Fuat Emir Şefkatli
Turkey, which has been approaching the two separate power centers and social bases of the country at an equal distance since the beginning of the Libya crisis, has recently attached great importance to diplomatic opening with the east of the country, with which it has strong relations.
Fuat Emir Şefkatli from the National Defense University wrote for AA Analysis about the benefits that Turkey’s steps towards normalization with eastern Libya will bring to both parties.
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Libya entered a new era in political, social and military terms when the uprising against then-President Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 turned into the February Revolution. The country is still referred to as a frozen conflict zone today. The power struggle in Libya, which largely began as rival political factions attempting to claim ownership of the revolution after the revolution, eventually gave way to military polarization as armed groups became active actors.
The unilateral policies of international powers and the inadequacy of supra-state mechanisms such as the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and NATO, which sought to find a solution to the crisis in Libya, were also effective in bringing this picture to life.
Turkey, on the other hand, is looking for solutions to restore peace and stability to the country within the framework of international law and foreign policy principles within this complex equation that has emerged over time.
In fact, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan noted in an interview with an international media organization on July 24 that relations with eastern Libya are progressing quite well. Minister Fidan, who announced that the Turkish Consulate General in Benghazi has reopened, added that they are in contact with Tobruk-based Parliament Speaker Akile Salih, as well as Khalifa Haftar and his sons.
Normalization with the East is gaining momentum
As is known, Turkey’s steps towards normalization with eastern Libya were taken in the last quarter of 2021. In this sense, the period when Turkey put the opening towards Cyrenaica, the eastern region of Libya, on the agenda corresponded to a period of political deadlock following the cancellation of the presidential elections planned to be held in December 2021.
During these dates, official visits by a delegation from the Libyan Parliament to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) were followed by the visit of the then Libyan Ambassador to Turkey Kenan Yılmaz to Akile Salih. However, the turning point in relations in a positive direction was the reception of Akile Salih by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in July 2022.
Since the beginning of the Libyan crisis, Turkey has approached the two separate power centers and social bases of the country at an equal distance and has recently attached great importance to diplomatic openings with the east of the country, with which it has strong historical and cultural relations. However, in addition to its increasing contacts with the east of Libya, Turkey also aims to maintain its relations with the National Unity Government (NMU) led by Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dibeybe and institutions in the west.
Unifying and solution-oriented rhetoric
Turkey’s recent integrative rhetoric and policy preferences developed through statements and visits can be interpreted as a serious effort to shift the tense atmosphere in Libya to diplomatic grounds. Because the legitimacy crisis between the East and the West, the fragmented security bureaucracy and governance crises constitute a strong obstacle to putting comprehensive solutions on the agenda.
On the other hand, the negotiation channels that Turkey is trying to establish contain certain gains in the medium and long term for both Libya and Turkey under three subheadings. The first of these, as emphasized by Minister Fidan in his interview, is Turkey’s motivation and intention to use the relations it has developed with the East for East-West integration.
In terms of organizing elections and ensuring democratic transition in Libya, Turkey is holding talks not only with local elements but also with Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar. Increasing its diplomatic efforts to establish stability and peace will prevent a new conflict environment in Libya and may strengthen the unity of the country in the long term. It should be said that this situation is an effective policy choice for Turkey in terms of both preserving current gains and reaching potential future benefits.
Based on this, the second issue is that Turkey, which has deep historical, cultural and economic relations with both parts of Libya, will secure its interests and commercial gains in the Eastern Mediterranean, namely the Blue Homeland, by transferring its influence from the West to the East. In such a scenario, the political climate in the East, which was relatively against Turkey’s Maritime Delegation Agreement in 2020 and Hydrocarbon Agreement in 2022, may be completely changed.
Although the relevant agreements are based on solid ground in terms of international law and legitimacy, obtaining the indirect consent of the Parliament and the Haftar wing for these agreements may strengthen the Turkey-Libya alliance relationship in the Eastern Mediterranean geopolitics.
On the other hand, when Turkey’s normalization with eastern Libya is more broad-based and institutional, it is quite possible that the agreements made with Turkish companies through the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund affiliated with the Parliament will increase significantly. The commercial benefits that this possible picture will provide to Turkey are of critical importance.
Finally, Turkey’s military presence in the west of the country has served as a deterrent in preventing small-scale conflicts from turning into large-scale civil wars after 2020. Turkey’s military mission, based on training and consultancy, has not only kept the military polarization between the east and the west in balance, but also the fragmented security bureaucracy in the west.
At this point, high-level diplomatic contacts with eastern Libya may also pave the way for breaking the negative narrative developed by the eastern-centered public and media organizations regarding Turkey’s military presence in the past. At the same time, the ongoing process may buy Turkey significant time in planning military structuring and engagements until a democratic structure is established.
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Fuat Emir Şefkatli is a PhD candidate at the National Defense University.
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