Archive - June 2023

Mary Fitzgerald

Libya’s political players have grappled with how to build a political party culture since the country held its first post-Gadhafi elections in 2012. Under Moammar Gadhafi, political organizing was banned. Decades of regime propaganda against outlawed opposition movements made Libyans suspicious of political groups and parties. 

When the rebel National Transitional Council (NTC) drafted a constitutional declaration during the 2011 uprising against Gadhafi, it stipulated the establishment of a democratic system based on “political and party plurality” and guaranteed the freedom to form political parties. The NTC declaration was only ever meant to be temporary, but in the absence of a proper constitution, it remains the legal underpinning of Libya’s troubled transition. 

Libya’s first experience of political parties came with the vote for the General National Congress (GNC) in 2012. During the drafting of the electoral law that year, some argued that an individual-based system would exacerbate tribalism and regionalism while others claimed that a party-based system would favor already established groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. The GNC was eventually elected under a hybrid system that included both individual and party lists, with non-Islamist parties ultimately faring better in the party list.

Two years later, the House of Representatives (HoR) was elected to replace the GNC. That ballot had one key difference: All candidates were required to run as independents. This was partly due to growing animosity toward political parties. Popular frustration with the GNC meant political parties were often blamed for its shortcomings. Party headquarters were frequently attacked during the GNC’s lifetime. Almost a decade on, however, many critics of the HoR — which remains in place as no elections have been held since 2014 — insist much of its dysfunction stems from the absence of political parties. 

Over the past nine years, Libya’s parties have operated as shadow players in the country’s fractious politics. During the 2014-20 civil conflict, there were frequent calls to ban political parties outright as polarization deepened and people sought scapegoats for the country’s derailed transition.

Libya’s political landscape now looks very different. Several of the main formations that emerged in 2012 have since either been riven by infighting or have faded away. Most notably, the two dominant groups in that year’s election — the Brotherhood-affiliated Justice and Construction Party (JCP) and its main rival, the National Forces Alliance (NFA) — have experienced splits. Those new to the scene include parties associated with the so-called “Greens,” or former regime figures and sympathizers, plus more tribal or regionally oriented parties. 

As part of efforts to get Libya’s democratic transition back on track, a more stringent political party registration system was introduced in early 2021, ahead of elections that were due to take place that December but were postponed. Robust vetting is considered crucial to prevent electoral fraud. More than 70 parties have since been approved for licenses, according to the body overseeing the process.

The number of parties not yet registered is estimated at over 100. Some parties, particularly those that trace their roots to the 2012 elections, such as the JCP plus NFA offshoots, have started to organize together and form networks and umbrella groups over the past two years. This may result in parties merging ahead of a future national ballot.

Three main currents are emerging: the Greens, the Islamists, and the nationalists. Libya does not have a defined secular/Islamist political cleavage, so anti/non-Islamist groupings are often described or self-describe as nationalist, a catch-all term that can include more liberal-leaning elements as well as social conservatives who do not identify as Islamist. In the 2012 election, there was little difference between nationalist party platforms and those of mainstream Islamist parties. All the leading parties supported the idea of sharia law being a basis for legislation. This is unlikely to change as parties prepare for future parliamentary elections. Detailed party manifestos were rare in 2012 and few have issued any since.

The Green current is believed to already comprise more than a dozen parties, with the most prominent being the National Movement party, led by former Gadhafi government minister Mustafa al-Zaidi. “That’s ironic when you consider the Gadhafi regime’s ideological opposition to the very idea of political parties,” says one party leader from the nationalist camp. Some observers believe the nationalist current stands to lose most if Green political parties gain momentum.

Since 2020, the development of youth-driven protest movements against the status quo raises the question of whether new political parties might yet emerge from a younger generation shaped by very different experiences in post-Gadhafi Libya. While these youth movements have yet to coalesce into a unified force, what they share is a frustration with an older political elite considered corrupt and out of touch. In recent years, the more established parties have sought to engage more with youth and women. Given the broad social conservatism of Libyan society, few believe the country’s political scene might include an openly secular or avowedly liberal party anytime soon.

Party leaders from across Libya’s political spectrum lament that they have too often been overlooked in diplomatic efforts to resolve the current impasse and nudge the country toward fresh elections. Indeed, some diplomats have considered them largely irrelevant to the power struggles that drove the 2014-20 civil conflict and still linger today.

In early March, 52 political parties signed a letter to U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres complaining that U.N. Envoy Abdoulaye Bathily’s new roadmap did not include them. “By virtue of the constitutional and legal framework, [parties] are a cornerstone and have a vital role in the political process,” the letter stated. “Democratic systems are based on political and party plurality.” Later that month, Bathily met with representatives from 21 political parties and his team has continued to engage since. Unsurprisingly, political parties are pushing for future electoral laws to include a large party list. “Without parties, it’s like trying to have a Champions League without any [soccer] clubs,” one party leader told me. “You cannot stabilize Libya’s politics without parties.”

The 6+6 Joint Committee, comprised of six representatives from the HoR and six from the High State Council (which is itself composed of former GNC members), has been tasked with drafting laws to organize elections Bathily wants to see happen later this year. They have decided to allocate just over 50% of seats in the next parliament to a party list.

Libyans who believe parties are key to embedding a less dysfunctional and more sustainable political culture say internationals should do more to support the idea of party lists. But Libya’s political parties themselves need to mature and reflect on whether they represent the longer-term interests of broad swathes of the population or narrower interests. “There’s not much vision beyond the here and now,” says one international. 

Despite Bathily’s entreaties, few Libyans believe elections will take place this year, or even next year. In the meantime, Libya’s political parties will continue to press their case. There are indications, including observations from party activists as well as public polling, that attitudes toward parties are shifting and that most Libyans accept they have a role to play in the country’s political life. Which parties might be up to the challenge is another question. Libya’s still-young experiment with democracy remains fragile and its political parties have a long way to go.

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Mary Fitzgerald is a researcher and consultant specializing in the Euro-Mediterranean region with a particular focus on Libya. She is a non-resident scholar with MEI’s North Africa and the Sahel Program.

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How do “international networks” bring African children to be trafficked and smuggled into Europe?

Jamal Jowhar

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Big human traffickers hide behind “false names” to round up boys from Africa and Asia for gangs to use them in forced labor, prostitution, and armed groups. Asharq Al-Awsat is tracking cross-border smuggling routes.

He called me from Italy in a frightened, trembling voice. “My brother Adham traveled to Libya, and there was no news of him. We no longer know if he is alive or dead,” he told me. This was one of the calls between us, during which Egyptian Osama Abdel-Tawab Amin informed me in October 2022 about what happened to his brother Adham, 14, who had traveled from Egypt to Libya, heading towards the city of eastern Libyan city of Benghazi.

Adham, born and raised in the southern Egyptian Assiut Governorate, is one of thousands of minors from several Arab and African countries who long dreamed of emigrating to Europe. Adham is one of those who surrendered themselves to “brokers” to start a “journey of wandering” that may end in either prison, on Europe’s shores, or perhaps a return to their countries, but this time to their “last resting place”.

