. As a result, Saddam Haftar controls almost all of eastern Libya’s maritime smuggling, which forms a major component of the illicit fuel trade in the eastern prov ince.

Unlike overland smuggling, which cannot easily move millions of liters at once, maritime smuggling involves entire vessels diverting massive shipments of subsidized fuel — often several million liters at a time. It also involves processes designed to obscure the fuel’s origin and destination to render de tection and interception challenging for authorities abroad. These traits make maritime reexports the most efficient means of stealing fuel, responsible for an enormous chunk of the fuel diverted daily.

Two main methods of diverting imported fuel by sea have flourished, especially since : simple reexport and indirect reexport. In simple reexport operations, fuel that was imported is subsequently loaded onto a separate vessel — often in Benghazi’s old harbor or, more seldom, in Tobruk, about 440 kilometers further east — and then shipped directly to its final destination, such as Turkey.

The Queen Majeda inci dent is a prime example. Local authorities in Albania intercepted this ship in September 2022, just days after it had departed from Benghazi’s old harbor carrying more than $2 million in foreign-refined heavy marine fuel that was diverted to Albania.

In indirect reexport, a vessel carrying the imported fuel departs from a Libyan port and sails to a location in the Mediterranean Sea, such as Hurds Bank just outside Maltese territorial waters, where the fuel is transferred to another vessel in a ship-to-ship transfer. Although this extra step adds cost, it helps conceal the connection to Libya. Consequently, the receiving vessel can reach its final destination with no trace that the product originated in Libya’s subsidized fuel program.

One well-documented example is the Aristo. In November 2023, Italian authorities intercepted the vessel near Licata, Sicily, as it was about to perform a ship-to-ship transfer. The Aristo, which had sailed from eastern Libya, was carry ing about 670,000 liters of diesel picked up at Benghazi’s old harbor. If the ship-to-ship transfer had occurred, the product would likely have been passed off as legitimate through a broker-arranged sale to Italian oil services company Saipem.

In both methods, foreign-refined fuel is delivered at a commercial port, stored in Brega Petroleum’s local depot, and then moved by tanker trucks onto vessels for reexport. In the Benghazi area, Ali al-Mashay serves as Saddam Haftar’s most trusted subordinate when it comes to overseeing illicit fuel transfers, from the moment imported fuel arrives at Benghazi’s new commercial port until it is loaded onto a differ ent vessel at the old harbor nearby.

In this context, the use of tankers that can carry up to 50 million liters of liquid fuel makes it easier to illegally export vast quantities of fuel from the Benghazi area. A Benghazi-based security official told The Sentry that no cargo — whether narcotics, migrants, fuel, or any other items — can pass through the ports of Benghazi without Ali al-Mashay’s personal approval. An even more brazen practice involves diverting the imported fuel at sea before it even reaches Libyan shores, transferring cargo from one ship to another, either within Libyan territorial waters or in interna tional waters.

Outside Libya’s territorial waters, maritime smugglers often use fraudulent paperwork for two reasons. Fraudulent paperwork helps deceive local authorities at the final destination, and carrying ostensi bly valid documents helps evade international scrutiny under UN Security Council resolutions, which condemn unauthorized hydrocarbon exports. In this context, international actors such as the EU’s Operation IRINI — tasked with upholding UN Security Council resolutions on Libya — can inspect fuel cargos. In addition to using fraudulent documentation, ships involved in smuggling often disable their automatic identification system (AIS) transponder, which allows public location tracking, to avoid mari time surveillance.

Although these maritime methods are employed along Libya’s western shores, corrupt actors on the country’s eastern shores operate at a far larger scale. The stark disparity in volumes stolen arises from western Libya’s more fractured security landscape, which makes it difficult for networks to secure the complicity and acquiescence of all other factions and bureaucrats — and thus keeps volumes much lower.

On the administrative front, the active involvement and complicity of senior officials within Brega Petro leum, as well as the NOC’s top leadership, is crucial for the large-scale diversion of fuel. It ensures that the NOC remains publicly silent while its multimillion-dollar fuel cargos disappear at sea, representing a steady flow of fuel into illicit operations. Such a level of coordination and corruption underscores the entrenched nature of the fuel smuggling sector and the significant obstacles in combating diversion schemes.

