Armed Conflict Location & Event Data
On 12 May, the security architecture of Libya’s capital, Tripoli, underwent an upheaval of seismic proportions. That evening, a meeting between the leaders of Tripoli’s main armed groups — purportedly convened to reduce tensions in the city — turned into a deadly shootout for reasons that have not been fully clarified.
Among those killed was Abdul Ghani al-Kikli, known as “Gheniwa,” the commander of the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA). Until this happened, the SSA was regarded by many as the capital’s most powerful armed group. But, in the months leading up to his killing, tensions between Kikli and Government of National Unity (GNU) Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeiba’s camp escalated amid growing competition for control over state institutions and state-owned enterprises.
Following Kikli’s death, a coalition of rival armed groups led by the 444th Brigade launched a well-coordinated lightning offensive to seize SSA headquarters across Tripoli, including in its heavily populated stronghold in the Abu Salim district. By dawn, the Ministry of Defense of the GNU — to which the 444th Brigade is nominally affiliated — announced the conclusion of the offensive: The SSA had been wiped off Tripoli’s map.
Building on its successful push against the SSA, on 13 May, Dbeiba’s camp moved against its other main rival in Tripoli, the Special Deterrence Forces (SDF), also known as Rada. At sunset, the 444th Brigade began to engage in armed clashes with the SDF and the SDF-aligned Judicial Police at strategic positions in the city.
By dawn, two of the capital’s other major armed groups — the 111th Brigade and the Public Security Service, led by Abdullah Trabelsi, brother of GNU Interior Minister Emad Trabelsi — rallied to the side of the 444th Brigade.
Their coordinated advance forced the SDF to withdraw from key positions in the city, entrench in its eastern strongholds, and rely on allied militias — mainly from Zawiya, west of the capital — to relieve pressure on its western flank. Almost as quickly as the fighting had begun, however, by noon on 14 May the sides had reached a new ceasefire.
Despite the magnitude of this latest round of clashes, the removal of the SSA from Tripoli and the attempt to follow suit with the SDF reflect dynamics that have long shaped political violence in the Libyan capital. Since the establishment of the GNU in March 2021 following a political process launched by the United Nations mission in Libya, Tripoli’s security architecture has undergone an uneven but steady consolidation around a handful of armed groups.
These groups have been locked in persistent intra-elite competition over authority and access to state institutions and rents.8 Within this fragile accommodation, episodes of infighting remain frequent and tend to follow familiar patterns, often playing out through fluid alliances that at times extend well beyond Tripoli’s boundaries.
| Armed group | Commander | Legal affiliation | Area of influence in Tripoli |
| Special Deterrence Force (Rada) | Abdurrauf Kara | GNU Ministry of Interior | East and southeast |
| Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) | Abdul Ghani al-Kikli (killed) | GNU Ministry of Interior | Removed |
| 444th Combat Brigade | Mahmud Hamza | GNU Ministry of Defense | Part of the center and the south center |
| 111th Brigade | Abdusalam al-Zubi | GNU Ministry of Defense | Southwest |
| Public Security Service | Abdullah Trabelsi | GNU Ministry of Interior | West |
| Janzur Knights Brigade | Muhamad al-Baruni | GNU Ministry of Interior | Janzur (West) |
| Rahbat al-Dara Brigade | Bashir Khalaf Allah | GNU Ministry of Defense | Tajura (East) |
| Misrata Joint Operations Force | Ibrahim Muhamad | GNU Ministry of Defense | Misrata and access to Tripoli from the east |
| First Support Force | Muhamad Bahrun | GNU Ministry of Interior | Zawiya and access to western Tripoli |
Contested arrests, territorial incursions,
and power shifts trigger infighting
From March 2021 through June 2025, ACLED records 64 instances of battles, mainly armed clashes, among Tripoli’s main armed groups.
These stemmed from 28 distinct outbreaks of violence that collectively spanned 26 days. This infighting is often localized, short-lived, and easily de-escalated. It is also generally linked to attempts at signaling dominance within the blurred space between formal state authority and militia autonomy in which these groups operate and, on occasion, to attempts to renegotiate the existing political order in the context of growing intra-elite competition.
However, the main trigger for armed clashes in Tripoli is contested arrests and captures that escalated into fighting — a pattern ACLED records on nine occasions over the same time period. The most illustrative instance of this dynamic followed the SDF’s capture of the 444th Brigade commander, Mahmud Hamza, at Mitiga Airport in August 2023. This led to clashes between the two groups between 14 and 15 August.
The fighting subsided after a ceasefire was brokered between the sides, whereby Hamza was handed over to the SSA and later released.
A revealing manifestation of this pattern involves the SSA and the Judicial Police. The two parties have clashed on three occasions, including with heavy weapons, following disputed arrests. The most recent of these occurred on 25 April 2025, when the Judicial Police and the SDF clashed with the SSA after attempting to arrest a person allegedly linked to the SSA, prompting its intervention.
Another major driver of armed clashes in Tripoli is territorial incursions into areas controlled by rival groups or considered neutral. These are often perceived as provocations, which suggests that disputes over perceived jurisdiction remain delicate. On 9 June, the SDF and the Public Security Service clashed in Tripoli after the latter set up a checkpoint in a contentious area of the capital falling within the deconfliction zone established by the May ceasefire agreement.
The SDF then responded by expanding its own positions, triggering brief clashes that lasted several hours. This type of retaliation underscores the fragile balance of deterrence that governs Tripoli’s armed ecosystem, where absorbing a blow without responding risks inviting further attacks.
Less frequent, but with far more profound repercussions, are the armed clashes sparked by strategic offensives tied to shifts in power, such as the Dbeiba camp’s successful offensive against the SSA in May and the failed push against the SDF. Prior to these, in August 2022, an attempt by former Prime Minister Fathi Bashagha, appointed by the eastern-based House of Representatives, to unseat Dbeiba in Tripoli also triggered clashes across several neighborhoods.
Fighting broke out between the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade (TRB) and Nawasi Brigade, which backed Bashagha, against the SSA and the SDF, which were both aligned with Dbeiba at the time. Bashagha’s failed bid to enter Tripoli ultimately led to the ouster of the TRB and Nawasi from the capital.
Despite the recurrence of clashes, ACLED data show that, except in strategic offensives, fighting in Tripoli tends to be localized in certain neighborhoods and short-lived. Over 80% of incidents last less than a day. This dynamic suggests a broad aversion among armed groups to prolonged and large-scale violence.
This is likely driven by strategic and reputational concerns tied to the fact that they are heavily armed, embedded in state structures, and have strong incentives to appear as guarantors of order rather than warlords.
An all-out conflict would also risk opening the door to outside actors, most notably the Libyan National Army (LNA), seeking to capitalize on the situation. What emerges is a pattern of calibrated violence, conflict containment, and a shared preference for de-escalation.
This is often achieved through back-channel communications and quasi-institutionalized conflict management mechanisms that enable swift compromises.
ACLED records fatalities in about one-third of all outbreaks of violence involving Tripoli’s main armed groups between March 2021 and June 2025. While details about casualties are often scarce, in 60% of the incidents in which fatalities were documented, the people killed were within the ranks of the armed groups involved.
The most violent clashes — typically those that escalate beyond their point of origin and involve operations in residential areas, the use of artillery, and indirect fire — tend to result in civilian injuries and deaths, as well as significant property damage.
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