Asharq Al-Awsat investigated these incidents in the Nile Delta to Sidi Barrani near the Libyan border, reaching other countries, including Sudan and Chad. It sought to document extensive operations that smuggle minors, and explore how they infiltrate Libya, and what parties are involved and benefitting from the situation.

In early 2021, we have observed an increase in Egyptian, African and Syrian families reporting that their children had travelled to Libya and whose fate is unknown. Families were looking for whoever could help return their children. They spoke of how they were “being scammed by brokers.”

Part of this tragedy was unfolded in front of the back entrance of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs building, overlooking the Cairo Nile. Asharq Al-Awsat witnessed a large number of complaints they submitted there. Complaints were also sent to the Egyptian parliament.

The beginning of tragedy … a broker

In mid-March 2022, the coastguard in the eastern Libyan city of Tobruk announced that a migrant boat sank in the Mediterranean Sea, off the Wadi Umm Al-Shawsh area. It was carrying a number of migrants, including about 18 young Egyptians. After days of searching for the missing, the family of Egyptian child Amr Sayed Anwar, 15, that lives in one of the villages of Dakahlia Governorate, north of Cairo, was told that their son was among the drowned.

About a month after the incident, I contacted Amr’s father, who lives in a village near Sinbalawin in Dakahlia. The man, who is about 50 years old and works as a daily-paid farmer, said the authorities in Libya have not found the body of his son, tearfully adding: “I lost my son forever”.

The man’s breakdown prevented me from inquiring about how he traveled to Libya, but he exploded angrily when he mentioned the “broker”.

“I paid 30,000 pounds, (US$ 1,000) and Amr traveled with 22 others of his age and may be older. They traveled to Marsa Matrouh to meet the broker. After they arrived in Libya, the broker, again, asked for an additional 70,000 pounds for his travel to Italy.”

I left the Anwar family, consisting of four daughters, all under 20 years of age and a child younger than seven, to their grief and poverty. I went to see the broker after the father gave me his phone number. It was clear that the “brokerage market”, like any other, is subject to supply and demand, bargaining and negotiation and that each Libyan region has a price paid by those wishing to go to it. Prices are also decided based on proximity to the Egyptian border.

It turned out that the broker is widely popular among those wishing to emigrate clandestinely in a number of rural governorates in the Nile Delta, although he lives in Sidi Barrani, 570 kilometers northwest of Cairo. The broker did not respond to any requests for an interview concerning his activity in transporting those wishing to travel across the border. However, he responded to us when we introduced ourselves as parents wishing to send their children abroad.

During the first phone call, I asked him to help smuggle three boys to Libya. He didn’t mind and asked me about which region they wanted to go. Broker Abu Mazen (a pseudonym), whose accent is a mix of Egyptian and Libyan, did not give me time to answer. He went on to specify the required amount and said that he could transfer any number across the Egyptian border to the Libyan inland. He added, as if reassuring me: “I consider them my children, I swear.”

About ten days later, I called Abu Mazen, and it seemed that he forgot our conversation due to the high number of calls he receives, so he asked me to remind him of our past talk. Then, I asked to meet him, and, reluctantly, he asked that we meet a week later in Matrouh.

This call was at the end of May 2022, and before the agreed date, he felt that it would be more appropriate for both of us to meet in Alexandria, as he was going to visit one of his relatives.

In a café overlooking the Mediterranean Sea, in the Asafra area of Alexandria, 230 kilometers north of Cairo, we met as agreed. We talked about how to bring young people together, and how to smuggle them out of the country.

It struck me that the 60-year-old man was speaking comfortably, but when we get to the details, he became cautious. While boasting, Abu Mazen, whose phone did not stop ringing, began to show how he has a strong network of relations inside Libya. He suddenly said: “I do not exploit young people or deceive them. They just come to ask us to smuggle them to Libya, and we help them and leave them only within the area they specify.”

Abu Mazen referred to the many phone calls he received in less than an hour that we spent together at the café, as proof of the growing demand for his services. He was also keen to show that his services are not overpriced “like others.”

He added: “We take care of others’ children. I take 20,000 Egyptian pounds (about US$650) per person to move from the Hodoud Barani to Tripoli, and 15,000 pounds to Benghazi. Others would ask for 40,000 and 50,000 pounds, and then leave the young people on the road, or sell them”. He added: “The Libyan dinar now is equivalent to five Egyptian pounds, (US$1 is equivalent to 5.12 Libyan dinar).”

In response to persistent appeals to show me the smuggling routes, Abu Mazen said: “This has been my job for years, and I have my men in Libya, ten hours away from the Customs Office side. Young people arrive in Libya, and I only leave them when each arrives at the place he wants.” I asked him: “which customs?” He replied with a Libyan accent: ” Emsaed Customs”.

Very discreetly, he said he brings young people from different governorates to the city of Matrouh on a specific date, before transporting them to Salloum, and from there, “they walk in desert roads and routes, along the Emsaed crossing border between Egypt and Libya”.

Having asked him again about the age of young people he helps smuggle, he showed no interest. He only said: “We take the money. We don’t care about their ages.” Laughing, he added: “There is a lot of demand for transporting young people. But what can we do? This is what their families want.”

He explained that those he smuggles “are planning to migrate from Libya to Europe… a trip costs aroun 120,000 to 150,000 Egyptian pounds.” He said he does not receive the full agreed amount in advance so as to “reassure people” that he is not a swindler. He added: “They will not get away with the money. My men in Libya are there.”

International networks

Due to increasing smuggling of young people by Abu Mazen and other brokers in the Egyptian Delta, the current situation indicates that smuggling operations exceed the capabilities of the “local network”.

Considering that irregular migration operations are carried out clandestinely, there are no related official statistics. Yet, the International Organization for Migration revealed the presence of more than 117,000 Egyptian migrants in Libya between December 2021 and January 2022.

What we have from Libya inland, and the details the families of migrant children have shared with us reveal a ramified and extended international network linking Libya with several countries, including Egypt and Sudan. The most well-known of these is, perhaps, the “Kidan” network, led by an Eritrean wanted by the Interpol.

The Italian “Information Security Policy” annual report for 2022 refers to “organized criminal networks in Libya, in the cities of Zuwara, Zawiya and Sabratha (to the west). The report considers these networks among chief reasons for the remarkable increase in migration by sea noticed the same year. The report also reveals “criminal partnerships made up of Tunisian and Italian brokers involved in various illegal trafficking operations, including facilitating irregular migration.”

The report attributed the “high pressure of irregular migration flows in 2022, towards Italy and Europe, especially from Africa, the Middle East and Asia”, to factors such as “political instability, armed conflicts, severe climate change and a strong demographic push.”

In addition to the report, Greek authorities are investigating seven Egyptians who were arrested there, according to press reports. They are accused of smuggling 484 people from Syria, Sudan, Pakistan and Egypt, including 128 boys and nine girls, after a rickety boat carrying them from Libya lost its way, near the southern Mediterranean island of Crete.