In May 2022, the NOC chairman at the time alerted Libya’s attorney general about an unprecedented surge in abnormal fuel exports from Benghazi. He lost his job two months after issuing this alert. Another stark example is that of Faraj al-Jaedi who, in June 2023, was promoted by the NOC chairman from the operations and human re sources director of Brega Petroleum to its board member responsible for finance‬.

According to a senior Libyan technocrat familiar with Brega Petroleum’s inner workings, Jaedi is close to Saddam Haftar. Jaedi was Brega Petroleum’s operations director when the Queen Majeda shipment to Albania occurred in September 2022, and the UN-recognized Libyan government vouched for the legality of the shipping documents that Brega Petroleum had issued. These facts strongly suggest that Jaedi actively helped divert the cargo. Brega Petroleum, the NOC’s wholly owned subsidiary, did not respond to a request for comment.

The NOC, in its response to The Sentry’s request for comment, denied that Jaedi played any role in the Queen Majeda incident and added that he has no relationship with Saddam Haftar. The NOC also asserted that none of its employees nor those of Brega Petroleum had been summoned by the attorney general in the context of fuel smuggling. Furthermore, the NOC said it provided relevant authorities with official reports pertaining to fuel smuggling cases and it cooperated with the United Nations Panel of Experts.

On the issue of large-scale fuel smuggling via maritime routes, the NOC told The Sentry that no smuggling incidents have been recorded from oil ports under its authority. It added that the NOC controls only oil ports and that the old Benghazi harbor is not an oil port and is therefore not under the control of the NOC or any of its subsidiaries.

Reached separately by The Sentry, former NOC Chairman Farhat Benqdara noted that maritime smuggling of fuel in Libya occurred not at oil terminals but at commercial ports, where the NOC and its subsidiaries had no authority.

Land-based smuggling operations

While maritime smuggling constitutes a major profit center for the Haftar camp, the coalition also over sees land-based routes for the transport of fuel, encompassing both legitimate fuel deliveries and fuel funneled into the parallel market, whether domestic or foreign. Fuel exiting northeastern Libya departs from the Ras al-Manqar depot, a strategic storage facility east of Benghazi. From there, official tanker trucks travel south through Ajdabiya — a critical choke point — before branching onto three main roads.

The first leads to Sirte, then continues to Jufrah and into the southwestern province. The second, the Ajdabiya–Kufrah corridor, is the primary artery for southeast Libya. The third follows makeshift tracks via Zillah and Umm al-Aranib, eventually reaching further south. The bulk of the fuel heading for the southwestern province passes through Zillah, with Umm al-Aranib serving as a major hub.

While all of these passages are under the control of Saddam Haftar-aligned brigades, tribal affiliations underpin fuel smuggling operations in logistically crucial areas. The Zway tribe, for example, dominates much of the Ajdabiya-Kufrah corridor through its ownership and operation of numerous petrol stations, the primary points of sale and diversion. In leveraging its connections with the Haftar family, the Zway tribe has expanded its market control since 2016, creating a profitable environment for smuggling, with residents in Kufrah often paying over 6 dinars ($1.20) per liter — 40 times the official subsidized rate.

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Federica Saini Fasanotti

The intense rivalries, power struggles among militias and shifting regional dynamics are casting a shadow over the country’s prospects of ever achieving unity again.

he divisions in Libya’s political landscape are becoming rigid and permanent. Recent clashes in Tripoli, particularly the late September fighting triggered by competing appointments to a top security position, highlight just how volatile the situation remains. Libyan Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh’s push to dismantle militias disloyal to his Government of National Unity (GNU) has disrupted already-fragile power-sharing agreements and sparked armed confrontations in the capital.

Italy, Turkiye and the European Union are keeping a close eye on the situation, as Libya’s turmoil directly affects their strategic interests, from migration and energy security to regional influence.

Dbeibeh vs. Haftar: Libya’s enduring power stalemate

At the heart of Libya’s political paralysis is the enduring rivalry between Prime Minister Dbeibeh, based in Tripoli in the west of the country, and Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, who holds power in the east. This clash of authority pits the UN-recognized GNU in Tripoli against Mr. Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA). The LNA operates from its regional stronghold in Cyrenaica, while Tobruk serves as its political center and houses the parallel administration known as the House of Representatives.

