Enrique Fojón
The fact that international attention is monopolised by the war in Ukraine and the conflict in Gaza has helped create a vacuum of attention on Libya, which is used by both local political actors and their regional and international allies to expand their influence.
One of the main beneficiaries of the conflict is General Khalifa Haftar, who could emerge as the victor of the current crisis.
The Libyan National Army commander’s goal is to take control of the country and establish a military regime in which his clan dominates politically and economically.
After almost four years of low profile, Libya seems to be back on track. After the ceasefire and the formation of a unity government in the framework of the Berlin Process 2020/2021, there was hope for a unification of state institutions and sustainable stability. However, these expectations were dashed after the failure of the elections at the end of 2021 and the emergence of a parallel government in Benghazi in February 2022.
The United Nations Mission in Libya (UNMIL) has so far failed to advance the electoral process and unify the country, although the international community seems to accept fragile stability as the lesser evil for now.
Since then, an agreement between the rival sides has allowed for a phase of relative stability. The agreement is weak and events are unfolding in a new situation in eastern Libya, dominated by General Haftar and his allies, weakening the current national unity government of Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah in Tripoli.
At issue is the distribution of oil revenues and the expansion of territorial influence.
In early August, under the pretext of national security and the need to protect the southern border from smuggling and illegal migration from neighbouring countries, the National Army, led by Haftar’s son, deployed in the southwest near the Algerian border, where one of the country’s largest oil fields and important smuggling routes are located.
At the heart of the problem is the power struggle in Tripoli that has reshaped Libya’s political alliances and helped the Haftar family obtain unprecedented funds to distribute favours. The Haftars have proven adept at exploiting that rift, between the seemingly immovable central bank governor, Siddiq Kabir, and Dabeiba, or rather his nephew, Ibrahim, who many consider the real power broker behind the Tripoli government.
As a result of this struggle, the haemorrhaging of state funds is worsening, Haftar’s sons are consolidating their power, and ultimately the precarious balance that has kept Libya calm for the past decade could crumble.
Haftar and his clan have managed to further expand their economic and military power in recent years. In addition to official central bank funding, there appear to be illegal sources for this effort. The general unofficially received part of the oil production, which is smuggled into neighbouring countries, as Haftar’s troops control migration routes and gold mines in southeastern Libya. By controlling lucrative reconstruction projects in Libya, Haftar’s family secures a share of the company’s profits and investments. In addition to Turkish and Egyptian companies, investors from the United Arab Emirates are also interested in the reconstruction of Benghazi.
Haftar receives support from regional and international allies. Egypt, by welcoming Usama Hammad, head of Libya’s eastern government, on 11 August, risked a diplomatic crisis with Dbeibah, which considers his government the only officially recognised one. The move came at the same time as a diplomatic rapprochement took place between Egypt and Turkey, a major backer of the Western government. While Turkey has pledged to supply the Tripoli government with modern air defence systems, while calling on it to de-escalate tensions, this support is likely to be short-lived if it affects Ankara’s relations with Cairo.
Libya’s geopolitical value means that Haftar continues to receive military support from Russia. In early 2024, Russia founded the pan-African ‘Africa Corps’ with some 45,000 fighters to replace the Wagner Group and protect Russian regional interests. In addition to military control of smuggling routes, it is tasked with securing sources of resources such as oil and gas fields, as well as gold and diamond mines in Africa. A close relationship with Russia strengthens Haftar’s negotiating position in Libya while significantly limiting Europe’s ability to act in Africa in the coming decades, especially with regard to refugees and migration.
The power struggle for key positions in the Libyan state reached its climax when the Presidential Council ordered the dismissal of Sediq al-Kebir , the influential governor of the Central Bank. As a result, production at several oilfields was halted as a means of exerting pressure on this decision.
Since then, oil production and exports have plummeted massively and the Libyans’ socio-economic crisis has worsened.
In addition, the conflict over the new governor caused liquidity bottlenecks in the banks. All this increased the pressure on the Dbeibah government, which has failed to significantly improve the living conditions of the population since its founding in 2021. Instead, Dbeibah has redistributed state resources through nepotism and corruption in favour of his clan and the Tripoli elite to secure his position of power.
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