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Five Years After the siege of Tripoli

Illicit Economies and Human Rights Violations

Militias in Libya, empowered by an extensive state-delegated security role, have demonstrated a flagrant tendency to abuse power, resulting in severe violations of human rights including arbitrary detention, extra-judicial killings, enforced disappearance, forced displacement and abductions committed in a country with a discredited judicial system that has impeded any chance of reaffirming justice and the rule of law.

These armed groups have exploited that veneer of legality to engage in more illicit economic activities including human smuggling and trafficking especially of migrants and asylum seekers who are trying to reach the European continent.

For the eastern authority, migrant smuggling across the eastern coast has served as a lucrative business which has culminated in one of the deadliest shipwrecks in years that sank off the coast of Greece taking the lives of hundreds.

Additionally, based on a UN report19 issued in 2023 by the Independent Fact-Finding Mission investigating severe human rights violations allegedly committed since 2016 against both Libyans and foreign nationals.

Migrants, in particular, have been the target of systematic torture as they were ‘enslaved in official detention centres’ where they were subjected to inhumane and degrading treatment, including sexual assault, forced labour and denied access to basic life necessities like food and water.

These acts, while they amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity under international law, they are being executed under the auspices of government-affiliated agencies like the Libyan Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration and the coast guard who still benefit from technical and financial assistance from the EU.

While it is challenging to ascertain precise figures, the IOM reported20 as of 2023, more than 17,000 of migrants were intercepted by the coastguard, and returned to war-torn Libya where many of them get detained in investigation facilities while a severe lack of transparency remains regarding their whereabouts, the reason, and the conditions of their detention.

The same investigation has also uncovered a widespread tendency of the Libyan authority to encroach on the work of civil society associations and stifle any expression of opposition through various forms of intimidation and the use of force exercised against defenceless civilians, journalists, and human rights defenders.

The report discloses that between January 2020 and March 2022, more than 581 civilians, both nationals and migrants, were either tortured to death or executed in detention facilities by law enforcement agents and militias; an indiscriminate violence with total impunity that have become the new normal.

Although civilians enjoy protection under international humanitarian law and are considered illegitimate and unlawful targets of armed hostilities, the use of force in Libya has been one of an indiscriminate nature where lines are blurred and distinctions between combatants and noncombatants are omitted.

Between April and June 2020, the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) reported a 173% increase in the number of civilian casualties (which include deaths and injuries) reaching 358 of men, women and children affected by the major escalation of armed hostilities and arbitrary deployment of heavy weaponry, explosive remnants of war and airstrikes on civilian populated areas.

The Way Ahead

Restoring justice and ending the grip of militia rule in Libya is a complex task that demands a multifaceted approach. In order for elections to effectively materialize, there needs to be concerted action to confront human rights abuses and disentangle criminally linked actors from Libyan institutions who are at the centre of blocking any prospect for security sector reforms: a status-quo that only preserves impunity and obstructs reconciliation.

The recent and abrupt resignation of the UN Special Envoy to Libya, Abdoulaye Bathily, and the postponement of the reconciliation conference that was planned for April, all highlight the complex trajectory facing the North African nation.

While the lack of political will from Libyan leaders is a focal factor for the failure of the democratic transition, the unabated international interventions and interference in the country’s domestic political and security affairs further undermine any potential of finding a viable solution to the Libyan crisis.

Although 2024 marks the 10th consecutive year since Libyans went to the polls, the first quarter of the year has only confirmed that the environment is still inconducive for holding parliamentary or presidential elections.

Deep fractions over the control of key oilfields and allocation of profits have been the striking theme since January, with protests erupting in many regions in the country, notably the Al-Sharara field that is the biggest in Libya, demanding the equal distribution of wealth and development projects.

Such political tension is also clear from the recent public disagreements between the newly unified Central Bank of Libya (CBL) and the GNU over the government’s expansive financial expenditures and fiscal policies that have led to the re-emergence of country-wide liquidity crisis, and which prompted the bank to alter the exchange rate and devalue the Libyan Dinar.

The path to democracy hinges on the acknowledgment, investigation, and prosecution of those responsible for egregious abuses during the three civil wars, as well as those implicated in alleged cases of corruption and mismanagement of the vast oil revenues that have further reinforced the state of underdevelopment in the country.

Crucially, transitional justice depends on the establishment of a robust and impartial judiciary capable of fairly addressing grievances and holding perpetrators accountable. The reinforcement of Libya’s rule of law stands as a critical obligation not only to honour the suffering of victims but also to establish a foundation of trust necessary for any functioning democracy.

It is imperative to ensure that international support directly contributes to the growth of lawful institutions and the rule of law and not empower the wrong entities. In this endeavour, foreign actors like the EU should apply more stringent regulations to ensure that their financial assistance does not inadvertently prop up criminal networks.

Funds intended for development, reconstruction, and stability must be closely monitored and audited to prevent their diversion into the hands of those perpetuating violence and human rights abuses.

Recommendations

In recognizing the complexities of Libya’s current state of affairs, it is essential to understand that the way ahead should be guided by a multifaceted approach driven by the constructive engagement of both the international community and national authorities with the ultimate goal being contingent upon safeguarding the well-being of the Libyan people.

The International Community:

• Should acknowledge the fallacies in its engagement in Libya and reassess its approach to arms control in a way that prioritizes the interests of the Libyan people and takes into consideration the need for genuine and lasting reconciliation.

• Should accord significant attention to judicial reforms and work to strengthen the domestic legal institutions in order to achieve accountability for all human rights violations and ensure justice for all victims.

• Should rally support for an international and independent investigation mechanism, along with the establishment of an ad-hoc court to prosecute every individual accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity.

• All international donors, notably the EU, should implement robust monitoring schemes and apply strict human rights due diligence in their funding to ensure that financial aid does not inadvertently support criminal networks.

The Libyan Authorities:

• Should develop effective incentives to encourage the disarmament, dissolution, and reintegration of former militia group members into society, while offering skill training and alternative employment opportunities to facilitate their transition to civilian life.

• Should take full ownership of the process of reforming the security sector, ensuring that it becomes unified, professional, and accountable.

• Should put aside self-interests and political considerations, actively and collectively work towards the creation of a positive and transparent civil society environment conducive to democratic and equitable election processes.

• Should commit to achieving a balanced economic development strategy that encourages the incentive for diversified investments and reduces dependence on oil revenues, deters the recourse to illicit forms of economic transactions, and guarantees a fair distribution of profits across the whole country.

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Ferhat Polat

Bathily’s resignation highlights the challenges of working towards peace, and stability in Libya, which has been grappling with conflict and political instability since 2011 when Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown.

Abdoulaye Bathily, the United Nations (UN) envoy for Libya, resigned from his position at the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) after just 18 months. This move was expected due to the lack of progress in the stuck political process in Libya. This resignation is expected to deepen the existing diplomatic crisis and intensify the political stalemate.

Behind the scenes of Bathily’s resignation

Bathily’s resignation highlights the challenges of working towards peace and stability in Libya, which has been grappling with conflict and political instability since 2011 when Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown. His exit not only signals the complexity of the situation but also highlights the immense challenges that lie ahead in reconciling the opposing sides.

Over the past few months, he has been engaging in shuttle diplomacy, attempting to persuade the opposing sides to participate in high-level discussions. Unfortunately, he has not been successful in bringing them together.

The current political leaders include the speaker of the House of Representatives, Aguila Saleh, the so-called leader of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalifa Haftar, chairman of the High Council State, Mohamed Takala, president of the Libyan Presidential Council, Mohammed Yunus al-Menfi, and Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, internationally recognized government’s prime minister based in Tripoli.

These leaders have failed to engage in meaningful discussions to find common ground, especially Khalifa Haftar, who sees the political process as threatening his interests. Libya’s weak state institutions, especially security, combined with increasing armed groups, have increased the incentive to compete for power.

As a result, the ongoing political deadlock continues to work in favor of military figures such as Haftar. Meanwhile, armed militias and foreign fighters with vested economic interests continue to operate freely, undermining any sense of central authority. Despite significant division among rival parties, both sides usually find common ground to share the profits when distributing oil income.

From time to time, if there is no agreement, then the eastern side, where most of the oil fields are located, which is under the control of Haftar, blocks the oil terminals from operating until a decision is reached. Haftar has been using the oil blockade as leverage against the UN-backed governments. For instance, in 2020, militias under the control of Haftar blockaded eastern Libya’s main oil terminals for 8 months, and the estimated cost of these oil blockades was around $11 billion.

Therefore, the dysfunctional state’s control over the resources benefits the current political status quo and their militia groups. They have been using the weak state institutions for their benefit. Simultaneously, institutions have become tools to deepen the division and entrench the conflict rather than reconcile the needs and demands of parties with those necessary for state building. Thus, 13 years after the Libyan conflict, the most critical component is that the country’s restoration primarily relies on uniting governmental institutions, particularly security and economic institutions.

Conditions for stabilization in Libya

The United Nations mission in Libya and other members of the international community have underscored the significance of conducting elections to establish stability in the country in recent years. However, it is essential to carefully consider the potential consequences of rushing into elections without first addressing the underlying issues that contribute to instability.

The lack of a constitution remains a central issue in Libya’s challenges, leading to disagreements among parties regarding election laws and key candidate eligibility. Furthermore, the lack of security across the country adds another layer of complexity to the situation.

Any postponement of a political process has its price and impact. This is no different in Libya. While it is good to make sure that everything gets organized and settled, in the Libyan case, the international community must prioritize providing security, strengthening the rule of law, fostering a sense of national identity, and promulgating a new constitution in Libya.

Elections should not be rushed at the expense of long-term stability. Without addressing the key issues first, holding elections will not effectively solve existing problems in the country. Over the past few years, the failure to find effective ways to address these issues has caused widespread disappointment and a loss of faith in the current political leaders as well as the international communities.

The incoming special representative to succeed Abdoulaye Bathily will face a challenging task in addressing the existing political dynamics in Libya. To promote a more inclusive political system, it is crucial that the new representative challenges the influence of those in power and advocates for broader participation.

The UN must refrain from perpetuating an elite-centric approach, and sanctions should be considered for individuals obstructing progress. Without these measures, the cycle of political turmoil will continue to benefit the ruling class while neglecting the needs of the Libyan population.

***

Ferhat Polat is a researcher at the TRT World Research Centre. Holding an MA in Middle East Studies from the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies at the University of Exeter, he specializes in North African geopolitics and security, with a particular focus on Libya.

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Five Years After the siege of Tripoli

Picture a nation caught in a relentless cycle of turmoil and uncertainty, where the echoes of a historic uprising have given way to a protracted civil war. Libya, once a land of promise, now bears the weighty label of a ‘failed state’ within the global community while international efforts to achieve peace and reconciliation have been met with domestic opposition.

For four decades, the country was ruled by an entrenched regime, but the 2011 uprising brought an end to that era, marking the beginning of a tumultuous period that continues to shape its state of affairs. As we delve into the complexities of Libya’s current standing, we will explore the pressing issues mainly generated by its appalling militia rule and offer recommendations aimed at restoring peace, stability, and democratic governance.

Contextualizing Libya’s Current Crisis

Libya’s post-revolution narrative has been one of perpetual instability. Conflict has become ingrained in its very fabric, with fragmented and polarized institutions confined in a perpetual state of chaos and an obsolete judicial system that has exacerbated the culture of impunity in the country.

The discordant confluence of militias vying for control coupled with the persisting interventions of foreign and opposing actors, all have left a trail of destruction, particularly for its civilian population. Thousands of civilians are constantly the victims of sporadic episodes of violence that have arisen between different armed groups throughout the years.

This month marks the fifth year of the military assault on Tripoli that was initiated by Khalifa Haftar in 2019 to take control of the capital leaving thousands between injured and dead and extensive material destruction. The incidental re-emergence of tribal hostilities, although they have significantly contracted in frequency and severity over the past two years, they only mark the state of insecurity that has plagued the country for more than a decade now, while aspirations to hold fair and transparent elections in the hopes of restoring peace and stability remain feeble.

As it stands, international efforts invested to establish a unified civilian government failed in 2021 with the indefinite postponement of elections and the consolidation of the current state of political cleavages we see today in the North African nation. The country is still divided between two parallel administrations with overlapping structures and functions, each legitimized by an association of foreign actors and supported by opposing paramilitary systems. But how did Libya arrive at this complex juncture?

The Militarization of Society

The NATO-backed overthrow of former leader Moammar Gadhafi has advanced the establishment of the militia rule in Libya. The heavily armed groups with unchecked reach and omnipotence that we know of today are the direct descendants of a multitude of civilian groups who, in their pursuit to fill in the power vacuum left void by the then-toppled regime, they managed to tighten their control and maintain security over their communities through self-weaponization and mass civilian mobilization.

Young men, faced with negligible employment prospects, are the labour force driving these militias. As regional fanaticism started to spread, youth were recruited in scores and trained to serve these statefunded armed groups who now constitute one of the most vital financial reassurance for the thousands of Libyans desperate to secure a stable source of income in midst of years of economic stagnation.

At the onset of the revolution, the number of fighters was put at around 25,000, yet after the establishment of the first transitional government, this number surged dramatically by tenfold to approximately 250,000 fighters just a couple of months later.

Additionally, disturbingly, reports from the US State Department indicate that over 6,000 children were also allegedly recruited by both proregime forces in 2011 and the Special Deterrence Force in 2020, a paramilitary police force operating under the UN-recognized Government.

An Internationally Maintained Internal Schism

More often than not, manpower is derived from within the Libyan society and neighbouring countries, gun power however, rests as an introduced externality. As it stands, countries like France, Italy, Egypt, Russia, Türkiye, and the UAE have all contributed to and even altered the course of the conflict in Libya either through financial and diplomatic support accorded to the warring factions, or through direct military engagement within the national borders of the country rendering the conflict a state of war by proxy.

During the first year of the conflict in 2011, small and heavy arms were dispersed across different channels after they were pillaged by local militia groups from Gaddafi’s armament depots that had been controlled away from the hands of the civilian population for decades. However, the country soon became a ground for foreign military equipment illicitly shipped from abroad in large quantities, reaching in 2016 a staggering 20 million pieces of arms in the North African nation of 6 million people (counting roughly 3 weapons for each person).

The stream of weaponry received for years has been maintained by a plethora of foreign actors who carry out the covert -sometimes even overt- supply of the opposing militias; a practice that comes in defiance of the UN-instituted -now deemed ineffective- arms embargo that was designed in 2011 to stop the proliferation of weapons with the aim of ending the civil war.

Presently, the country remains chronically split between two rival governments who compete for legitimacy: the UN-recognized, Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU) on the west, and the Government of National Stability (GNS) led by the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk and loosely affiliated with warlord Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) which is under his command.

Since 2014, the state of parallelism has been an appalling component of Libyan politics that has only been reinforced through foreign intervention. In fact, the contrasting interests of different domestic and international actors conceive an unpredictable arrangement of shifting alliances in the country. Currently, the GNU is backed by UN member states who provide it with diplomatic recognition and material support notably from Turkey and Italy, while the eastern government is backed by Egypt, UAE and Russia.

A precarious balance of power is preserved with both Turkey and Russia establishing military presence in the western and eastern regions respectively since 2019. As per UN estimates, there were roughly 20,000 foreign fighters and mercenaries, namely from the Wagner Group, Chad, Sudan, and Syria, who were deployed in Libya in 2020 following the UN-brokered ceasefire.

The thwarted attack on Tripoli that was initiated in April 2019 by Khalifa Haftar is just one of the manifestations of Libya’s protracted state of deadlock. The political and military status quo, reflected through Haftar’s defeat and his retreat eastward, was advanced by the engagement of a heterogeneous coalition of international actors, with Turkey’s intervention and military support for the western militias of the GNA being a decisive factor that broke off the 18-month-long civil war in Tripoli.

Consolidating Irregularity: Libya’s Informal Security Architecture

The profound institutional disunity in Libya arises from the lack of a cohesive national army, dedicated solely to the nation and holding exclusive control over the use of force. Various poles of power have subsequently emerged across different territories where the most resourceful armed groups have succeeded to consolidate wealth and influence over the people and the state itself.

These paramilitary networks have become deeply entrenched within the security apparatus of the state, either within units or ‘brigades’ operating under the ministries of the interior and defence, or through more explicit links where former militia leaders are promoted to senior government positions. The recent designation of Imed Al Trabelsi as Minister of Interior of the GNU, who is formerly associated with the “Public Security and Security Positions Apparatus,” is just a case in point of such reputation laundering of those accused of criminal acts in the past.

The security landscape in the country is that of overlapping hierarchies and structural hybridity. As ‘private armies’ have undergone a process of institutionalization, they slowly infiltrated state constituencies and started taking on official law-enforcing responsibilities like arrest and detention, surveillance and intelligence, border security and migrant control.

The professionalization of these armed formations has been conducted through the assistance of foreign security institutions who have operating in the country for years. As of 2024, LAAM Network has reported the presence of at least 12 international security institutions in the country, 8 of them being western European companies, namely France, Ireland, and the UK, while the remaining are from Russia, Türkiye, Canada, and the US.

Now, well-established militias continue to receive considerable amounts of funds to execute such activities that are usually the sole prerogative of the state, while they remain strategically independent from any kind of state control. This conferred formality has only strengthened militia’s political influence and solidified their legitimacy as a more effective source of security especially in light of an increasingly weaker political standing of the current leaders.

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Wiesław LIZAK

Consequences of The Crisis For The Stability of Libya and Its International Environment

Contrary to the hopes of both the participants of the Libyan revolt and the intervening coalition of states, the process of rebuilding the structures of political power after the overthrowing of al-Qaddafi’s dictatorship did not proceed as expected.

Regional differences, ambitions of local leaders, tribal divisions, different visions of the future of the state, striving by local political and military forces to control territories and maximize their possession, efforts to take control of the oil extraction sites, transport routes and oil exports facilities – all this lay at the background of the gradual evolution of internal situation in the country towards anarchy. This was favoured by the weakness of the central authorities elected as a result of electoral procedures (aimed at legitimizing the new authorities) and the resulting lack of efficient and effective military forces.

The inability to form a strong army encouraged local groups, usually formed on the basis of tribal loyalty, to manifest their own interests. The first elections after the collapse of the al-Qaddafi regime, carried out on July 7, 2012, brought hope for stabilization of the political system, nevertheless the political disputes in then National Assembly caused by different views of the form and future of the state (including works on the new constitution) led to pre-term elections ( June 25, 2014).

Lack of consent by some political forces to such a resolution led to the contestation of newly elected authorities and, consequently, to the formation of two rivalling decision-making centres and, although the peace negotiations held subsequently under the auspices of the United Nations led to the formation of the National Unity Government (agreement of December 17, 2015), many influential groups and their leaders refrained from accepting the adopted solutions.

As a result, Libya found itself under the control of rival power centres that, apart from their mutual rivalry, had to face the expansion of jihadist forces and regional and tribal groups. Political chaos in turn gave rise to competition for resources (oil) attracting the interest of external actors.

Libya, during the previous regime, was a state with a relatively well-equipped army. Its collapse with the fall of the al-Qaddafi’s regime due to a lack of armed forces capable of taking control of this equipment led to the proliferation of weapons and radical reduction of the citizens’ security. It was one of the reasons why local militias began to appear in many parts of the country to guarantee the security of local communities.

The country found itself in a kind of a vicious circle: the lack of security and strong power centre enforced the emergence of local military forces guaranteeing to the inhabitants of various regions stability and preservation of status quo, at the same time this factor deepened internal chaos leading to the increasing anarchy of political life. It is worth noting that Libya’s destabilization processes have also affected other countries of the region.

The desert character of most of the Libya’s border areas with neighbouring states facilitated the transfer of people and weapons beyond the borders of the country. This, in turn, facilitated the activities of jihadist groups (such as Islamic State or Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb) which, using the weakness of central government structures, tried to create territorial base for their activity in North and West Africa.

Fundamentalist groups present in Egypt, Tunisia or Algeria took action across the borders of these countries trying to expand their influence, especially during the time when the Islamic State was celebrating triumphs in Syria and Iraq – Libya became another country in which it tried to create the territorial bridgehead of the restored caliphate.

In particular, the central coastal part of the country (with Sirte as the main city) was temporarily controlled at the turn of 2014 and 2015 by the forces related to the Islamic State, eventually repudiated by the coalition of various groups (including AlQaida) in December 2016. Activities of jihadist militia were also favoured by natural conditions – difficult to control areas of the south of the country enabled functioning of the routes leading to sub-Saharan Africa. The instability in Libya constitutes also a factor affecting the situation in western Sudan.

The lack of effective control of interstate borders was encouraged by anti-government groups operating on the territory of Darfur to seek a territorial base in Libya. Through the territory of the Sahara, weapons and combat equipment are supplied to partisans in Darfur and local armed groups support each other’s goals. The destabilization of Libya was also one of the causes of escalation of the conflict in Mali in 2012. It was caused by the tensions between the northern Berber people inhabiting the northern regions (Tuaregs) and the representatives of the Negroid people inhabiting the southern provinces who are politically dominant in Bamako.

