The Sentry
To maintain dominance over eastern and southern Libya, the Haftar family relies on Russia’s military support and the UAE’s political backing. Although other countries also assist, these two stand out. In return for their crucial assistance, the Haftars grant them numerous concrete advantages, including the systematic diversion of subsidized fuel to Russian personnel in Libya and to the Emirati-backed RSF in Sudan.
Inside the Russian entrenchment in Libya Since 2020, Russia has maintained a significant military presence at four air bases in Libya: al-Khadim, east of Benghazi; al-Jufrah, in central Libya; al-Qardabiyah, near Sirte; and Brak al-Shatti, in the south western province. There, hundreds of Russian personnel operate radar installations and air-defense systems.
Such an arrangement enables Moscow to enjoy a degree of operational autonomy while helping the Haftar family reinforce a de facto demarcation line between Haftar-held territories and northwestern Libya, where Turkish troops remain entrenched.
Field Marshal Haftar and his family view these Russian-operated air defenses as indispensable in protecting their territory against any potential advance from northwestern Libya, officials from France, the US, and Egypt told The Sen try. It is within this context that the Russians receive fuel supplies from the LAAF.
In mid-2022, Saddam Haftar’s Brigade Tareq bin Ziyad and Hassan Zadma’s Brigade 128 ramped up fuel deliveries to Russian forces beyond what was needed for local operations. This arrangement, which has benefited Russian-controlled air bases such as al-Jufrah and Brak al-Shatti, has included deliveries of jet fuel in volumes that align with the operational needs of Russian helicopters and aircraft stationed there.
Distinct from that, the quantities of diesel and gasoline supplied surpass what might be used locally by the Russians. The surplus fuel is then directed toward two distinct activities.
First, the Russians sell a portion of it to local traffickers for profit, which likely assists the Russians in covering their day-to-day expenses, such as food and other basic needs, in dinars.
Second, there are regular cargo flights transporting fuel from al-Jufrah and al-Khadim to Gao Airport in Mali, a known Russian-controlled facility.
Moreover, in the past, fuel was also sent by truck from al-Jufrah to Wagner units, which were active in Darfur until their exit in autumn 2023. These Russian-to-Russian transfers of fuel occurred through the greater al-Kufrah area under the protection of the LAAF.
In 2023, the Russian Ministry of Defense asserted more direct control of the military mission in Libya previously implemented by the Wagner Group. Its intelligence directorate, the GRU, replaced the semi-private mercenary company and now coordinates operations directly with the Haftar family.
This shift saw Russian state forces take over and bolster existing Wagner-dominated bases and tighten up direct ties with select LAAF brigades, reflecting a more formal, Russian state-directed presence. Another such strengthening phase unfolded in Libya after the December 2024 collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria.
Amid this expansion of the Russian presence in Libya, the LAAF has carried on delivering fuel for Russia’s benefit. The Russian Federation did not respond to a request for comment. The UAE, the Haftars, and the RSF Since the start of Sudan’s civil war, the Haftar camp has been a key fuel supplier to the RSF. This persistent flow of diesel and gasoline has enabled the RSF’s mobility in Darfur and, therefore, its tactical operations there.
By supplying fuel and other aid to the RSF amid the Sudanese war, the Haftar family has tightened its command structure and strategic control in southeastern Libya. The transfer of fuel to the RSF reflects the Haftars’ deep loyalty to the Emirati government, a crucial backer of the paramilitary force.
Because of the UAE’s extensive ideological, diplomatic, financial, and political support for the Haftar family since 2014, the Emirati government occupies a privileged position in the eyes of Haftar’s forces, leaving them beholden to Abu Dhabi.
Between 2014 and 2019, the UAE was the most consequential foreign actor in Libya, intervening heavily on Haftar’s behalf. To this day, it remains vital to the Haftar family, continuing to offer political and diplomatic backing and providing a banking platform for illicit financial flows. Because of this legacy, the UAE wields sway over the family.
When the war in Sudan broke out in April 2023, the UAE used its influence over the Haftar family to ensure that they supplied RSF forces with support, including fuel. Neither the UAE nor the RSF responded to requests for comment. Soon after fighting erupted in Sudan on April 15, 2023, Saddam Haftar traveled to southeastern Libya’s Kufrah district, a long-standing hub for illicit activity, to oversee efforts to secure fuel supplies for the forces of RSF leader General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, or “Hemedti.”
In addition to reinforcing security, Saddam Haftar asserted personal command over the local LAAF-affiliated Battalion Subul al Salam, even though it had previously shown a preference for business dealings with the RSF. The wartime context demanded more direct oversight by the LAAF leadership to transform existing commercial relationships into reliable wartime supply channels.
To maintain uninterrupted shipments of fuel and other goods across the border, Saddam’s Brigade Tareq bin Ziyad increased its manpower and equipment in the Kufrah area by bringing in additional forces from Benghazi and Ajdabiya. This buildup enabled tighter control over key assets, most notably Kufrah airport, which served as a critical ground hub.
Beyond supervising the flow of fuel, Saddam Haftar’s forces also coordinated occasional arms transfers to the RSF in Darfur as part of a broader support policy that included regular deliveries of ammunition. Due to concerns about potential ground incursions or air strikes from the Sudanese Armed Forces and its allies — and the treacherous conditions along the sand routes from Kufrah to Sudan — the LAAF required RSF-linked drivers to handle the final leg of fuel transportation.
Distinct from Subul al-Salam, other LAAF units play a role in the transfer of fuel to the RSF. They include Battalion 129 and other Tubu armed groups spearheaded by senior commander Mohammed Ali Sida, who is based in Rebiana, a Tubu-majority municipality near Kufrah. Formally reporting to Khaled Haftar since 2022, these Tubu forces are responsible for the Sarir refinery, located near the oilfield of the same name in the middle of eastern Libya.
The Sarir refinery operates almost exclusively for south ward smuggling purposes, with a current capacity of about 8,000 barrels (1.3 million liters) per day. Under the LAAF’s increased control, part of the refinery’s output is diverted to illicit channels, bypassing the NOC’s regular circuit. As part of its pro-Emirati policy of supporting the RSF, the LAAF also protects the passage of military resources supplied by the UAE via eastern Libya and provides training camps for Hemedti’s men in the greater Kufrah area.
______________________
The Source: INSIDE JOB: Libya’s Fuel Smuggling Escalation by the Sentry (November 2025)