Neither side has the strength to unify the country completely, yet both possess enough military and financial clout to undermine any solution that threatens their position. This dynamic has led to a frozen stalemate in which no faction can prevail, but each can still impede progress toward peace. Field Marshal Haftar’s attempted offensive on Tripoli in 2019 showcased his ambition to seize the capital by force. Although Turkiye’s military intervention foiled that assault, Mr. Haftar entrenched himself in the east and reinforced his influence by appointing loyalists, including his sons, to crucial positions.

In the west, Prime Minister Dbeibeh’s mandate has officially lapsed since 2021, and his authority barely reaches beyond the patchwork of militias that only somewhat recognize the GNU. Their rivalry continues to be a significant barrier to achieving any form of national reconciliation. Efforts from the international community – ranging from United Nations roadmaps to regional mediation – continually falter, caught in the trap of this zero-sum contest for power.

Fragile militia alliances and unstable security

The leadership rivalry is further complicated by the fragmented and unstable nature of the country’s security landscape. Militias are the real power brokers, and today’s ally can swiftly turn into tomorrow’s adversary. This year’s clashes in Tripoli have sharply highlighted how quickly a militia, once considered loyal, may turn against the government if its own interests are jeopardized.

In May, the assassination of a prominent militia leader, Ghnewa al-Kikli, sent the capital spiraling into its worst violence in years. Although a ceasefire eventually restored a shaky semblance of calm, tensions flared again by September. This resurgence of fighting was sparked when Prime Minister Dbeibeh attempted to curb the influence of the Special Deterrence Force (Radaa), a powerful militia in Tripoli aligned with the Presidential Council. A deal brokered by Turkiye aimed to have Radaa return key sites, such as the airport and Mitiga prison, to state control. However, implementation faltered amid a turf war between the GNU and the Presidential Council.

The feud over rival appointments to head the Judicial Police, one made by Prime Minister Dbeibeh and the other by the Presidential Council, ignited armed street battles on September 21.

Episodes like this underscore the inherent fragility of Libya’s militia-dominated order. Armed groups have divided the country into fiefdoms, controlling airports, ports and oil facilities, which they exploit for financial gain and political influence. Any attempt to alter this precarious balance, whether by disbanding a militia or reassigning its commanders, can shatter the temporary coalitions that pass for stability.

In Tripoli, the GNU relies on a constellation of militia “partners” whose loyalty is transactional. Meanwhile, in the east, Field Marshal Haftar’s LNA holds an uneasy coalition of tribal and Salafist units, similarly bound by convenience. The potential for sudden escalation looms constantly, and each flare-up further erodes public trust and worsens humanitarian conditions.

For Libyan civilians, constant skirmishes between militias means that daily life is often precarious. Armed factions constantly vie for power, showing little consideration for the people caught in the middle. For foreign stakeholders, it means that any diplomatic or economic involvement in Libya is fraught with the potential for disruption.

Turkiye’s expanding role as kingmaker

Turkiye has emerged as the most influential external actor in Libya, with its role evolving rapidly. In 2019-2020, Ankara supported the Tripoli government during a critical moment, deploying military advisors, armed drones and Syrian fighters that helped beat back Field Marshal Haftar’s offensive. In return, Turkiye secured lucrative construction and energy contracts in western Libya, along with a controversial maritime delimitation agreement in 2019 that expanded its claims in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The maritime deal closely tied the Tripoli authorities to Ankara’s strategic vision, often referred to as the “Blue Homeland” doctrine. This move, however, infuriated Greece and Cyprus and was rejected by Mr. Haftar and his foreign backers like Egypt. For a while, Turkiye seemed satisfied as the main supporter of western Libya, solidifying a Misrata-Tripoli-Ankara alliance. Yet, as the Libyan conflict settled into a stalemate, Turkish policymakers began to rethink their approach.

Today, Turkiye is expanding its engagement to hedge its bets across Libya’s divided landscape. Recognizing the limitations of relying solely on the Tripoli faction, Ankara has prudently begun to establish ties with Mr. Haftar and his base in Cyrenaica. Turkish diplomats and business leaders have made high-profile visits to Benghazi and even to Field Marshal Haftar’s stronghold, exploring investment opportunities and fostering political dialogues.

