Amine Ghoulidi
If Russia entrenches itself in Libya unopposed, it will create problems for Europe in the Mediterranean and Africa.
The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian regime and the increase in Russian Libya involvement may seem like unrelated phenomena. However, Russia’s shift towards Libya is a direct reaction to Bashar al-Assad’s downfall.
While this shift reflects constraints on Russian power, it may also increase risks to European and regional security by concentrating Russian power closer to NATO’s southern flank, potentially allowing Russia to exploit regional fractures in Libya and elsewhere.
Currently, Libya remains divided between the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli and Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), which controls the east. This division has allowed external powers to take advantage of Libya’s instability to advance their own regional agendas.
Recent reports indicate a Russian cargo plane departing Khmeimim, Syria for Libya. This could have reinforced Moscow’s established Libyan presence via private military contractors tied to the LNA.
Satellite imagery of dismantled Ka-52 helicopters and S-400 systems points to Russia’s planned redeployment of key military hardware. Italian defense minister Guido Crosetto warns that repositioning from Syria to Libya puts hostile naval capabilities “two steps away” from Italian maritime space.
Whether a reflection of opportunism or a coherent plan, Moscow’s moves—driven by setbacks and resource constraints—could reshape regional security well beyond Libya’s fractured landscape.
This realignment unfolds against a backdrop of unprecedented Western retrenchment across Africa. France’s forced withdrawals from Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, and Senegal mark not merely the collapse of decades-old security arrangements. Still, the unraveling of an entire post-colonial order that had (however imperfectly) stabilized the region. The American departure from Niger has contributed to the strategic vacuum—and Moscow appears eager to exploit that.
For Moscow, Libya provides an ideal platform to reassert the influence that had been contested in Syria. LikAmine Ghoulidie in Syria, where Moscow and Tehran used a conflict to entrench themselves, Libya’s fractious landscape now provides a playground for outside powers.
Yet, while Syria granted access to the Levantine corridor and Israel’s doorstep, Libya offers strategic depth in Africa, allowing Russia to project power into the Sahel. In Syria, Russia’s aims centered on shoring up a beleaguered ally. Still, its objectives in Libya reflect broader ambitions—ambitions for which anti-Western sentiment and fragile states offer fertile ground.
Moscow seeks a durable maritime presence in the Mediterranean, a longstanding aspiration that demands year-round port access and the ability to deploy naval assets. It also seeks control or influence over transit routes from Libya, which would position Russia to pressure Europe on energy routes and critical infrastructure.
Russia views Libya as an anchor for further entrenchment in the Sahel, where Western disengagement and weakened governments create openings. From oil in Libya to gold in Sudan to uranium in Niger, control of North Africa’s resources would feed Russia’s broader power projection goals.
Libya’s geographic centrality amplifies its strategic value. Libya offers multi-directional influence: north toward Europe, south into the Sahel, and west across the Maghreb. This geographic centrality presents operational complexities that temper Russia’s reach. The vast Saharan expanses pose logistical challenges. Still, even a limited Russian presence in the country’s east provides significant leverage over critical Mediterranean and trans-Saharan routes. These strategic considerations illustrate why Libya isn’t a mere substitute for fading influence in Syria—instead, it may be Moscow’s new proving ground.
Russia’s constraints (including recruiting challenges and Ukraine force commitments) may make Libya’s fractured landscape appealing. Further, the loss of the Syrian air bridge makes securing and expanding Russia’s Libyan foothold even more crucial for maintaining Moscow’s broader African operations.
Unlike Syria, where Russia maintained expensive military deployments, Libya allows Moscow to project influence through a combination of private military contractors, targeted arms supplies, and political leverage—a model better suited to Russia’s current constraints.
Currently, Moscow and Ankara maintain a careful balance of rivalry and tactical cooperation in Libya. In contrast to the stark antagonism of the Syrian war, competition in Libya is more restrained and pragmatic, relying largely on proxies and military assets to sustain influence without risking open confrontation.
Russia’s Wagner Group supports Khalifa Haftar’s LNA, while Turkey backs Tripoli’s GNA with drones and advisors. This dynamic fosters “managed instability”—a scenario where both sides prevent decisive victories, ensuring that neither can unilaterally dominate Libya’s strategic corridors.
For Russia, however, this contest might serve more than mere strategic purposes—it could be an opportunity to settle scores with Turkey after being outmaneuvered in Syria.
The Russian pivot to Libya also affects Libya’s North African neighbors like Algeria and Tunisia, which share borders with Libya and thus have an immediate stake in the outcome.
Tunisia’s and Algeria’s positions on key regional issues seem almost completely aligned—largely because of Algeria’s strong backing of the Kais Saied administration. Algeria typifies the intricacy of the regional situation. While it has deep military ties and a vital alliance with Moscow, it’s also voiced concerns about the growing Russian military buildup in Libya.
Yet, these tactical disagreements don’t undermine the broader Russian-Algerian strategic partnership, which remains anchored in extensive military-technical cooperation and Algeria’s position as one of Moscow’s largest arms customers.
However, the implications of Russia’s Libyan presence aren’t limited to the region—implications for Europe are also severe. Russian forces operating from Libya could position advanced weaponry and sabotage capabilities within close range of critical European infrastructure. This would leave naval routes, undersea cables, and energy corridors vulnerable to disruption.
These risks are amplified by Western military withdrawals from the Sahel, where Wagner-linked entities have already established footholds. There, these entities profit from Sudan’s gold reserves while embedding themselves in local power structures.
As a result of deteriorating security, regional extremist operations have expanded, creating overlapping crises that Moscow can exploit for economic and diplomatic leverage.
Yet flashpoints remain. If Russia were to deploy advanced air defense systems, or if Turkey were to deepen its military footprint substantially, the resulting shift in Libya’s power balance could provoke a more intense proxy conflict with broader regional implications.
The ultimate impact of Russia’s realignment toward Libya hinges on its capacity to juggle competing interests. Libya’s environment is more fragmented than Syria’s, creating a precarious setting where subtle actions can have outsized repercussions. The region already bristles with external players, and a single misstep could pull it into an even deeper cycle of interventions.
Russia’s pivot from Syria to Libya demonstrates how even a constrained power can pose significant regional challenges. Moscow’s more flexible engagement in Libya enhances its ability to exploit vulnerabilities amid a historic Western retreat from Africa. Libya has become Moscow’s launching pad to extend influence in the Sahel, hold Europe’s strategic infrastructure at risk, and elevate its global posture.
The challenge for the United States and its allies is to contain Russian ambitions while averting further fragmentation in North Africa. If Russia entrenches itself in Libya unopposed, it will create problems for Europe in the Mediterranean and Africa.
The stakes are high: missteps in managing Russia’s Libyan gambit may usher in a new era of rivalry in the Mediterranean—this time within striking distance of Europe’s vitals.
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Amine Ghoulidi was a Visiting Fellow at Heritage’s Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy and is currently pursuing a PhD in Geopolitics and Security at King’s College London’s School of Security Studies.
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