Milad Elharathi
The Hybrid Security Department
Not all the armed Islamist groups operating in Libya are affiliated with the state in some way, which has led to the establishment of a mixture arrangement between formal and informal forces.
Over time, most of the armed groups are subordinated themselves to the chief of staff and Ministry of Defense. Others joined the Ministry of Interior’s Supreme Security Commitiee (SSC), which roughly approximated the functions of the police. The SSC was always stronger in Tripoli than in other areas.
Because entire armed groups joined the SSC and Shield forces, the new structures essentially preserved the cohesion and parochial outlook of the armed groups, even though under the cover of the state . Effectively represented by the government and flush with funds, the armed groups were even more emboldened to pursue agendas that were increasingly political and self-serving.
At best the Libya Shield and SSC structures were ways for the Libyan government to purchase firepower when needed to quell crises. But the new structures took on a life of their own, confusing efforts to build up the regular army. In many parts of the country, it is the armed Islamist groups, not the army, that control defense ministries, barracks, bases, and ammunition terminuses. In the past four years, the Libya Armor has become a shadow army that has rapidly over shadowed the power of the regular forces.
Ironically, the monthly government salary for Islamist armed group member exceeds that of a regular policeman and army recruit, giving the members of the Islamist armed groups or would-be recruits little incentive to join the government’s formal forces
Furthermore, the splitting up of the state, the lack of a capable central power and the persistence of large numbers of heavily armed militias with often conflicting interests led to a general state of insecurity. Moreover, Libya has become an access strip for arms and drug traffickers, who can move in virtually any geographical direction and in any neighboring country they desire. Ironically, the Islamist threat is quite low due to the militias and tribes.
But this does not stop the Islamists to use the isolated territories (particularly those in the south and south / west) as launching pads for attacks in neighboring countries, such as the one on the natural gas processing plant at In Amenas in Algeria, which is very close to the border with Libya and where, among others, two Romanians died more than a year ago.
For this reason Algeria, Mali, Egypt as well as Chad have increased the number of patrols and monitoring operations at their borders with Libya. The movement of Qaddafi-era officers reveals this clearly.
Haftar (Libya’s former chief-of-staff Gen. Khalifa Hftar ) and many of his core supporters are from Benghazi or other eastern towns, which explains why the Special Forces and Air Force have declared for him, while Farnana claims to represent the (Nafusa-Zintan) militia-based “Western Regional Military Council.”
Together they organized the series of “extraordinary conferences of the Libyan army” that resulted in the formation of the Assembly of Free Libyan Officers in April 2013, and most recently announced the establishment of a Supreme Military Council to rival the general staff headquartered in Tripoli.
The emerging military politics clearly revolve in part around formal posts such as that of the chief of staff, who acts as one of several interfaces between various armed groups on the ground, the ministry of defense, and the General National Congress.
The same dynamic also applies to the third camp that has formed since 2011, centering institutionally on the ministry of defense, but also comprising various militias. Qaddafi abolished the ministry in 1991, but since its resurrection in 2011 it has largely been controlled by (Zintanis) and their affiliate militias, while the post of deputy minister has been held by (Sadeq Mabrouk and Khaled al-Sharif), both former leading members of the militant Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG, founded in 1995).
In short, as in 2011, the Libyan armed forces may again be splitting and fragmenting, and their ability to decide the balance of political power is far from certain. However, the weaknesses and disunity of the country’s civilian governing bodies suggests that resolution of divisive debates about the distribution of power and wealth will be driven by military politics, much as in the transition from the monarchic era to the republic in 1969.
These remain very much in flux, and have been greatly complicated by the addition of powerful revolutionary militias to the mix.
The concept of Rebuilding and
Transformation (Libya)
In the times of transformation and transition of any giving society priorities should be established. State building process takes longer time and further collective understanding and agreement because of the political currents and their role. The aim of this reporting essay is to lay down the ground for how new Libya can build its destination.
Rebuilding Libya after a revolution should be done according to a national development plan that includes all spheres which were either ignored by the old regime or have deteriorated as a result of exceptional circumstances in which the country live as a result of productive activities’ halt when most of the people are engaged in the revolution which represents for them a great event and a great hope, especially as they were accompanied by demonstrations and sit-ins due to factional demands, and due to difference between workers and company owners which lead to closing some factories and governmental facilities.
In addition, reality and limited potentials impose themselves forcibly, and the post-revolutionary government (PRG) has to draft a list of priorities that needs to start with, not only to meet necessary daily requirements for all the people but also for the production wheel to start anew in the right direction, and to realize a speedy return to satisfy the biggest number of the people, especially the needy and those of limited income.
Nevertheless, to start projects to rebuild the state on new revolutionary bases and with determined priorities needs huge of funds; even if there have been already feasible studies which in turn cost a lot of money and time.
However, with some deterioration in productive sites that generate incomes such as tourism, exports and services, thinking to allocate necessary funds as soon as possible starts. The only available financial source of Libya is energy income. Loans from international donors, if it’s a soft ones with grace periods and less costly than domestic loans are encouraged.
However, bearing in mind that some of the international loans have difficult conditionality concerning expenditure rationalization, and basic commodities; subsidies.
The Missed Path Toward
a National Strategy
A matter of great importance and sensitivity is that the Revolution erupted in protest to certain rejected practices in international politics: such as the necessity to have independent national decisions, and in home politics: the necessity to provide means of living and basic needs for a people who is aspiring for improving their economic and social levels in the light of its sacrifices to achieve the Revolution’s objectives.
To draft a plan for development priorities needs understanding of available resources to help realize desired results. Local resources can be either local or international. Availability of resources may be an important factor in the necessity to put down priorities, and that needs field research and studies.
Moreover, national development strategy usually includes: security matters, good governance and economic development, as well as regional and international cooperation. Most important is to work for political reconciliation with the society’s spectra.
Paradoxically, it is crucial that the government is committed by a national strategy for development, and that one of its objectives is to empower the citizens and institutions to provide better services, to create job opportunities and sustainable development, to allow NGOs of the civil society to participate and to protect citizens’ rights.
The development priorities’ list is important as it:
– Explains to the people the government’s efforts to legitimize them and to secure stability to help implement its plans.
– Improving incomes, public services, providing more job opportunities, and strengthening capabilities for good governance.
– Government’s control of the development’s agenda in all fields.
– Preparing a list of priorities and implementing it will spread a feeling of satisfaction for the Libyan citizens and the international community that there are serious efforts that are exerted to realize development, and not be satisfied with slogans only.
The list includes good governance, providing security and peace, developing the private sector, developing human resources, developing infrastructures and agricultural and rural development.
– Developing human resources includes (developing skills, education for all, high education, women’s affairs and capacity building in health affairs).
– Development of infrastructures includes: generating local resources, industries, energy programs and urban development.
– Development of the private sector includes: trade facilities, small and medium enterprises, using Egyptian and Tunisia labor force and not exported ones.
– Good governance includes: economic and financial reform, transparency and accountability, rule based on efficiency and efficacy, local good governance, justice for all, respect of human rights.
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Milad Elharathi – Visiting Fellow, at Clare College, University of Cambridge UK
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