The outbreak of another Tuareg insurgence in March 2012, seeking to proclaim an independent state (Azawad), was possible mainly because after the collapse of the al-Qaddafi’s regime huge amounts of weapons were released from the Libyan warehouses to the south supplying rebel troops.

Many Tuareg mercenaries also served in the Libyan army – after its disintegration they joined the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) which set for itself the goal of building the independent state in the northern part of Mali. The training and combat experience gained in Libya increased the military capability of the Azawad partisans contributing to the escalation of the conflict.

The outbreak of insurgency in northern Mali became the starting point for the activation of groups referring to militant Islam. They successfully undertook military effort resulting in taking control of the region and establishing their administration over the areas affected by the conflict.

Consequently, in fear of further expansion of jihadism, France (Operation “Serval”), supported by the military forces of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), launched a military intervention on January 11, 2013 which restored the control of the authorities in Bamako over northern provinces of the state.

However, due to their specific conditions, desert areas are still penetrated by anti-government forces38. Jihadist groups undertook terrorist actions in several countries of West Africa (alongside Mali, also in Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Ivory Coast). The expansion of jihadism in this part of the world is therefore one of the consequences of the Libyan crisis and the progressive dysfunctionality of this country.

This dysfunctionality was to a certain extent “exported” beyond the borders of Libya, contributing to the increase of the security threats in neighbouring countries. At the same time, the anti-Western sentiments in this region were strengthened – both the international intervention in Libya in 2011 and the French intervention in Mali in 2013 encouraged the radicalization of local communities previously marginalized and devoted to religious traditions of Islam in North and West Africa (all Sub-Saharan Africa countries in the geographic region of Sudan are inhabited mostly by Muslim population).

The destabilization and anarchisation of political life in Libya was also the source of threats to the security of Western Europe countries. The proximity of the southern coast of Italy (Sicily) makes Libya the transit state for migrants from Africa seeking to improve their living conditions.

Under the regime of Colonel al-Qaddafi, the authoritarian order was able to create an effective mechanism to protect the Libyan coasts and transit routes from Sub-Saharan African countries towards the Mediterranean coast.

Especially after waiving sanctions imposed on Libya by the UN Security Council in 2003 when the authorities in Tripoli were seeking normalization of relations with the countries of the high-developed West (by seeking investments in the oil sector and contracts for the supply of energy resources) one of the conditions of cooperation laid down by European countries was to seal borders and strengthen control over the illegal emigration flow.

These actions proved to be effective – the Libyan routes of migrants to the north were to large extent blocked. After the political changes caused by the so-called the Arab Spring the situation has changed fundamentally. Lack of effective power capable of controlling the entire territory of the state led to the reconstruction of migration routes and the development of illegal smuggling structures controlled by criminal groups.

Transporting people across the Mediterranean is at the same time associated with high risk due to the quality of ships and boats used for transport, excessive burden or, frequently, deliberate actions of criminal structures incapable of ensuring to smuggled persons basic security conditions.

The “Libyan” route became one of the three main directions of the influx of people seeking asylum during the migration crisis which emerged in Europe in 2015 along the eastern route through Turkey (then used to the greatest extent) and the western route between Morocco and Spain. The migration crisis contributed to the rise of nationalist moods in many European Union countries, led to increased tensions between EU member states in connection with the strategy of adapting illegal immigrants and displayed the weakness of the European Union institutions in the absence of effective means and mechanisms to solve the problems generated by the crisis.

This situation made European leaders aware of the need to pursue a more active policy aimed at neutralizing contradictions and threats generated in Africa. It also constitutes a proof of the progressive process of the internationalization of threats generated by dysfunctional states in the modern world. The dysfunctionality of the Libyan state translates also into the stability of the oil markets. The high dependence of extracting operations on the political conditions resulted in large fluctuations in the level of oil extraction and export in Libya.

This further aggravated the uncertainty on the international energy raw material markets and among recipients of Libyan resources, although in the context of low oil prices after 2015 it should be noted that this did not have a huge impact on the level of supply and prices on international markets – uncertain supply from Libya was previously taken into account in the market assessments by experts, intermediaries and recipients of crude oil.

However, stabilizing the Libyan oil market is in the best interest of both importers and exporters of this raw material – as a factor stabilizing the international situation in the sector that is crucial for the global economy. This increases the involvement of third countries in activities aimed at forcing solutions that are positive from their point of view (in particular, Western European countries are involved in such activities due to geographic proximity and prospects of favourable business solutions).

In the long term, however, this may preserve the phenomenon of Libya being objectified by external partners. The involvement of Italy and France in attempts to peacefully resolve the intra-Libyan conflict, the Italian initiative to strengthen the potential of the Libyan coast guard or Russia’s attempts to use political divisions in Libya to rebuild influence in this part of the world indicate the existence of such tendencies.

The dysfunctionality of Libya is a consequence of the presence of at least several factors favouring the destabilization of this country. Among them, the external military intervention must be mentioned, which was decisive for the fall of the authoritarian political regime symbolized by Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi.

Lack of political forces capable of effectively managing the transformation process, in the absence of sufficient interest of external players for its support, contributed to the anarchization of the internal situation, the destabilization of the state and creation of threats to the stability of the international environment.

The example of Libya has become another case for analysis in discussions regarding the rationality of actions aimed at enforcing political change through external interventions even when they are justified by humanitarian reasons.

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Wiesław Lizak – University of Warsaw

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Canan Atilgan / Veronika Ertl / Simon Engelkes

Breeding Ground of Extremist Groups

In conjunction with uncontrolled migration towards Europe, permeable borders and the availability of weapons in the post-revolutionary disorder make Libya a fertile breeding ground for extremism and terrorism. During the revolution, established jihadist factions were already fighting alongside the rebels and, following the overthrow of the regime, took on posts in Libya’s political system next to moderate Islamists. However, the continuing state disintegration opened the doors to another actor: the so-called Islamic State. As in other territories, IS turned the undefined power situation in Libya to its advantage and established a territorial presence.

Returning fighters from Syria formed the first Libyan IS offshoot and were later supported by IS representatives dispatched from Syria and Iraq in the creation of three provinces (wilāyāt) in the east, west and south of the country. IS initially settled in the eastern city of Derna, but was driven out by other jihadist groups. It then moved westwards along the coast and installed itself in the coastal city of Sirte, which became the first region outside of the Levant to fall under the territorial control of IS. Sirte

was considered its most crucial base and was retaken following months of fighting by militias and U.S. air strikes. With regard to the total number of IS fighters in Libya, the estimates fluctuated between 6,000 and 12,000. What is interesting here is that the majority of IS fighters in Libya – up to 70 per cent in Sirte – were made up of foreign fighters, primarily Tunisians. While being displaced from Sirte constituted a heavy territorial defeat for IS, it would be inaccurate to

speak of an ultimate victory over the group in Libya. Moreover, the victory over IS provides scope for other Islamist factions to proliferate, which – unless the country is stabilised and gains political peace – presents an ongoing terrorist risk. Libya’s neighbours face cross-border security challenges as terrorist factions spread, especially through the recruitment and training of fighters by groups in Libya and their return to their home countries after the military defeats of IS.

Attacks by terrorists trained in Libya, for example in Tunisia in 2015 and Algeria in 2013, also show the increased risk of attacks emanating from Libya as a retreat for these groups. For Europe, too, there is an increased risk of terrorism due to the strengthened international jihadist networks. The Tunisian Anis Amri, who perpetrated the attack on a Christmas market in Berlin at the end of 2016, was in contact with IS in Libya. The Manchester attacker had connections to Libyan IS networks as well. Salman Abedi is thus the latest link in the chain between the situation in Libya and the threat to Europe posed by international terrorism.

The continuing state disintegration facilitates the spread of extremist groups in Libya.

Furthermore, Libya’s instability is one of the main reasons behind the internationalisation and growing autonomy of armed factions in the Sahel region. In Mali, the epicentre of Islamist violence in Sahel, in Niger and in Chad, the dissemination of weapons from Libyan holdings fuelled the equipment of insurgencies, which were dominated by Islamists and tribal groups. The tribal areas along the Libyan borders in the south are, moreover, key to regional security. The conflict in Libya has underpinned the crises in Sahel, a region with historically weak governments and widespread zones where the state has little authority.

The lack of state structures in Libya turns the country into a magnet and transfer route for foreign fighters, as well as the logical junction for jihadism in North Africa, given its use as a place for training and retreat for extremists. Unless the situation were to change by means of a political peace process and the construction of a legitimate government with an effective monopoly on power, the activities of terrorist factions will remain a security risk for the region and for Europe.

At the same time, however, it must be determined that IS in Libya has no far-reaching control over territories and populations; local support for IS is relatively low. Experts believe that the strong clan and tribal structures are proving to be an important counterbalance to radicalism. The Libyan localism seems to not only be hindering a democratic process, but also a jihadist expansion.

From Fortune to Bankruptcy

Once the country with the highest per capita income in Africa, Libya is now on the brink of national bankruptcy. The country’s oil reserves are estimated at 48 billion barrels, making them the largest reserves on the continent and the ninth largest worldwide. In 2012, production of crude oil amounted to 70 per cent of Libya’s gross domestic product (GDP), 99 per cent of the nation’s exports and 97 per cent of state revenue. As a result of the escalating violence, however, the oil production declined sharply in the subsequent years and is far from being a stable supply since the oil industry in

Libya has become part of a pronounced wartime economy. In addition to this, there is the dramatic decrease in the global market price of oil. The banking system has likewise almost completely crumbled due to the liquidity crisis. The state budget has been put under considerable strain by the appeasement policy of unproductive salary and pension payments.

40 per cent of budgetary expenditure flows into salaries and subsidies respectively and less than half is currently covered by revenue while the remainder comes from depleting currency reserves. Meanwhile, illegal economic activities, especially the smuggling of people and goods, have developed into a profitable industry. The shadow economy has also been able to greatly expand its capacity by linking criminal networks with territorial access for militias.

The war in Libya has led to a reorganisation of the smuggling cartels and turned the country into the regional hub for illegal trade in drugs, medicine, vehicles and people. The economic collapse of Libya has drastic consequences for neighbouring countries, too. The economic collapse of Libya has drastic consequences for neighbouring countries, too. Tunisia and Egypt are most seriously affected by the developments. The dramatic economic weakness in Tunisia is therefore ascribed in large part to the crisis in Libya. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) estimates that the chaos in Libya cost Tunisia at least 4.3 billion euros by the end of 2015 alone.

After the collapse of the Libyan economy, Tunisia’s GDP sank by 3.7 per cent and 3.8 per cent in 2013 and 2014. Furthermore, Tunisia traditionally satisfied 25 per cent of its oil demand with Libyan oil bought at preferential prices. However, this supply was difficult to sustain following the collapse of Libya’s oil sector. In the tourism sector, Tunisia saw a slump of 30 per cent in the numbers of Libyan tourists (around 1.8 million annually prior to 2011). A further problem is the return of around 60,000 to 90,000 Tunisian migrant workers.

Money transfers from Libya have sunk by one third since 2011. The return of tens of thousands of workers is an additional burden for the country which already has a high unemployment rate. At the same time, informal trade flows between Tunisia and Libya make up almost half of the trade between the two countries. Almost 40 per cent of the Tunisian economy is informal. Smuggling, as well as other illegal activities often represent the only source of income for people in marginalised border areas. With a revenue of 850 million euros, border trade provides a living for approximately ten per cent of the Tunisian population.

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Dr. Canan Atilgan is Head of the Regional Programme for Political Dialogue Southern Mediterranean of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung based in Tunis, Tunisia.

Veronika Ertl is Research Associate at the Regional Programme for Political Dialogue Southern Mediter-ranean of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung based in Tunis, Tunisia.

Simon Engelkes is Project Coordinator at the Regional Programme for Political Dialogue Southern Mediterranean of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung based in Tunis, Tunisia.

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Wiesław LIZAK

The Road To The “Fall” Of Statehood

Libyan state decomposition processes are associated in their genesis with the events of the so-called Arab Spring which led to the collapse of several political regimes in the countries of North Africa and the Middle East.

Anti-government demonstrations began in December 2010 in Tunisia and then spread to other countries in the region. As a result, current political elites were removed from power in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, civil wars broke out in Syria and Yemen and more or less mass anti-government demonstrations were held in other countries of this part of the world.

The developments in Libya were preceded by the resignation from their offices of the presidents of Tunisia and Egypt which had a huge impact on the public opinion in Libya leading to the radicalization of anti-government moods especially in the younger part of the country’s population.

In this context, it is worth remembering that in the economic dimension, in terms of quality and standard of living, the situation in Libya was not bad. Libya was one of the better developed countries of North African in terms of socio-economic indicators with the relatively high standard of living, extensive system of social benefits financed with oil revenues as well as developed and modern economic infrastructure.

It is worth noting that immediately before the outbreak of the uprising in 2011, the country had one of the highest standards of living in Africa and one of the highest indicators of national per capita income, quite well-functioning education and health protection systems (though also benefiting from the imported labour force).

The main driver of social dissatisfaction was the authorities’ authoritarianism preventing the mitigation of existing social tensions. The lack of civil society combined with the efforts to fully control the lives of citizens by the authoritarian authorities and suppressing even the smallest manifestations of opposition activity created the atmosphere conducive to the contestation of the existing political order.

The symbol of the status quo and the ossification of the regime was the then leader of Libya, Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi who, although formally did not hold any official state functions, was the number one of the regime and maintained this position for 42 years (he came to power at the age of just 29 years).

A characteristic feature of al-Qaddafi’s rule was the unpredictability and unconventionality of his behaviour. Original political concepts, exemplified by the content comprised in the Green Book, led to the creation of a specific political system which was based on original solutions and – according to the assumptions of its creator – was to be based on certain forms of self-government combined with elements of direct democracy with strong reference to values such as social justice or basing the country’s development on own resources.

This specificity of the system was to be contained in specific terminology – the concept of Jamahiriya coined by al-Qaddafi was supposed to reflect the uniqueness and specificity of the Libyan development model. Needless to say, behind these slogans lay in fact a local form of authoritarian regime with a strong position of its political creator, leader and ideologist in one person.

The unmasking of the autocratic elements in the political system of Libya, a very long period of colonel al-Qaddafi’s domination and the prospect of family succession as the leader of the state (Sayf al-Qaddafi, was prepared to become his successor) led to progressive delegitimization of the Libyan regime among the inhabitants of the country despite a fairly extensive system of social benefits.

Also in the international dimension, the policy of the al-Qaddafi regime evoked a lot of controversy. Radically anti-Western course in foreign policy led during the Cold War to the deterioration or severance of relations with virtually all countries of the bloc. Libya, during this period, not only continued verbal criticism of “Western imperialism” but it was also involved politically and materially in supporting various forces that could weaken its international position of the West.

This logic led Libya to support various terrorist organizations, especially those which had undertaken spectacular actions, such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army in Great Britain or the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The supply of weapons and explosives to terrorist organizations provided Libya with the label of the main sponsor of international terrorism and Libyan secret service was directly accused of similar actions (such as the attack on discotheque in Berlin in 1986, the above-mentioned attack on the American plane over Lockerbie in 1988 or the attack on an the Air France plane over Niger in 1989.

As a result, the country was subject to international sanctions introduced by the UN Security Council resolution of 1992 which were in force until September 12, 2003 (Libya finally agreed to accept its responsibility for the attacks on planes and paid compensations to the victims which led to the suspension of sanctions in 1999).

Libya’s activities in the international arena were also directed at promoting mechanisms of cooperation with countries that perceived the Cold War international system in a similar way which were engaging in the processes destabilizing and contesting the role of the American power and its allies.

The cooperation with Iran or leftist political regimes in Africa and in the Middle East led to the isolation of Libya on the international forum. The community of interests with the countries of the former Eastern bloc resulting from the rivalry with the West led to the creation of many levels of mutual cooperation although unconventional statements and behaviours of the Libyan leader limited the possibility of allied cooperation, at least on the official level.

The involvement of Libyan authorities in supporting anti-system forces in the Arab states of the region (often under the Pan-Arabic slogans, though filtered through the Libyan interests and specific ideological assumptions promoted by Colonel al-Qaddafi) in that period led to the isolation of the state also in the immediate international environment (which was one of the reasons of the fiasco of the successive initiatives of the Libyan leader aimed at creation of the union of Arab states).

As a consequence of diplomatic failures in the region of North Africa and the Middle East, Libya then reoriented its foreign policy seeking to strengthen its position in relations with Sub-Saharan African countries. The successes of Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi in this field were rather the result of African leaders’ interest in Libyan economic aid (during the oil boom play Libya had budget surpluses at disposal) than real interest in the cooperation model promoted by the Libyan authorities.

Libya at that time tried to “punch above its own weight” on the international forum achieving rather limited results. However, it built a negative image of the country among the main actors in the framework of the then international order leading, as a consequence, to limiting its ability to achieve foreign policy goals. Therefore, after the end of the Cold War, Libya undertook certain measures to change the existing image and normalize relations with the Western powers and proWestern states in its international environment.

The most spectacular proof of this stance was the consent of Tripoli to refrain from further development of the potential of mass destruction weapons (chemical and nuclear weapons) as well as the consent to submit its arsenals to the system of control.

Economic needs have also led to gradual normalization of relations with European countries that are the main recipients of energy resources exported by Libya (Italy and France were particularly interested in developing cooperation in the oil sector). Nevertheless, despite the desire to change the international image, Libya remained the state of “limited reliability” – and this should be probably perceived as one of the reasons for the decision of the Western powers to support the opposition forces after the outbreak of the anti-regime uprising during the Arab Spring.

The outbreak of the anti-government riots in Libya took place in March 2011. The success of anti-government insurgencies in neighbouring countries gave a strong impulse to Libyans dissatisfied with the existing socio-political and economic conditions. Hopes for the change of the authoritarian regime led thousands of protesters to the streets. At the same time, it launched the opposite process of mobilizing pro-government forces to defend status quo.

Aware of the experiences of neighbouring countries, Colonel al-Qaddafi did not want to risk losing his power (attempts to make concessions or compromises seemed only a way to strengthen the demands of the opposition and could be interpreted as a weakness). Consequently, the situation escalated to the conflict in which the government side decided to use the full arsenal of forces and resources being at its disposal. The riots turned into an internal conflict in which the opposition side, as deprived of the access to arsenals of weapons, seemed doomed to failure.

The prospect of victory of the forces faithful to al-Qaddafi’s, however, prompted Western countries to launch the military intervention. Formal pretext, formulated on the international forum, were humanitarian issues, nevertheless the fact that Libya is an oil state gave rise to additional speculations about the real motives of the intervention forces (especially as the initiator of the venture was France, subsequently supported by Italy and the United Kingdom – that is the states economically involved in Libya).

The adoption by the UN Security Council of the resolution banning military flights in Libyan air space combined with the activities of the regime forces – including aviation – gave the pretext to launch an international intervention which in fact supported Libyan opposition. The coalition of Western countries which took the initiative decided to transfer the coordination of operations to the North Atlantic Alliance (Operation Unified Protector). International intervention has reversed the fate of the conflict.

Air support has made it possible to the anti-government forces to gain advantage also in ground operations. As a result, the regime of Colonel Mu’ammar al-Qaddafi was overthrown and the dictator died in fighting, brutally murdered by partisans on October 20, 2011. This started the new stage in the history of the Libya.

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Wiesław Lizak – University of Warsaw

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Marco Giannangeli

Libyan strongman Khalifa Haftar is “so inexorably linked to the Russian state that every decision is now taken in the realm of what Moscow finds acceptable”, warn experts. And this includes weaponising migrants. Western diplomats who engage with Libyan hardman Khalifa Haftar are hindering Europe’s capacity to curb Russia’s growing influence in the North African country, experts warned last night.

And they could pay a heavy price if Moscow chooses to engineer mass waves of migration which could “stretch European infrastructure and unity”. Using Benghazi as an alternative Libyan capital, the General – who received his military training in the USSR – is now completely reliant on Russian military might for his power. There are 2,000 Russian mercenaries employed by the Wagner group in Libya today. They were joined recently by a further contingent of 1,500 regular Russian troops.

Russia’s entrenched presence in Libya already presents several threats to Europe and the UK, in the form of plundered gold and diamonds which bring billions to Moscow’s war chest, Russian oil sales and control of the port of Tobruk from which it can threaten Nato interests just 700 miles away. Now, the weaponisation of desperate migrants offers another, deniable and non-military method of exerting pressure on the West.

It means that Russian leader Vladimir Putin can use Haftar to hold a gun to Europe’s head should he seek leverage in UN Security Council votes or in the event of military setbacks in Ukraine. European leaders and the US have been trying to court Haftar for the last two years.

