The Rise and Mysterious Fall of Militant Islamist Movements in Libya
Wolfram Lacher
Rise and fall: conformism and demarcation
Another key to understanding the dynamics since 2011 is provided by social mechanisms of demarcation and conformism, of distinction and adaptation. The driving force behind these mechanisms is an individual’s search for social recognition and group affiliation.
For Georg Simmel and Pierre Bourdieu, distinction and emulation express social status or its aspiration; the dialectical relationship between both is the driver behind fashion and taste. Similar processes can be observed in the rise and decline of militant Islamist movements in Libya.
The driving force behind these mechanisms is an individual’s search for social recognition and group affiliation. . For Georg Simmel and Pierre Bourdieu, distinction and emulation express social status or its aspiration; the dialectical relationship between both is the driver behind fashion and taste.120 Similar processes can be observed in the rise and decline of militant Islamist movements in Libya.
As discussed above (page 20ff), Libya’s militant Islamist movements in the first few years after 2011 formed part of a societal mainstream that followed a politically revolutionary but socially conservative zeitgeist.
Initially, militant Islamists and jihadists did not stand out from the mass of revolutionaries either by appearance or discourse. The aesthetics of the revolutionaries – bearded, often in camouflage clothing – could hardly be distinguished from those of militant Islamists. Many militiamen adopted this aesthetic.
A former LIFG leader recalled: “Back then, even hashish-smoking militia leaders grew a beard and had themselves called Sheikh. We misinterpreted this phenomenon, because we had been isolated from Libyan society for so long; suddenly everyone seemed to share our beliefs.”
As discussed above, Libya’s militant Islamist movements in the first few years after 2011 formed part of a societal mainstream that followed a politically revolutionary but socially conservative zeitgeist. Initially, militant Islamists and jihadists did not stand out from the mass of revolutionaries either by appearance or discourse.
The aesthetics of the revolutionaries – bearded, often in camouflage clothing – could hardly be distinguished from those of militant Islamists. Many militiamen adopted this aesthetic.
A former LIFG leader recalled: “Back then, even hashish-smoking militia leaders grew a beard and had themselves called Sheikh. We misinterpreted this phenomenon, because we had been isolated from Libyan society for so long; suddenly everyone seemed to share our beliefs.”
A revolutionary from the Islamist spectrum took a similar view: “Take Ismail Sallabi or Wissam ben Hamid, for example. In 2012, Ismail wore the abaya [long robe] of the Islamists because it was popular back then. Today he offers you cigarettes when you meet him” (an observation that the author can confirm).
Along with aesthetic emulation came formulaic commitments to the ideals of the revolution and a widespread tendency to conceal or reinterpret one’s own role in the Gaddafi era to better suit with zeitgeist.
The fact that the aesthetics and habitus of the revolutionaries and Islamists found so many imitators was not least due to their status as victors and heroes. As one leader of the Rafallah Sahati Brigade said: “In October 2011, we came back from the front as heroes, as revolutionaries. When the killing spree began, people suddenly started calling us terrorists and militias. We were shocked – only a year before we had been noble revolutionaries!”
Youthful boasting and aspirations for heroism were driving forces behind the gradual separation of jihadist splinter groups.
Aspirations for heroism were also a driving force behind the gradual separation of jihadist splinter groups after the fall of the regime. For example, many young men from Darna went to Syria because “those who had fought against the Americans in Iraq or against Gaddafi in 2011 had come back as heroes. If you wanted to be a hero, you could join the jihad.”
A commander from Benghazi recalled a sixteen-yearold who came from western Libya to fight against Haftar: “Someone like him also went to Benghazi so he could later brag at home that he had fought there. Fortunately, he joined us and not some extremist group.”
According to a Rafallah Sahati veteran, the popularity of IS in Benghazi was also due (among other things) to adolescent boasting: “There was a lot of Hollywood involved with IS, it was all about action – ‘I did this, I did that’.
They were by no means all ideologues.” 126 However, ideology was also a means of distinguishing oneself as superior. Groups such as Ansar al-Sharia and later IS saw themselves as representatives of the only true doctrine; for them, followers of more moderate movements were apostates or infidels.
Characteristic of the emerging jihadist splinter groups was the age of their members, who were mainly teenagers and young adults. Leaders of the revolutionary brigades often emphasised that a generational gap separated them from the members of Ansar al-Sharia and IS: “There were only very young people in IS. None of the older revolutionaries joined it.”
In addition to youthful boasting and the pursuit of fame, other general youth phenomena were also recognisable, namely rebellion against parents and society as well as the search for identity, belonging and a higher purpose. Such dynamics have also been observed in other contexts, for example among young Salafists in Tunisia or socially marginalised teenagers in Europe who were attracted to a jihadist subculture, a “jihadi cool”.
What has gone largely unnoticed so far is how fast-moving such a subculture can be – just like other youth cultures. With the reversal around 2016, the aesthetics and habitus of militant Islamists quickly disappeared. Some who had worn the “abaya of the Islamists” in 2012 now wore the “abaya of the Madkhali Salafists,” whose movement experienced a surge.
Among the leaders of armed groups, beards became shorter or were shaved off completely; militia leaders such as Haitham al-Tajuri from Tripoli now wore designer clothes and embodied an ostentatious materialism that replaced Islamist revolutionary rhetoric. The militiamen’s new youth culture glorified quick riches through violence and crime.
Later, the leaders of armed groups donned uniforms to emphasise the formal and disciplined nature of their units. In late 2023, the author met with a sheikh and university professor who, as well-informed fellow citizens alleged, had helped recruit fighters for the jihad in Iraq before 2011.
He had led an armed group in 2011, some of whose members later joined Ansar al-Sharia and then IS in Sirte. But now he met the author in a suit and was clean-shaven, and he emphasised that he was a pure academic and had had nothing to do with armed groups since the fall of Gaddafi.
Libya is not the only case where militant Islamists appeared and disappeared again as if it was a fashion movement. In the Lebanese port city of Tripoli, which became notorious for its jihadist subculture, older citizens can still remember the approximate date when the young people of a particular neighbourhood “suddenly became ‘Islamists’ – it was in the summer of 1980…[They] began to regularly perform their five prayers a day, grow beards … [and] ostensibly hold up the black banners of jihad.” And in Tunisia, from where thousands of young men had joined jihadist groups in Libya and Syria after 2011, jihadism was already “out of fashion” by 2020.
Mechanisms of demarcation and emulation can help to understand both the rapid spread and the equally rapid decline of militant Islamist movements in Libya. The impetus came from key events such as the 2011 revolution and the fight against IS, but also from the shaping of public opinion by the media.
Processes of social realignment and the weight of conformism help to explain how quickly such impulses can cause societal trends to emerge and to disappear again. Or, to use the vocabulary of social movement theories: how discursive frames resonate at a certain point in time – and no longer do so only a little later.
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Dr Wolfram Lacher is Senior Associate in the Africa and Middle East Research Division at SWP.
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SWP Research Paper – June 2024 – German Institute for International and Security Affairs
