Frederic Wehrey
Libya
Russia’s ties to Libya are also historic and deeply rooted in the Cold War period, when Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi started importing large quantities of Soviet weaponry and hosting thousands of Soviet advisers in the early and mid-1970s.
By 2008, Russia had forgiven Libya’s substantial debt in return for deals on energy, weapons, and transportation infrastructure. Yet, as in the case of Algeria, these security-centric ties did not convert Libya into a reliable Russia client, and the never-implemented announcement of a Russian naval port in Benghazi was in fact a stratagem deployed by Gaddafi to gain leverage over Russia and the West.
Following Gaddafi’s ouster, the dysfunction and fragmentation of Libya largely dissuaded Russia from reestablishing a presence. But when a nationwide civil war erupted in early 2014, a multitude of Libya political actors drew in competing regional and international powers, particularly Russia.
In the years since, Russia’s goals can be broadly described as the following: to recoup and exceed the economic benefits it enjoyed under the Gaddafi era through infrastructure and energy deals; to obstruct and undermine European diplomacy on Libya through aggressive initiatives unencumbered by human rights; to establish military bases and logistical hubs for its power projection into the Sahelian states to the south and along the Mediterranean’s littoral, where it can threaten NATO’s southern flank; and, since the start of the Ukraine war, to get cash through illicit smuggling.
Its strategy in pursuing these objectives has been flexible, opportunistic, scalable, and, since a good portion of it has been conducted through private military companies, nominally deniable. It has also been geared toward a diverse range of Libyan actors: Gaddafi loyalists; a local militia controlling oil facilities; the internationally recognized government in Tripoli; and especially the eastern-based military leader Khalifa Haftar, whose rise to prominence was due in no small part to Russian assistance, along with support from the United Arab Emirates and Egypt.
Working in conjunction with these Arab powers, Russia sent spare parts and medical care to Haftar’s self-styled Libyan Arab Armed Forces, as well as to technicians, logisticians, advisers, and intelligence personnel. It also printed banknotes for the Haftar-aligned, unrecognized Central Bank in eastern Libya and launched a propaganda campaign on behalf of the militia chief, using official state media and clandestine channels.
When Haftar launched his military campaign to topple the internationally-recognized government in the Libyan capital, mercenaries from the Wagner Group acted as artillery spotters and snipers and in some cases directed battlefield maneuvers. Though ultimately unsuccessful due to a Turkish military intervention on behalf of the Tripoli government in early 2020, the resulting battlefield stalemate and frozen conflict has been adroitly exploited by Moscow to reap strategic dividends.
Russian paramilitary and regular forces currently maintain access to key oil facilities and occupy major air bases in central and southern Libya. From these bases, they have been ferrying weapons, supplies, and personnel to fragile and conflict-wracked states to the south, including Sudan, where Russia has backed the Rapid Support Forces, as well as Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Chad, Mali, and Niger.
Moscow is also using its air bases in Libya to profit from the transregional smuggling of gold, fuel, and narcotics—especially Captagon pills from Syria. More recently, in the wake of the tragic flooding in Libya’s coastal town Derna in September 2023, Russia has solidified its relations with Haftar through the dispatch of doctors and medical aid and through high-level visits.
This support was followed by a massive uptick in military materiel, such as air defense systems and armored vehicles, flowing into Libya’s eastern port of Tobruk, which the Kremlin hopes to eventually convert into a more permanent basing arrangement.
While much of this Russian activity takes place on territory nominally controlled by Haftar, Moscow is in no sense beholden to the warlord, but rather acts autonomously. Moreover, Russia is increasing its outreach to the Tripoli government and its patron Türkiye on economic and energy matters, while bolstering its soft power in the form of a polished, Arabic-speaking Russian ambassador, an Arabic-language satellite channel, and engagement on Libyan education—all of which contrasts with the absence of a permanent diplomatic presence by the United States.
American efforts to erode Russia’s foothold in the country and to affect the departure of foreign military forces more broadly through a democratically elected executive have been stymied by the obstinacy of Libya elites and militia bosses, who are benefiting economically and politically from the status quo and from Washington’s unwillingness to significantly sanction or pressure two of its closest
Arab allies in the region, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, whose policies have directly enabled Russia’s growing influence. And unlike in the battle against the Islamic State, the United States cannot call upon Libyan proxy militias to pressure or confront Russian forces in the country.
While the question of a post-Haftar transition looms over Libyan politics, Russia will almost certainly adapt to and benefit from his successor, which will most likely be his more powerful son Saddam or the more discreet Russian-trained son Khaled.
Over the near and mid-term, then, it seems likely that Libya will continue to serve as Russia’s most significant point of entry into the Maghreb and its most successful intervention on the African continent, which now serves as a launching pad for Moscow’s growing footprint in the south through its Africa Corps.
Morocco
Morocco does not factor significantly into Russia’s strategy to gain influence in the Maghreb, given Rabat’s enduring security ties with the United States and Europe. Along with Tunisia, Morocco enjoys the status of being a major non-NATO ally, and it routinely participates in U.S.-sponsored military exercises in the region. It was also the first Maghreb country to send military aid to Ukraine, in the form of twenty renovated T-72B main battle tanks.
That said, Morocco has substantial economic relations with Russia. Trade grew by 42 percent in 2021 alone, and the country depends on Russian imports of key agricultural products such as ammonia and fertilizer to sustain its farming sector, which employs an estimated 45 percent of the Moroccan workforce and contributes to 15 percent of its GDP. Coal, petroleum, fishing, and nuclear energy are other areas of substantial cooperation.
As a result, Morocco has tried to steer a middle course amid growing Western pressure on Russia since the start of the Ukraine war, exemplified by it refraining from casting a vote against Russian aggression during an early 2023 UN General Assembly meeting. Rabat also reportedly seeks to preserve Russia’s position of qualified neutrality on the Western Sahara dispute. Despite Moscow’s declared support for Sahrawi self-determination and backing of the insurgent Polisario Front, some analysts have argued that Morocco has been encouraged by the Kremlin’s voting record at the United Nations and reportedly believes Russian officials can exert a moderating influence on Algeria’s belligerency on the issue.
Tunisia
As in the case of Morocco, Russian inroads in Tunisia have been offset by the country’s historically strong security relations with the United States, which have endured and grown despite the tumult and authoritarian turn of the post-2011 transition. That said, Tunisia has long depended on Russian wheat supplies and has remained a “significant customer for Russian gas and oil exports during the post-Ukraine EU embargo.”
More recently, the two countries’ educational and cultural ties have grown, with the Russian state press hailing Tunisia as the first country in North Africa “to officially recognize Russian as a supplemental language in secondary education.” Moreover, since his 2021 “self-coup” and in the face of growing Western pressure, President Saied is seeking to diversify the country’s external relations, which includes cultivating closer ties with Russia.
And, already, Tunisia is following its neighbor Algeria’s example of applying for membership to the BRICS. For its part, Moscow is trying to capitalize on Tunisia’s chilling of relations with the West to exert greater influence, using the multifaceted approach it has pursued elsewhere in the region. It is unlikely, however, that Tunisia will become a full-fledged Russian client, given the liabilities it could create for Moscow as an economically troubled and politically unstable state, as well as Saied’s predilection for hedging through continued ties with other countries, including China, Europe, the Gulf states, Iran, and the United States.
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Frederic Wehrey – Senior Fellow, Middle East Program
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