Tahani Elmogrbi
Performative Peacebuilding
The ways in which Libyan elites are involving themselves in these processes are proving especially controversial and delegitimizing. The first major concern is the performative aspect of elites’ involvement in the processes.
Both sides have been highly visible in their engagement; Lt. Gen. Saddam Haftar, deputy general commander of the Libyan National Army, has paid official visits to Jordan, Germany, France, Turkey, and the United States since the beginning of 2026, while Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibeh has visited Turkey, Italy, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.
Yet these trips lack tangible deliverables or concessions from Libyan elites on the key governance issues at stake.
Instead, they produce a steady stream of carefully staged photographs and professionally edited videos for Libyan participants’ media channels to celebrate another “successful” visit with a major international figure. With Libyan political discourse increasingly mediated through social media—a primary source for journalists, politicians, analysts, TV and radio stations, and online news outlets—officials in Benghazi and Tripoli actively compete over who can demonstrate the greatest international access.
These highly public visits thus primarily appear to benefit Libyan elites by allowing them to demonstrate power, reassure supporters, and demoralize rivals while presenting a veneer of legitimacy to international observers.
These visits are also impacting the unification process, with Saddam Haftar’s June 29 trip to Washington, DC being a case in point. Washington remains the most important source of external political recognition in Libya.
Haftar’s meetings with various senior U.S. officials at the invitation of Boulos—most significantly his publicized meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio—signaled to many Libyans that Saddam Haftar would be Libya’s next head of government given Dbeibeh’s lack of a comparable visit.
Dbeibeh’s subsequent meeting with UAE President Sheikh Muhammad bin Zayed Al Nahyan in Abu Dhabi was generally interpreted as a last-resort attempt to receive assistance from the Gulf states in response to Haftar’s visit.
This has prompted a growing number of Libyans to message below these social media posts “What have you accomplished for us?” as it becomes increasingly clear that accountability for Libya’s numerous problems and institutional oversight remains largely absent from these meetings.
The announcements that have come out of these processes are also coming under question. The Boulos initiative’s focus on Libya’s oil production has raised particular concern given the level of control that elites hold over Libya’s oil resources and economy in general.
In eastern and southern Libya, not only do Khalifa Haftar, his sons, and their close associates hold military and political power; they also control all major businesses. In addition, the family maintains a strong grip on the oil fields in the territories under their control.
Similarly, in western Libya, the security, political, and economic sectors revolve around Prime Minister Dbeibeh, his family members, and their entrenched circle of loyalists. They control many of the country’s most important institutions, including the Central Bank, the NOC, and the High National Elections Commission.
Thus, the memorandums of understanding that have emerged from the Boulos initiative have political undertones.
In early 2026, Libya’s Government of National Unity signed a strategic cooperation agreement with Boeing to modernize the country’s civil aviation sector. The agreement includes support for acquiring modern aircraft, enhancing technical and technological cooperation, upgrading aviation infrastructure to international standards, and advancing plans for a new national carrier as part of a broader U.S.-Libya economic partnership.
In addition, Libya and Chevron signed an agreement in January of this year marking the company’s return to the Libyan energy sector after more than a decade.
The agreement included an MoU with the NOC to assess Libya’s unconventional shale oil and gas potential, estimated at approximately 123 trillion cubic feet of gas and 18 billion barrels of oil. In February, Chevron was awarded an exploration block in the Sirte Basin during Libya’s first international licensing round since 2007.
Libyans increasingly view these developments—and the United States government by association—as enabling a political system that confers power via international recognition, business deals, and access, rather than via successful governance. According to the language of the mediation initiatives, these processes are designed to facilitate elections, accountability, and state-building in Libya. Yet if Libyans fail to see progress on these governance issues while the country’s political elites reap the benefits of these efforts, popular support for them will continue to dwindle.
In other words, continued international engagement with Libya’s political status quo is primarily benefiting those with the greatest interest in remaining in power and expanding business opportunities with foreign partners.
So long as Libya’s elites retain high-level access to the international community while dodging the responsibilities of governance, they will continue to gain political oxygen while selling an elusive reality to the Libyan people. And if this path continues, international mediation efforts risk encouraging the continuation of Libya’s crisis rather than delivering a solution.
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Tahani Elmogrbi is a Libya specialist, a MENA conflict-resolution advisor, and political analyst with extensive experience in democracy and governance, peace building, and foreign policy. She advises several European governments on security architecture, foreign fighters, and post-conflict recovery.
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The Washington Institute