In March the UK struck a £1m deal to ensure Libya’s formal government in Tripoli stops migrants from crossing into Europe, instead repatriating them to their countries of origin. But this holds no sway over Haftar. Italian PM Giorgia Meloni has twice visited Benghazi, offering valuable concessions and economic contracts in return for Haftar’s pledge to clamp down on migrant flows from Libya. The first meeting last year was followed by a 600 per cent rise in migrant flows from Cyrenaica. And action by Western leaders is offering no deterrence.

On Thursday, Libya’s UK ambassador Dr Martin Longden met with Haftar in Benghazi to “relay the view that all parties should engage in the UN’s political process.” Jalel Harchaoui added: “The UK, US, France, Italy all sent their diplomats to celebrate and honour Haftar’s armed coalition in Benghazi on Thursday – barely weeks after Russian armed forces sent tens of thousands of tonnes of military hardware “At the very same time, the same Western democracies vow to combat corruption and Russia’s expansionism”

When countries like Italy legitimise Haftar and offer incentives, it has a knock-on-effect, he said, adding: “Once Italy becomes engaged with reconstruction projects it can no longer support, say, a British call for sanctions.” And it will not work, because when the West talks to Haftar, it is talking to “someone who is inexorably linked to the Russian state”.

“He considers Russia vital and every decision is now taken in the realm of what Moscow finds acceptable,” said Mr Harchaoui Russia has already used migration as a weapon in 2023, when crossings from Belarus to the EU increased by 62 per cent. Frontex, the EU’s border police, has warned that an increasingly isolated Putin choosing to move migrants to Europe’s doorstep – both along Russia’s eastern borders and through proxies in the south, including in Africa – is a major threat to security for 2024.

Now, Moscow controls the borders around Haftar-occupied Libya including Chad, Niger, Sudan and Egypt. “Imagine if the situation in Sudan worsened and migrant numbers increased and Italy began to panic,” said Mr Harchaoui “It now has to face a power base backed by Russian forces. Options have dwindled.”

Alia Brahimi of the Atlantic Council think tank said: “More than a security issue, this is fundamentally a humanitarian emergency, and short-term deals with human rights abusers erase from the picture the desperate people trapped in an abhorrent cycle of violence involving enslavement, forced labour, sexual exploitation, and organ theft. “Libya is fast becoming a mafia state, where a few individuals own almost all the criminality. The same Russian proxies who run large human trafficking rings are also trading in illegal drugs from Syria as well as vast quantities of fuel stolen systematically and in plain sight from the Libyan state, which ends up with Russia’s allies in Syria and Sudan.

“Haftar is very unlikely to abandon his strong relationship with Russia as this will risk his entire empire. So the Libyan migration crisis is a weapon open to Moscow. “Illegal migration from Eastern Libya has a capacity to stretch European infrastructure and unity. And this is something that Russia is very alive to.”

“The UK, US, France, Italy all sent their diplomats to celebrate and honour Haftar’s armed coalition in Benghazi on Thursday – just  weeks after Russian armed forces sent tens of thousands of tonnes of military hardware. Meanwhile, the same Western democracies vow to combat corruption and Russia’s expansionism”.  Jalel Harchaoui, RUSI

A second meeting in May seemingly heralded results, with transit figures now dropping as Haftar reins in his criminal gangs. While only 100,000 migrants crossed from Libya into Europe last year – compared with a million in 2015 – this situation can change. “If Haftar has the power to crack down on the number of fishing vessels being used to illegally transport migrants from Libya, he has the power to do the opposite,” said Libya expert Jalel Harchaoui of the RUSI think tank. “He can also just send migrants along to Western Libya. “If something happens in Ukraine, or within the UN Security Council, there is the possibility that Moscow will use Libya as part of its tool kit to exert punishment on Italy or Europe.”

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Marco Giannangeli is the Defence and Diplomatic Editor at the Sunday Express. He covers defence and security issues as well as Geopolitics around the world and is particularly interested in recruitment and personnel, Nato, weapons systems and other innovations.

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Wiesław LIZAK

Libya is an Arabic-speaking country and according to most sources it is relatively ethnically homogeneous. Around 86% of the population are Arabs, and 11% of the population are Berber tribes (including Tuaregs inhabiting desert areas).

At the same time, it should be remembered that a large part of the country has Berber roots and the ongoing Arab conquest in the time of the first Muslim caliphs changed its demographic structure in favour of the Arabic-speaking component (both groups make up approximately 97% of the population and the South is also inhabited by the Sub-Saharan Tubu).

However, until today the tribal divisions, characteristic for communities living in this difficult climate, have survived. It is estimated that about 140 tribes and large families with political significance live in Libya.

Considering the relatively short history of the country as an independent geopolitical unit and additionally its creation as a result of external intervention, it is difficult to expect that the Libyans have become a modern, homogeneous nation. On the one hand, belonging to the Arab world and on the other hand, persistent tribal differences, make Libya a specific state where the loyalty to the central government must compete with loyalty to other reference groups created on the basis of tribal identity.

The ethnic differences also overlap with regional differences resulting from the fact that Libya was created as a conglomerate of two provinces which for the past three centuries belonged to one country (the Ottoman Empire) but retained some distinct features.

These differences date back to ancient times. Historically, Tripolitania was a region of the Maghreb countries (today’s Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco), while Cyrenaica was more integrated with the Arab East (Mashrek) in terms of socio-economic factors.

At the time of the Turkish rule in North Africa this was not a problem – both the east and west of today’s Libya were the provinces of the empire.

The relatively large scope of their autonomy made it easier to rule over the vast territory of the country. The Italian intervention, uniting Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, created the premises for full integration of both provinces, but it required time and commitment to promoting modernization processes. Italian rule in Libya, however, lasted only about 30 years and for the greater part of this period the national liberation struggle (led by Umar al-Mukhtar) continued, so unification processes could not proceed effectively.

Of course, this does not change the fact that the epopee of the anti-colonial insurrection was an important factor in building modern identity of contemporary Libyans in its ideological-political layer. The British and French occupation, which lasted for nearly a decade, was of temporary character, so only after gaining independence on December 24, 1951 Libya could launch building a strong state and modern identity.

However, the challenges faced by the authorities were confronted with factors objectively limiting the effectiveness of this process such as the vastness of the territory and the dispersion of the relatively small population, regional differences and low level of development in the social and economic dimension (the oil deposits were not discovered until 1959 and their exploitation began in 1963).

There were also some elements of rivalry between the main centres of both provinces – the capital of Tripoli and Benghazi in eastern Libya which, on the one hand was an expression of historical differences, but on the other hand – of modern aspirations to play the dominant role in the state.

The political dominance of Tripoli was one of the factors driving the mechanism of this rivalry. The Libyan Monarchy tried to use the religious factor to build a new Libyan identity. This factor played an important role, but was only one of many elements shaping social awareness.

Nevertheless, the political role of the Sanusijja brotherhood in the interwar period favoured the use of a religious factor in the process of building the modern national identity.

Entrusting the role of a monarch to the religious leader, Idris I, and the conservatism of the ruling elite around him evoked reluctance and resistance in some social circles impressed by the pan-Arab and socialist ideas which were triumphant at that time thanks to Egypt’s policy and its charismatic leader Gamal Abdel Nasser in the fifties and sixties of the XX century.

The above created the prerequisites of the fall of the monarchy as a result of the coup by the military group of young officers in 1969 and the transformation of the country from autocratic monarchy into an authoritarian regime led by Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi but also – despite the revolutionary rhetoric – based on neo-patrimonial principles referring to local specificity of tribal and rural communities and political patronage.

Libya is a relatively rich country. The main source of Gross Domestic Product is oil, whose vast deposits were discovered in the Libyan Sahara. With the population of several million, it allowed Libya to achieve a high GDP per capita making it one of the richest countries in the African continent.

The geographical proximity made European countries (mainly from Western Europe – Italy, Spain, France, Germany) the main recipients of Libyan energy resources which in turn generates interest in the development of their mutual relations.

As a result of the geopolitical location and energy resources, during the Cold War period Libya became the subject of influences of the Western and Eastern powers which in turn triggered international tensions resulting from the endeavours to gain influence and control of the strategic resources of the country.

This rivalry continued also after the end of the Cold War, although in another geostrategic and economic dimension. Between gaining independence and the military coup organized by Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi on September 1, 1969, Libya remained in the Western powers’ sphere of influence and close relations with the United States resulted in the location on its territory of the largest US military air base on the Mediterranean coast, where about 4 600 American soldiers were stationed (Wheelus Air Base – near Tripoli).

Libya remained in the orbit of Western influence also in the economic dimension (investments in the oil industry). The radicalism of transformations initiated together with the “revolution of September 1” led to the deterioration of relations with the West. The new Libyan authorities with colonel al-Qaddafi in the lead decided to break the existing external connections and took steps to develop an independent development path.

In 1977 al-Qaddafi published the program of political transformation of the country calling it in the ideological dimension the third global theory constituting in fact a mixture of nationalist (with strong references to Pan-Arabism), socialist and populist slogans as well as elements of the Muslim religion.

The program was comprised in the Green Book which, printed in millions of copies and in many languages, was aimed at dissemination in Libya and in the whole world the slogans of the Libyan revolution as the expression of striving for modernization and development based on own resources and own concepts, competitive to the models offered by the developed world.

The wealth coming from the export of crude oil was to be the source of support for ambitious development programs implemented by revolutionary authorities. The anti-Western course in Libya’s foreign policy objectively positioned the country on the side of the Eastern bloc in the Cold War era, nevertheless the radicalism of actions and the high level of assertiveness in Libyan politics made Tripoli a difficult partner for Moscow and its allies.

His unconventional behaviour in foreign policy made the Libyan leader a controversial partner for other actors, building a wall of reluctance around him and inducing readiness to engage in attempts to eliminate the politician who does not avoid actions negatively evaluated from the point of view of the stability of the international order.

Libya has been among others sanctioned by the UN Security Council for more than 10 years for supporting international terrorism (after accusations of organizing the attack on an American plane of the Pan Am Airways on December 21, 1988 over the Scottish city of Lockerbie, which resulted in the death of 259 passengers and crew members as well as city residents).

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Wiesław Lizak – University of Warsaw

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Canan Atilgan / Veronika Ertl / Simon Engelkes

A Country of Regional Contrasts

The country’s social divide is crucially important for understanding the political fragmentation in Libya. The east, Cyrenaica, is dominated by tribal groups with links to Egypt and is characterised by a social and religious population that tends to be more conservative.

The west, Tripolitania, is more cosmopolitan and oriented towards the Mediterranean. The south, Fessan, is Libya’s sparsely populated hinterland, inhabited by Tuareg and Tubu people who today fight for control of the lucrative border trade, the oil fields and military facilities.

Long before the start of the civil war, the depoliticising of public life in Gaddafi’s Jamahiriya triggered a strengthening of the tribal structures in the regions. The power vacuum after the end of the revolution further encouraged the rise of armed tribal groups and local militias.

In addition to the historical territorial partitioning of Libya, geographical divisions are based in particular on the distribution of national oil reserves. The majority of the oil reserves are located in the “oil crescent”, which stretches from Ras Lanuf in the east through the central-northern city of Sirte to Jufra in the south. Irrespective of this, for decades the revenue from the oil sector flowed to Tripoli, thereby giving rise to the sentiment in the east and south of being cheated out of their legitimate income. Since the oil sector makes up around 97 per cent of the Libyan state revenue, control of oil exports represents an important strategic variable for the future of Libya and the influence of various groups.

In the negotiations and implementation of the LPA, it is predominantly the divisions between east and west that play a central role. The rejection of the agreement by important factions and key protagonists from the east can therefore in large parts be attributed to the perception of a power imbalance in the negotiations and the structure of the newly created system in favour of western forces. Because of this, instead of working to establish peace in Libya within the framework of the LPA, General Haftar and his allies tried to cement their position of power in the east and expand their territorial control, in part by co-opting militias and replacing elected communal councils with military governors.

The takeover of the strategic oil crescent in autumn 2016 is a clear example of these ambitions, and an important means of political leverage against the GNA.

The Effects of a Lack of State Structures on Regional Security

The context of a lack of state structures offers a fertile breeding ground, especially for the proliferation of extremist groups and, in connection with the country’s uncontrolled and porous borders, for increased and irregular migration flows. The consequences of these dynamics in the form of escalating instability therefore constitute a huge challenge for the future of Libya, but also for regional and international stability. State Without Borders Libya is traditionally a country of migration and, prior to the revolution, accommodated an estimated two to three million legal immigrant

workers from neighbouring countries and the wider continent of Africa.11 Irregular migration, albeit at a much lower level than at present, was regulated under Gaddafi by a system of selective allocation of unofficial control over border sections and smuggling routes. Following the revolution, these agreements were rendered void and the increasing destabilisation of the country contributed to the rise in the number of irregular migrant flows to and through Libya, as well as to a rapid expansion and professionalisation of smuggling, which had suddenly become deregulated.

Accordingly, 95 per cent of the 85,183 people who reached Italy between January and June 2017 via the central Mediterranean route had set out from Libya.12 In addition to the vacuum of state control in Libya, the aggravated conditions on the eastern and western Mediterranean routes put the country at the centre of migration flows in the Mediterranean area.

While UNHCR data speaks of approximately 40,000 people registered in Libya (asylum seekers and refugees), the actual figure is estimated to be considerably higher at between 700,000 and one million people. In the present situation, neither the GNA nor other state or non-governmental groups have the capacity to effectively put a halt to smuggling activities. Both the 1,770 kilometers long Libyan coast, as well as the 4,348 kilometers

long land borders with neighbouring countries remain porous. A higher concentration of smuggling activities are evident in the south of the country, where there is a lack of state control and alternative economic activities. Therefore, the southern borders and coastal regions in the west of the country form an easy point of departure for smugglers due to the collapse of the former security structures and the GNA’s lack of capacities. Since the revolution, this has become a hotbed for smuggling networks to expand, for whom control of this increasingly important economic sector means not only resources, but also securing territorial zones of influence as well as consolidating influence in this volatile power structure.

After the fall of Gaddafi, irregular migration to and through Libya grew enormously.

At the end of 2016, the EU and UN began to train the Libyan coast guard in carrying out rescue missions, combatting smugglers and upholding human rights; and provided them with the equipment to do so.14 What is problematic, however, is that the Libyan coast guard has emerged from revolutionary militias from the Libyan civil war and has no professional staff. According to a UN report, in some cases the units themselves are involved in criminal smuggling schemes.

In July 2017, the number of migrants reaching Italy from Libya fell by half to 11,459 people and, in August, this figure fell again by approximately 80 per cent. The causes for this dramatic decline are not clearly identifiable. According to various press reports and expert opinions, the expansion of the activities of the Libyan coast guard and their approach against the search and rescue missions of humanitarian aid organisations might have led to this.

The withdrawal of international aid organisations has, however, resulted in the operations in Libyan waters becoming even less transparent to observers. International observers and experts accuse the Italian government of supporting an agreement between the GNA and militias that allows for some armed groups to be financed so as to avoid further crossings, and to already intervene on the mainland. Therefore, this decrease appears to be merely linked to the interception of migrants.

This does not, however, provide a sustainable solution; and may have the opposite effect with the emergence of alternative migration routes. A challenge of particular urgency is the precarious legal and humanitarian situation of migrants in Libya, which has been documented and criticised time and again by reports from international organisations.

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Dr. Canan Atilgan is Head of the Regional Programme for Political Dialogue Southern Mediterranean of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung based in Tunis, Tunisia.

Veronika Ertl is Research Associate at the Regional Programme for Political Dialogue Southern Mediter-ranean of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung based in Tunis, Tunisia.

Simon Engelkes is Project Coordinator at the Regional Programme for Political Dialogue Southern Mediterranean of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung based in Tunis, Tunisia.

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Thousands of Russian fighters are flooding into Libya, raising concerns over what the Kremlin might be planning

Russia has been bolstering its military presence in Libya for the past few months, according to a joint investigation from the independent outlet Verstka and the All Eyes on Wagner project. Libya has been mired in civil war since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, and Russia has long been accused of meddling in the conflict.

Now, the Kremlin appears to be shipping more military equipment to Libya and the surrounding region and redeploying regular troops disguised as mercenaries, along with recruits from Wagner Group’s Africa operations.

‘Tectonic shifts’

In the past three months, Russia has begun actively transferring military personnel and mercenaries to Libya, according to Verstka’s findings. These forces are primarily concentrated in eastern Libya, a region under the control of Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the Libyan National Army and a Kremlin ally. (The western part of the country, including the capital, Tripoli, is governed by the U.N.-recognized Government of National Accord.)

A source within a Libyan security agency reported that at least 1,800 Russian military personnel have arrived in the country in the last two weeks alone. Some were dispatched to Niger, while others remain in Libya awaiting further orders.

One serviceman told journalists that he and several hundred other special forces soldiers were redeployed from Ukraine at the beginning of the year. Several thousand more fighters — both professional soldiers and mercenaries from Wagner Group’s Africa operations — arrived in Libya between February and April. In conversations with journalists, the soldiers themselves acknowledged that their presence in Libya is unofficial. They said that they’re there as part of a private military company, though they didn’t specify which one.

Russian military personnel and equipment have been spotted in at least 10 locations in eastern Libya since the beginning of March. Russian troops are stationed around major military bases, such as Al Jufra Air Base and Ghardabiya Air Base, as well as near smaller ones by Waddan and Marj.

Sources say that some of the newly arrived Russian military personnel are involved in training local soldiers and new recruits from private military companies. Others are carrying out combat missions, such as securing the transport of military equipment.

“There’s never been such a fuss; tectonic shifts are happening here,” one Russian soldier in Libya commented. “I think a big mess is brewing.”

Following the breadcrumbs

Location data from Telegram users show an increase in activity around military sites in Libya. On March 5, a Russian soldier with the username “Andrey” showed up near the Ghardabiya Air Base near Sirte. A few months before, “Andrey” was in Mulino — a city in Russia’s Nizhny Novgorod region where soldiers are being trained for combat in Ukraine. Nearly two weeks after “Andrey” appeared at Ghardabiya Air Base, the Libyan National Army conducted military exercises there.

Soon after, another group of Russian soldiers was spotted in Marj, Libya. On March 17, photos of them were posted on Libyan social media; Verstka and its investigative partners were able to geolocate these photos by comparing the buildings and structures in them with satellite images.

In early May, geolocation data confirmed the presence of two Russian soldiers in Jufra. One of them was the same “Andrey” who’d been at the Ghardabiya Air Base in March. He stayed there until at least April, then moved to Jufra by May.

The second soldier in Jufra was 26-year-old Pavel Vavilov from Russia’s Vladimir region. It’s likely that Vavilov entered the military recently: leaked data shows he worked as a security guard in 2020, and before that, as a taxi driver. He’s faced various legal issues, including a theft conviction. Another Telegram account linked to Vavilov shows a car with a license plate from the self-proclaimed “Luhansk People’s Republic” in the profile picture.

In recent weeks, there’s been a notable increase in shipments of Russian weapons and transport vehicles from Syria to Libya. In photos published on March 30 by the Russian pro-war Telegram channel Military Informant, several Russian Tigr armored personnel carriers can be seen being used in Libyan National Army exercises. Judging by the unit insignia on the front doors, they were delivered to the Libyan National Army’s 106th Brigade.

The channel also released video footage of the exercises. After comparing the terrain, buildings, and landmarks seen in the video to satellite images, Verstka and its investigative partners determined that the footage was shot between Al Jufra Air Base and the town of Waddan.

Russia is shipping a large amount of military equipment to Libya by sea. A source told Verstka that he had personally escorted equipment from a “military port” to various “military bases.” In some cases, the equipment comes to Libya via Syria’s Tartus port. For instance, on April 2, two Russian landing ships — the Alexander Otrakovsky and the Ivan Gren — were spotted in Tartus.

On April 6, the same ships were off the coast of Crete, and on April 8, they arrived at the Port of Tobruk in Libya. These vessels were transporting vehicles and weaponry; one item in the shipment resembled a Soviet-era 2S12 “Sani” heavy mortar system. According to open-source investigators, this marked the fifth such shipment in the last six weeks. Satellite imagery shows that since then, the ships have continued to make trips back and forth.

Jalel Harchaoui, a Libya expert at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) think tank, drew attention to the fact that Russian military personnel are being redeployed to the Brak al-Shati base in Libya. According to him, the number of Russian-speaking personnel at the base has increased by about 25 percent in recent weeks.

Back in March 2024, investigators from the All Eyes on Wagner project didn’t find any Russian Telegram accounts at the base. However, the situation has changed in the last few weeks. For example, in early May, an account registered to a Russian number was discovered near the base. The user, 28-year-old Russian Maxim Kukol, doesn’t appear to have been connected to the military before 2021. But there’s no public record of his employment after this. However, by 2022, his debts had been cleared.