From Adham, the Egyptian…. to Eissa, the Sudanese

The tragedy of the family of the drowned child Amr, is not much different from what many other families suffered. They all share the same motives and social reasons that prompted them to accept the departure of their children from Egypt by means of smuggling through “brokers”. “Many people have traveled to Italy, and God helped them. They built new houses, and their circumstances improved”, says the mother of child Mossad Mohammed Ismail, from Ezbet Akl, in Mansoura city.

What is remarkable here, as we moved from one governorate to another and listened to some families, is that large groups of those who have fled to Libya, at least over the past year, are children and minors between the ages of 12 and 17. One of them is Adham Abdel Tawab Amin, who left from Borg El Arab Airport in Alexandria, according to his brother Osama, before enrolling in the third grade of middle school.

With great sadness, Osama explained that “the broker got Adham into the plane from Borg El Arab in Alexandria, to Benina airport in Benghazi on August 22, 2022. From there he moved to western Libya. We do not know his whereabouts.”

There are many tragic stories that we have seen related to many children detained in Libya. Some of them are held at official detention facilities, others are believed to be in the grip of human trafficking gangs, while others may have been washed away by the sea.

Our list is long and has hundreds of children from Egypt and as well as other African countries. Apart from Adham, there are Ayman Tarek Al-Bari, 14, Marwan Abdul-Salam ,15, Osama Hamed Abdul-Ati, 17, Ahmed Mohammed Faiq, 17, and Bilal Mohammed al-Jamal, 17.

We met their families successively in Egyptian governorates. There are also the Sudanese Mubarak Harun Musa, who disappeared five years ago, and Abdul Mawla Issa, with whom we spoke by phone. It turned out that he entered Libya at a young age, and recently left it at the age of 23 on an evacuation trip to Rwanda.

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Elis Gjevori

A pivotal force in Russia’s war against Ukraine, Wagner Group’s capabilities have been honed in Syria, Libya and elsewhere in Africa.

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The Wagner Group’s rebellion against the Russian state could have major repercussions not only for the group’s operations in the Middle East but also for Moscow’s ability to replace the financial and military networks fostered by the paramilitary outfit in the region. 

The mercenary group, which launched an armed mutiny overnight Saturday, has built a spider’s network of military, business and political relationships over the past decade that encompass Libya, Syria, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates. 

Wagner forces fighting in Ukraine had also until recently been a crucial asset supporting the Russian military on the battlefield. The self-funded force recently provided Russia with its first recent discernible victory when it captured the strategic town of Bakhmut. 

But the group’s considerable capabilities might not have been so well-honed were it not for its experiences in the Middle East and Africa. Wagner mercenaries cut their teeth fighting side-by-side with Russian troops in the battlefields of Syria, as a stand-alone outfit in Libya, and are even involved in the current conflicts in Sudan, Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR). 

“Wagner really started its Africa operations in Libya and did so in a very effective manner. It was a bridgehead that the UAE facilitated at the time from which Wagner was able to really expand,” Andreas Krieg, associate professor of security studies at King’s College London, told Middle East Eye.

While Wagner is not an official company in Russia, since the existence of private military companies is not allowed, the group has nonetheless created shell companies outside the country that it used to self-finance its operations and propel itself to power. 

Its “strategically significant” bridgehead in Libya allowed the group to create links with Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemeti, who heads the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Krieg added.

The RSF, a militia force like Wagner, is now embroiled in its own rebellion against the Sudanese state. 

Wagner and the UAE

Wagner, which is under the control of Yevgeny Prigozhin, until recently a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, is sanctioned by the United States and other countries for a network of investments made in places like Sudan, Mali and the CAR. 

Billions of dollars worth of gold have allegedly made their way from Sudan to the UAE, much of which is widely thought to be facilitated by Wagner.

MEE reached out to the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs for comment but did not receive a response by time of publication.

US officials have openly expressed that it believes some of the gold mining concessions operated by Wagner have been partly re-directed towards Moscow’s $130bn gold stash, helping Putin’s administration circumvent the effect of economic sanctions imposed over the Ukraine war.

“The Kremlin relied on the UAE to facilitate many of the Wagner operations across Africa in 2018 because at the time it was a tool of Russian partially soft power but also hard power,” said Krieg. 

Last year, the US accused Wagner mercenaries of exploiting natural resources in the CAR, Mali, Sudan and elsewhere in the continent, which it would not have been able to do without the UAE.

“Prigozhin in particular had good relationships with the UAE, which is an important partner for Russia because there are a lot of private personal networks between Abu Dhabi and Kremlin elites,” Krieg said.

The multibillion-dollar question now is the extent to which Putin will pressure UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan to “clamp down” on these networks, Krieg said.

“Wagner would not be able to operate if they no longer had access to the infrastructure, financial logistics, gold trade infrastructure that the UAE has provided,” he added.

While the Wagner, Sudan and UAE nexus has been a key relationship that has made all sides significant amounts of money, the Russian paramilitary group’s military skills have been much sought after in other conflict areas.

Russia’s strategic interests in Libya

Since 2019, Wagner mercenaries have played a crucial role in helping Libya’s eastern renegade military commander turned warlord Khalifa Haftar to maintain control over the country’s southern and eastern regions. 

“Without an alternative foreign security umbrella, the withdrawal of Wagner would pose a threat to Haftar’s influence in eastern and southern Libya,” said Ferhat Polat, a researcher at the University of Exeter with a focus on Libyan affairs.

With Wagner’s help, the Libyan conflict has effectively become a cold war. Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) and the internationally recognised Tripoli government are likely looking at events in Russia and what it might mean for the balance of power in the country.

“The Wagner mercenaries have provided the necessary military expertise and resources that are not available within the LNA,” Polat told MEE.

“The Kremlin’s increased presence has given them greater leverage over western powers. The withdrawal of Wagner fighters could impact Russia’s geostrategic interests. However, it remains unclear whether Russia will actually withdraw its mercenaries from Libya,” he said.

Wagner’s presence in Syria

Syria was one of Wagner’s first forays outside Europe. The group deployed mercenaries to fight alongside the forces of Bashar al-Assad in 2015, at the same time that Putin launched an air campaign in support of Damascus.

It’s difficult to draw “bold conclusions” at the moment and the unfolding situation has a “tremendous  amount of potential to impact  the Ukraine war as well as Russia’s foreign policy in the Middle East at large,” Giorgio Cafiero, CEO of Washington-based geopolitical risk consultancy Gulf State Analytics said.

“Clearly what is happening in Russia undermines Russian unity, and there is potential for actors in the Middle to look at Russia differently,” he said.

Syria is one of the few publicly documented conflict zones where US forces have directly engaged Wagner fighters. In 2018, the US military killed between 200 and 300 pro-Assad fighters, many of whom were assumed to be Wagner mercenaries, after they assaulted a US military outpost in eastern Syria.

