Center for Preventive Action
More than a decade after a U.S.-backed intervention toppled Libya’s authoritarian leader in 2011, political divisions and cascading security crises continue to threaten Libya’s stability. After a 2020 cease-fire ended the country’s six-year civil war between rival political factions, a UN-supported process led to the formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU).
Due to rival factions’ unwillingness to agree on rules overseeing national elections scheduled for December 2021, the vote was postponed indefinitely. Widespread frustration from actors on both sides of the political divide has put pressure on the GNU to hold the long-overdue elections without delay, but little progress has been made.
Reflecting the relatively low levels of violence since 2020, the humanitarian situation has eased in recent years. In 2023, approximately three hundred thousand people needed humanitarian assistance in Libya, down from 1.3 million [PDF] in 2016. But compounding threats have posed new challenges for the country, including the worsening effects of a precarious and oil-dependent economy, arms proliferation, climate change, and complex migration crises.
Libya has struggled [PDF] to rebuild state institutions since the ouster and subsequent death of former leader Muammar al-Qaddafi in October 2011. Libya’s transitional government ceded authority to the newly elected [PDF] General National Congress (GNC) in July 2012. The GNC faced numerous challenges over the next two years, including the September 2012 attack by Islamist militants on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi and the spread of the Islamic State and other armed groups throughout the country.
In May 2014, General Khalifa Haftar launched Operation Dignity, a campaign conducted by the Libyan National Army (LNA) to attack Islamist militant groups across eastern Libya, including in Benghazi. To counter this movement, Islamist militants and armed groups—including Ansar al-Sharia—formed a coalition called Libya Dawn. Eventually, fighting broke out at Tripoli’s international airport between the Libya Dawn coalition, which controlled Tripoli and much of western Libya, and the Dignity coalition, which controlled parts of Cyrenaica and Benghazi in eastern Libya, escalating the conflict into a full-fledged civil war.
The battle for control over Libya crosses tribal, regional, political, and religious lines. Each coalition has created governing institutions and named military chiefs—and each has faced internal fragmentation and division. To find a resolution to the conflict and establish a unity government, then-UN Special Envoy to Libya Bernardino Leon, followed by Martin Kobler, facilitated a series of talks between the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR)—based in Libya’s east and a key supporter of Haftar—and the Tripoli-based GNC. The talks resulted in the creation of the Libyan Political Agreement [PDF] and the UN-supported Government of National Accord (GNA) in December 2015. However, the GNA faced obstacles to creating a stable, unified government in Libya.
Taking advantage of the widespread political instability, armed Islamist groups, including Ansar al-Sharia—the terrorist group allegedly responsible for the attack on the U.S. consulate in 2012—and the Islamic State, have used the country as a hub to coordinate broader regional violence, further complicating efforts to create a unity government.
After seizing territory [PDF] in Benghazi, Derna, and Ajdabiya, the Islamic State’s power in Libya peaked in 2016 when it captured the coastal city of Sirte—formerly the group’s most significant stronghold outside of Syria and Iraq. While in control, its members committed numerous human rights abuses for which they now face trial in Libya. In July 2018, Haftar announced that the LNA had recaptured the city of Derna, the last outpost of the Islamic State militants in eastern Libya. However, the group continues to operate throughout the country.
Though the Islamic State was largely defeated in Libya in 2016, the GNA and HoR remained divided on a path to unification. In August 2018, violence in Tripoli ended the relative calm maintained for over a year. However, the UN quickly brokered a September 2018 cease-fire between the involved militias.
Foreign states have also taken an interest in Libya, with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), France, and Russia backing Haftar’s LNA and Turkey, Qatar, and Italy supporting the UN-backed GNA. Egypt and the UAE have been particularly involved with military support for Haftar, as they fear the GNA’s connections to political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood. Russia also allows the Wagner Group to aid Haftar in exchange for favorable strategic access to ports and other transit centers. Meanwhile, Turkey supports the GNA because of maritime oil and gas deals they have brokered.
The other foreign backers have taken a more subtle approach, providing aid and diplomatic support to their preferred partner. Militarily, Turkey and Egypt have gone the farthest by approving troop deployments, though Russia also has a presence through the Wagner Group, and the UAE has conducted airstrikes for Haftar.
The GNA declared a state of emergency in Libya’s capital city of Tripoli in September 2018, less than a week after a UN cease-fire went into effect. Attempts to create a unity government failed as the HoR and the GNA continued to compete for power. Both governing bodies created their own central banks [PDF] and consolidated control over oil fields.
In May 2018, French President Emmanuel Macron convened a meeting between Haftar, GNA leader Fayez Seraj, and parliamentary leaders to discuss ending the conflict and future elections. Though the rival groups agreed to hold elections in December 2018, UN Special Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame said elections would be postponed until spring 2019.
Meanwhile, rival armed groups, including militias loyal to Haftar and the GNA’s security forces, continued fighting over access to and control of Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) and regional oil fields. In December 2018, the NOC closed Libya’s largest oil field, El Sharara, due to security concerns; Haftar later declared the field secure and ready to restart operations but cut off all oil fields when fighting resumed.
On April 3, 2019, Haftar upended peace efforts by launching a campaign to take western Libya and Tripoli with the backing of Egypt, the UAE, France, and Russia. Haftar’s LNA made fast progress until stalling on the outskirts of Tripoli, achieving only small gains over the next year. At the GNA’s request, Turkey sent troops to Tripoli in early 2020 to reinforce the city’s defense and increase the size of the force ahead of the GNA counteroffensive. Meanwhile, the UAE conducted airstrikes in support of Haftar.
UN-led mediation efforts made little progress [PDF] as the war escalated and civilian casualties rose through May 2020. With Turkish support, the GNA-aligned forces achieved a breakthrough in June, pushing the LNA back to Sirte. Tensions escalated when Egypt warned that Sirte was its “red line,” and in July, authorized the deployment of troops to help prevent the GNA from taking the city.
In August 2020, violence eased as the GNA declared a unilateral cease-fire. Haftar ended an oil blockade shortly after, paving the way for a nationwide cease-fire signed in October. The 2020 cease-fire established the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC), comprised of officers from the GNA and LNA, to work on implementing the cease-fire and other security issues. The JMC made progress, but it has struggled to achieve the withdrawal of foreign fighters. Most importantly, despite a lack of trust and a faltering cease-fire, levels of violence remained low following the 2020 truce, allowing for a reopening of political dialogue.
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