Geolocation data also shows a steady stream of Russian military personnel arriving at the Tartus port in Syria, which has become a kind of redistribution hub for military resources. Among them is 19-year-old Navy serviceman Anton Zaikin, who was stationed in Baltiysk, in Russia’s Kaliningrad region, in early 2024. By early May, he had relocated to Syria.

A strategic move

Turkey, the U.S., and other countries have repeatedly accused Russia of interfering in the Libyan conflict, including through the use of Wagner Group mercenaries. Journalistic investigations have confirmed that Russian mercenaries have been present in Libya since at least 2019, and experts say the Kremlin has been supporting Khalifa Haftar since around 2018.

In 2023, Russian officials and Haftar held their first public negotiations since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In August, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov met with him in Libya, and in September, Haftar met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow. Following this, there were multiple media reports of Kremlin plans to build a Russian naval base in Tobruk, Libya (where Russian military cargo arrives from Syria).

In January 2024, shortly before Russia began sending large numbers of troops to the region, Yevkurov visited Libya again. He met with Haftar in Benghazi; Verstka’s sources say that a new Russian military training base is already operating not far from this city. According to Verstka and All Eyes on Wagner’s sources, the Russian contingent in Libya is controlled by four commanders who were previously in Syria. They, in turn, report to Yevkurov.

“I think the Russians are betting on a war inside Tripoli among the militias, so they’re going to shift gears,” said one military source. Another source suggested that the current influx of Russian equipment and the repositioning of troops are intended to supplant Wagner Group forces in Libya and pave the way for further deployments to other African countries.

RUSI’s Jalel Harchaoui noted that an increased presence in Libya aligns with many of Russia’s strategic regional interests. “Libya offers extremely valuable access to the Mediterranean Sea, acts as a southern flank to exert pressure on NATO and the E.U., and strengthens dialogue with other key Arab countries,” he explained. “Importantly, it also serves as a gateway to Sub-Saharan African countries, offering a strategic route to countries like Sudan, Niger, and beyond.”

According to him, cooperating with the Haftar family allows the Kremlin to achieve these goals while minimizing costs. “Roughly speaking, the Haftar family rewards Moscow materially and financially for doing things that are already in its interest,” Harchaoui believes.

The increased military activity in the region may also have something to do with increased pressure for Libya to hold elections. While there have been several attempts to hold elections, plans have often been delayed or disrupted due to escalations in the military conflict. The U.N. has urgently called for elections to be held to prevent the country from sliding further into war.

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Wiesław LIZAK

Abstract

The developments of the Arab Spring of 2011 extended, among others, to Libya. As a consequence of the armed anti-government uprising supported militarily by the air forces of the Western powers (under the auspices of NATO), the regime of Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi, who has controlled the state since the 1969 military coup, was overthrown.

The collapse of the current regime has initiated the path to the social, political and economic transformation of the Libyan state. However, the rivalry of local political forces which is a reflection of tribal, regional and ideological divisions, prevented the emergence of an effective political system.

As a result, Libya has evolved into a dysfunctional state and the processes of internal destabilization and lack of state borders control generate threats also for the international environment of the country (West Africa, East Africa, Europe).

The developments of the so-called Arab Spring have brought significant political changes to many countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Despite the expectations of democratization and socio-economic reforms, as a consequence of the mass anti-government insurgences, in most countries affected by this process their effects proved to be far from expected.

The social energy released in the process of contesting the existing political order turned out to be insufficient to give to the processes of changes following the fall of political regimes the political vectors aimed at increasing political liberties and economic freedom.

Apart from Tunisia, where the transformation of 2011 has so far resulted in the democratization of the system and the liberalization of political life, in other states where previous regimes have been subjected to contestation the authoritarian regime has been restored (Egypt) or anarchization of the political system lead to the civil war and/or dysfunctionality of the state.

Libya constitutes an example of such developments, as following the overthrow of Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi’s regime it failed to create stable structures of political power and the country gradually plunged into conflict fuelled both by internal contradictions underlying the rivalry of various political-military forces and external influences of regional and non-regional actors pursuing their own strategic interests in this part of the world.

Prerequisites Of Libya’s Dysfunctionality

Libya has the location of strategic importance – located in the northern part of the African continent at the Mediterranean Sea, it has a relatively long coastline (1775 km), which both in the past and today has attracted the interest of the superpowers seeking to control the Mediterranean Sea and adjoining areas.

The mild Mediterranean climate and good conditions for colonization in the coastal area since antiquity attracted consecutive waves of conquerors and settlers – from the Phoenicians, Greeks and Romans, through Arabs and Turks, to the Italians in the modern era.

Libya, however, was not a separate geopolitical entity in the past but rather constituted the part of larger empires that extended their rule over the neighbouring territories. The name of the country comes from the ancient inhabitants of this land, referred to by the Greek with the term Libue (Libyans) – they were a part of the Berber communities inhabiting North Africa since prehistoric times.

The inhabitants of this land were also called similarly by ancient Egyptians and Romans. The name ‘Libya’ appeared in contemporary times on the world map only in the twentieth century along with the change of the legal status of these territories.

In 1912, as a result of the Italian-Turkish war (1911-1912), two coastal provinces of the Ottoman Empire – Tripolitania (western part of the country) and Cyrenaica (eastern part) – were united within the new territorial unit becoming Italian colony. The third province of the country became, Saharan and almost uninhabited, Fezzan.

Officially, since 1934, these three territories were united within one geopolitical entity called Libya, although the name itself had appeared in the area before. De facto (along with the transformation of Morocco into a French and Spanish protectorate in the same year), this ended the process of dividing Africa by the European colonial powers.

The establishment of Italian domination over Libya became an impulse for the birth of the resistance movement. For more than twenty years (until 1935) the struggle for the liberation of the country from the colonial system (mainly in the area of Cyrenaica) was conducted by the partisans (mujahedin) under the command of Umar al-Mukhtar, who – after being captured in combat and sentenced by Italians to death in 1931 – became a national hero and a symbol of the national liberation struggle.

Libya remained under the Italian administration until 1943 when it was taken over by British troops as a result of the wartime allied offensive. Formally, the authorities in Rome waived all claims to this territory in the peace treaty concluded with the victorious allied states in 1947.

During the transition period the administration over the country was held by Great Britain (provinces of Tripoli and Cyrenaica) and France (south-western province of Fezzan). At the same time, it was a period of activation of local political forces striving for the political emancipation of the country.

The question of the future of Libya was the subject of negotiations of the victorious Allied Powers. In the absence of an agreement among them regarding the future international legal status (in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, territories detached from the defeated countries should be included in the UN trust system) ultimately it was decided to grant Libya full independence. Finally, on December 24, 1951 Libya was proclaimed an independent state as a monarchy. Its first (and as it later turned out also the last) ruler was King Idris I (As-Sajjid Muhammad Idris al-Mahdi asSanusi).

He originated from the religious-social movement with Sufi tint called Sanusijja, whose founder (in the 1830s) was the grandfather of the future ruler, Muhammad Ibn Ali as-Sanusi. This movement played a very important role in the history of the country, being one of the birth factors of local nationalism with a strong anti-colonial tinge and the later ruler, Idris, was a de facto inter-war period (while in emigration in Egypt) ideological political leader of the anti-colonial insurrection (Umar al-Mukhtar was the military leader of Sanusijja).

Libya is a country with large territory (about 1.75 million square kilometres) but the vast majority of its area is a desert (about 93% of the area). Only the coastal areas of Libya ensure convenient conditions for their inhabitants. The Mediterranean climate and soils, suitable in some areas for the development of agriculture, make the vast majority of the 6.5 million citizens of the country live there.

The dry tropical climate in the interior entails extreme temperatures.10 Desert areas are characterized by permanent water deficit but also in coastal areas the amount of water available for economic purposes is limited (a characteristic feature of the landscape of these area is the lack of permanent rivers).

In Libya, however, there are huge reservoirs of underground water (in the area of the Sahara) which constitute about 70% of the country’s water resources and are exploited for the needs of coastal cities by supplying them through the water supply system. Unpopulated and inhospitable areas of the interior were in the past and are now a difficult place to control and, as a result, may constitute a shelter for various forces contesting the existing political order.

In the absence of effective central authority this factor becomes even more important. At the same time, communication routes leading to the Sub-Saharan Africa countries go through the interior.

Their control is therefore of strategic importance for the stability of the entire region, especially the areas neighbouring Libya in the south and south-east (Sudan, Chad, Niger – these countries are perceived as highly unstable).

To some extent, this also applies to the eastern and western neighbours of the country – Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria.12 These Arabic-speaking countries lie in similar geographical latitudes, which makes them similar in terms of climatic and landscape factors and makes their borders (especially in the Sahara) difficult to control and thus easy to penetrate (in all directions).

The abovementioned feature of the borders in the region has become even more meaningful in connection with the rapid development of means of communication in the twentieth century.

***

Wiesław Lizak – University of Warsaw

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Canan Atilgan / Veronika Ertl / Simon Engelkes

Ex-U.S. President Barack Obama once described the United States’ and its allies’ lack of success in ensuring stability in Libya following the fall of the Gaddafi regime as one of the biggest failings of his time in office. Indeed, the country is sinking ever deeper into chaos.

Now, the action plan by Ghassan Salamé, the United Nations’ new Special Representative for Libya, is expected to revive the peace process. If this does not succeed, the security situation risks escalating further – with far-reaching consequences both for neighbouring countries and Europe.

Introduction

Six years after the former Libyan ruler Muammar al-Gaddafi was overthrown, hopes of democracy, stability and growth in Libya have not come to fruition.

The country is descending into chaos. Politically and territorially fragmented, with a plethora of rival state-run and non-gov-ernmental actors and alliances, porous borders and little prospect of imminent stabilisation, Libya represents a security threat for its neighbouring countries, the wider Mediterranean region and Europe.

The UN-led peace process, which resulted in the Government of National Accord (GNA) in December 2015 under Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, has so far been unable either to consolidate its control over Libyan state territory, or to make noticeable improvements to the living conditions of the Libyan people.

Furthermore, the government’s authority is openly contested by both of the other self-proclaimed parliaments in Libya – the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk in the east of the country and the General National Congress (GNC) in Tripoli – as well as by a number of non-governmental armed factions. De facto, there is no government that controls the whole of the Libyan territory.

In the absence of a united national army, various actors are competing for power and resources. Armed factions are gaining a foothold at the local level. In many cases, this is accompanied by control over illegal economic activities, especially the smuggling of goods and people.

This all creates a situation that offers room for manoeuvre for extremist organisations too, such as the group known as Islamic State (IS). These organisations recognise and exploit the national power vacuum as a convenient opportunity to expand their activities and even local territorial control in Libya.

Political and Territorial Fragmentation

Looking Back: Revolution and Civil War

In contrast to the rebellions in the neighbouring countries of Tunisia and Egypt, the 2011 protests in Libya escalated within the space of a few days and developed into an armed conflict between the forces loyal to the regime and those rebelling against it. The overthrow of the Gaddafi regime, which was accelerated by the support of the international powers, gave the loose consortia of rebels no opportunity to develop their organisational structure or a programme for the future of Libya and the transition process.

The absence of influential, political and civil society leaders who could have filled the power vacuum after the fall of Gaddafi, contributed to the chaos following the revolution.

The government elected in 2012, the GNC, likewise failed to stabilise the security situation. Instead, the armed groups were integrated into a form of parallel security sector and from that point on received salaries from the state to prevent an escalation of the security situation. To date, none of the three Libyan governments has succeeded in curbing the influence of these informal armed groups and transferring control to a state-controlled security unit.

Libya does not have a unified, nationally controlled army.

Nonetheless, further escalation of the simmering conflicts was prevented until 2014. The fragile stability ended with the parliamentary elections in June 2014, which, marked by violence and low voter turnout, meant a clear defeat for the Islamist forces and which were subsequently annulled.

The elections took place in the context of the simmering conflict between General Khalifa Haftar’s groups from the east, consolidated under Operation Dignity, and the Libya Dawn coalition from the west formed as a counter-response. The confrontation culminated in a civil war that claimed thousands of victims, turned almost half a million people into internally displaced persons and brought the country’s economy to a virtual standstill.

After the defeat of the Operation Dignity coalition around the strategically important airport in Tripoli, the elected parliament, the HoR, moved back to the eastern city of Tobruk. Meanwhile, the GNC reconstituted itself as a rival government in Tripoli.

“Libyan Political Agreement” and Perspectives

The negotiations in favour of a political agreement for the creation of a unity government that would end the conflict between the rival parliaments began in January 2015 under the direction of the UN. This government was set up to guarantee the drafting of a new constitution and the holding of elections; and to act as a trusted partner in the fight against IS.

The process resulted in the signing of the “Libyan Political Agreement” (LPA), which envisaged the creation of a Presidential Council that would assume the formation of a Government of National Accord and, until then, would replace the existing governments. The intention was to involve members of the Tripoli based GNC in a newly created advisory institution: the High Council of State. The HoR in Tobruk was to remain in existence as the single national parliament.

A binding Cabinet agreement by a parliamentary vote of confidence was determined in order to secure democratic legitimacy for the new government. However, some central questions remain unanswered, especially as regards the regional balance of power and the configuration of the security sector.

Due to the ongoing deterioration of the economic and security situation, the danger posed by the spread of IS as well as international pressure on account of increased migration flows, a speedy signing was ultimately preferred to further negotiations. In the following months, these unresolved questions led to a loss of legitimacy of the Presidential Council and the newly formed government.

To date, the HoR has not given the vote of confidence necessary for legitimising the new government. Both General Haftar and the GNC withdrew their support for the GNA unity government, established themselves as rival governments in Tobruk and Tripoli respectively, and consolidated their respective power bases through military initiatives by loyal, armed groups.

Meanwhile, the new government also lost public support in the face of the worsening living conditions in the country. According to UN estimates, 1.3 million people, a fifth of the Libyan population, are dependent on humanitarian aid, while the number of internally displaced persons is rising. Ongoing displacement, a collapse of the markets, and plummeting production have made the food shortage more acute; and electricity and water are also only available in limited quantities across the country.

Additionally, the healthcare system has collapsed: 60 per cent of the infrastructure functions only in part or not at all and there is a lack of medicine and clinical equipment. The public administration has almost completely crumbled and the banks experience a shortage of cash. Due to the unstable security situation, most humanitarian organisations are forced to operate from the neighbouring country of Tunisia and aid services often do not reach all those affected. These daily challenges fuel the conflict further.

More than one and a half years after the signing of the LPA, the implementation of the “Political Agreement” appears to be infeasible in its current form. Renegotiations of the key elements with the involvement of those actors who have so far been neglected, seem unavoidable in order to overcome the political blockade and prevent further escalation of the conflict.

This realisation has sparked a new willingness to negotiate.6 To the surprise of many international observers, a meeting between the GNA Prime Minister al-Sarraj and General Haftar on 25 July 2017 brought about an agreement to hold a ceasefire, as well as parliamentary and presidential elections at the start of 2018.

It is assumed that a structural change to the Presidential Council underlies the agreement, which would reduce the institution to three members and secure Haftar a central role in Libya’s political system along with al-Sarraj and HoR President Agila Saleh.

At the end of September 2017, the new UN Special Representative for Libya, Ghassan Salamé, presented a new action plan for reviving the peace process. The plan envisages a revision of the “Libyan Political Agreement” by a committee, before a national Libyan conference votes on the individuals responsible for the new executive.

The conference under the direction of the UN Secretary-General will aim to bring all previously excluded or under-represented stakeholders to the table. Members of the High State Council and Islamist-spectrum militias allied with the GNA had feared marginalisation within the framework of a renegotiated LPA. It now remains to be seen how successful the renegotiation of the balance of power in Libya will be.

***

Dr. Canan Atilgan is Head of the Regional Programme for Political Dialogue Southern Mediterranean of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung based in Tunis, Tunisia.

Veronika Ertl is Research Associate at the Regional Programme for Political Dialogue Southern Mediter-ranean of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung based in Tunis, Tunisia.

Simon Engelkes is Project Coordinator at the Regional Programme for Political Dialogue Southern Mediterranean of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung based in Tunis, Tunisia.

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Deliveries of military equipment to the port of Tobruk

The delivery of military equipment and vehicles from Syria to Libya was the most visible aspect of the increased Russian involvement in Libya observed over the past few weeks. 

The port of Tartus in Syria was the point of departure for Russian military vessels used to deliver military equipment to Libya. This port has already been used in the past for Russian deliveries of wheat and military equipment, and as a departure point for Russian ships operating in the Mediterranean Sea.

Two Russian vessels were spotted in the port of Tartus on 02nd April 2024. The vessels, Ropucha class landing ship LSS Aleksandr Otrakovsky and Ivan Gren, were later spotted off the Cretan coastline on 06th April.

The Aleksandr Otrakovsky is a large landing vessel that redeployed from the North Sea to the Mediterranean in late 2023.

One of the two Russian military vessels was filmed by Libyan media in the port of Tobruk, confirming the Russian presence on April 08, 2024.

This latest delivery oft was reported by some sources as the fifth delivery of Russian equipment to Tobruk over the last 45 days. The equipment delivered includes vehicles and weapons, such as 2S12 Sani mortars or BTR and BM APCs.

Kremlin interests in Libya and North Africa 

Since the death of Prigozhin in August 2023, the Russian Ministry of Defense has relaunched discussions with Libya and Marshal Haftar. The Russian Defense Ministry delegation led by Yunus Bek Yevkurov has visited Libya four times since August 2022 and was seen by commentators as a major new boost for Russian engagement in the country.

Marshal Haftar was also invited to Moscow in September 2023 after being considered « an imperfect and outmatched military leader » by Russian private agents in Libya in 2020. It appears Russia has changed its mind and is here to stay and extend with a navy base on the Mediterranean Sea. 

For Jalel Harchaoui, the Kremlin’s objective in Libya is clear: “Libya offers ultra-valuable access to the Mediterranean, serves as a southern flank to pressure NATO and the EU, and enhances dialogue with other key Arab countries. Importantly, it also acts as a passageway into Sub-Saharan Africa, offering a strategic path into countries like Sudan, Niger, and beyond. Thus, Libya holds crucial strategic value for Russia, and the Haftar family’s cooperation allows Russia to secure these objectives while minimising costs. Said crudely, on a material and pecuniary level, the Haftar family rewards Moscow for doing exactly what Moscow wants to do anyway. In all cases, Russia has been in the process of becoming as strong as possible on Libyan soil, knowing that that strength will have several uses”.

Not only is Russia intensifying its military activities in the East of Libya but also its diplomatic activities in the West. Since 2023, Russia has aimed to reopen a consulate in Benghazi and an embassy in Tripoli.

The new ambassador, Aidar Aghanin, an Arabic speaker who was director of RT channel in Arabic and served in Jordan, divides his time between the two Libyan cities having established his headquarters at the Radisson hotel in Tripoli.

During the Africa Russia summit in July 2023, the government of Mohammed Yunus Al-Menfi (in charge of Tripoli) was received directly in a bilateral meeting with Vladimir Putin. On May 9 from Moscow while the Haftar clan visited the Russian government, 

Belqacem Haftar, one of Marshal’s sons, declared having met with a Russian diplomat to discuss the unification of the Libyan political factions and resolve the political and military crisis . Other Libyan officials from Tripoli are expected in Russia very soon.

But it’s not just about Libya. The Kremlin has placed seasoned personnel in other neighbouring countries such as Algeria.

On site, Russian interests are represented by Valerian Shuvaev, Arabic-speaking and French-speaking ambassador, who served as number 2 in Yemen, Iraq, Libya and Morocco.

In Morocco, it is Vladimir Baibakov, also Arabic and French-speaking, who was ambassador to Mauritania. Alexandre Zolotov has been Russian ambassador to Tunisia since 2022.

Arabic-speaking and French-speaking, he has been stationed in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Oman. These ambassadors are figures from the Primakov school, a former senior executive of the KGB and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1996 to 1998.

According to a Western diplomatic source, these diplomats and Kremlin representatives are not there by chance: “It’s to be noted that most of the Russian ambassadors managing the Northern African region around Libya are seasoned diplomats with significant experience in the Middle-Eastern countries. Some are even francophones, showing a renewed strategic interest from Russia in this region”.

Another important figure in the Kremlin’s security spheres is in the region: General Serguey Surovikin, the former commander in charge of Russian military operations in Ukraine.

Dismissed from his position for his links with the Wagner group following the death of Evgeny Prigojzhin, he took the post of military representative in Algeria. According to a source who prefers to remain anonymous, Surovikin was regularly in Libya during his year of exile. According to unverified sources, he is currently returning to Russia to be called for more important functions.

With its feet in the Mediterranean waters, the Kremlin takes the lead in a corridor going from North Africa to the borders of the Sahel while reaching their Syrian base. Russia has become the new security partner of a region destabilised by terrorist violence, coups, civil war and illegal immigration.

Can we trust that Russia will effectively manage local instabilities and can we afford to delegate responsibility for security issues at the gates of Europe  to Russia?