Syria is a linchpin for Moscow’s projection of regional power. Russia has strategic access to the Eastern Mediterranean through its naval base in Tartus. Meanwhile, companies linked to Wagner have obtained lucrative stakes in oil and gas deposits in territory formerly controlled by the Islamic State group.

“No matter how the latest crisis unfolds, Russia’s power projection is bound to be diminished across the MENA region,” said Yonatan Touval, an analyst at the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies (Mitvim).

Post-Wagner power vacuum

While the war in Ukraine has meant that Russia has had to reduce its military presence in Syria, Wagner has also been impacted.

“Wagner Group has been struggling to keep its operations across multiple fronts too, with the additional challenge posed by strong pressure exerted by the US on its Middle East allies to expel its mercenaries from Sudan and Libya,” Touval told MEE.

“The key question is whether these developments will create a power vacuum that will allow other players to enter, with the downside being rapid destabilisation in such areas as Syria and Libya.”

The weakening Russian hand in the region is already being felt. MEE reported last year that Russia had to delay servicing Middle Eastern arms clients because of supply shortages as a result of the war in Ukraine.

While Russia’s military presence in Syria means that Wagner’s activities can be quickly stopped in Libya and other African countries, this is going to be “more difficult” if Moscow moves to liquidate the group, said Kirill Semenov, a non-resident expert with the Russian International Affairs Council.

“There are no Russian troops in these other regions, and local regimes work directly with Wagner and not with official Russian structures,” said Semenov, speaking to MEE from Russia.

“It cannot be ruled out that if the rebellion is suppressed, and I hope this will happen soon, the Wagner branches in Africa may turn into completely uncontrollable mercenary structures that will themselves build ties with local governments without regard to Moscow,” Semenov said.

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Key issues remain strongly contested despite draft laws agreed in Morocco by Libya’s rival legislative bodies.

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Libya’s feuding parties have reached an agreement on legal steps to hold long-delayed elections in the troubled North African nation, yet contentious issues blocking the democratic process remain unresolved, according to observers and a copy of the agreement seen by Al Jazeera.

A 6+6 committee drawn from Libya’s two rival legislative bodies – the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) and the Tripoli-based High Council of State (HCS) – agreed on June 6 on draft laws for presidential and parliamentary elections, inching forward in the country’s current political crisis.

Libya has been fraught with conflict for more than a decade since the removal of former strongman Muammar Gaddafi during the Arab Spring in 2011 and rival factions began competing for power. By 2015, the two legislative bodies had formed and the struggle over Libya’s rule and wealth has continued since.

While welcoming progress, UN envoy Abdoulaye Bathily on Monday warned the Security Council that “key issues remain strongly contested,” blocking the road to “a final settlement” and harbouring the potential to spark a new crisis in the divided country.

He added that he intended to intensify negotiations to address “serious loopholes and technical shortcomings” in the draft laws and make them “implementable” and effective in regulating “successful elections”.

The current political crisis stems from the failure to hold elections on December 24, 2021, and the refusal of Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah – who led the transitional Government of National Unity (GNU) in the capital Tripoli – to step down.

In response, the country’s east-based parliament appointed a rival prime minister, Fathi Bashagha, who has for months sought to install his government in Tripoli.

Observers told Al Jazeera that many of the contested issues that hijacked the democratic process in 2021 were still unresolved.

“Bathily is rightfully noticing the concerns around an elections programme that is not accepted across the political spectrum and that risks sowing further division,” Tim Eaton, senior research fellow at Chatham House, told Al Jazeera.

“Clearly his calculation is that he needs to get a much wider agreement on what happens next and the challenge is being able to do that [and] to move forward,” Eaton said.

Presidential candidate eligibility

One of the main roadblocks to the democratic process has been reaching an agreement on the eligibility criteria for presidential candidates.

Azzedine Guerbi, a member of the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) who attended talks in Morocco’s Bouznika ahead of the deal, told Al Jazeera that the two sides had agreed that candidates with military affiliations must automatically resign from their posts.

A copy of the text obtained by Al Jazeera states that once a candidacy is accepted, the presidential runner is “considered disqualified from their occupation or position by force of law”.

However, no additional provisions are made to ensure that a candidate does not resume their post once the electoral process is concluded.

Jalel Harchaoui, an expert on Libya and associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), told Al Jazeera the failure to address the issue presents clear dangers.

“If you lose, you can go back to being military and mobilise a force to go after the winner,” Harchaoui said. “This should not be possible.”

Similarly, the draft law requires dual nationals to provide a “statement certified by the granting country’s embassy that proves the submission of final waiver of the citizenship of [the second] country”, but does not specify mechanisms to verify compliance.

According to Eaton at Chatham House, the debate over the eligibility criteria for the presidential election has become shorthand for the engagement of Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the Tobruk-based Libyan National Army (LNA), who also holds US citizenship.

“The UN previously felt that agreement could be reached on this area, so I think it’s a question of whether that agreement is being held up to prevent a political process or whether it is a true point of contention that can’t be navigated,” Eaton said.

New interim government

Among the provisions that Bathily raised as a concern was the requirement to form a new government ahead of elections.

According to Harchaoui, Bathily “knows that if a brand-new government is installed, that government will do everything in its power to make the elections fail and to stay in power for as long as possible.”

Additionally, the definition of a “new” government was still up for debate. “If Abdul Hamid Dbeibah reshuffles his ministries and implements a big change, is it a new government even if he remains prime minister?” Harchaoui said.

Dbeibah’s rivals, including HoR speaker Aguila Saleh and the Egyptian government, maintain that he should leave the post.

Eaton said the insistence on formulating an interim government again begged the question of whether the issue hid the “unwillingness of the existing elites to create a new process that could lead to their replacement.”

“Some of their arguments for removing the [Government of National Unity (GNU)] from its privileged position are justified, but if they create an interim government what we’ll probably see is that the talk of elections will die down,” the analyst added.

Second-round voting

The “linkage between presidential and parliamentary elections” was flagged by the UN envoy as potentially problematic.

According to Harchaoui, the criteria determining whether to hold a second round of voting were very vague. “There are still mechanisms to force a second round even if a candidate wins with an absolute majority in the first round,” he said.

Additionally, the draft laws’ provision cancelling parliamentary elections if the first-round presidential vote is not held or completed was also fraught with risks.

Having a parliamentary vote at the same time as the second round of presidential elections exposes the legislative vote to the possibility of being hijacked by presidential candidates dissatisfied with their performance in the first round, the analyst said.

Bathily warned that those contested issues were likely to take the electoral process into a dead end as happened in 2021, “which will result in further polarisation and even the destabilisation of the country”.

Libya has “once again reached a critical stage”, he said.

“Successful elections require not just a legal framework, but also a political agreement that ensures buy-in and inclusion of all major stakeholders.”

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Khaled Mahmoud

Washington’s obsession with the Wagner Group is clouding its efforts to contain Russia’s growing influence in Libya and Sudan. 

