Tom O’Connor
At the Crossroads of Crises
Risks posed by Libya’s fractured state and the presence of foreign actors are compounded by instability in neighboring nations—some of which can be traced back to the initial shock of Qaddafi’s sudden downfall and the subsequent vacuum of power.
The collapse of Libya in 2011 sparked a major influx of arms and fighters through the Sahel, with ethnic Tuareg fighters who once fought on both sides of the Libyan Civil War staging a 2012 uprising in Mali. This was followed by an explosion of Islamist insurgency, including groups linked to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, that is spreading across the region today.
To the southeast, Haftar’s troops have been accused of aiding the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces against the Sudanese Armed Forces in the civil war that first erupted in Sudan in 2021. The Government of National Unity has further alleged that Haftar supported the Rapid Support Forces with fuel transfers backed by the United Arab Emirates, though UAE officials have repeatedly rejected direct involvement in Sudan’s civil war.
The conflict in Sudan is considered to be the world’s worst humanitarian crisis today, driving millions of people out of the large African nation. Many of these refugees from Sudan and others fleeing conflicts and harsh conditions elsewhere in Africa find their way to Libya, taking advantage of the country’s disunity and unpatrolled borders to embark on a treacherous trip across the Mediterranean to Europe.
Nearly 60,000 people survived the journey and another 1,500 are known to have perished in 2025 alone, according to the European Union’s Frontex border security agency, which identifies Libya as the primary departure point. The total number of those who fled from Libya by sea since 2011 is believed to at least be in the hundreds of thousands, with potentially more unreported.
“Europe has a big problem with the immigrants who come with ships,” Sahad said. “Why do we have these immigrants? Because we could not control the borders, our southern borders. We cannot control them. We need help in that regard. We need technology.”
“We cannot control the vast borders in the south, but with technology, you can, and Europe is not giving us that help,” he added.
Yet there’s hope Washington may be able to step in here, as Sahad believes this is “another thing the United States can help us with,” and do so with a promise of reciprocal benefits.
“We’re not saying that we are demanding or asking, but also Libya will give the United States the energy, and we will give their states the stability of that region,” Sahad said. “If Libya is stable, then there are big advantages for Northern Africa, for Africa.”
Alftise reiterated this point, arguing that, while the Government of National Unity has so far been able to keep the threat of Islamist militant resurgence in the west at bay, the lack of control over the southern border and growing jihadi infiltration of nations such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger meant U.S. support was necessary not only for safeguarding Libya, but far beyond as well.
“It’s not only for the sake of Libya,” Alftise said, “it’s the sake of Africa and the sake of southern Europe.”
Unity First
As the 15th anniversary of the uprising that toppled Qaddafi nears in February, uncertainty prevails over the nation of roughly 7.5 million people once considered one of the richest nations in Africa that has still yet to rebound from its pre-2011 economic performance.
Alftise said that “there is still a big hope that things will be okay,” though he acknowledged a wave of nostalgia for Qaddafi’s rule, fueled largely by social media and foreign outlets. In response, he said, “we’re trying to tell the people that era has more bad things than good things.”
And while the cautious calm that continues to hold has produced some positive growth in the economy and social development in recent years, so much potential is hindered by the still-unwavering split between the opposing governments.
In the east, Haftar continues to entrench his position, promoting at least two of his sons, Saddam and Khalid, to senior military positions and a third, Belqasim, as his top political adviser. Critics accuse of him emulating Qaddafi in his dynastic tendencies and strongman persona that overshadows Government of National Stability Prime Minister Osama Hammad.
In the west, Dbeibah faces not only the rival government in Tobruk and its foreign backers but also a complex array of internal factions, including Islamist forces who seek to push their own vision of Libya in backing the Government of National Unity. His leverage is further challenged by incessant clashes over Libya’s oil and gas infrastructure, a backbone of the national economy that has been sapped by the dual power rivalry and rampant fuel smuggling.
Nevertheless, Dbeibah’s administration continues to enjoy international recognition and his outreach to the White House has not gone unnoticed. Trump’s senior adviser on Africa affairs, Massad Boulos, traveled to Tripoli in July to hold talks with Dbeibah that reportedly included a Libyan offer to forge a $70 billion economic partnership with the U.S.
But Libya has also caught the eye of the administration on another matter often tied to Trump’s diplomatic efforts in the Middle East and North Africa. In April, Trump’s special envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, named Libya as among six nations that could potentially join the Abraham Accords, a series of agreements through which the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco established diplomatic ties with Israel in late 2020 and early 2021.
The deals marked the first Arab-Israeli normalization pacts since those struck by Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994, save for Mauritania’s short-lived recognition offered in 1999 and rescinded amid a war in Gaza a decade later. Like the rest of the Arab world and many Muslim nations, Libya has never recognized Israel and has consistently expressed support for Palestinians, once constituting a major source of Palestinian militia funds and arms throughout the Qaddafi era.
Even years from Qaddafi’s ouster, the Israeli-Palestinian issue remains a sensitive one for Libya. Both Alftise and Sahad said unifying and stabilizing the nation remained the first order of business before such decisions could be taken.
“The important thing for us at the moment is to revive Libya as a as a country with a civil government, with democracy, so we can have our country in a sovereign situation, and it could take whatever decisions built on, one, the sovereignty of the nation, and, two, the agreement of the people, because that’s democracy,” Sahad said. “So, this is what we are facing.”
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Tom O’Connor – Senior Writer, Foreign Policy & Deputy Editor, National Security and Foreign Policy
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