Can we also imagine that Russia will not take advantage of the immigration lever (materially or in the information sphere) as we have seen them do on the border with Belarus?

__________________

Even before the death of Prigozhin in a plane crash in Russia on August 23, 2023, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus Bek Yevkurov went to Libya the day before to meet Marshal Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army which controls part of Libyan territory.

Libya, which had been quite neglected by Russia delegating its affairs to Evgeny Prigozhin and some GRU operators, seems to once again become a strategic country for Moscow serving as a link between its expansion in the Sahel and the installation of a Russian naval military base in the Mediterranean.

On site, a source from the Russian Ministry of Defense, from whom we were able to cross-check all the information, told us that he had been to Libya several times before the war in Ukraine. He says there has never been so much noise, tectonic shifts are brewing here. He thinks “great chaos is brewing.”

With Verstka, an independent media, and the support of Radio Svoboda, the Russian service of RFE/RL, we discovered that thousands of Russian Defense Ministry personnel as well as “Wagner” recruits were transferred to Libya since the beginning of the year under the cover of a paramilitary organisation, probably African Corps.

Arrival of thousands of Russian fighters in Libya

According to information obtained by our consortium, Russia has been transferring Russian military and fighters to Libya for the past three months. According to a Libyan security source that we consulted, there are already 1,800 Russian soldiers in the country for the past two weeks.

They are mainly grouped in Eastern Libya, in territories controlled by Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army and its affiliated militias. Some of them were transferred to Niger while others remained in Libya awaiting further instructions, according to the consortium source.

This information is also shared by a Russian Defense Ministry source, who indicates that several hundred members of the special forces were redeployed from Ukraine to Libya at the beginning of the year.

Several thousand professional military personnel and other fighters belonging to the Wagner Group’s « African Directorate » arrived in Libya from February to April. According to the Russian security source, the soldiers are in Libya unofficially and are presented as representatives of a private military company. AEOW believes that it could be the new African Corp brand carried by the GRU Special Actions Service outside Ukraine commanded by General Andrey Averyanov.

According to our consortium sources, part of the Russian military personnel is responsible for the education and training of Libyan fighters and recruits of the “African Directorate”. The other part carries out targeted missions such as the transport of military equipment, said one of the interlocutors at our consortium.

The Russian contingent in Libya would be controlled by four commanders rotating between Syria and Libya. In turn, they would report directly to Yunus-Bek Yevkurov.

Thanks to technical OSINT tools, several individuals of Syrian nationality were also detected among Russian individuals on military bases. The @KHADORA1 account was recently detected at Al Kharoba airport, which has been used to transport equipment by Russian planes since December 2023.

Active military bases

Our sources indicate the presence of this new contingent on several bases affiliated with the LNA: Kharouba/Al Khadim, Jufra, Tobruk, with two further bases in the south. They also mention the existence of a new training camp near Benghazi which we have not been able to identify. Nevertheless, our online research detected a revival of the Russian presence and events in recent months.

Ghardabiya airbase, IVO Syrte

A Russian personnel under the name “Andrei” was identified in direct proximity of the airbase. The appearance of this account correlates with a parade/military exercise held by the Libyan National Army (LNA).

The event was geolocated south of Ghardabiya, at the following coordinates: 30.815761, 16.86251. Using satellite imagery from Sentinel 1, All Eyes on Wagner were able to accurately determine the location where the Pantsir systems were located during the exercise. The small runway is only visible on Sentinel 1 and does not appear on  platforms such as Google Earth.

Al Marj

Pictures of alleged Russian mercenaries visiting a shop in al Marj were released on Libyan social media on 17th March 2024. All Eyes on Wagner confirmed the pictures were taken in al Marj through reverse image and image geolocation techniques.

The pictures were taken on one of the streets of al Marj and the shop identified.

In addition, an account associated with a Russian phone number was located at the al Marj airport. The account appeared in the area in February 2024. We were unable to collect any further information about this account.

Waddan

On 30th March, the Telegram account Milinfolive, associated in the past with the coverage of Russian military and Wagner Group operations in Africa, published several photos of a Libyan National Army (LNA) training exercise.

The vehicles were identified as being the 5-door versions of the Russian made Tiger SBM VPK-233136 Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC).

The unit badge visible on the pictures allowed us to confirm the unit of the LNA to which the vehicles were delivered. The Tiger APCs featured in Milinfo Live’s video were delivered to the LNA’s 106th “Syrte” Brigade, commanded by the son of Marshall Haftar, Saddam Haftar. The brigade had already received TAG Terrier LT79 vehicles in 2019.

Brak Al Shati

According to Jalel Harchaoui, associate fellow at the British think tank Royal United Services Institute, the Brak Al Shati military base has seen its workforce increase by almost 25%. Using various OSINT tools, we were able to confirm the presence of Russian military / former military personnel around Brak al Shati airbase. This presence is relatively new. Previous investigations, as recently as March 2024, had not revealed such presence, suggesting it is quite recent.

One of the detected accounts belongs to a Russian soldier registered under a Russian number under the nickname “Arkan”. The owner of the account is 28-year-old Russian Maxim Kukol. In other users’ phone books he is listed as « Scumbag ».

Until 2021, it had no connection with the military domain according to Russian administrative databases. Kukol lived in Sochi and worked as a security guard, storekeeper, loader and factory worker. In 2022, he lived in Voronezh with no further indication of his profession.

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Hafed Al-Ghwell

Nearly a decade and a half after a supposed “awakening,” Libya is still paralyzed by division, conflict and the pursuit of narrow self-interests by a range of actors disguised as well-intentioned support.

Today, the North African country remains suffocated by quarrelsome rival administrations: the internationally recognized Government of National Unity in Tripoli and the eastern-based Government of National Stability. The last notable effort to bridge this divide culminated in the creation of a joint committee by the House of Representatives and the Government of National Unity-aligned High State Council, which aimed to pave the way for national elections.

Although initial drafts of the electoral legislation were agreed upon and approved, the proposed laws soon became the latest point of contention due to their controversial provisions and technical issues, as identified by both the UN and Libya’s own elections watchdog. Additional amendments only led to further disarray, with the High State Council firmly rejecting the revised legislation and stalling all progress.

The UN Support Mission in Libya, led by Special Envoy Abdoulaye Bathily, found itself yet again in the challenging position of having to mediate a political process among squabbling Libyan institutional stakeholders. Bathily resolved to invite said actors to a series of sit-downs to hash out resolutions to the contested provisions and discuss the possibility of forming a unified government that could oversee progress toward elections.

Inevitably, that initiative also fizzled out, stifled by irreconcilable differences, conflicting conditions and demands from the involved parties, which were keen on hijacking any process threatening their grip on power. It effectively closed the book on the UN mission’s eighth attempt at steering Libya’s ruling elites toward elections and national reconciliation.

Moreover, parallel dialogue initiatives — i.e., a meeting in Cairo under Arab League auspices in March and efforts by the African Union to organize a national reconciliation conference in early February — though aimed at supporting the political process, did not help further the UN Support Mission in Libya’s objectives. Historically, parallel discussions outside of Libya tend to prioritize the elevation of foreign interests and elite bargains among the Libyan actors they support, legitimizing their entrenchment. 

These are just the latest developments that highlight some of the challenges facing the UN mission as it tries to navigate a frustrating stalemate, with outside influences and conflicting internal proposals hindering mediation efforts. Thus, it came as no surprise when Bathily’s next move was simply resigning, becoming the eighth envoy in just 13 years to hang his hat, while Libya remains in limbo.

Bathily’s departure, like those of his predecessors, is a testament not to individual failings but to systemic inadequacy in the UN mission’s design, ambition and capabilities. His departure signals the need for an overdue rethink of the international community’s disappointing approach toward Libya, if the ultimate goal is the realization of a stable and unified state free of corrosive influences.

From its inception, the UN’s Libya mission was kneecapped by a limited mandate — attributed to the international community’s hesitancy and fragmented engagement. Initially given a mere three-month authorization, the mission has ambled along for more than a decade without the assurances of enduring commitments from influential global actors that still demand progress. Despite notable achievements, such as the signing of the Libyan Political Agreement in 2015, the framework has been fundamentally limited by an inability to compel concessions from rival factions or assert significant influence over external parties responsible for Libya’s paralysis.

Critically, the mission has been shackled by the very nature of its creation and the shifting dynamics it was designed to navigate. Rapidly evolving from a need to stabilize post-revolution Libya into addressing deep-seated political divisions and external interference, its mandate has consistently proven ill-suited to the complexities of the Libyan context. It has devolved into merely managing failure, rather than being a well-orchestrated attempt at resurrecting democratic governance in a post-Qaddafi Libya. Its emphasis on mediation and political dialogue, while noble, has failed to account for the leverage that will be necessary to fully enforce ceasefires, manage the transition to governance or curb the influx of arms and mercenaries bolstered by self-interested external meddlers.

The fracturing of the Libyan body politic, with the emergence of dual governments and empowered militias, has posed perhaps the most significant challenge. An enduring stalemate remains underpinned by a lack of consensus on constitutional and electoral frameworks, deepened by the entrenchment of local and international stakeholders in the status quo. These conditions have rendered the UN mission’s efforts to foster reconciliation and pave the way for national elections increasingly quixotic.

Besides, the repeated renewal of its mandate, with only incremental adjustments, reflects a persistent underestimation of the complexity of Libya’s political dynamics and the level of intervention required. This cycle of temporary leadership, envisaged as a bridge to Libyan autonomy, has instead translated into a lack of continuity, authority and, ultimately, effectiveness. 

Addressing the litany of challenges requires a rethinking of the international engagement strategy. Reengaging global actors must revolve around a holistic reimagining of the UN Support Mission in Libya’s mandate, capabilities and goals to align with the current realities of Libyan society and politics. Such a recalibration necessitates an empowering of the mission — or its successor entity — with a robust mandate that includes explicit provisions for security reform, disarmament and the integration of armed factions into a unified national framework.

Moreover, the international community must confront the realities of foreign interference by establishing mechanisms for accountability and enforcement against those who flout sanctions or continue to fuel the conflict. Enhanced coordination and pragmatic engagement with regional actors are crucial to reconciling divergent interests and reining in external influences that are increasingly weaponizing their reach to undermine painstaking dialogue on state-rebuilding.

Finally, the UN mission must evolve to facilitate a genuinely inclusive political process, one that transcends elite negotiations to incorporate a broader spectrum of Libyan society. This involves not only mediating between political factions but also bolstering civil society, local governance and mechanisms for grassroots participation that targets engaging disaffected youths.

The road to a stable, unified Libya is fraught with complexities that have stymied eight UN envoys. It has left even more Libyans convinced that the status quo may just be preferable, rather than an “end state” that the global community cannot properly define. However, what lies ahead requires not the abandonment of international mediation but its reinvention. Acknowledging and adapting to the multidimensional nature of the Libyan crisis, underpinned by a steadfast commitment to Libyan sovereignty and self-determination, is paramount. Only through a concerted, reconfigured approach can the international community hope to catalyze a sustainable resolution to Libya’s turmoil.

***

Hafed Al-Ghwell is a senior fellow and executive director of the North Africa Initiative at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C.

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Nadia Al-Faour

Muammar Qaddafi’s capture and killing by rebel fighters near his hometown of Sirte on Oct. 20, 2011, failed to usher in the era of stability and democracy that Libyans had hoped for when mass protests erupted earlier that year.

Instead, despite the best efforts of the UN Support Mission in Libya, the country remains deeply insecure, divided by two rival administrations, and fragmented among a plethora of armed groups vying for control.

“The fracturing of the Libyan body politic, with the emergence of dual governments and empowered militias, has posed perhaps the most significant challenge,” Hafed Al-Ghwell, a senior fellow and executive director of the North Africa Initiative at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, said in a recent op-ed for Arab News.

“An enduring stalemate remains underpinned by a lack of consensus on constitutional and electoral frameworks, deepened by the entrenchment of local and international stakeholders in the status quo.”

Libya is split between the UN-recognized Government of National Accord of Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah based in Tripoli, which controls barely a third of the country, and the Government of National Stability of Gen. Khalifa Haftar based in Benghazi.

The latest effort to bridge this divide culminated in the creation of a joint committee by the House of Representatives and the Government of National Unity-aligned High State Council, which aimed to pave the way for national elections. These, however, are still yet to take place.

A meeting in Cairo under Arab League auspices in March and efforts by the African Union to organize a national reconciliation conference in early February also did little to help UNSMIL bring about elections and national reconciliation.

“Rapidly evolving from a need to stabilize post-revolution Libya into addressing deep-seated political divisions and external interference, (the UN’s) mandate has consistently proven ill-suited to the complexities of the Libyan context,” said Al-Ghwell.

“It has devolved into merely managing failure, rather than being a well-orchestrated attempt at resurrecting democratic governance in a post-Gaddafi Libya.

“Its emphasis on mediation and political dialogue, while noble, has failed to account for the leverage that will be necessary to fully enforce ceasefires, manage the transition to governance or curb the influx of arms and mercenaries bolstered by self-interested external meddlers.”

On April 16, Senegalese diplomat Abdoulaye Bathily tendered his resignation as the UN’s special envoy for Libya, saying he was unable to support the country’s political transition while its leaders continued to put their own interests above finding a solution.

“Under the circumstances, there is no way the UN can operate successfully. There is no room for a solution in the future,” Bathily said in a statement at the time, announcing the delay of a national reconciliation conference originally scheduled for April 28.

“The selfish resolve of current leaders to maintain the status quo through delaying tactics and maneuvers at the expense of the Libyan people must stop.”

As the country’s finances are split between the two governing powers, which are backed by competing foreign players, the matter of their legitimacy in the eyes of Libyans and the international community remains an issue.

Foreign involvement is arguably the main reason why Libya has been unable to move on and establish a unified, stable administration. By sponsoring their preferred side in the conflict, experts say external actors have periodically added fuel to the fire.

Indeed, experts believe Libya has become little more than a playground for competing foreign interests, with the spoils of war — oil, arms contracts, and strategic influence — up for grabs.

To further these aims, various outside interests have sponsored militias inside Libya, thereby compounding and prolonging the fragmentation of the nation’s security apparatus.

Haftar commands the Libyan Arab Armed Forces, also known as the Libyan National Army. Although multiple armed groups serve under its banner, many operate under their own command structures and engage in their own raids and patrols across eastern Libya.

Meanwhile, in western Libya, prominent militias such as the Stability Support Apparatus, Misrata Counter Terrorism Force, Special Deterrence Forces (known as Radaa), 444 Brigade, 111 Brigade, Nawasi Brigade, and Joint Operations Force engage in their own state-sanctioned activities.

These include intelligence gathering and surveillance, street patrols, border security, and overseeing migrant camps.

“In today’s Libya, armed groups are the only entities capable of projecting power and maintaining territorial control,” Jalel Harchaoui, an associate fellow at the UK-based Royal United Services Institute, told Arab News.

“These groups lack a limpid chain of command and do not always follow the authority of the central state or manage their personnel in a clear and organized manner. They are inherently informal, often flawed, and dysfunctional.

“Despite their shortcomings, they are powerful when it comes to controlling territories and using force.”

Although these armed groups have been tasked with improving the nation’s overall security situation, they frequently clash with one another. This violence has shown little sign of abating, despite international efforts to establish a unified government and security apparatus.

Fifty-five people were killed in August 2023 when Radaa and the 444 Brigade engaged in running street battles in Tripoli. In February this year, at least 10 people, including members of the SSA, were shot dead in the city.

During this year’s Eid Al-Fitr celebrations, clashes broke out in the capital between the SSA and Radaa militias. Although this most recent bout of violence incurred no casualties, it raised fresh concerns about the country’s perilous security situation.

While the humanitarian situation in Libya has somewhat improved since the UN-facilitated ceasefire agreement of October 2020, civilians continue to bear the brunt of political and economic instability.

Militia skirmishes have resulted in the internal displacement of some 135,000 people. Another 300,000 are in need of humanitarian assistance, according to UN reports from 2022.

The dire humanitarian situation was made worse by the devastating storm that pounded the Libyan coast in September last year. Storm Daniel burst two dams in the eastern city of Derna, with the resulting torrent of water flattening everything in its path.

The storm killed at least 5,900 people and displaced more than 44,000, according to the US Agency for International Development.

“Achieving stability in Libya requires a long-term strategy that would take many years and involve significant commitment from key foreign states,” said Harchoui.

“This would demand dedication and the willingness of countries like the US to challenge their regional partners, such as Turkiye, the UAE, and Egypt. It’s a major undertaking by all means.”

The SSA and Radaa are not under the direct authority of Libya’s interior or defense ministries. Nevertheless, they receive public funds and operate independently under a special status granted in 2021 by the prime minister and the presidential council.

Armed groups in Libya are often accused by the UN and human rights groups of committing war crimes with impunity. A report published by the UN last year found that these militias had engaged in murder, rape, arbitrary arrest, and slavery.

A 2023 report by Amnesty International also found that groups like the SSA, LAAF, and several others had committed acts of sexual violence, abductions, mock executions, and had restricted freedom of expression.

Libyan civilians have no power to hold these groups to account — particularly those backed and legitimized by the state.

An initial step toward achieving stability, Harchaoui believes, is recognizing that armed groups have infiltrated government institutions to become integral parts of the Libyan state and are “increasingly involved in corrupt and illegal activities.”

He said: “Tackling corruption should therefore be the initial focus, as this would slow the expansion of armed groups into areas beyond physical security, like government administration, finance, oil, and wealth extraction writ large.

“Once corruption is addressed, further steps can be considered.”

There are, however, multiple factors behind the Libyan military’s inability to rein in the country’s many armed groups.

Chief among these is that Libya’s “political leaders, economic institutions, and foreign states still need the protection of these armed groups for day-to-day operations,” said Harchaoui.

“This protection is needed for activities like oil production, diplomacy, contract signing, and counterterrorism intelligence gathering.”

These operations, he says, allow these groups to become more entrenched and powerful — and, in turn, make it more difficult to reduce their influence.

“This paradox means that continuing to rely on these groups for daily operations only strengthens them, preventing the ultimate goal of replacing them with formal forces some day in the future.”

There were some green shoots of change in July 2023 when the two rival administrations agreed to set up a committee to oversee the sharing of Libya’s significant oil revenues.

In a statement at the time, UNSMIL said it “welcomes the decision announced by the Presidential Council to establish a High Financial Oversight Committee to address fundamental issues of transparency in the spending of public funds and fair distribution of resources.”

Nevertheless, far from emerging from the Qaddafi era with greater openness, economic growth, and productive engagement with the international community, Libya continues to endure lawlessness and institutional collapse, becoming something close to a failed state.

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Federica Saini Fasanotti

The divisions in today’s Libya have deep historical roots, which have left the country without functional institutions. A decentralized, federalist approach could help build stability, but the international community will likely insist on repeating past mistakes.

In a nutshell

• Modern civil conflict in Libya has deep historical roots
• Decentralizing power could allow Libyans to build stronger institutions
• The West seems intent on repeating failed approaches to the conflict

During Italy’s colonization of Libya (1911-1943), fascist colonial police engaged in ruthless counter-guerrilla warfare were struck by how antagonistic the Libyans were against each other. As they reported back to Mussolini: they found Arabs pitted against Berbers, Cyrenaicans against the denizens of Tripoli, and clan against clan in an atavistic struggle for land. In fact, it was the Italians who unified Libya after several military efforts. As I described in 2016:

The Italians occupied the [Sirtic Corridor], an ideal break line, and conquered the oases of al-Jufrah, Zellah, Awjilah, and Gialo, isolated in the Cyrenaic desert more than 150 miles from the Mediterranean Sea. Shortly afterward, three [mobile groups], formed by thousands of Italian soldiers, moved in from Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in a pincer movement. The target: the rebels in the Sirtic Corridor, who also fell. These developments allowed the unification of the two colonies, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, under the leadership of Marshal Pietro Badoglio. This was a major shift: Until that point, Libya had two political governments, two military commands, and two different administrations.

Libya, as we know it today, did not exist a century ago. At that time, the most fundamental identity was not the concept of “nation” but that of “tribe”: Libyans recognized themselves in their tribes and were loyal to them. The Italians understood this fact and used it in their favor, through the classic conqueror strategy of divide and rule.

But it was not only the Italians who leveraged tribal hatreds. Muammar Qaddafi (1942-2011) himself took ample advantage of these divisions during his 42-year-long dictatorship. Qaddafi laid the foundation for what Libya is today: a divided country without functional institutions or a ruling class worthy of the name. Modern politics in Libya is not the art of governing the state for the good of its citizens, but rather the pursuit of privileges. Those who have managed to seize power in the past 13 years – since the outbreak of the rebellion against the Qaddafi regime in the spring of 2011 – have rarely relinquished it.

Since the fall of Qaddafi, there have not been many cases of Libyan leaders cycling out of power, with rare exceptions like Fayez al-Sarraj, the former prime minister of the National Accord Government, who was appointed in 2016 after the United Nations-brokered Skhirat Accords in Morocco and left office in 2021.

Much more common are officials like Aguila Saleh Issa, who has been the Speaker of the House of Representatives in Tobruk since the beginning of the second civil war, immediately after the 2014 Libyan parliamentary elections (the country’s most recent ballot). The dysfunction of a decade-long rule without electoral accountability would be unthinkable in most democratic regimes. However, such elites do not seem to be interested in even trying to build consensus in a badly divided polity.

A neo-medieval system

This state of affairs is the result of an anti-modern way of governing that goes far back, even before the emergence of state sovereignty as a concept. In 1977, Australian professor Hedley Bull wrote in his canonical The Anarchical Society about a hypothetical weakening of the sovereign state that would eventually overcome the existing system. He presented many scenarios, but one still seems particularly appropriate in the case of Libya: “neo-medievalism,” a modern variant of the medieval political organization.

In a neo-medieval system, the notion of sovereignty – the supreme power over a given territory and its inhabitants – evaporates, giving way to an agglomeration of overlapping powers in which none can achieve exclusive obedience from its citizens. In this proto-state, there are no functioning institutions. War is no longer understood as occurring between states. It takes place between groups within former state boundaries so that violence becomes a daily constant.

In the mutation of today’s Libya, different centers of power have emerged: Tripoli, Benghazi, Tobruk, Misrata, Sirte, Sabha, Murzuq, Zintan and beyond. The management of power has further fragmented in the hands of different armed groups who can exert violence, substituting a monopoly of force with an oligopoly of force.

In the face of this now institutionalized “genetic mutation,” it is clear that democratization by imitating other successful examples cannot work. Democracy is not an exportable facility. Libya is still at a proto-state level, with the requisite institutions either nonexistent (like a unitary government), fragile (like the High Council of State), or hegemonic, in the sense that they are left unchecked by counter-balancing institutions (like the central bank). It matters little on this score that Libya enjoys oil riches – that is nothing but a driver for further conflict. The events of the past 13 years have only reinforced this thesis.

Repeating the same mistakes

Immediately after Qaddafi’s overthrow, the UN established a dedicated support mission in Libya, UNSMIL. Despite a rotating cast of special envoys, this mission is nowhere near succeeding in its primary goal: to set the country up for elections and then for healthy governance. This has been the mantra for all these years, touted at numerous international conferences on Libya. But, as a keen observer of the country, Libyan-American scholar Hafed al-Ghwell, has recently noted:

Doomed to fail before it even began, we are seeing a recurrent pattern of failure that betrays a stubborn reality: conventional diplomacy is ill-suited for the complexities of Libyan politics. Influential actors still refuse to confront the uncomfortable truth that repeated interventions have yet to materially shift Libya’s political elites and institutional stakeholders toward the reconciliation that the country so desperately needs.

Indeed, everyone involved in the Libyan affair has tried to put their own signature on the project, which has only served to diminish the authority of the UN mission. For example, in July 2017, a meeting was held in Paris between the then leaders of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, Prime Minister of the Government of National Accord Fayez al-Sarraj and Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. The two signed onto 10 principles, including a ceasefire, the establishment of a regular army and the preparations for an election that Mr. al-Sarraj had sought to hold in March 2018.

While French President Emmanuel Macron claimed this as a diplomatic achievement, it was no such thing. Internal tensions continued to escalate, especially in the Libyan capital. When the French leader decided to hold a second conference in May 2018, all hell broke loose in Tripoli that summer due to the dissatisfaction of militia cartels that had not been called to the negotiating table.

A missing constitutional foundation

Over the years, I have written extensively about why elections are not the solution in Libya unless the proper constitutional ground is prepared for them to work, and unless there is an outside force to prevent elections from becoming an occasion for civil war, like the one that erupted in Libya in the summer of 2014 (and continued until 2020).

As the analyst Ferhat Polat has recently written:

[F]or Libya to conduct successful and legitimate elections, the rival factions must agree on a constitutional framework well in advance. Creating a new constitution should outline the governance structure, define the roles and powers of the central authority, and establish clear rules for presidential, parliamentary, and electoral processes.

At the moment, not only has this not been done, but it is likely that highly polarizing figures will run for president in any elections that are held (as has happened before). There is no clear political agenda, as there was none in 2021, weeks before the election deadline.

In February 2017, I argued:

Libya is still too immature, politically, to overcome the atavistic divisions among the people and tribes of what once were known as the historical regions of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan. These divisions have impeded real leadership – in its absence, the international community must come in to help Libyans build from the bottom, in small steps. Rather than funnel money to militias, international actors should help fund roads, power plants, refineries, hospitals, and, above all, schools. Qaddafi purposely under-invested in developing Libyans’ minds and professional skills – instead of sending military advisers, international actors should support Libyans’ efforts to build a civil service. The Turks, Italians and Qaddafi always used violence and an iron fist. That never truly succeeded, and to overcome this impasse now, a change of course is needed.

I have not changed my mind since then.

Scenarios

Most likely: The UN persists in the elections dream

The most plausible outcome is that the UN will stubbornly continue to force the issue of elections using current systems and approaches – ones that have so far not been successful. While elections could eventually be held, even successfully, they will not guarantee peace or stability. Without robust institutions, Libya will continue to flounder in conflict.

This will have dire consequences, with elites squandering more international aid and the future of the Libyan people. Though rich in oil, Libya will not be stable enough for the industry to benefit its people any time in the foreseeable future. Countries in the region will worry about the instability spilling over into their own territories and could decide to get involved, potentially intensifying and extending the state of conflict.

Less likely: A new federalist approach

Though it would be operationally complex, it is not too late to institute a system of decentralization that would keep rival groups in Libya from preying on each other and jockeying for loyalty. That could look like allowing each faction to create and develop its own institutions. Once that process is underway, mechanisms could be put into place to help achieve stability, whether in the form of regional (German-style) or municipal (Swiss-style) federalism.

This approach is anathema to Western powers, some of whom prefer to support separatist elements of their choosing, while others worry that it could spread destabilizing separatist activity in other African countries. If allowed to develop smaller institutions from the ground up, Libyans would be more likely to invest in these governance systems, creating a more solid foundation. This could then support investment and build the potential for greater regional stability. Such scenarios remain unlikely, however, since they require a paradigm shift that is one step too far for many Western leaders and those at the top of international institutions.

________________

Frederic Wehrey

Outside powers take a growing interest in this oil-rich African state where the U.S. Embassy has been closed since 2014.

Success in diplomacy, like success in life—to borrow from an old cliché—largely depends on showing up. But for over half a decade, the United States hasn’t been showing up in Libya, at least not in a way that is sustained and meaningful. It speaks to a U.S. State Department approach to the country that is often more akin to sloganeering and wishful thinking than implementable policy.

Caught in the crossfire of inter-militia fighting that raged throughout the Libyan capital of Tripoli in summer 2014, U.S. diplomats shuttered their villa-based embassy and evacuated to Tunisia. They have yet to return, even as conditions in Libya have become considerably safer in the past years and other foreign embassies have either reopened or are in the process of doing so.

Their absence is due in part to the politicized legacy of the 2012 terrorist attack on the U.S. diplomatic outpost in Benghazi, Libya, which killed then-Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens and three other Americans and unleashed a flurry of Republican scapegoating in Congress that has yet to fully abate. That tragic episode has also made Biden administration officials unusually risk averse in signing off on the embassy’s return to Libya.

Earlier this month, though, there were signs for guarded optimism that this may be changing. At a March 22 hearing of a Senate Appropriations subcommittee, Secretary of State Antony Blinken testified that his department was “actively working on” reestablishing a permanent U.S. diplomatic presence in Libya, though he declined to go into specifics about what steps the State Department was taking, or a timetable.

The State Department has included funds for the return of the embassy to Tripoli in its budget request to Congress—a good thing—but it’s not clear if this funding will clear the Republican-dominated House of Representatives, or if and when Blinken will move forward with the reopening.

Without a physical presence in the country, the U.S. diplomats working on Libya will continue to be based at the U.S. embassy in neighboring Tunisia. But, as I’ve seen firsthand during extended fieldwork in Libya over the years, many of the Libyans who matter are unable or unwilling to make that trip, often for financial or political reasons. 

As a result, U.S. diplomats are unable to build trust with, understand, and possibly influence key Libyan players. Half-day in-and-out stops by senior U.S. officials to heavily fortified airports or ministries in Libya are hardly a viable substitute for continuous visibility and interaction.

These deleterious effects have only compounded as Libya’s security and energy importance has grown in recent years and a bevy of outside powers have taken a growing interest in the oil-rich African state.

Russia deployed thousands of Wagner Group mercenaries, regular personnel, and advanced weaponry in 2019-20 to support a military bid by eastern Libya-based warlord Khalifa Haftar. Haftar sought to topple the internationally recognized government in the capital. Though that effort failed because of Turkish military intervention, Russia continues to enjoy a spoiling influence in Libya. Most notably, it is propping up Haftar’s armed coalition, the Libyan Armed Forces, giving him the means to maintain his grip over vast swathes of Libyan territory and to block the export of Libyan oil—as he did from April to July 2022, precisely when crude prices were skyrocketing because of the Russia-Ukraine war. That self-serving act harmed ordinary Libyans, European states that receive Libyan energy exports, and the global economy, while conveniently benefiting the Kremlin.

Wagner fighters have also ensconced themselves around oilfields and inside airbases across southern and eastern Libya, from which they’ve ferried personnel and material into African states in the Sahel. Here, they’ve presented themselves as an appealing alternative to what locals perceive as an overbearing French—and American—neocolonial order, offering autocrats a suite of services, ranging from military training and counterinsurgency to propaganda and personal protection, while committing horrific abuses in the process.

It is a measure of just how seriously the Biden administration views Libya as a springboard for Russian power projection, as well as a potential source of illicit financing—Wagner personnel are already said to be tapping into Libyan oil revenues—that it recently dispatched two high-level emissaries to eastern Libya to meet with Haftar. 

CIA Director William Burns traveled to Benghazi in January, followed by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf in March. The details of their full discussion with the famously obdurate Haftar remain unclear, but it likely centered on his support for planned elections in Libya later this year and a mix of pressure, warnings, and incentives to compel him to cut his ties with Moscow and eject Russia’s mercenaries from Libyan soil.

But herein lies the longtime problem with Washington’s policy toward Tripoli—a problem that a sustained diplomatic presence may diminish but certainly can’t remedy completely.

U.S. officials from successive administrations have historically viewed Libya through the singular lens of some other U.S. policy priority, assigning it the role of a supporting actor a larger strategic drama:

(a) the quest for energy security,

(b) the fight against terrorism—especially the Islamic State, which set up a powerful affiliate in Libya—and now

(c) the United States’ rivalry with so-called great powers that many in Washington see playing out across the African continent and in the Middle East. 

As a result, the United States and its allies have pursued contradictory policies in Libya that have empowered an array of venal Libyan personalities and let the country more fragmented.

Relatedly, U.S. officials have often sacrificed the North African state on the altar of other, more pressing policy imperatives in the Middle East—namely, Iran and the Arab-Israel conflict—when they believe the United States requires the support of key Arab states such as Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, two habitual interferers in Libyan politics.

According to this calculus, transgressions by these Arab partners in Libya, including breaking the arms embargo, enabling Haftar’s illegal bid for power and war crimes, and killing civilians in drone strikes, did not merit the expenditure of U.S. diplomatic capital in the form of a firm rebuke or pushback.

The United States’ distance from and disinterest in Libya has also produced a myopic reading of the country’s complex challenges.

The current fixation on a “Libyan-led” process toward parliamentary and presidential elections is a case in point. Holding those elections by the late fall or winter of this year is the centerpiece of an ambitious roadmap unveiled by the new U.N. envoy to Libya, the veteran Senegalese diplomat Abdoulaye Bathily. The United States and other Western states say they are enthusiastically backing this plan, but it is fraught with pitfalls, lacking in details, and seems destined to repeat the mistakes of the past.

There’s no question that the Libyan people want and deserve a legitimate, elected executive authority after more than a decade of ineffective appointed transitional governments and rump legislative bodies. But as it is currently construed, Bathily’s plan cedes too much control over the convening of elections to a coterie of avaricious Libyan politicos and militia bosses who benefit from the frozen status quo and are exploiting the election’s procedural and legal questions—over candidate eligibility, sequencing, and the powers of the presidency—to stall, obstruct, or otherwise shift balloting in their favor.

With so much subterfuge underway, it is nearly impossible that voting will occur on schedule, and if by some miracle it does it is likely to be marred by insecurity or violence, boycotting, and lack of free campaigning and ballot counting. In one of many worst-case post-election scenarios, Haftar might claim to win the south and east and accuse the other districts of fraud, leading to the further dissolution of the country—something that the elections are intended to avert.

All of this suggests that U.S. policymakers, following the United Nations’ lead, seem to have unrealistic expectations about what voting by itself will accomplish, especially when Libya’s political, financial, and military institutions remain so fragmented and leading figures have escaped accountability for past crimes.

As in the past, elections seem to be an end to themselves, with little forethought given to the day after voting.

For many Libyans, then, and for those of us foreigners on the ground in Libya during the previous elections in 2012 and 2014—when nationwide voting didn’t put an end to Libya’s conflicts and divisions but merely reconfigured them—and in 2021, when another United Nations plan didn’t produce elections at all, Bathily’s roadmap elicits a sinking feeling of familiarity.

To be clear, U.S. development assistance policies toward Libya at the local level have been commendable and comprehensive, focused on bolstering civil society; promoting human rights, justice, and peace building; training journalists; running workshops for elected municipal governments; and helping Libyan citizens adapt to the looming challenges of climate change. But none of this important work can be effectively done from outside the country or even from the confines of a fortress-like embassy—a truism that Stevens recognized and put into practice during his time as ambassador. And while he may have pushed the limits of person-to-person diplomacy, much has changed in the past decade in how the State Department deals with risks and protects its diplomats abroad.

Sensibly applying these improved security measures to Libya when reopening the U.S. embassy—while avoiding quick-fix solutions and grounding U.S. policy in local Libyan realities—is the best way to honor Stevens’s legacy and help Libyans achieve the future they deserve.

***

Frederic Wehrey, a senior fellow in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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Karim Mezran

The most recent United Nations (UN) special envoy for Libya, Abdoulaye Bathily, resigned on April 16, announcing his decision to the press shortly after reporting it to the Security Council. He had been appointed to the post only eighteen months prior, in September 2022, following the resignation of his predecessor, Jan Kubis.

Bathily’s resignation was motivated by the UN’s inability to successfully support the political transition process that it has been trying to foster in Libya for more than a decade in the wake of the country’s civil war and enduring political fragmentation. As Bathily pointed out, the reason for this inability is that Libya’s various political actors are unwilling to place the collective interest above their own personal interests.

Bathily bluntly described the leaders of the country’s political factions as lacking “good faith,” rendering UN initiatives futile and ruling out the possibility of any solution to the country’s current chaotic and unstable political impasse. His resignation, and his candid assessment of the political process in Libya, demonstrate the slim prospects for UN initiatives in Libya so long as national leaders remain unwilling to collaborate.

Bathily described the attitude of Libyan political leaders as driven by a “selfish resolve” to defend their individual interests and impede the transition process through political and administrative expedients. Bathily’s criticism is directed at the major political figures in Libya whom the UN special envoy had often described as the “big five”: General Khalifa Haftar, Mohammed Takala, Mohamed al-Menfi, Aguila Saleh, and Abdul Hamid Dbeibah.

For these five political figures, the transition process doesn’t offer any incentives, but rather would severely limit their current ability to control the political system and the national economy. Particularly frustrating for Bathily, after almost two years of continuous initiatives that these internal actors systematically boycotted, the UN needed to put off a planned national reconciliation conference, which was initially scheduled for April 28 and is now postponed indefinitely due to the rival parties’ intransigence. 

The reasons for Bathily’s criticisms are clear. Although a relative calm has returned to the country since the failure of Haftar’s siege of Tripoli in 2020, this calm has not facilitated the resumption of national dialogue nor the start of the necessary transition process to organize national elections. Instead, this quiet period has allowed the different political factions’ balance of power to freeze in place. They are now unwilling to give up their respective spheres of power by initiating an unpredictable transition to elections that could subvert the status quo.

The web of individual political interests, moreover, is closely linked to a variegated framework of parallel interests, including control of the economy, corruption, management of the various militias that control most of Tripolitania (although in a disorganized manner), and deep ties with organized crime, which runs trafficking of all kinds in Libya.

Bathily’s resignation thus demonstrates how the role of the UN special envoy to Libya has become frustrating and devoid of real prospects over time. In 2020, Ghassan Salame resigned after two years in office citing health reasons, although he expressed deep disappointment at how the transition process had been systematically opposed by both local actors and the foreign powers and regional actors that have been intermingling in Libya since the 2011 revolution. He was succeeded by Jan Kubis, who in turn resigned in 2021 without clearly specifying the reasons, although he had clearly determined that it was impossible to fulfil his mandate.

The question remains how and whether the United Nations intends to appoint a new special representative. Talk among insiders indicates that the next special envoy could be Stephanie Koury, currently the vice head of the UN mission in Libya, who would take up the post on an interim basis pending new guidelines from the Security Council.

But regardless of who replaces Bathily, the next special envoy will not be able to solve Libya’s longstanding political impasse as long as the leaders of the country’s factions remain unwilling to meaningfully engage with the UN’s initiatives. The country’s political stasis is unlikely to shift anytime soon.

***

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative at the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

Maher Al Shaeri

The law protects the women’s rights

Musa Al-Qunaidi, a specialist in public law and lecturer at Misrata University, says, “When we talk about law in this context, we are talking about Law No. 6 of 1959, regarding the protection of women’s right to inheritance. Article 2 stipulates that it is impermissible to withhold payment of the share of inheritance to which a woman is entitled. And Article 5 stipulates that anyone who violates the provisions of this law shall be punished by imprisonment as well as being made to pay the woman the share of the inheritance to which she is entitled.”

Ahmeed Al-Mourabit Al-Zaydani, head of the Victims Organization for Human Rights, agrees. He says that depriving women of inheritance constitutes violence against them. Based on Article 2 of Law No. 6, he argues that it is impermissible to withhold from a woman her rightful share of inheritance, or to prevent her from benefiting from it or disposing of it.

On the question of substituting a financial reward for the rightful inheritance, Al Zaydani says that, as long as this is done with the woman’s complete consent, and there is no coercion or fraud involved, then there is no problem with such a substitution, provided the woman has full legal capacity and is over the age of eighteen. The compensation must also equal the real value of the inherited property or possessions.

However, if the compensation is made under coercion – seizing her share of the inheritance, and forcing her to accept financial compensation under the pretext that the inheritance from the property will go to a stranger (her husband) – then this is not permissible and is a violation of the text of Article 2. Some women were able to obtain judicial rulings on their inheritance rights and were forced – under threat – to give them up. Others were pressured to accept small sums of money or even remain silent about their rights without any of the “consolation” amount they are sometimes given

Holding on to traditional customs and norms

Muhammad Al-Ghaithi, a member of the Committee of Elders and of the Dispute Resolution Committee, sees no objection to the fact that assets and property are inherited by male heirs only. He says that this is common practice in the eastern region and even in all of Libya. For Al-Ghaithi, the reason is that “across Cyrenaica, the prevailing practice is that a person owns a particular plot of land that belongs to him entirely and exclusively.”

According to Al-Ghaithi, splitting up land means it will be wasted, and divided between tribes, “What we are seeking usually is for the entire land to be ours as one family; this is the main reason.” Al-Ghaithi points out that some people do not have much money to pass on when they die, but do have a lot of property. So, males who inherit are not able to compensate female heirs financially for their share in the property. They therefore take full possession of it. He says, “We know that this is forbidden by law, but the brothers who inherit are not able to price the land and give money in compensation.”

What happened to the law?

Today there is much discussion and back and forth about the law – now in its 65th year – as the country waits for a “new” constitution, which is in the process of being drafted. In 1973, the Libyan state suspended the constitution, established in the 1950s, on orders from Muammar Gaddafi, who ruled Libya from September 1, 1969 until February 2011. Gaddafi ordered the abolition of all laws and regulations in force in Libya, and so the state has no constitution. The majority of laws today are those that were in force when Libya was a kingdom under the country’s founder, King Idris al-Senussi.

Maryam Hussein, a member of the Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA), explained to us about how women are deprived of rights to inherit and how the CDA sees this. Article 49 of the draft Libyan constitution stipulates that “the state is committed to: supporting and caring for women and enacting laws that guarantee their protection and raise their status in society; eliminating negative culture and social customs that detract from their dignity; prohibiting discrimination against them; guaranteeing their right to representation in general elections; and providing them with opportunities in all fields, while all necessary measures will be taken not to prejudice or harm rights women have acquired and to support them.”

