Among regional states, Egypt appears most strongly opposed to the deal, though it has largely kept its objections quiet. Cairo’s position is somewhat paradoxical: since its first military operation in Libya in 2015, it has supported the Haftar family politically and militarily.
Yet Egyptian officials are wary of Saddam Haftar, whom they believe is resistant to their influence. They are uneasy about hereditary succession in the military.54 Their hostility toward Abdelhamid Dabaiba is equally longstanding; in the past, they have openly called on him to step down as prime minister.
U.S. diplomats acknowledge Egypt’s qualms but believe they have faded over time.
Like others, Türkiye has sent mixed messages. Since 2023, its officials have sought to build strong military and business ties with Saddam Haftar and, in June, its foreign minister and intelligence chief both welcomed the Libyan commander in Ankara. Privately, however, Turkish diplomats voice misgivings about Saddam, the scion of a family with whom their relations have historically been strained and whom they blame for failing to deliver on a promise to persuade the Benghazi-based parliament to ratify a 2020 maritime border agreement that Ankara signed with the Tripoli government.
Russia’s position is unclear, though there are reasons to suspect that it, too, may oppose the proposal.
First, despite Moscow’s historically strong relations with the Haftar family, Russian officials appear ambivalent about Saddam, whom some view as too close to Washington. By contrast, Russia has cultivated ties with his brother Khaled, the Haftar-led forces’ chief of staff.
Secondly, while Moscow has backed Haftar since 2018, including on the battlefield, and Russian private military contractors continue to provide training and logistical support to his forces (even as thousands of Haftar-led troops have been trained in Belarus, a Russian ally), the proposal paradoxically could reduce Russia’s manoeuvring room. According to sources close to Haftar, the U.S. would condition its backing for the new political setup, as well as future military assistance, on ending Russian military support for the unified executive.
As for the UN, it has largely been shunted aside by the U.S., despite Washington’s claims that the Boulos initiative complements the international organisation’s constitutional and electoral efforts.
UN officials were not consulted by U.S. mediators, who merely provided them with occasional updates. The UN thus finds itself in an uncomfortable position: while in principle the proposal aligns with its longstanding objective of Libyan reunification, the U.S. has bypassed the political process it set up to achieve that goal.
The U.S. initiative has merit in its aim to unblock a transition that has long been stalled and insofar as it has put institutional reunification back on the agenda. But given its reported contours, and the lack of detail, transparency or inclusiveness surrounding it, as well as the opposition it has generated, the initiative remains a gamble – and a gamble is not something Libya can afford.
In particular, elevating Saddam Haftar to the presidency risks turning an effort to overcome the country’s divisions into a catalyst of renewed confrontation.
Many Libyans fear that the Trump administration may seek to secure agreement on the broad outlines of the deal before its details have been fully fleshed out or agreed upon. Some in Haftar’s camp reportedly favour this approach, arguing that once the deal has Washington’s imprimatur, its Libyan opponents will have less room to resist it.
It is, of course, possible that fears will prove unfounded and that, once the agreement is signed and implementation begins, western forces will not rise up; opposition factions may be persuaded (or bought off); and remaining contentious issues will be resolved along the way.
But there is no guarantee. A far more worrying scenario is at least as plausible:
Clashes between rival military factions; last-minute backtracking by Dabaiba and his supporters; and a growing conviction within the Haftar camp that their only remaining option is to seize Tripoli by force. For a country that has taken years to recover from the mayhem after the fall of Qadhafi, renewed fighting would be a devastating setback.
In light of these risks, the Trump administration should resist the temptation to rush an agreement. Instead, it should take time to broaden political consultations and share details of the deal to allow for meaningful public scrutiny.
It should also seek consensus on two issues that remain unresolved: the distribution of military authority in a manner that allows the two sides to share it, and the seat of the new executive.
Finally, on the difficult issue of elections, U.S. mediators should work closely with the UN and seek the parties’ commitment to holding them on a realistic timeline. Optimally, the timeline would not exceed two years, but disagreements surrounding a possible ballot, the numerous legal and administrative hurdles encountered over the past decade, and the danger that elections could prove destabilising, all dictate a measure of caution and flexibility in how this matter is approached.
In the meantime, U.S. efforts should focus on priorities that need not await the deal’s completion:
- Strengthening Libya’s public financial institutions, notably by promoting greater transparency around the reported unified budget deal and making clear Washington’s opposition to parallel funding schemes and the associated diversion of public funds though smuggling. In this regard, the U.S. Treasury has significant leverage insofar as Libya’s oil sales are denominated in U.S. dollars.
- Improving cooperation between Libya’s rival military structures by expanding opportunities for joint trainings and, together with Italy and other European and international partners, establishing joint logistical and operational coordination centres for ground manoeuvres, border security and maritime patrols.
The burden cannot fall on U.S. shoulders alone. Libya’s rival leaders bear primary responsibility for their country’s future. To date, their actions suggest that preserving power and access to state resources remains their overriding priority.
Meanwhile, ordinary citizens face persistent insecurity, a narrowing political space and worsening socio-economic conditions. For many, the central question remains unanswered:
How, concretely, would this initiative improve their daily lives? If Libya’s leaders are genuinely committed to opening a new chapter, they should begin by publicly articulating a clear and shared vision for the country’s political, economic and military future.
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