The goal is not to abandon Tripoli, but to gain leverage on both sides of the country’s east-west divide. By engaging with Mr. Haftar’s camp, Turkiye aims to broaden and legitimize the 2019 memorandum of understanding regarding maritime zones, preferably with the endorsement of Cyrenaica. Establishing a potential understanding with Mr. Haftar could also help repair Ankara’s strained relations with Egypt, the field marshal’s primary Arab supporter, ultimately bolstering Turkiye’s regional influence.

Turkiye aims to be the indispensable powerbroker in Libya, positioning itself as the go-to nation able to engage with all factions and shape any political resolution. This expanding footprint presents significant opportunities for Ankara, including securing energy exploration agreements, gaining access to Libya’s vast oil reserves and securing reconstruction contracts. But it also brings inherent risks; Turkiye needs to navigate complex rivalries carefully to avoid overextending itself or provoking a backlash. The choices it makes next will substantially affect the country’s future and the interests of other international players.

Implications for Italy and Europe

Libya’s turmoil presents a complex challenge for both Italy and the EU, blending security threats with strategic opportunities. Rome’s main concerns focus on migration, energy resources and geopolitical influence. The chaos in Libya has significantly driven irregular migration across the central Mediterranean route, a key political issue in Italy. Each new outbreak of violence or breakdown of governance raises the alarming possibility of fresh waves of migrants making their way to Italian shores.

Rome also worries that protracted instability in Libya could provide terrorist groups with a new foothold and disrupt the country’s crucial oil and gas output, which is heavily linked to investments made by the Italian energy company Eni. Conversely, a more stable Libya could offer Italy opportunities to deepen trade ties, secure energy imports and enhance migration cooperation through robust bilateral agreements.

However, Italy’s ability to influence events in Libya has been hampered by the growing presence of other powers, particularly Turkiye and Russia, as well as by Rome’s own difficult compromises. The danger for Italy is that it risks being sidelined in a country it once regarded as part of its sphere of influence. In some instances, Italy has felt it necessary to engage in questionable deals with Libyan factions just to maintain a say in the unfolding situation.

Rome’s approach in the Mediterranean involves delicately balancing cooperation with Turkiye when possible, while also protecting against being squeezed between Turkish and Russian expansionism in North Africa. Its recent efforts to bolster its navy and presence in the Mediterranean are a direct response to this shifting balance of power. Italy sees the southern flank as the focal point of its main strategic threats and interests.

For the European Union, Libya represents both a humanitarian concern and a strategic vulnerability at Europe’s doorstep. The EU officially supports UN-led peace efforts and runs an operation to enforce the arms embargo on Libya, but internal divisions often weaken Europe’s influence. Member states have pursued differing agendas: Italy and Malta focus on migration, engaging with Tripoli on coast guard training, and France has at times courted Mr. Haftar, driven by potential business opportunities in the east. Meanwhile, Greece and Cyprus focus on countering Turkiye’s maritime claims stemming from agreements with Libyan authorities.

The EU’s concerns coalesce around a few key issues. The first is migration: Ongoing instability in Libya means that migrants and refugees continue to use Libyan territory as a launching pad to reach Europe, a situation that EU leaders are eager to manage or control. Second is security: A lawless Libya could become a hotbed for organized crime and terrorism, posing direct threats to Europe through arms smuggling, human trafficking and extremist networks. Third, the presence of Russian mercenaries and military equipment in Haftar-controlled areas is another worrying factor, as it extends Moscow’s influence along the southern edge of the Mediterranean.

Scenarios

Unlikely: National unity and elections

In an ideal scenario, a unified diplomatic effort, perhaps spearheaded by Turkiye, given its unique ties to both camps, successfully bridges the divide between the Dbeibeh-led west and Field Marshal Haftar’s east. A power-sharing agreement is reached, paving the way for a cohesive interim government, finally allowing the long-delayed national elections; Libya has not held such elections since 2014. Bringing an end to the split between Tripoli and Tobruk could help Libya gradually rebuild a unified army and reestablish central control over its resources.

However, the likelihood of this occurring in the near term is slim. Years of distrust and zero-sum politics would need to be overcome, and as of late 2025, adversaries still prioritize maintaining power over compromising.