Custom rules

Only discussing laws and constitutions does not get to the heart of the problem, though. The issue is not that easy, according to Dr. Salma Al-Shaeri, a specialist in contemporary social issues. She says that for Libyan women to demand their inheritance through the courts and judicial system is considered shameful by society and damaging to a family’s reputation. This in turn leads to more persecution and oppression of women and the harnessing of all means to prevent them from gaining their rights. “In fact, things have gotten to the stage where some families have stolen the identity of women so as to waive the right to inheritance in their name. This case recently happened in the city of Derna,” she says.

Even though the constitution remains suspended, laws are still in force. The author of this report has managed to obtain a complaint filed by two women in one city against their brothers. The men had categorically refused to give them the inheritance due to them from their father, who left properties worth millions, forcing them to go to court.

When the men appeared before the judge and were faced with the legal documents, they promised to give their sisters what was rightfully theirs. The two women therefore concluded that the matter had been resolved. But the men did not keep their promise, showing that social custom in Libya can even prevent judicial rulings being implemented. The brothers have gone as far as threatening that their sisters will be killed if they make any further complaints.

“Women are intimidated or persecuted if they make a complaint against their brothers to obtain their rightful share of the inheritance. Lack of knowledge leads some women to sign documents giving up their rights to an inheritance in return for a symbolic sum of money, which is paid just to silence them.” Some women have even faced death threats.

“If the case comes to court, social customs remain a stumbling block for women when trying to secure their rights to inheritance” Musa Al-Qunaidi argues that when it comes to punishment, this is a matter for judges not legislators. Every crime has its appropriate punishment, and the judge has the right to sentence people to between one day and three years in prison, according to the law.

Back to pre-Islamic times

“Depriving women of inheritance is a remnant from pre-Islamic times. Women had no inheritance rights until Islam came and removed this injustice against them.”

So says Dr Salma Al-Shaeri, a specialist in contemporary social issues. She points out that the problem goes beyond depriving women of their rightful inheritance and has devastating social effects, including stoking hostility and hatred between a sister and her brothers. It can affect sons and daughters on both sides, while some women may resort to taking some action in revenge, which would harm the reputation of the family.

Dr Al-Shaeri also argues that depriving women of a large portion of their property inheritance creates an economic disparity between them and their brothers, who alone benefit from the returns on the property, while the women remain economically inferior.

Women are the answer

The public prosecution service cannot initiate a criminal case on its own, explains Musa Al-Qunaidi, but needs first to receive a complaint from an inheritor claiming her rights from brothers or other relatives. Only after that can the prosecution proceed with the case.

Al-Qunaidi believes that the problem comes down to the fear that women have, and their failure to act against those who withhold their rights from them. Alongside this are customs and traditions and the failure of the executive agencies of government to carry out their duties once the matter reaches court.

Ahmeed Al-Mourabit Al-Zaydani, head of the Victims Organization for Human Rights, agrees. He says that depriving women of inheritance constitutes a violation against them, according to Article 2 of Law No. 6. He believes that it is impermissible to not give a woman the share of the inheritance to which she is entitled, or to prevent her from benefiting from it or disposing of it.

“Women can be intimidated or persecuted if they make a complaint against their brothers. Lack of knowledge leads some women to sign documents giving up their rights to an inheritance in return for a symbolic sum of money, which is paid just to silence them. But then they say they were forced into it,” says Al-Qunaidi. Women can sometimes even face death threats. “Money makes people lose their minds,” as the popular saying in Libya has it.

Fathia used to lower her head whenever she passed by the building which she believed should be hers, in full or in part, according to Islamic law. But today she is more determined than ever to obtain what is due to her, and thereby become an example to other women in working to obtain their legitimate inheritance rights.

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Kawthar Zantour

According to a study by CME Group, a US firm that manages stock exchanges, global demand for gold reached an all-time high in 2023, up 3% in 2022.

Security in turbulence

Gold is still considered “the world’s preferred safe haven” because it holds its value without dependence on any issuer or government for trade. By contrast, currencies and bond prices can fluctuate, sometimes wildly.

Market analyst Ross Norman, speaking to Reuters, said: “What makes the gold rally so unusual is that it is occurring despite significant traditional headwinds with the US dollar rising, Treasury yields rising, and the likelihood of higher-for-longer US rates increasing.”According to the IMF, the increased demand can be explained by one of two things.

First, during periods of high economic and political uncertainty, coupled with low yields on currencies—a combination characteristic of recent years—gold has been a safe and desirable reserve asset.

Second, gold is seen as a secure asset where countries face financial sanctions, asset freezing, and the confiscation of financial investments.

The IMF report cited the example of the Group of Seven (G7) countries’ decision to freeze the foreign exchange reserves of the Russian central bank, which prompted Russia to accelerate its gold purchases.

Russia announced in 2021 that its gold assets were fully stored in Russia, likely prompted by concerns over potential asset seizures or freezes amid international financial restrictions, as indeed transpired.

Gaddafi’s piggy bank

During Gaddafi’s rule, Libya prioritised accumulating foreign exchange and gold reserves. Still, its gold and foreign exchange reserves declined after 2014 due to port and oil field closures as militias fought. A report from the World Gold Council suggested that Libya’s gold reserves dropped from 143 tonnes in 2011 to 116 tonnes in 2014, but the CBL refuted this claim, saying its “gold balance has remained unchanged since 2011”.

After Dbeibeh announced new gold purchases, some suggested that this was a cover for another historical gold reserve theft, similar to the looting of 2011. In September 2011, Libya’s then-Central Bank Governor Qassem Azzuz accused Gaddafi of selling a fifth of the country’s gold reserves in the days before his downfall.

Azzuz revealed that 29 tonnes of gold valued at 1.7bn LYD ($1bn) were sold to local traders to finance Gaddafi’s ill-fated war against opponents. “Gold was converted into cash to pay salaries and provide liquidity, especially in Tripoli,” he said.

The remarks by Azzuz came a month after his predecessor, Farhat Bengdara (who defected from the regime in March 2011), confirmed suspicions that Gaddafi was trying to sell Libyan gold to fund his own protection and buy off the tribes. Bengdara said Gaddafi had even offered to sell 25 tonnes of gold to his friend but that Bengdara had advised his friend against the purchase.

The missing tonnes

Efforts to trace the looted gold have failed. Some claim it was buried in the Libyan desert, transported to South Africa, or stolen by foreign parties. Leaks from the former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s emails in late 2020 alleged that former French President Nicolas Sarkozy (who supported Western intervention in Libya) had his eyes on the country’s gold and oil.

In another account, Libya’s gold and silver reserves (143 tonnes of gold and a similar quantity of silver) were transferred in March 2011. According to this story, it went from the central bank’s vaults in Tripoli to Sabha, a city in southwestern Libya, where major clashes occurred between pro- and anti-Gaddafi forces.

Gold and guns

Despite relative and precarious stability today, concerns persist over the potential for renewed conflict in Libya, a divided country with the world’s highest concentration of weapons in the hands of non-state actors. A UN report estimates that up to 200,000 tonnes of weapons are dispersed across Libya. And wherever there is gold and guns, there will be temptation.

Unsurprisingly, therefore, Libya’s central bank has been subject to repeated attacks and break-in attempts. In 2016, the US Embassy in Libya expressed “strong concern” at efforts to drill into central bank safes “to circumvent Central Bank of Libya (CBL) control over Libya’s financial resources”.

The US and others have sought to prevent Libya’s wealth from being misappropriated for fraud or corruption. CBL officials say the United States and international financial institutions safeguard it. Certainly, Libya’s gold reserves are still subject to fears about theft, fraud, and diversion.

This is closely tied to the levels and integrity of Libya’s governance systems and adherence to the rule of law. CBL officials say any harm to its gold stock is highly improbable. One wonders.

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Kawthar Zantour – A Tunisian journalist specialised in economic and political affairs, based in Tunisia.

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Skylar Watkins

Hindering Development

Human trafficking has implications that extend far beyond the individual victims. Trafficking undermines the rule of a law of a country and compromises its national and economic security. Human trafficking is one of the fastest-growing criminal enterprises and is one of the largest illicit industries in the world. Every year human trafficking and forced labor within the private economy generate over $150 billion in illegal profits.

Two-thirds of these profits are generated from commercial sexual exploitation and the remaining third is generated from other means of forced labor. The prominence of the illegal economy prevents open markets from thriving. Even more dangerously, the illegal market oftentimes funnels money into criminal and terrorist organizations, further promoting corruption and endangering the Libyan political system.

A Wider Regional and Continental Issue

Human trafficking is not only an issue in Libya and has become an increasingly prevalent issue within the African continent, particularly due to a lack of institutional capacity. At any given time, it is estimated that 3.7 million people in Africa are in forced labor and slavery. Almost a quarter of all trafficking globally occurs in the continent. The most common type of trafficking in Africa is forced labor, however there are over 400,000 victims of sexual exploitation in the continent and approximately 99% are women and girls and 21% are under the age of 18.

Despite global efforts, including funding and resources provided by the US, very few African countries have fully met the minimum standards set forth by the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) that the Department of State utilizes to rank countries for its Trafficking in Persons Report. In 2023, Seychelles was the only African country to achieve a Tier 1 placement, meaning that the country is meeting the minimum standards set forth by the TVPA. A majority of African countries are Tier 2 countries, meaning that the countries do not meet the TVPA’s minimum standards but is making a significant effort in an attempt to meet these standards.

North Africa in particular is an attractive spot for irregular migration due to its close proximity to southern Europe. The heavy flow of migrants in Northern Africa further threatens the stabilization and development of the region, allowing criminal networks such as human trafficking to intensify and grow across the region. Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia all ranked as Tier 2 countries in the 2023 TIP Report.

Egypt was ranked as a Tier 2 Watchlist country, meaning that the country is ranked as a Tier 2 country but is at risk of falling to Tier 3. Algeria was ranked as a Tier 3 country, meaning that it does not meet the TVPA minimum standards, nor is it making any significant effort to do so. North Africa’s TIP rankings exemplify how, even when countries are attempting to meet these standards, they are failing to succeed and are unable to meet the minimum standards to combat trafficking effectively.

US and International Interventions and Efforts

As of August 2022, the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Office has dedicated over $225 million to active anti-trafficking projects globally, many of which work within Libya. Examples include the $750,000 project to support the expansion of the Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA) in select Sub-Saharan African countries and Libya. This project specifically looks at the Islamic State’s organized exploitation of migrants through human trafficking.

Despite US funding and interventions in the continent, trafficking persists, and nations continue to fail to enhance efforts to combat this crime. As of August 2023, the State Department’s TIP Office manages over $61 million in anti-trafficking projects in Africa alone. Although many of these projects have had positive impacts, overall, they have failed to foster long-term and effective international changes. This is certainly not to say that funding for anti-trafficking efforts is pointless; in fact, it is critical. However, the lack of change seen in Africa’s TIP Reports and the consistently high rates of trafficking on the continent point to inefficiencies in generating substantial change.

Internationally, Libya is a party to the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children (2000), which acts as a supplement to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Although the country has lacked the institutional capacity to eliminate human trafficking, the United Nations has attempted to act within the country.

For example, the United Nations Support Mission for Libya (UNSMIL) was adopted in 2011 through resolution 2009. Since then, the mandate has been renewed through 31 October 2024. Although the primary purpose of the mandate is to support in the transition of power, the mandate also includes the monitoring and reporting of human rights violations.

Furthermore, in October 2015, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 2240, which authorized member states to seize and inspect vessels in Libya that are suspected of being used for either human trafficking or migrant smuggling. The mandate has been renewed annually and was most recently renewed for another year on September 29th, 2023. The U.N. Security Council specifically calls upon member states with the proper jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute individuals responsible for human trafficking and migrant smuggling and cites member states’ obligations under international law.

Other global efforts include a 2019 EU and UNODC join-program to combat human trafficking and migrant smuggling in North Africa (Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco). The program is worth over $15.8 million and aims to enhance border patrols’ capacity to detect and intercept traffickers; strengthen the capacity of first responders to identify and protect victims; enhance law enforcement’s skills and knowledge regarding investigative techniques; and strengthen skills in adjudicating human trafficking and smuggling cases.

Conclusion

Human trafficking in Libya is only one of many humanitarian crises being perpetuated by Libya’s status as a failed state. Despite the efforts of the international community, the human trafficking situation in Libya seems to be heading in the wrong direction. US and international resources are being funneled into addressing the issue, but not in an effective manner that will create long-term change. In order to address human trafficking in Libya, the instability in the country must be addressed. Without proper internal institutions to protect victims, prevent trafficking, and prosecute traffickers, long-lasting change is not possible, and the full extent of the issue remains unknown.

***

Skylar Watkins was a research intern with the Africa Program in Fall 2024. She is a senior at Pennsylvania State University graduating with her B.A. and M.I.A. in International Affairs with concentrations in International Security and Humanitarian Development.

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Foreign Policy Research Institute

Hafed Al-Ghwell

In Libya’s fractured political and security landscape, the evolution of hybrid armed groups into near quasi-state actors has become a significant challenge obstructing the nation’s progress toward stability, security and sovereignty.

A convoluted dynamic is now the norm, whereby nonstate actors are firmly welded to what remains of Libya’s still functioning institutions, creating new political economies that thrive on a predatory governance model that is detrimental to the fabric of Libyan society. This strange mesh of political leadership, financial systems, transnational organized crime and heavily armed groups with foreign backing now ties any prospects of a promising Libyan future to the almost impossible task of dismantling these groups and the political economies that sustain them.

Hybrid groups in Libya have morphed into complex entities with vertically integrated operations that span from imposing tolls on urban streets to divvying up national resources — embedding themselves deeper within the country’s sociopolitical fabric. The political process in Libya, marred by division and inertia, often appears as a facade, with the real power dynamics being dictated by bargains between these groups and political elites. Such arrangements not only disenfranchise the Libyan populace but also cement the authority of these actors, making the transition toward a functioning state increasingly unreachable.

The timid return of the US to Libya with a new ambassador, after many years of failures, can be a positive step to at least a limited extent, given the major mistakes Washington has made in Libya over the past few years, such as engaging with and giving legitimacy to some of the worst characters that emerged after the fall of Muammar Qaddafi.

The pending withdrawal of more than 1,000 US personnel from Niger, reports of a series of shipments of advanced Russian hardware to Tobruk and even the establishment of Russian military bases in the Eastern part of Libya might have caused some panic and a few sleepless nights across the Atlantic. By returning to Libya, the US will be able to put diplomatic boots on the ground, so to speak, which may help it make some serious headway in countering the existing and emerging threats, if only to safeguard American strategic interests in the Southern Mediterranean.

So, how can Washington succeed in, for instance, countering Russia’s deepening influence in eastern Libya and the likelihood of Western “over the horizon” counterterrorism operations going “blind” in parts of the Sahel? The US must take an active role in steering political and diplomatic activity toward rebuilding the collapsed Libyan state, rather than its repeated policy failures of trying to arrange a compromise between the thuggish forces that created this ever-expanding mafia state.

As such, a reengaged US policy toward Libya must also prioritize the dismantling of Libya’s corrosive political economies, which are central to the power and influence of its armed nonstate groups. This endeavor is indispensable for slowing Libya’s fragmentation and energizing efforts toward unified governance.

Until then, however, Libya’s political impasse will persist, driven by a mafia-like ruling elite that prioritizes power and money over the populace and a financial system that is disproportionately reliant on oil revenues, which creates an endless cycle of opaque wealth distribution favoring the elites. The morass of semiofficial, mostly state-funded, hybrid groups — benefiting from state privileges while exerting mafia-like territorial control — remains the greatest barrier to any meaningful progress, state rebuilding and security sector reform.

For more than a decade, these groups have enjoyed unchecked expansion. Not only have their numbers grown exponentially, but US diplomats and military officials have also injected them with credibility through public meetings and photo opportunities showing America’s officials smiling while standing next to the worst of Libya’s thuggish spoilers and mafia leaders.

Washington’s strategy must therefore prioritize the dismantling of these economies through a multifaceted approach that includes encouraging transparent, equitable financial systems to cut off the flow of oil revenues to armed groups. There must also be robust support for nontraditional interventions that can quickly offer viable alternatives to discredited militia membership and foster inclusive political dialogue.

The inclusion of the Libyan populace in the political process — even through holding referendums in the absence of an ability to hold elections — is not merely a democratic ideal but a strategic necessity for degrading the influence of hybrid actors. The widespread mistrust in state institutions and political developments is a direct consequence of a system that allows criminal political elites to escape punishment and that simply benefits these exclusionary elites, leaving the broader population marginalized. Encouraging genuine decentralization and local governance would empower communities and create a bulwark against the resurgence of militia-based power.

Recognizing the pivotal role of security sector reform in paving the way for effective governance in Libya, there has been an intensive discourse among policymakers and analysts over the prospects for the successful implementation of reforms specific to the Libyan context. Yet, despite extensive deliberation, strategic missteps have plagued attempts at reform, such as an overreliance on so-called train and equip programs, which have failed to address the need for sustainable and holistic strategies. Such initiatives, undercut by a shortsightedness that prioritizes quick fixes over the foundational restructuring of Libya’s security apparatus, remain insufficient for long-term stability.

Furthermore, within Libya, officials have engaged in superficial restructurings of security-related ministries, driven by internal power dynamics rather than a comprehensive vision — all a byproduct of those malignant militia-state dynamics. Those decisions only deliver the facade of reform, yet systematically undermine genuine progress while purporting to contribute to security sector reform.

Libya’s security sector is still growing to this day — drawing recruits into a mix of state-affiliated and nonstate militias — meaning the need for interventions cannot be deferred until a nebulous “post-conflict” scenario crystallizes. Instead, the US and its Western partners must draw inspiration from the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s more proactive and comprehensive “next-generation disarmament, demobilization and reintegration,” which is well suited to the Libya scenario.

This model, unlike its predecessors, does not await peace agreements and instead initiates action in anticipation of them. Its scope extends beyond piecemeal efforts, integrating activities that align with broader national development aims. Crucially, it functions in tandem with security sector reform, transitional justice and state-rebuilding initiatives. This approach recognizes the dismantling of Libya’s hybrid groups not as a static program but as a fluid political process, one which is acutely attuned to localized contexts.

It is through these initiatives, continuously adapted to the Libyan sociopolitical dynamics, that the US can reengage in a meaningful and credible way. A renewed focus on underpinning long-term solutions over short-term illusionary gains — and recognizing these efforts as inherently political and intertwined with the overarching objectives of national unity and development — would be groundbreaking. Strategic US participation, in concert with international partners, would also help de-incentivize and disassemble the hybrid groups entrenched within Libya’s political and economic sphere, thereby advancing the country toward the dissolution of political gridlocks and the restoration of its sovereignty.

Only by tackling these underlying issues can the US hope to contribute to a stable and unified Libya, where governance and economic opportunities are not held hostage by armed factions, some of them even headed by American citizens without any fear of legal consequences in Libya or the US.

***

Hafed Al-Ghwell is a senior fellow and executive director of the North Africa Initiative at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC.

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Alia Brahimi

This month, the UN Special Envoy for Libya, Abdoulaye Bathily, resigned his position with visible frustration. Bathily was charged with delivering the troubled country to long-delayed elections, as it remains politically and militarily divided between east and west, but the peace talks were performative from the start.

Last week, Canadian police uncovered a conspiracy by two former UN employees in Montreal to sell Chinese drones to Libya, in direct violation of UN sanctions—and also to export millions of drums of Libyan crude oil to China at a heavily discounted price, in exchange for million-dollar kickbacks.

The reality is that a political agreement in Libya is so elusive because an economic bargain has already been struck. And Libya’s oil sector is central to the corruption binge.

For more than a decade now, and particularly in the last 18 months, political elites across the divide have worked together to carve up Libya’s institutions—and their budgets—between themselves, as well as all manner of black-market fiefdoms.

Bathily, a seasoned Senegalese diplomat, found that his Libyan interlocuters were not negotiating in good faith; but there was no rational incentive for them to change the current system or to help the United Nations turn off the taps to their patronage networks and private interests.

Meanwhile, Libyans themselves are experiencing a crippling economic crisis, despite living atop Africa’s largest oil reserves—and in the time of a relatively high global oil price.

In tandem, a geopolitical storm is gathering. Sources indicate that a significant number of new Russian fighters arrived this week in southern Libya—joining the 1800 already in-country—with some of them destined for Niger, and the remainder for Libya’s oil installations.

In addition, since last summer, the Kremlin has put plans in motion for a Russian naval base at Tobruk. On April 8, a vessel escorted by the Russian navy docked at the port and unloaded 6,000 tons of military hardware. But equipment has been coming in for weeks, from radars and communications tools to T-72 tanks.

The base will empower Russia to grow its supply operations—whether of fighters, weapons, food, fuel, dollars, gold, or ammunition—to and from allies on the African continent.

