IV. The View from the Initiative’s
Opponents
The proposal’s most provocative aspect for Libyans is that Saddam Haftar would become head of the Presidential Council. Critics fear that any power sharing arrangement would prove short-lived at best, because Saddam would sideline Dabaiba to consolidate authority for himself.
As one politician put it, “Saddam is a military man with blood on his hands. His project is to rule alone over the whole of Libya. He is not interested in ruling it jointly”. She pointed to a legal mechanism at his disposal:
under the 2015 UN-mediated Skhirat agreement, the president can declare a state of emergency, mobilise security forces and impose exceptional measures, with potentially far-reaching constitutional consequences.
Such concerns appear especially pronounced within the Presidential Council itself. According to people close to its chairman, Mohamed al-Mnefi, he would be willing to step down, but only in favour of a more broadly acceptable political figure.
Many opponents warn that concentrating power in Saddam’s hands could trigger a violent backlash.
Several influential armed groups in western Libya have made it known that they might use force to resist his appointment if they deem it necessary. Insiders say this talk is not mere bluster. The aforementioned politician said, “These men simply do not accept Haftar’s son becoming president”.
Already, observers point to early signs of military escalation, with a reported increase in the quantity of weapons entering Tripoli through Mitiga airport. That said, whether these shipments are intended for armed groups aligned with or opposed to Haftar remains uncertain.
Critics point to a second source of concern, namely widespread scepticism that the power sharing deal would make living conditions better. Many say U.S. efforts on the economic track have yet to tangibly improve ordinary Libyans’ lives.
The data appear to bear out this judgment. The exchange rate still hovers at more than eight dinars to the U.S. dollar on the parallel market, 20 per cent higher than the current official rate and over 40 per cent higher than the one set in early 2025.
Cash withdrawals remain heavily restricted, access to foreign currency is tightly controlled and businesses in need of hard currency continue to face significant administrative hurdles.
Fuel smuggling is pervasive, and many suspect the tacit acquiescence of competing political elites, even as large numbers of Libyans experience recurring fuel shortages, liquidity constraints and severe electricity outages.
Revenues generated by illicit markets have also sustained a real estate boom seen by many as disconnected from the broader economy. More generally, critics say the initiative risks reinforcing Libya’s dysfunctional political economy.
Describing the U.S. envoy’s attempt to unify the two governments’ budgets, a Misrata businessman argued that it reflected a narrow vision of economic development centred on construction projects, leaving Libya’s deeper problems unaddressed:
Any development plan worthy of note should work toward making the country less reliant on oil. But the only development these people [Saddam Haftar and Dabaiba] have in mind is building bridges and hotels. So, what the U.S. considers an achievement, we consider a disaster because they are giving money to thieves.
A third critique centres on the negotiations’ lack of inclusivity, their emphasis on elite bargaining over popular participation. Many Libyans resent the exclusion of swathes of society from a process that could fundamentally reshape the political order.
A Libyan sociologist asserted that the initiative reflects a U.S. perception of the country as “a struggling company looking for a CEO and a group of investors”, rather than as “a nation in crisis searching for a new social contract”.
In this assessment, there is an absence of an explicit commitment to elections. After years of international promises that Libya’s future leadership would be decided at the ballot box, the proposed arrangement instead appears to eschew public consent by institutionalising the existing balance of power.
Boulos sought to offer reassurance, explaining that his endeavour is meant to go hand in hand with UN-led efforts to organise polls, but Dabaiba and Haftar supporters have been far more dismissive, suggesting these could be put off “for years”
Many Libyans are furious. “In one sentence”, the sociologist wrote in a social media post, “elections vanished, the popular will disappeared, talk of justice and accountability evaporated, and only oil remained to speak for everyone”
U.S. officials appear taken aback by the intensity of the public backlash. A businessman who met U.S. mediators in Misrata in July described them as “stunned by the uproar [the initiative] caused”.
Yet so far, the resistance has prompted neither substantive nor procedural changes in Washington’s approach. Sources confirm that both sides continue to submit proposed amendments to the agreement through U.S. mediators.
V. Where Foreign Capitals and
the UN Stand
During the early years of Libya’s division, and particularly during Haftar’s 2019-2020 attempt to capture Tripoli, several foreign powers aligned themselves with one side or the other.
Türkiye was the Tripoli-based government’s most visible backer, intervening militarily to help its forces repel Haftar’s assault, while most European states offered it primarily diplomatic and rhetorical support.
Haftar, by contrast, received military aid from the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Russia, which reportedly supplied varying degrees of equipment and air cover.
France and the U.S. also allegedly gave his offensive their tacit blessing, at least at first, before it became clear that the siege would fail.
Since the 2020 ceasefire, however, foreign alignments have become far less polarised. Türkiye opened channels to the Haftar camp, and it has since developed strong ties with the east while (reportedly) retaining its garrison in western Libya.
Conversely, the UAE, Russia and Egypt have all strengthened their relations with Tripoli.
Today, external actors, including Western capitals, continue to recognise the Tripoli-based government as Libya’s legitimate authority while simultaneously maintaining political and commercial contacts with the Haftars in the east.
Against this backdrop, the U.S. initiative has exposed differences among Libya’s foreign partners, despite U.S. officials’ insistence that it is broadly endorsed.
France and the UAE appear to be among its strongest supporters, arguably because both hold favourable views of Saddam Haftar, welcome his political ascent and consider the Haftar-led military coalition to be critical in fighting Islamist militants along Libya’s porous borders.
Their approval was on display in mid-June, when French President Emmanuel Macron hosted Saddam Haftar at the Elysee. In recent months, he has also been received by the leaders of Greece, Chad and Qatar.
Others, notably several European states, express private doubts despite publicly backing the initiative. Their caution is understandable:
few are willing to openly challenge Washington’s approach for fear of jeopardising U.S. cooperation in other areas. As a European diplomat explained, “Nobody tells the Americans to their face that they have reservations, even when these are substantial”.
Italy, in particular, is sceptical. It acknowledges that U.S. efforts have eased security cooperation with Haftar-aligned forces, an important asset as it seeks to curb migrant flows from Libya, a key political priority.
At the same time, Italian officials are apprehensive about the implications of a botched power sharing agreement, which they worry could trigger armed opposition, undermine Libya’s relative calm and unleash a new wave of migration across the Mediterranean.
As an Italian diplomat put it, “We are supportive [of the U.S. initiative] and would love to see a unified country”, but, referring to the risk of backlash, he added, “we absolutely do not want to see Libya destabilised”.
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