Alessandro Borgato
Turkey is seeking to expand its footprint in the region and the situation in Libya could represent a window of opportunity for Ankara. However, other actors such as Egypt and Russia, may try to limit the Neo-Ottoman expansion of Ankara.
Turkish posture in Libya has grown significantly in recent years. The main changes came with Ahmet Davutoglu, who stressed the importance of Turkey, extending its influence in the “near abroad”. He defined Libya as the heart of Ankara’s geopolitical strategies and the future of Turkish influence in the region. In 2011, Ankara participated in the NATO’s operation in supporting of the Libyan opposition and gradually increased its aid for the revolutionary and Islamist groups in Tripolitania.
In the beginning, Turkey used a mixture of socio – religious ties to exert influence. Between 2011 and 2014, the AKP (Justice and Development Party) created a network among the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood members, together with Qatar. By 2014, the situation escalated to a second civil war, characterized by the presence of two rival governments: One based in Tripoli (Western Libya, backed by Turkey) And one in Tobruk (Eastern Libya supported by Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA)
After 2019, the Turkish government decided to strengthen its presence, following the LNA offensive. The intervention of Ankara was motivated by the US withdrawal from Libya in 2019, as well as the possibility of targeting Russian and United Arab Emirates ambitions. Moscow is considered the main competitor of Turkey in the country and the UAE has demonstrated its hostility to the Muslim Brotherhood, which prompted Erdogan to distance himself from Abu Dhabi.
In 2019, Turkey signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the GNA in order to organise the next steps, with a focus on security and military cooperation. Since then, Ankara’s strategy has changed from indirect to direct intervention, backing the GNA, through deployment of weapons systems and Syrian mercenaries. Among the military support, Erdogan transferred military personnel and Bayraktar TB2 UAVs. The intervention shifted the war in favour of the GNA.
Furthermore, Turkey has strengthened its presence with the Naval base in Misrata and the Air base in Vatiyya. Subsequently, the Maritime Deal of November 2019, signed by the GNA and Turkey, aimed to expand Turkey’s claims from 41,000 to 148,000 square kilometres in the Mediterranean and to allow the exploitation of resources. Protests came from Cyprus, Egypt and Greece, as it has been seen as a Turkish move to consolidate its presence in Libya. On the other side, actors such as Russia, Egypt and UAE gave their support to Khalifa Haftar’s troops and offensive. Cairo tried to break the ceasefire in 2020 but failed. In addition, these countries viewed the intentions of Ankara to stay as a concern for their interests, especially for what this could have implied for the Libyan unification.
In 2020, Egypt signed a maritime agreement with Greece with an exclusive economic zone between the two countries, mirroring of 2019 deal. The tensions between Ankara and Cairo arise from the coup d’etat in 2013, when Turkey sided with Islamists aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and cut diplomatic ties with Cairo. However, the recently restored relationship between the two countries reflects their willingness to collaborate in shaping Libya’s future.
On 5 February 2021, the new Libyan interim government, formed by the Libya Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), appointed Abd al-Hamid Dbeibah as interim Prime Minister. Under Dbeibah, Turkey and the GNU have signed in 2022 a Memorandum of Understanding on oil and gas, building on the 2019 MoU. However, the Turkish approach also included an adaptation to the Libyan political context. Ankara established relations not only with the western but also with the eastern Libyan factions, including the Haftar family. This underlines the shift from direct confrontation to cautious diplomacy, as Turkey’s objective is to remain involved for the long term.
Turkey and Egypt from clashing to
rapprochement on Libya’s dossier
Following the meeting of September 2024, which constituted a turning point in Egyptian-Turkish relations, the two countries announced the establishment of a bilateral Strategic Cooperation Council. The aim is to coordinate mutual regional objectives in order to prevent potential conflicts.
The results of the rapprochement have been reflected in Libya’s political dynamics. Cairo and Ankara expressed their willingness to collaborate and work together to stabilise the troubled political environment in Libya and push the two governments – the Bengazi government led by Haftar and the GNU – to resolve their disputes. These efforts could also boost hydrocarbon production in Libya and represent a chance for both countries to consolidate their influence in the region.
However, during his visit in Cairo in early September 2024, Erdogan reiterated Turkish intentions to institutionalise relations with Tripoli, an aspect that risks destabilising the newly restored relations with Egypt.,The MoU signed in August between the Turkish government and Dbeibah confirmed the consolidation of Turkish military presence in Libya. This agreement gives the Turkish armed forces access to Libyan territory, airspace, and territorial waters.
The following day, Egypt invited Osama Hamad, head of the eastern government. Tripoli authorities interpreted this as a provocation and expelled two Egyptian diplomats. Nevertheless, Turkey maintained its strategy of cautious diplomacy. In the eastern part of Libya, Ankara made numerous investments, including the Turkish steel company Tosyali, which announced plans to build the largest iron and steel production plant in the world in Benghazi. In November, the Turkish military attaché to Libya traveled to Benghazi to meet with Lieutenant General Khairi al-Tamimi, the secretary of the general command of the self-proclaimed Libyan National Army.
Why does the current situation
benefit Turkey?
The current situation in Tripoli, which emerged on May 12 after the killing of Al-Kikli, (known as “Gheniwa”), head of the Stability Support Authority (SSA), has thrown the country into renewed chaos. Clashes erupted between militias aligned with the GNU.
This situation could strengthen Dbeibah – backed by Turkey and the GNU – following several attempts to replace him. In addition, factions that are under the Defence Ministry, particularly the 444 Brigade under Mahmoud Hamza, the 111 Brigade and the Joint Force from Misrata, could gain more power and consolidate their positions. The 444 Brigade is known for its close ties to Turkey. Furthermore, Ankara favours a less fragmented security landscape in Tripoli and the removal of Gheniwa could foster a more unified and secure environment.
Future perspectives
Following the fall of the Assad regime in Syria – which represented a window of opportunity for Turkey to expand its regional footprint – Ankara may attempt to do the same in Libya, albeit with a different approach. Turkey’s ability to operate on multiple fronts, and to capitalise on regional instability, could push it to further consolidate its presence in Libya. However, the presence of other key players, such as Russia and Egypt, must not be overlooked.
Their manoeuvres in the region will be critical. On one hand, they stress the importance of restoring governmental cohesion in Libya; on the other, they will not refrain from pursuing their own interests. Russia is present in Libya with military bases and maintains strong ties to the eastern government, having repeatedly supported Haftar. Although the war in Ukraine has somewhat loosened Moscow’s regional grip, its presence remains significant.
The same goes for Egypt, which despite re-establishing communication with Ankara, seeks to retain its influence over Libyan affairs. It cannot be ruled out that these actors – particularly Turkey and Russia – could exploit the current context to pressure Europe on migration issues. This tool has often been used, as demonstrated in Syria, to shift the balance of power. In the event of a deterioration of the situation – though less likely but still plausible – a new confrontation could arise, this time with different and potentially more serious consequences.
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