At Tobruk, Russian proxies will gain sway over traffic crossing the larger Mediterranean and expand the smuggling economy around migrants, drugs, and fuel as a source of funds and as pressure points against Europe. Russia will also be better positioned to watch us closely and, perhaps in the future, to use surrogates to disrupt shipping, in the manner of the Houthi in the Red Sea. Furthermore, Russia can mobilize the corruption multiplying within the Libyan oil sector to fund its operations.

It’s not just that its Libyan allies, the family of eastern warlord Khalifa Haftar, now have access to the budgets of National Oil Corporation (NOC) subsidiaries and control of the private banks that hold NOC money. It’s also about Russia getting its hands on cash and fuel. Russia is helping the Haftars to print counterfeit 50-dinar notes in large quantities, which the Wagner Group can convert into dollars on the Libyan black market to fund its activities in sub-Saharan Africa. Wagner Group fighters are personally involved in the super-charged fuel smuggling operation gripping Libya—Libya is actually a net importer of refined petroleum products because investments have not been made in local refineries—which is itself a multi-billion-dollar industry.

To illustrate, last year the Libyan National Oil Corporation spent $17 billion importing fuel—in 2021 that figure was only $5 billion. Availability on the domestic market in no way reflects that increased supply—there are still queues around the block for petrol—meaning that the fuel is being smuggled out of Libya systematically and at record rates. And much of that fuel is being bought in the first place from Russia, through upstart brokers registered in Dubai and Turkey.

Furthermore, despite an unprecedented budget of roughly $12 billion over two years, which exceeds even its funding during the Gaddafi era, there is little sign that the NOC is capable of ramping up production to help Europe cope with the fallout from Ukraine. Many Libyans, including the head of the Libyan Presidential Council, are now asking where all of these billions have gone.

This oil corruption is threatening to embroil global energy giants, engineering an element of Western complicity. Last November, the Libyan Attorney General paused the signing of major deal between the NOC and a foreign consortium, including Total and Eni, owing to doubts over the transparency of the tender process for the NC-7 block and the fairness of the terms.

Similarly, a Libyan oil minister—who was abruptly removed from his post last month—warned Halliburton against working with an obscure, newly-registered Libyan entity in its development of the Dahra fields, pointedly advising that this “may raise questions about the possibility of corruption in the oil sector”.

In Libya, economic forces are clearly (mis)shaping political outcomes. In the wake of Bathily’s resignation, disrupting this corruption must be the new paradigm for international engagement.

The Biden administration can take the lead in adopting a financial prism and promoting intensified economic scrutiny, targeted sanctions, improved coordination amongst Western powers—even naming and shaming—to help break established patterns of predatory behavior and therefore the political deadlock favored by the current political class.

For too long the foxes in Libya have paid themselves to guard the henhouse. While the Biden administration cannot force a political settlement on Libyans, it can work to dry up the money to the spoilers. This would energize the potential for a democratic transition in Libya, just as it would deny Russia further opportunities to profit from Libya’s oil chaos.

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Alia Brahimi is a nonresident senior fellow within the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

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Maher Al Shaeri

This investigation exposes a traditional practice in Libya that enables men to monopolize inheritance of property to the exclusion of women, on the pretext that a woman might pass the property on to her husband and that the family property would be divided and lost, lowering the social standing of the family.

Fathia (pseudonym) feels sadness whenever she walks past the building in which she grew up in the city of Misrata. She believes that she should, by rights, have inherited the building from her father, but her brothers took it for themselves, leaving nothing for her and her sister.

In Libya, there are social norms that deprive a woman of her right to inherit property. If a woman’s father dies, her legal rights are withheld by her brothers or uncles, and thus, it is now abnormal for women to obtain their stated share of properties passed on to them by the deceased.

Fathia, from western Libya, has one sister and five brothers. When their father died, she and her sister failed to receive their share of his inheritance. All of her paternal grandfather’s estates were also in her father’s name, who did the same thing with his sisters, preventing them from receiving their share of the inheritance. Everything went to Fathia’s father. This pattern is repeated again and again in Libya, along generations, instilling a resentment in women, who see no way to stop their inheritance being taken by the men of the family.

Fathia is far from the only victim of this practice. There are many cases of women in Libya speaking out about the tyranny and controlling behavior of their male relatives, and their weakness as they are deprived of rights under the pretext of traditional custom and practice. But most of the time, such conversations are held in a whisper behind closed doors. Again, custom prevents women from speaking out about any pain they might feel.

When Fathia demanded that her brothers give her what is rightfully hers, they were shocked, given that most women stay silent on this issue. They responded, “We do not have daughters who inherit from their fathers. The family does not inherit or hand down property to women.”

Why women are denied property

Property is regarded as one of the sources of tribal power and status in Libya. So, for many years, custom has dictated that properties should be inherited by men alone, since they carry the family name. If women marry outside the family, they are not allowed a share in the property, for fear that it will pass to their husbands, thus increasing the power and status of a different tribe or family, at the expense of the family of the deceased.

Sometimes brothers will compensate their sisters financially in lieu of property, so as not to be accused of acting unjustly. But according to the women impacted, this “meager” compensation cannot be compared to their rightful inheritance. It is a “gift” meant to “placate” women, not an acknowledgement of their inherent right as a beneficiary, as stated in both religious and civil law.

Property is regarded as one of the sources of tribal power and status in Libya. For years, custom has dictated that property should be inherited by men, since they carry the family name. If women marry outside the family, they are not allowed a share in the property, for fear that it will pass to their husbands, thus increasing the power and status of a different tribe or family, at the expense of the family of the deceased.

Mabrouka Besikri, Director of the International Arab Organization for Women’s Rights, has come across many similar cases in the Nafusa Mountain region in eastern Libya, southwest of the capital Tripoli. She explains that brothers deliberately deprive their sisters of their rights as co-inheritors of land. They claim that a woman will bring a stranger into their midst, and on this basis, they take away from the woman her right of inheritance. Besikri adds, “It is possible that some families will give women financial compensation in exchange for their right to land, but they end up owning no land, property, or anything else. This is a clear and obvious injustice, and many organizations have called for it to be brought to an end.”

For his part, Academic Musa Al-Qunaidi, who teaches at the University of Misrata, describes as “weak and feeble” the justifications put forward by male heirs that their “sustenance” will be lost to the family of the daughter’s husband. Salem adds, “A few families do give a woman the right to inherit, but the overwhelming majority withhold this right from her.” The dominance of this traditional practice led Mabrouka Besikri and her team to demand that Libyan women be given the right to inherit.

Human rights activist Manal Al-Hanashi calls on every individual and institution in society to work to protect a woman’s right to inheritance and to achieve this through legal means. “The state and the judiciary must put in place laws and procedures to stop women’s inheritance rights from being ignored or abused, to hold accountable any law breaker, and to spread a culture of justice and equality. Family, schools, and society all need to bring up future generations to respect and appreciate women’s right to inherit.”

Musa Al-Qunaidi believes that, before any discussion of constitutional and legal action, something needs to be done to raise the level of awareness among those sections of society which stand in the way of the right of women to inherit.

Like hitting your head against a wall

Fathia was biding her time, waiting for the chance to return to the issue of her stolen inheritance, when she heard that her brothers had sold some of her father’s property to people outside the family. So, the very thing they claimed they were afraid of – that family property would be lost by falling into the hands of others – had actually happened.

Fathia raised the issue again and demanded that her brothers give her and her sister their share in the remainder of the inheritance – which consisted of many plots of land – and that they should receive the same share as the men. In return, she would excuse them for the way they handled the original division of the inheritance. The brothers stuck by the tribal custom, but after strenuous attempts by Fathia, they finally compromised and gave her a sum of money in exchange for her share in the building that had been sold, but without informing her of its true value or the sale price.

Fathia is fully aware that her brothers have in their possession not only her father’s money, but also the inheritance that had been due to her aunts, who have received nothing. But none of her efforts, either on her own or her aunts’ behalf, have yielded any result. And her brothers have continued to sell off land whenever they need, to fund their children’s marriages, the upkeep of their livelihood, or other things.

In every family

Fatima had no more luck than Fathia. She has three sisters and two brothers. After the death of their father, the father’s property in its entirety – worth millions of dinars – was inherited by the two sons, leaving the three sisters empty-handed. Fatima was reluctant to come out and speak in this report, since the brothers are keen to prevent their sisters from airing their grievances publicly, or going to court, or even discussing the matter.

The author of this investigative report sought the help of a property assessor, and Fatima gave him information on all the properties her father left to them upon his death. The assessor calculated the total value of all these properties at the current price and, based on the correct legal apportioning of the property, it turned out that Fatima’s share was worth approximately 2.7 million Libyan dinars (about $800,000).

The assessor also calculated the market value of the properties inherited by Fathia and her brothers. In this case also he divided the inheritance based on the correct legal distribution. And it turned out that Fathia’s share of this inheritance was equivalent to about one and a half million dinars (approximately $300,000).

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Karim Mezran

Libya is still divided between two governments: the Government of National Accord (GNA) headed by Abdul Hamid Dbeibah in Tripoli and a government in Benghazi supported by the warlord Khalifa Haftar. Western countries seem to accept this status quo in Libya favored by the new post-Muammar Gaddafi elites.

As long as no Western nation shows interest in stabilizing Tripoli’s political system, the country remains mired in institutional limbo, allowing corruption to flourish. While the Europeans are primarily concerned with irregular migration and thus find it convenient to deal with a semi-anarchic situation; the United States is concerned with terrorism and the spread of Islamist organizations such as ISIS throughout the region, and pays no concern over who governs Libya as long as extremist groups are contained.  This vacuum not only invites external intervention but also presents Russia as the most conspicuous, power-hungry player poised at Libya’s doorstep.

Following the eruption of Libya’s civil war, the conflict swiftly escalated into a matter of international concern, prompting various international actors to align with different factions based on their strategic interests. Turkey and Qatar directly and militarily support the GNA, while most other nations, while formally recognizing the government, play both sides to their advantage. General Haftar, however, is supported by Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Russia. Nevertheless, in 2020, an opportunity to stabilize Libya appeared thanks to the support of Turkish forces leaving Cyrenaica in Russian forces’ hands. 

At first, the Russian penetration in Libya was limited to a few hundred instructors for General Haftar’s LAF in 2015 and 2016. It was only around late 2018 that these Russian soldiers were substituted by a couple of thousand—mostly Russian—mercenaries hired by the Wagner Group, a Russian company owned by a close friend of the Kremlin’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, who died in a suspicious plane crash after his mercenaries attempted a coup in Russia in 2023.

Wagner’s presence did not take place suddenly. It was preceded by constant courting by the Russian top establishment, General Haftar, his family, and his officers, not only with generous provisions of weapons and equipment but also with a public show of support for Haftar’s political positions and views, which consisted mainly in his ambition to rule over the whole country. Thus, the Russians had established a strong foothold in Libya by the end of 2019 and the beginning of the attack on Tripoli. All of this happened with almost no reaction from the United States and its NATO allies, even though this has brought armed Russian troops less than a few hundred miles from the southern shores of Italy, the Southern flank of NATO. 

This became even more evident after Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2022 as Russian presence in Libya started to raise some questions among commentators, pundits, and military strategists. Still, even when confronted by this evidence, western decision-makers seemed to pay scant attention to the issue. The truth is that the US diplomacy and political establishment in general in the years between 2014 and 2022 were not receptive to any alarm coming from Libya since they had practically checked out mostly due to the shock of the assassination of US Ambassador to Libya, Chris Stevens, in 2012. Since then, the US has preferred to delegate the task of untangling the Libyan issue to the Europeans and the United Nations. 

Despite the presence in Tripoli of the United Nations Secretary-General Guterres on April 4, 2019, on a visit with Libyan Prime Minister Fayez Sarraj, Haftar launched his troops in a sudden attack against Tripoli. The US barely reacted, limiting itself to publishing a few diplomatic notes protesting the military operation. It was a worldwide deafening silence that met Haftar’s aggression. The US position sounded to Haftar like a green light for the attack. The Russian component of the aggressor’s forces was primarily formed by contractors—almost all from Moscow’s special forces hired by the Wagner Group. The Russians constituted the better-trained and equipped contingent of Haftar’s army and were the ones who fought harder and got closer to the center of Tripoli. The intervention of Turkish troops in defense of the legitimate government forced the Russians to abandon the capital’s outskirts and withdraw behind the Sirte line about halfway between Tripoli and Benghazi. After a truce was declared between the parties, only about 600 Russian mercenaries remained in Libya, mainly to guarantee that Western Libyan troops and their Turkish allies would not stage a blitz and charge toward Benghazi.

At the end of 2021, reports of an expansion of Russian forces— as it became hard to distinguish Wagner contractors from regular troops—began to appear in the Western press, and it was revealed that Russians were penetrating the territories of countries in the African Sahel ostensibly to protect their economic interests, including mining investments. While this could well be true, they were there with a different purpose, as it was revealed by a series of military coups that mainly overthrew pro-western governments in favor of military dictators who showed evident pro-Russian inclinations. 

The Russians penetrated the territories and political environment of the Sahel countries with the precise purpose of intervening in their internal affairs. Russians are very thorough in their destabilization plans since they do not limit the penetration of a particular country only to their armed forces but, as the Libyan case proves, extend the destabilization to the economic area as well. Between 2016 and 2020, the Central Bank of Libya branch, located and operating in the east under the control of General Haftar, contracted the Russian state-owned Joint Stock Company Goznak to print its version of the Libyan dinar even though Haftar’s administration did not have access to collateral, such as gold, and thus in open violation of various international norms as well as Libya’s Banking Act. The issue of these false banknotes in the order of billions of dollars in Libyan dinars is tied to Haftar’s plans of conquest, as shown by data that noted that 4.5 billion Libyan dinars ($0.93 billion in 2019 value) were dispatched in four shipments from February to June 2019, just as Haftar attacked Tripoli in April 2019.    

It is estimated that Russians flooded the Libyan market with at least the equivalent in Libyan banknotes of more than 10 billion dollars, most of which paid for Haftar’s army and civil officials. The destabilizing effect of these maneuvers is self-explanatory. There are also unconfirmed rumors of another quantity of counterfeited bills being smuggled again into the Libyan market at the beginning of 2024. Despite all this evidence, coupled with the expulsion of French troops from these countries, there was still no American reaction besides some mid-level officials’ “outrage” and vague calls for the return of democracy. With all the above-described strategies, Russia is attempting to establish itself as the dominant power in Libya to control the territory of the country and, from there, safely project its power towards other North African countries and even further south like Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

The ups and downs of Russia’s war against Ukraine, compounded with the tragic events of October 7, 2023, in Israel and following more than six months of the war in Gaza with all the international consequences that these conflicts brought about, absorbed the US attention and capacity to react, even more so than before. But Washington and its allies cannot ignore anymore the importance of stabilizing Libya through a constant, inclusive, and transparent political process accompanied by a forceful action of resistance and pushback against the Russian infiltration by establishing in Libya a new unity government that could lead the way towards this objective. This would go a long way to gratifying the population and winning their hearts and minds to Western values.

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Karim Mezran is the director of the North Africa Program at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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Ufuk Necat Tasci

Analysis: The UN has failed to instigate meaningful change in Libya, allowing status quo actors to strengthen their entrenched positions in the divided country. Amid a sharp international shift in attention towards active wars in Ukraine and Gaza, frozen conflicts in the Middle East have become overshadowed. In Libya, one of the places most affected by the Arab Spring, the fighting has subsided but the country remains mired in uncertainty and division.

This political instability was reinforced last week as the UN Special Envoy to Libya Abdoulaye Bathily resigned after just 18 months in his post. Accusing rival Libyan leaders of putting their own interests above finding a solution, Bathily, in his final words, said the UN support mission in Libya (UNSMIL) “made a lot of efforts under my leadership over the last 18 months,” but the situation has deteriorated. “The status quo actors in Libya persist, not due to their invincibility but because of a UN strategy that opts for appeasement over action”

“Under the circumstances, there is no way the UN can operate successfully,” he concluded. “There is no room for a solution in the future.” Bathily’s remarks confirm both the UN’s failure in Libya and the chaotic environment in which it operated, accusing Libya’s rival governments of perpetuating national divisions.

The country is currently divided between the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU) in the west, led by Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, and the rival Benghazi-based House of Representatives in the east. The UN envoy’s resignation, and condemnation, raise questions about what could come next in Libya’s frozen conflict.

Anas El Gomati, founder and director of the Libya-based think tank Sadeq Institute, told The New Arab that Bathily’s departure is part of a carousel of UN envoys, underscoring a deeper, more systemic issue. According to him, a major impediment to progress in Libya has been the absence of political will among major powers within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to instigate meaningful change via elections. “The status quo actors in Libya persist, not due to their invincibility but because of a UN strategy that opts for appeasement over action,” El Gomati told TNA.

“This approach has favoured the creation of interim governments that serve as placeholders rather than problem-solvers, allowing those entrenched in power to fortify their positions further.” Jalel Harchaoui, an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), told TNA that even before Bathily became the UN Special Envoy external actors had played a key, and often damaging, role in exacerbating Libya’s stalemate.

“Cairo has maintained for several years that in order to conduct elections in Libya, it is necessary first to dismantle the current Dbeibeh government in Tripoli and replace it with a smaller caretaker government tasked with overseeing fair elections,” Harchaoui said “This tactic by the Egyptians is perfectly dishonest, and they have promoted it both directly in NYC and Washington but also through their support for the speaker of the eastern Libyan Parliament, Aguila Saleh.”

Harchaoui claims that Egypt had consistently contradicted Bathily, a tactic that Washington and others have largely tolerated. “Throughout his tenure, Bathily responded by making small concessions to Egypt, one after another, until his roadmap lost much of its most basic logic, to the point where, for the latest several months, the Bathily process had become devoid of realism and coherence,” he said.

“From this perspective, it is not surprising that the 76-year-old Bathily ultimately gave up and left. What’s important now is that in early March 2024, the Americans had taken the step of appointing a US diplomat as the deputy head of the UN mission in Libya. In practice, this means that Stephanie Khoury will now lead the UN mission in Libya on an interim basis. It’s entirely possible that her new direction may shift focus away from the issue of elections.”

There has also been a failure to pressure Aguila Saleh, the chief of the Tobruk parliament and the longest-standing member of the status quo, alongside the Tripoli-based High Council of State (HCS), to call for simultaneous parliamentary and presidential elections. “The UN has preferred to perpetuate an approach that recycles the old guard into seemingly new but fundamentally unchanged interim unity governments. This strategy maintains a facade of progress while ensuring that there is no real threat to the entrenched power structures and, therefore, no real change for Libyans. It’s old wine, in new bottles,” analyst Anas El Gomati said.

Bathily’s resignation stems from the unsatisfactory results of a prolonged period of experimentation. Although the most topical issue now concerning Libya is what the UN, the US, Russia, and other actors will do following the UN envoy’s resignation, some think that war is only a matter of time. In this context, Harchaoui says that as the UN seeks to address its own failures, the main Tripoli decision-makers are leaving little room for dialogue or pragmatic arrangements among themselves that would prolong the current malaise without resorting to violence.

“The Central Bank of Libya continues to block the financial channels that Dbeibeh needs to function and survive as Prime Minister. For this reason, the plan to overthrow the governor has become increasingly tempting for Kabir’s enemies,” Harchaoui argues. “Dbeibeh does not have the luxury of waiting. Therefore, the risk of clashes erupting in Tripoli keeps inching higher and higher,” he added, saying that in the meantime Russia is implementing a bold and rapid military expansion of its presence in eastern and southern Libya.

While a new conflict is always possible, the circumstances now are very different to 2019, when Libyan National Army (LNA) leader General Khalifa Haftar launched a months-long offensive to capture Tripoli. “The prospect of war, while always possible, seems unlikely to manifest in the form of a direct invasion akin to Haftar’s 2019 power grab,” Gomati told TNA. He argued instead that the dynamics within Tripoli might evolve more subtly, with figures like Haftar possibly agitating from the sidelines to manoeuvre strategically into power within Tripoli’s militia landscape rather than through overt military aggression.

“External backers are also critical. Haftar’s backers in the UAE and Russia would not back another conflict. These players have a vested interest in maintaining Libya’s current divided and paralysed state, which serves as a logistics hub, and allowing them to leverage Libya to support the war in Sudan and their interests in the Sahel. Initiating another war in Libya would risk destabilising this advantageous balance, potentially undermining their broader regional strategy,” Gomati said.

“As for the UN’s new envoy in Libya, they are entering an arena where geopolitical interests favour paralysis and internal divisions have created a revenue-sharing mix for the elites like the Haftar and Dbeibeh families,” he added. “Nothing changes that game, apart from the insatiable greed on their respective parts. Without significant changes in the UN strategy towards Libya and a genuine commitment to enforce peace, security sector reform, and hold free and fair elections, the new envoy’s efforts are a different chapter in the same story of the last decade.”

***

Dr Ufuk Necat Tasci is a political analyst, academic, and journalist. His research areas and interests include Libya, the foreign policy of Turkey, proxy wars, surrogate warfare, and new forms of conflict and history.

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