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In the 12 years since the killing of Muammar Gaddafi and the collapse of the state, Washington has stayed clear of direct engagement with the Libyan civil war.  CIA Director, William Burns’ 24-hour visit in January is an indication of the necessity – rather than the desire – to re-engage. The most immediate reason for this: to curb Moscow’s growing influence both among Libya’s warring factions, and in the wider region in which the crisis in Sudan has been sucked into the region’s larger vortex of violence and instability.

The foreign mercenary file

Although the 5 + 5 Joint Military Committee, which includes the two main protagonists of the military conflict in Libya, have met inside and outside Libya to settle the niggling issue of  removing mercenaries from Libyan territory, the response of their patrons is far from enthusiastic.

According to sources in the United Nations mission in Libya, its head, Abdoulaye Bathily, returned from his visit to Sudan, Chad and Niger, all of which border Libya, without obtaining a clear timetable for the start of the gradual withdrawal of an army of foreign mercenaries from Libyan territory.

Months after CIA Director William Burns visited Libya, the first high-ranking US official to do so since the end of 2011, . Burns contented himself with meeting representatives of the two military forces in the east, represented by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, Commander-in-Chief of the National Army stationed in the eastern region, and Abdel Hamid al-Dabaiba, head of the Interim Unity Government, ignoring the presidents of the presidential councils, parliament, and the state.

Hany Khallaf, the former Egyptian ambassador to Libya, believes that the Americans, who control Libyan affairs remotely, are seeking to replace any other international parties to determine the future of Libya.

He told African Arguments that the visit is an attempt to ensure the future of the US presence there and to compete with other countries such as Russia, France and Italy with their military and economic presence.

He pointed out that Burns’ meeting with Dabaiba means that the latter, from the US point of view, is the legitimate official responsible for the government. The legitimacy of Dabaiba’s government supported, on the other hand, the parallel government of stability headed by Fathi Bashagha, which was recognized by the Libyan parliament.

He believed that the US presence in Libya, although it mainly concerns the strategic interests of the United States, is threatened by more than one regional and international party.

New strategy

In confirmation of this trend, in March the Biden administration presented its strategy for the next ten years for Libya, which the active political parties have unsurprisingly received in complete silence.

The United States said in an official statement wntirely lacking in irony, that it is committed to assisting the Libyans in their ongoing struggle for a more peaceful, stable and united future, noting that Libya has faced, since the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, division and violent conflict.

Washington accused external actors, including Russia, of exploiting the unstable situation in Libya, posing a threat to NATO’s southern flank and further destabilizing the Sahel region.

The American plan is supposed to create the necessary conditions for holding democratic elections in the long term, which elections all the parties insist must be held this year, an increasingly unlikely possibility.

Recently, US special envoy to Libya, Robert Norland put forward the possibility of holding elections in the presence of foreign forces and without the withdrawal of mercenaries. Dabaiba, who appears to believe that staying on Washington’s good side bolsters his chances of consolidating power, immediately endorsed the proposal. Haftar, the strongman who militarily controls the south and east of the country, thwarted by the mercenaries, quite predictably, is opposed to it.

Although Norland ruled out the reopening of the US embassy in Tripoli, closed since 2014, it is becoming increasingly difficult for US Libya diplomats to justify working from neighbouring Tunisia while trying to limit Russia’s growing influence, and hoping that its coterie of corrupt proxies and ageing warlords will get the job done.

Further signs of Washington’s growing desperation could be detected, say our Egyptian sources, when Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi recently received an American request to help end the Russian presence through the Wagner Group in Libya and Sudan. The Americans, our Egyptian sources say, are now keen for the withdrawal of foreign mercenaries as soon as possible.

Regional players

The Biden administration has been pressing for months, in cooperation with some regional powers such as Egypt and the UAE, to put pressure on the military leaders in Sudan and Libya to end their relations with the Wagner group.

Washington called on the Sisi government to help persuade Field Marshal Haftar, the head of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, and his deputy, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, to end their dealings with Wagner, while a Libyan official said that US officials demanded the withdrawal of mercenaries from oil facilities.

However, sources close to Haftar said that the American official asked him to stop Wagner activity on Libyan soil, and warned him of sanctions and charges against of aiding and abetting the Russian mercenaries.

As part of his follow-up talks with Burns, Haftar met with American political and military envoys at his headquarters in Al-Rajma, outside Benghazi, in eastern Libya. Sources close to Haftar say he asked for Washington’s support in ending the confrontation the Turkish-financed Syrian mercenaries and Al-Dabaiba’s forces in western Libya, pointing out that he considered that the continuation of what he described as the Turkish occupation of the western region of the country was no longer acceptable.

The sources, who asked not to be identified, said that Haftar requested the repatriation of the mercenaries without delay, given that their presence was an insult to the Libyan people, and obstructs all efforts aimed at creating a security and military environment for holding the postponed elections. According to the information, Haftar asked for assurances that Turkey and the militias supporting the Dabaiba government would not attack his forces.

Oral guarantees

Haftar confirmed, according to the same sources, his response to international and regional efforts aimed at finding a political solution to the current situation, providing verbal guarantees that he does not intend to repeat the experience of his failed war against Tripoli in 2019, again.

These assurances contradict his controversial statements during successive visits to the various areas under his control, of adopting a military solution. Sources in Haftar’s forces said that instructions were issued to equip military forces to replace the Wagner elements and what they described as collaborating Chadian and Sudanese militias, without going into further details.

An announcement in April by Major General Tariq bin Ziyad, a Haftar ally, that he was stationing his forces at the Chad border after an armed Chadian faction, the “Union of Forces for Democracy and Development” led by Muhammad Nuri announced the start of the withdrawal of his forces present in Sabha city in the south of Libya towards the Chadian lands.

Haftar never acknowledged the presence of these mercenaries within the ranks of his fighting forces, but it is widely believed that they, along with the Wagner Group, supported him and helped secure the territories under its control.

Former Libyan Foreign Minister, Muhammad al-Dairi, considered that Burns’ visit indicates the growing interest of the United States in the Libyan crisis, especially in the wake of the presence of the Wagner Company, pointing to the concerns raised by US Forces Africa Command (AFRICOM) about Wagner’s activities in several statements since 2018.

Al-Dairi added: “We cannot ignore Wagner’s use of its presence in Libya in logistical support for its operations in Mali, and the recent extension of the presence of the Russian company’s forces to Burkina Faso. All of this takes place in the midst of the participation of Wagner’s forces in Russian operations in Ukraine, which increases the United States’ opposition to Wagner’s presence.”

Unofficial estimates

Starting in 2018, Haftar used Wagner mercenaries to help his forces fight against extremists in the eastern region, in addition to his failed attack on Tripoli in April 2019.

The AFRICOM leadership estimated that about 2,000 mercenaries, said to be financed by the UAE, were present in the second half of 2020 with Russian military equipment, including armored vehicles, air defense systems and combat aircraft.

The existence of Wagner has been linked to widespread human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and forced displacement of civilians.

AFRICOM presented, on more than one occasion, evidence of Russia’s involvement in the Libyan war, including its introduction of manned armed attack aircraft in an attempt to change the nature of the current conflict.