Most likely: Continued fragmentation and external patronage

The most likely scenario is that Libya remains mired in its post-2014 deadlock. Power remains divided between rival governments in the east and west, resulting in a mosaic of localized ceasefires that, while preventing a full-blown civil war, offer no genuine progress toward unity. Prime Minister Dbeibeh may hold onto his position in the west, while Field Marshal Haftar and his allies sustain their parallel institutions. Militias would continue to clash periodically, especially in the western region, where rivalries within the Tripoli camp simmer. Any new UN peace initiatives would face delays or be undermined by local spoilers.

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The Sentry

Executive Summary

Fuel smuggling in Libya has escalated into a major national crisis, costing the country about $6.7 billion per year. Although fuel smuggling has long been one of the North African nation’s most persistent illicit activities, a few key Libyan actors—with foreign assistance—have significantly intensified the exploitation of Libya’s bloated fuel subsidy program, whose dollar size surged to unprecedented levels from 2022 to 2024.

The consequences both within and outside Libya have been numerous, including inflation and the further consolidation of power by the Haftar family in Benghazi and, to a lesser extent, the Dabaiba family in Tripoli, as well as the fact that foreign players—including Russian armed units and Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—have benefited from the country’s fuel crisis.

Despite steady oil production and favorable market conditions throughout 2023 and most of 2024, the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) reported a hard currency deficit two years in a row. The fiscal imbalance stems in large part from Libya’s swapping of crude output for fuel imports, with more than half of the imported fuel siphoned off by criminal networks.

Libya’s outsized fuel subsidy program reduces the amount of crude that Libya can sell for dollars, depriving the CBL of the hard currency it needs for food, medicine, and other essential imports. By reducing the National Oil Corporation’s (NOC) income, Libya’s excessive fuel imports have also made paying government salaries more difficult. Thus, the rise in smuggling activities has contributed to the Libyan dinar’s depreciation on the black market and added to consumer price inflation, hurting households across the country.

Plus, as corrupt officials increasingly dominate the fuel subsidy program, legitimate consumers face fuel shortages, risks of electricity outages, and higher prices at the pump. As a result of the takeover by illicit networks, the fuel subsidy program has become less accessible to those it’s meant to serve, exacerbating the economic strain on Libyan households.

Smuggling not only deprives the CBL of crucial dollar revenues, it also undermines the integrity of the NOC, whose hydrocarbon exports account for virtually all of Libya’s income. Years of gigantic illicit profits derived from the fuel scheme have enabled some corrupt networks not only to organize themselves better but also to expand their influence—across the NOC and other formal institutions alike—often causing lasting damage. Meanwhile, the surge in fuel smuggling means that a larger share of Libya’s oil wealth is stolen, hurting the legitimate economy and worsening hardships for ordinary citizens.

Saddam Haftar, the primary force behind the surge in fuel smuggling, has reshaped the sector to be more coordinated. His influence over the NOC, particularly since 2022, as well as his increasingly integrated armed factions and expanded maritime capacity, has industrialized previously scattered activities.

The Haftar coalition’s armed dominance over most of eastern Libya and significant parts of the south has facilitated larger fuel flows into Mediterranean destinations by sea and sub-Saharan Africa by land, spurring even politically unaligned smuggling networks in Libya’s northwest to adapt to the growth.

Illicit operators in the northwestern cities Zawiyah and Misrata now channel increased fuel imports southward into Haftar-held areas, from which they are in turn funneled into Chad, Niger, and Sudan. Saddam Haftar’s emergence as the sector’s foremost leader has helped precipitate the professionalization of smuggling operations nationwide and the strengthening of illicit networks even in areas outside his direct control.

The effects of Libya’s fuel crisis stretch beyond its borders. EU states such as Malta and Italy are affected by the infiltration of illegally diverted fuel from Libya into their economies. Russia benefits in several ways, with Libya’s fuel smuggling enabling Moscow’s military activities in sub-Saharan Africa. The illicit flow of fuel from southern Libya to Sudan’s RSF also facilitates the genocidal war waged in Darfur, Sudan.

Despite a series of pledges from Libyan leaders to lift or reform the fuel subsidies, the swift growth in smuggling volumes in 2022-2024 would not have been possible without their tacit acceptance. In fact, some of Libya’s leaders personally profited from this expanding illicit trade, which has triggered wide-ranging macroeconomic and political implications.

