Rhiannon Smith
When the spark of the 2011 Libyan Revolution was lit in Benghazi 15 years ago, protests and armed revolt against the brutal 42-year rule of Qadhafi quickly ignited across the country, fanned by anger and grief over decades of oppression and kept alive by the wider hope of the Arab Spring.
The fear, determination and anticipation of those days was palpable. After months of death, destruction and defiance, and the support of the NATO intervention, the Libyan rebels succeeded in liberating Tripoli in summer 2011. On 23 October, days after Qadhafi was killed in his hometown of Sirte, the liberation of Libya was formally declared.
Just weeks later, Saif al-Qadhafi, was captured. The streets of the capital were raucous with beeping car horns, celebratory gunfire, and Libyans waving their fingers in the air, mocking Saif’s infamous finger wagging speech during the 2011 Revolution (and the subsequent images showing bloody stumps on his right hand after he was caught trying to flee through the desert).
It was a time of giddy hope that Libya could move on from four decades of oppression and dictatorship, that justice could be served for the victims of the regime, and that the country could finally realise its potential, using its rich oil resources to improve the lives of its citizens.
A decade and a half later, however, on the anniversary of the 17 February Revolution, that hope is in tatters, the dreams of a ‘new Libya’ slowly but inexorably torn apart by years of militia rule, political instability and corruption.
The assassination of Saif al-Qadhafi
When the news broke on 3 February of the assassination of Saif al-Qadhafi in his secret compound in Zintan, in the mountains south-west of Tripoli, it was yet another blow to hopes that Libya might be able to find a way to dismantle the autocratic control of its ruling families and the ecosystem of armed groups keeping them in power. Not because most Libyans expected or wanted Saif to lead Libya into a better era, but because his continued presence at the edges of Libyan politics suggested there was still hope for wider reconciliation in the country, still hope that Libya might yet achieve a unified future.
Unsurprisingly, supporters of the Qadhafi regime, known as ‘Greens’, expressed their grief and anger at Saif’s ‘martyrdom’, calling for those responsible to be held accountable. There were also Libyans who celebrated his death, both because of his role in the crackdowns on protests (he was wanted by the International Criminal Court on war crimes charges) and because it effectively ended the threat of a Qadhafi ever leading the country again.
However, a common reaction among Libyans seemed to be one of unease and resignation, with many people seeing his killing as evidence of the increasing ‘mafia-isation’ of the Libyan landscape, where rival actors are assassinated or intimidated as a matter of course.
Although Saif was rarely seen or heard in public, kept under careful watch by his Zintani guards-turned-protectors after he was released as part of an amnesty in 2017, he remained an important symbolic figurehead for the Greens and for Libyans who rejected the East-West division of power in the country.
Saif stood as a presidential candidate in the failed 2021 elections, and his intended candidacy was a key factor preventing agreement and progress on fresh elections.
Rumours, speculation and accusations are rife about who sent the armed men to Saif’s compound to kill him and why, though there is no clarity yet. An investigation is underway by the Libyan Attorney General, though it is far from certain it will reveal the truth.
Rather than being an outlier, his assassination is instead the most high-profile indication of a wider trend of political instability and militia rule in Libya.
Libya’s divided political and security
landscape
There have been no national elections in Libya since 2014 and the country is divided into two distinct spheres of political, economic and military rule. The Government of National Unity (GNU), under Prime Minister Abdul Hameed Dabaiba, controls Tripoli in the western region and the Libyan National Army (LNA) in Benghazi, under the leadership of Khalifa Haftar and his sons, controls the eastern and southern regions of Libya.
Dabaiba is the head of the internationally-recognised executive authority in Libya, yet his direct influence extends little further than Tripoli and his hometown of Misrata. Even in these places, he is reliant on the support of powerful armed groups to retain control and implement his government’s edicts. While some armed groups are strategic allies, most require more tangible benefits (whether money, territory, positions or access) to ensure their continued support. As such, continued access to the country’s wealth is the cornerstone of Dabaiba’s strategy for staying in power.
The armed groups that control the capital have evolved into better organised, professional-looking, and well-equipped forces than their revolutionary militia days, yet the rank and file still primarily follow the commands of their militia leaders, not the government.
As such, the militias are able to act with impunity and are rarely held accountable for their transgressions against those they intimidate, imprison, torture and even kill without recourse to justice. Civil society activists, journalists, and political rivals have been increasingly targeted, while the abuse and mistreatment of migrants detained in Libya remains endemic.
Although there have been no major violations of the 2020 Ceasefire Agreement between Tripoli and the LNA (ending a months-long attempt by the LNA to take control of the capital), there are frequently localised clashes between rival militias and targeted killing in the western region. Civilians are often injured or lose their lives to such violence. The coastal cities west of Tripoli, including Zawiyya, suffer particularly badly from such violence.
In the East, the internationally recognised parliament, the House of Representatives (HoR), is within the sphere of influence of the Haftar family while the Government of National Stability (GNS) –recognised by the HoR but not by most international actors – functions as the political and governance arm of the LNA.
The LNA General Command exerts significant command and control over LNA forces in the eastern region and has extended its influence over armed groups in the southern regions. Nonetheless, Khalifa Haftar is still reliant on retaining the support of key tribal groups in order to maintain stability.
The security situation in LNA-controlled areas is less volatile than in the western region as the LNA has been able to extend and embed its command-and-control structures across large swathes of the eastern region and much of the South.
However, the reins of power are held firmly by Khalifa Haftar, and increasingly his son and LNA Deputy Commander Saddam Haftar. As such, although there is arguably greater stability in the East, there is even less freedom. Opponents of the LNA are quickly detained, tortured or disappeared, and open criticism or protest is rare in recent times.
Libya’s legislative and executive bodies are set on protecting their own positions and power. Successive UN-mediated political processes have failed to either force or persuade the country’s deeply entrenched crop of political leaders to reach the consensus needed to hold presidential and parliamentary elections.
The most recent UN roadmap announced in August 2025 has so far failed to create any meaningful progress, and this doesn’t look as if it is about change in the short term, not least because there is a lack of international unity and interest in the political process.
The political divisions are also having a corrosive impact on the Libyan judiciary, with competing constitutional courts issuing conflicting rulings, creating a judicial quagmire where legal rulings are being politicised and the rule of law rendered meaningless.
Although both the Tripoli and Benghazi authorities held various events and displays to celebrate the 17 February anniversary and shore up their revolutionary credentials, these days there are not many Libyans who enthusiastically celebrate the occasion. After all, on its current trajectory, Libya is moving further and further away from the ideals the revolution espoused – namely freedom, accountability and democracy.
***
Rhiannon Smith – Libya-Analysis’s Managing Director.
__________________