In the past, it broadcasted photographs of Russian planes taking off from bases under the control of Haftar’s forces in the cities of Al-Jufra and Sirte.

In addition to securing energy sources and checking US expansion in the Mediterranean basin, Russia seeks to restore the influence it had in the 1960s in the North African region, and its strategic interests in Libya. However, Moscow failed to convince Haftar to grant a military base on Libyan soil.

Many international human rights organizations believe that Wagner is involved in the Libyan conflict on behalf of Haftar, and is accused of war crimes, including extrajudicial killings, indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas, and the use of child soldiers.

According to a report issued in March 2021 by the United Nations Panel of Experts in Libya, between 800 and 1,200 Wagner members supported Haftar’s forces in various roles of monitoring, advising, protecting forces, and fighting.

Since the United Nations announced a ceasefire in Libya in 2020, a year after the failed war launched by Haftar’s forces to liberate Tripoli from the control of armed militias loyal to the Dabaiba government, Wagner’s efforts have been limited to training members of the National Army led by Haftar and protecting oil installations in the areas under his control. in the east and south of the country.

According to a high-ranking Egyptian official, American officials are obsessed with the Wagner file, pointing out that it tops every meeting they have, whether in Egypt or Libya.

Washington’s man on the inside 

General Mohamed Abdel Wahed, an Egyptian national security expert, believes that the Americans would like to re-establish stability in Libya, however temporarily, especially in light of the war in Ukraine between Russia and NATO, by urging all political forces to cooperate on a number of issues: the unification of military forces; holding elections in the country as soon as possible; in addition to emphasizing the importance of maintaining global energy supplies by securing oil facilities in Libya, a member of OPEC.

He added: “Washington wants to continue the American presence in the region and not leave the arena empty for greater Russian presence, whether directly or through Wagner, in light of an American strategy to expel the Russians from Syria, Libya and the Sahel region…especially after its battles and victories in Ukraine, and its heavy presence in the Sahel region and its contribution to the expulsion of the French forces there.”

What’s in it for the Libyans? General Abdel Wahed says that al-Dabaiba presented himself as a strategic partner and agent of Washington in the region, who demonstrated his willingness to advance American interests by handing over former Libyan intelligence officer Abu Ajila Lammari, accused of making the Lockerbie bomb in 1988. Flirting with Washington’s economic desires, Dababa has also pledged that his country will increase oil exports to three million barrels per day in the next three years.

Thus, the political division continues in Libya between Dabaiba’s government and the parallel government of stability mandated by the House of Representatives led by his rival, Fathi Bashagha, who insists on remaining in office without obtaining the recognition of the international community.

Unfinished mission

In any case, there is an incomplete mission for NATO, which under US and Turkish leadership,  removed the Gaddafi regime in 2011, without establishing an alternative and coherent power structure – the roots of the current instability that has left the Libyan people in the midst of chaos and ruin.

The latest proposal made by Abdoulaye Bathily, head of the United Nations mission to the UN Security Council, to resolve the political crisis there and pave the way for elections that have been postponed for two years, also lacks imagination and reveals the international community’s lack of an effective strategy.

It appears that the initial optimism in Bathily was misplaced. A lasting solution remains very distant, as Washington  continues its strategy of motion without movement.

***

Khaled Mahmoud is an Egyptian journalist covering political and Arab affairs. He has corresponded for several Arabic newspapers in the Middle East.

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Gregory Aftandilian

Recent meetings in Morocco between representatives of Libya’s two main factions, the Government of National Unity (GNU) in the West and the House of Representatives (HoR) in the East, have yielded a tentative agreement on election laws that may pave the way for holding nationwide presidential and legislative elections at some point in the near future. However, this agreement has yet to be signed by the leaders of the two factions.

The leadership’s reluctance to nail down such laws is indicative of the deep divisions that remain in Libya, which benefit the political class and the militias associated with it, but which keep the country in political chaos and fail to resolve its myriad problems, including corruption that is rampant on both sides. Although elections may not be a panacea for Libya’s ills, they would at least begin a process of national reconciliation, which the country desperately needs in order to move forward.

The Long and Divisive Road to Elections

Since 2014, Libya has been divided between two rival governments, the House of Representatives in the East, backed by the so-called Libyan National Army of self-proclaimed Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, and the government in the West, based in the capital city of Tripoli. In its latest incarnation, the latter is called the Government of National Unity, and is internationally recognized. Each of these governments is supported by various militia groups, as well as outside players.

After Haftar failed to take Tripoli by force in 2019–2020, the United Nations put in place a process that led to the appointment of an interim government in February 2021 and the promise of holding presidential and legislative elections in December 2021. However, these elections failed to materialize because of sharp disagreements on their rules, as well as eligibility criteria for presidential candidates.

In the aftermath of this debacle, the interim prime minister of the GNU, Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, declared that he would remain in office. The HoR charged that Dbeibah should no longer stay in this position because his tenure had expired at the end of 2021, and in February 2022, this faction appointed a rival prime minister, Fathi Bashagha. Ironically, Bashagha was interior minister in the Tripoli government when Haftar tried to take control of the city.

Bashagha thus became prime minister of the eastern faction, now called the Government of National Stability. Why Haftar and the HoR chose him as prime minister was the subject of considerable speculation, but it may have had to do with the fact that Bashagha was likely to have more legitimacy vis-à-vis Dbeibah because he once held a prominent position in the Tripoli government.

Backed by militias, Bashagha tried to enter Tripoli twice in the past year but was repelled by forces allied with Dbeibah, resulting in scores of civilian deaths. After these failures, Bashagha ensconced himself and his government in the central coastal city of Sirte.

The main reason that reconciliation has not taken place is that the opposing factions benefit from the status quo.

Then, in mid-May of this year, the HoR fired Bashagha, allegedly because of “poor performance and corruption,” but more likely because, in the words of one analyst, he had outlived his usefulness. Since he failed to take Tripoli, for the HoR faction Bashagha was no longer worth keeping on. Whether the corruption charges are true is anyone’s guess, but since most Libyan politicians are alleged to have their hands in the till, the corruption charges may have been raised simply to obfuscate other reasons for his dismissal.

One alternative theory is that Bashagha got into a dispute with members of the HoR over the budget, with him complaining that the money allocated by the Libyan Central Bank was insufficient to run his government. Another theory is that Haftar may have wanted to use Bashagha and his allied militias to try to take Tripoli without harming his own forces, and when that did not work, Bashagha was no longer needed. The HoR subsequently announced that Finance Minister Osama Hammad would temporarily take over Bashagha’s duties.

In the meantime, UN Special Envoy for Libya Abdoulaye Bathily has tried to get the election process back on track. In March 2023, he said that elections could be held by the end of the year if the two factions could iron out their differences by June. A steering committee was formed with equal representatives from the HoR and the High State Council, which is associated with the GNU. Negotiations began in Libya but were shifted to Morocco in the latter part of May.