All in all, the 2022-2024 surge in fuel smuggling has cost the Libyan population about $20 billion—an alarming figure that demands decisive international action. Libyans need support in safeguarding their country’s primary revenue source, the NOC, which has been instrumentalized and made fragile by powerful figures—based in Tripoli and Benghazi alike—who lack any legitimate authority over the NOC’s internal affairs.

These politicians and security leaders who claim to serve the public and fight organized crime have, in fact, acted as the chief architects of Libya’s fuel smuggling industry, often with backing from foreign states. Still in office, the same rulers will now likely use their vast ill-gotten wealth to entrench themselves even further. Without robust international intervention to hold culprits responsible, actors within and outside the NOC will continue undermining Libya’s economic viability.

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Mustafa Fetouri

The UN mission in Libya, criticised for its internal dysfunction, has laid out a new political roadmap that promises progress but will likely deliver paralysis

Last week, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) began soliciting nominations for a 120‑person “Structured Dialogue,” a key component of its 18‑month roadmap toward national elections in the war-torn country.

A first meeting is expected soon, signalling UNSMIL’s intention to advance the political process. Yet an internal audit published in October 2024 documented systemic governance and management failures – including a missing Concept of Operations, unimplemented prior recommendations, and weaknesses in finance, procurement, and staffing.

While UNSMIL formally accepted the recommendations, there is no public evidence that they have been fully implemented, raising doubts about its capacity to deliver a complex, trust‑dependent electoral process.

The UN mission, created in the aftermath of the Libyan civil war, has a record of strategic aimlessness and internal dysfunction that critics say renders it ill-prepared to lead an 18‑month process requiring trust and discipline from rival Libyan factions.

These institutional weaknesses have tended to reinforce the widespread Libyan critique that the mission is prolonging the very crisis it was meant to resolve.

The UNSMIL’s fragility

UNSMIL’s roadmap rests on three pillars: adopting a technically sound and politically viable electoral framework, unifying Libya’s institutions and government, and holding a Structured Dialogue to engage Libyans on governance, economic, security, and reconciliation issues.

Yet its credibility is undermined by symbolic and institutional weaknesses. Former Special Envoy Abdoulaye Bathily, who resigned in April 2024, still lists himself as UNSMIL head on X, highlighting the gap between the UN’s public narrative and internal mission realities.

This disconnect mirrors the 2024 audit’s findings, raising doubts about UNSMIL’s capacity to implement a complex, trust‑dependent electoral process.

The audit had exposed systemic flaws, casting doubt on UNSMIL’s ability to execute the roadmap. It notes a strategic void, with no finalised Concept of Operations for over two years, leaving mandate guidance and priorities undefined.

The audit highlights a crisis of accountability, with prior strategic recommendations largely ignored, and no mechanisms in place to monitor progress or enforce corrective action. Operational risks remain, including deficiencies in finance, procurement, and staffing, with critical vacancies compromising core activities.

While UNSMIL formally accepted all recommendations, only ‘Recommendation 3’ on monitoring and filling vacancies had been implemented at the time, with most others in their early stages, showing that acknowledgement alone has not translated into functional reform.

The mission’s internal weaknesses are compounded by political manoeuvres aimed at delaying the process. Libyan National Army (LNA) leader General Khalifa Haftar, a key player, has spoken of tribal-based alternative initiatives, while many parliamentarians – mostly his supporters – have increased criticism of UNSMIL, erecting further obstacles.

Such ambiguity allows rival factions to exploit institutional failings, raising serious doubts about UNSMIL’s ability to shepherd Libya toward credible elections under its current structure.

In her 14 October 2025 briefing to the United Nations Security Council, Hanna S. Tetteh, Special Envoy to Libya, issued a blunt warning.

If the institutional steps of the roadmap, such as the reconstitution of the High National Elections Commission and amendments to the electoral and constitutional legal framework, are not completed within the next month, “UNSMIL must - and will - pursue another approach and seek the support of this Council to help ensure that the roadmap advances”.

The heightened urgency underscores how UNSMIL itself views the first phases of the plan as being at critical risk.

Yet this insistence on speed comes even as the mission remains under the shadow of its own 2024 audit’s findings of strategic and governance paralysis (no approved Concept of Operations, many unimplemented recommendations) – a striking contradiction that raises the question: how can a mission that admits it may “pursue another approach” still credibly insist on guiding a complex, trust‑dependent electoral process in a country as fragmented as Libya?

The roadmap also faces acute political obstacles in western Libya. Any attempt to form a new government – a prerequisite for the Structured Dialogue – that excludes Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah is unlikely to be accepted by his armed supporters, mainly in his hometown, Misrata.

With his popularity at rock bottom, his legitimacy eroded, his government widely seen as corrupt, and facing rejection by most political actors, forcing him from office could spark violent confrontation in Tripoli itself.

In this context, many observers view the proposed new unified government – a key pillar of UNSMIL’s plan – as a potential trigger for conflict, with the Structured Dialogue potentially igniting tensions rather than easing them.

While UNSMIL may be able to navigate these challenges, doing so would require strong, clear, and unequivocal backing from the UN Security Council, which is not guaranteed at this point.

Although the Structured Dialogue has yet to begin, UNSMIL’s determination to move forward with its preparatory steps – soliciting nominations and setting timelines – has already drawn criticism from Libyan observers.

Many question whether the mission can deliver on its pledge to ensure balanced representation across political, social, and security lines. For now, the process remains opaque, and its credibility and legitimacy will depend on who is ultimately selected to participate.

Scepticism persists that the dialogue, the final stage of the roadmap, could reproduce existing power structures rather than overhaul them, particularly if key stakeholders from the east or influential security actors feel excluded. Until the list of participants is made public, concerns about tokenism and limited inclusivity will continue to overshadow UNSMIL’s initiative.

At the same time, UNSMIL faces the delicate task of balancing competing and conflicting expectations from all Libyan protagonists and international stakeholders. While the mission emphasises inclusivity in principle, many Libyans remain unconvinced of its neutrality, especially given its ongoing interactions with the Dbeibah administration.

Questions about timing, selection criteria, and potential influence by entrenched political actors fuel doubts that the dialogue will meaningfully address Libya’s longstanding divisions.

Observers note that even the perception of partiality – real or imagined – could undermine public trust before the process even begins. As one analyst put it, “initiatives multiplied, proposals diverged, and no process was ever completed – only prolonging the crisis”.

And from the east, a public statement warned of “unilateral actions … a violation of the sovereignty of the Libyan State”. This growing scepticism complicates UNSMIL’s ability to act as a credible mediator in the later stages of the roadmap.

Haftar and political interference

Compounding UNSMIL’s challenges, General Khalifa Haftar recently met with tribal delegations from different parts of Libya, emphasising that the resolution of the political crisis must come “from the people, with the support of the tribes”, and assuring that “any agreement… will find its implementation guaranteed by the LNA”.

While these meetings do not constitute formal initiatives outside UNSMIL’s roadmap, Haftar’s encouragement and offer of guarantees function as a political counter‑signal, offering an alternative path outside the structured dialogue.

Analysts are divided on his intentions: some interpret it as an effort to shape the process in his favour, while others see it as a strategy to delay implementation by creating uncertainty among political actors and the public.

Regardless of motive, Haftar’s intervention highlights how competing domestic agendas – particularly from influential eastern and southern actors – can limit UNSMIL’s leverage and threaten the fragile consensus the roadmap seeks to build.

Undoubtedly, UNSMIL finds itself in a particularly difficult position. Beyond its own structural weaknesses, it faces a high-stakes balancing act.

This includes navigating entrenched rivalries, repairing its increasingly questioned credibility, ensuring genuinely representative participation in the upcoming Structured Dialogue, and managing the competing agendas of both domestic and international actors – while making clear that the Dialogue’s recommendations are not binding on the Mission.

Although UNSMIL’s goal remains to unify Libya and take it to elections, a long-time wish of Libyans, domestic scepticism, regional divisions, and the unpredictable interventions of influential figures cast serious doubt on whether the roadmap can achieve its objectives.

The coming months will test not only UNSMIL’s capacity to mediate but also Libya’s fragile social and political cohesion, with any misstep risking an escalation of tensions rather than their resolution.

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