Some Progress Announced on Elections, but Leadership Stays Aloof

On June 7, the steering committee announced from its meeting venue in Bouznika, Morocco that it had reached an agreement on presidential and parliamentary election laws. Although the details of this agreement were not revealed publicly, the announcement was the only positive news to have come out since the elections were postponed in late 2021.

A representative from the High State Council, Omar Aboulifa, claimed that, “All that is left is for parliament to ratify” the agreement. However, neither Aguila Saleh, speaker of the HoR, nor Khalid al-Mishri, leader of the High State Council, decided to sign it, thereby putting the agreement in doubt.

Indeed, according to Libyan press reporting, Saleh and al-Mishri were supposed to attend the press conference on the deal, but they chose not to because of disagreements over conditions for running for president. The two leaders had actually arrived in Morocco for the signing ceremony, but when al-Mishri reportedly left the meeting hall over the dispute the signing ceremony had to be cancelled.

It is possible that the eligibility criteria for presidential candidates may be at the root of the dispute. The GNU has maintained that dual citizens should not be allowed to run for president—a criterion that was clearly aimed at Haftar since, in addition to his Libyan nationality, he holds US citizenship based on his long residence in the United States prior to 2011.

Whether the representatives from the High State Council conceded on this point during the negotiations with the HoR representatives is hard to say; but if they did, that would account for al-Mishri leaving the meeting hall without putting his signature on the accord. For its part, the HoR is opposed to Dbeibah running for president, charging that he reneged on an earlier pledge that he would not do so when he threw his hat into the presidential ring in late 2021.

Behind-the-Scenes Talks and Entrenched Interests

Regardless of what happens with the election law agreement, it seems that Haftar and Dbeibah are exploring some type of power sharing arrangement on their own, outside of the UN process. Over the past year, Dbeibah’s nephew, Ibrahim Dbeibah and Haftar’s son, Saddam Haftar, have been engaged in an ongoing dialogue supposedly aimed at bringing about some form of reconciliation. But it is unknown whether these talks, some of which have reportedly been held in Egypt and the UAE, are serious or are just meant to buy time while each side tries to bolster its military and economic capabilities.

Dbeibah’s decision to replace the head of the Libyan National Oil Corporation in July 2022 with a Qaddafi-era official took place soon after Ibrahim Dbeibah and Saddam Haftar had a meeting in the UAE, suggesting some type of agreement on this issue. The reason behind this consensus may have had less to do with politics and more to do with illicit economic activity, according to one prominent analyst who noted that there has been an “uptick in corruption” involving the national oil corporation in recent months.

However, the main reason that reconciliation has not taken place is that the opposing factions benefit from the status quo. Neither side wants to give up power and the associated economic benefits that come along with it. Corruption is said to be widespread in both camps, to the point that the majority of Libyans see the political class as being only out for itself and not caring about the average citizen who is struggling financially.

Moreover, foreign patrons want the status quo to continue because it benefits them as well.  Despite the pledge by international actors at the Berlin Conference in January 2020 that foreign forces and foreign intervention in Libya should cease, this agreement has been widely flouted.

The Tripoli government is still supported by Turkey and its allied troops, while the eastern government has the support of Egypt, the UAE, and Russia’s notorious Wagner Group, made up of mercenaries who not only fight for a particular side in a given country but often engage in the economic exploitation of that country’s resources.

One report that circulated earlier this year among Libya observers said that the Libyan Central Bank sent the national oil corporation around $6 billion after the head of the corporation was replaced in 2022, but that this money was not used for any upgrades of Libyan oil facilities as one might expect. Instead, the money remains unaccounted for, and rumors have circulated that Haftar used part of these funds to pay the Wagner Group. These mercenaries, in addition to supporting Haftar’s 2019–2020 offensive against Tripoli, have reportedly been used to protect key military bases and major oil facilities in the eastern part of the country.

As for Turkey, it wants to stay in the good graces of the Tripoli government, in large part to maintain its support for gas exploration projects in the Mediterranean Sea that are being opposed by several neighboring governments that resent Ankara’s unilateral expansion of its maritime borders.

In addition, having friendly ties to Tripoli allows Ankara to project force in North Africa. The recent reelection of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will likely mean that Turkey will not depart from this policy, nor from Libya anytime soon. As for Egypt and the UAE, while paying lip service to Libyan reconciliation and occasionally hosting meetings of the two factions, they still favor Haftar and the HoR because of their opposition to Islamists.

The Militia Problem

Since the ouster of Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi in 2011, one of the main problems in Libya has been the proliferation of militias. These forces are usually allied with one political faction or the other and have been a major cause of violence and instability in the country. Efforts by the UN to undertake security sector reform through a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration and integration process have largely gone nowhere, and as long as there is no unified national government, each side will see militias as useful allies in the power struggle.

Many of the militias have been involved in illicit activities, particularly in human trafficking and drug smuggling.

Many of the militias have also been involved in illicit activities, particularly in human trafficking and drug smuggling, and they sometimes turn on each other. In May 2023, the GNU’s military forces struck militias west of Tripoli in the town of Zawiya that it accused of trafficking in fuel, narcotics, and human beings. That same month, two militias, both loyal to Dbeibah, clashed in Tripoli after a member of one of the groups was arrested by GNU authorities. Although a cease-fire between the two main Libyan factions has generally held since October 2020, there have been occasional bouts of violence since then.

Unfortunately, the recent civil war in Sudan has the potential to make these matters worse.  Human trafficking, which was already a serious problem in Libya because destitute people from various African countries wanting to reach Europe often try to go through Libya, is likely to pick up as life becomes unbearable in neighboring Sudan. Some Libyan militias will undoubtedly see this development as an opportunity to exploit.

No Substitute for Elections

Although national elections may not end Libya’s myriad problems—and there is always the possibility that the losing side will not accept the results—it is hard to imagine that true national reconciliation can take place without them. Without a central national government brought about through free and fair elections, Libya will not be able to deal with its militia problem and create a true national army; nor will it be able address the corruption that is sapping the wealth of the country. But in order for these goals to be achieved, the international community must step up its efforts in Libya to persuade all foreign forces to leave and put pressure on the two main political factions to move ahead with elections.

Efforts by the steering committee in Morocco to agree on election rules seem to have been a good start, but pressure needs to be applied to both GNU and HoR leaders to accept the compromises reached in Morocco, to sign the agreement, and to set a new date for elections. After more than a decade of violence and instability, the Libyan people deserve a better future. The longer elections are postponed, the greater the chances that civil war will erupt again, with civilians continuing to suffer as they always do during conflicts.

***

Gregory Aftandilian is a Nonresident Fellow at Arab Center Washington DC. He is a Senior Professorial Lecturer at American University where he teaches courses on US foreign policy. He is also an adjunct faculty member at Boston University and George Mason University, teaching courses on Middle East politics.

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Christopher “Kip” Hale

On May 11, International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor Karim Khan announced new arrest warrants for crimes in Libya. They were made public during a regular briefing to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which referred Libya to the ICC in 2011 during the start of the country’s internal conflict.

Specifically, ICC judges approved four sealed arrest warrants and are deliberating over two more arrest warrant applications. Such news represents a surge in ICC activity in the country after relative dormancy, which has been largely caused by persistent violence between Tripoli, Benghazi, and their affiliates. While these ICC arrest warrants may be the accountability spark Libya desperately needs, the country’s culture of impunity will require more than arrest warrants from The Hague if it is to be uprooted.

What do the ICC arrest warrants mean?

As these new ICC arrest warrants are under seal, only relevant Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) staff and law enforcement partners know details, such as the identity of the accused. The OTP has, however, requested the unsealing of all arrest warrants and judges are considering that request. While not possible to glean identities for certain, there are some indications that the targets may be high profile.

By way of context, the ICC does not have its own police to enforce its orders, relying on cooperation from states—meaning the law enforcement agencies of the ICC’s 123 states parties and other countries willing to assist—like all international tribunals do. As such, international prosecutors use the element of surprise provided by sealed warrants, where they believe an arrest in the not-so-distant future is feasible. It is possible that arrests are in the making, with authorities in Tripoli or Benghazi willing to arrest foes that enter their controlled territory. Police in Tunisia, an ICC state party, may assist, given that many travel from Libya to Tunis for leisure, business, or medical purposes.

Yet, there are compelling reasons to believe the OTP is targeting senior individuals. To unseal arrest warrants often indicate a belief that an arrest cannot be executed anytime soon. Unsealing is done primarily to isolate and delegitimize more senior—and often more well-protected—targets through the pressure that public indictments can generate. Most importantly, the ICC has limited resources for each of the seventeen countries it is involved in, meaning it often must focus on the most senior and/or most responsible individuals to make the greatest impact with the smallest investment possible. Adding six cases to its existing one Libyan case—Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, the son of Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi—means it is unlikely the OTP will have the wherewithal to open additional cases. So, assuming these arrest warrants are all the ICC can muster for the foreseeable future, the odds are that at least some of the accused individuals are well-known figures in Libya. 

Recommendations for policymakers

It is all too common for ICC arrest warrants to be interpreted as panaceas for larger societal ills or organic harbingers of change rather than as external attempts to foster positive change. These new warrants are no different and will not magically resolve the situation. To support these arrest warrants specifically and nurture their general catalytic effect, policymakers focused on Libya should consider the following recommendations.

The Ukraine-Russia conflict changed the global landscape across different sectors and international criminal justice is no exception. Antiquated US law on the ICC was overhauled significantly—including allowing the US government to support the ICC financially—and done so by strong bipartisan support. However, these changes were primarily limited to Ukraine. Both advocates on Capitol Hill and in the Biden administration should push for further amendments to US law to allow for Libyan victims to receive the same level of support as Ukrainian victims. This includes underwriting US in-kind support of ICC activities in Libya and providing grants for non-governmental organizations to support the work of the ICC and accountability writ large in Libya.

Separately, the mandate of the United Nation’s Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya (FFM) was not renewed and closed operations on March 31. Last summer, actors pushing for the FFM to continue until conditions change on the ground—most acutely the United States, European countries, and Libyan civil society—failed to come to an agreement with Libya and its African and Middle East allies, resulting in an unprecedented “non-renewable” mandate extension until the end of March 2023. Its closure means there are no independent, intragovernmental human rights entities carrying out investigative work in Libya at present. While it maintains jurisdiction and there are preliminary discussions of opening a field office, the ICC’s mandate and resources mean its focus will remain solely on mass criminality and on only a sliver of those involved.

By contrast, United Nations (UN) investigative bodies have broader mandates that include, for example, issues of state responsibility and a wide range of human rights violations—such as attacks on human rights defenders, women’s rights, and rights of minorities—that do not meet the threshold of, for instance, crimes against humanity. Khan and the OTP also publicly praised the FFM for the tangible support provided to its criminal investigation, most recently at the UNSC briefing.

UN investigative bodies like the FFM are the vanguard of interactions with and between affected communities and governments, vetting numerous kinds of allegations and providing the world with a full picture of what is truly happening in the country. For instance, despite several internal and external challenges, the FFM generated six well-received reports—including two optional longer ones—covering numerous categories of violations.

On top of losing such thorough reporting, the negative repercussions of the FFM’s closure are compounded by the fact that there was and remains zero justifications on the ground for its closure; to the contrary, all indicators of future violence and armed conflict are present. The reality is that geopolitics between the West and the Middle East and North African states led to its closure, not circumstances on the ground. Rectifying this error would reaffirm the international community’s commitment to positive change in Libya.

Another relatively recent development in international criminal justice has been the advent of UN investigative mechanisms, which are non-prosecutorial bodies that conduct their own investigations and act as a clearinghouse of evidence collection and analysis. Unlike the UN investigative bodies that have quite broad mandates that include non-criminal work, the primary purpose of these mechanisms is to build prosecution-ready casefiles for domestic and international jurisdictions that may have the power to prosecute atrocity crimes and human rights abuses. Temporary mechanisms have been created for Syria, Myanmar, and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham’s (ISIS) crimes in Iraq.

Yet, momentum is building to evolve this concept, just like the temporary international tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda led to the creation of the ICC. Calls to establish a global, standing investigative mechanism, with Libya as its first referral, have already been levied. Such a mechanism would not only enhance the global infrastructure on atrocity crimes accountability, but would also strengthen the prospects of justice across Libya by empowering both foreign courts with jurisdiction—e.g. European courts with authority over crimes committed in migration—and an international tribunal like the ICC, which relies on the support of such partners to augment their work.

One of the more striking findings by the FFM was that, unlike most other conflicts, Libyan judges and lawyers are trying to do their jobs in principled fashions. However, like most other conflicts, they experience significant repression from state and non-state actors. For example, the FFM interviewed many victims who had one or more judicial orders authorizing their release, which their captors ignored habitually, resulting in their brutal torture and detention in miserable conditions lasting for months, if not years. Additionally, judges and lawyers were regularly intimidated, punished, and/or subjected to violence for “unfavorable” judicial orders or for representing clients that authorities found undesirable. Policymakers should want to support these brave professionals through more robust rule of law projects in Libya, as well as through human rights defenders’ programs and advocacy campaigns.

Undoubtedly, these ICC arrest warrants are welcome developments. They help cement the importance of accountability in charting a better future for Libya and provide a glimmer of hope in a country currently possessing little of it. If well supported, these arrest warrants can serve as catalysts for the broader accountability and rule of law support needed across Libya. Yet, on their own, these arrest warrants will have a limited impact. If left unsupported, Libyan and international stakeholders will forsake this unique opportunity to change the culture of impunity that persists in the country’s East, West, and South. This must not be a case of another good opportunity in Libya going to waste.

***

Christopher “Kip” Hale has led investigations of atrocity crimes in conflict zones for the United Nations (UN) and a non-governmental organization, most recently as the Investigation Team Leader of the UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya.