Author - ab_mnbr

Michael Robbins, Amaney A. Jamal, and Mark Tessler

POLL VAULT

Each Arab Barometer survey polls over 1,200 respondents and is conducted in person in the respondent’s place of residence. These surveys question respondents on their views on a wide array of topics, including economic and religious issues, views of their governments, political participation, women’s rights, the environment, and international affairs. Since October 7, Arab Barometer has completed surveys in five diverse Arab countries: Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, and Morocco.

Because Arab Barometer’s previous round of surveys in these countries was conducted between 2021 and 2022, factors other than the war in Gaza may have contributed to changes in public opinion between then and now. One additional poll, however, happened to provide an invaluable benchmark, allowing us to deduce that certain key shifts in opinion probably occurred much more recently.

Between September 13 and November 4, 2023, we conducted a scheduled survey in Tunisia involving 2,406 interviews. About half these interviews were conducted before October 7 and about half afterward.

To understand how Tunisians’ views changed after October 7, we calculated the average responses during the three weeks before Hamas’s attack and then tracked daily changes in the weeks that followed—finding a swift, sharp drop in the percentage of respondents who held favorable views of the United States. The results in most other countries we surveyed in 2021–22 and after October 7 followed a similar pattern: in all but one, views of the United States also declined markedly.

Despite the horror of Hamas’s attack, few Arab Barometer respondents agreed that it ought to be called a “terrorist act.” By contrast, the vast majority agreed that Israel’s campaign in Gaza ought to be classified as terrorism.

For the most part, Arab citizens surveyed after October 7 assessed the situation in Gaza as dire. When asked which of seven words, including “war,” “hostilities,” “massacre,” and “genocide,” best described the ongoing events in Gaza, the most common term respondents chose in all but one country was “genocide.”

Only in Morocco did a substantial number of respondents—24 percent—call those events a “war,” about the same percentage of Moroccans that called it a “massacre.” Everywhere else, less than 15 percent of respondents chose “war” to characterize what was happening in Gaza.

Furthermore, Arab Barometer surveys found that Arab citizens do not believe that Western actors are standing up for Gazans. Our survey asked, “Among the following parties, which do you believe is committed to defending Palestinian rights?” and allowed respondents to select all that applied from a list of ten countries, the European Union, and the United Nations. No more than 17 percent of respondents in any country agreed that the United Nations is standing up for Palestinian rights.

The European Union fared worse, but the United States received the lowest marks: eight percent of respondents in Kuwait, six percent in Morocco and Lebanon, five percent in Mauritania, and two percent in Jordan agreed that it stood up for Palestinians.

The results for the United States diverged even more from those of other Western and global actors on the question of protecting Israel. When asked whether the United States was protecting Israeli rights, more than 60 percent of respondents in all five countries agreed that it was doing so. These percentages far exceed the percentages of respondents who agreed that the European Union or the United Nations is protecting Israel.

These perceptions in the Arab world about Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, and about the United States’ approach to it, appear to have had major consequences for the United States’ overall reputation. In nine of the ten countries in which Arab Barometer asked about U.S. favorability in 2021, at least a third of all respondents said that they held a favorable view of the United States.

In four out of the five countries surveyed between December 2023 and March 2024, however, fewer than a third viewed the United States favorably. In Jordan, the percentage of respondents that viewed the United States favorably dropped dramatically, from 51 percent in 2022 to 28 percent in a poll conducted in the winter of 2023–24.

In Mauritania, the percentage of respondents that viewed the United States favorably fell from 50 percent in a survey conducted in the winter of 2021–22 to 31 percent in the survey conducted in the winter of 2023–24, and in Lebanon, it fell from 42 percent in the winter of 2021–22 to 27 percent in early 2024. Similarly, the percentage of respondents who agreed that U.S. President Joe Biden’s foreign policies were “good” or “very good” dropped by 12 points in Lebanon and nine points in Jordan over the same period.

The timing of our survey in Tunisia strongly suggests that Israel’s military campaign in Gaza drove this overall decline. In the three weeks before October 7, 40 percent of Tunisians said they had a favorable view of the United States. By October 27, not quite three weeks after the start of Israel’s military operations in Gaza, just ten percent of Tunisians said the same.

Although Arabs’ opinion of the United States and Biden declined after October 7, views on different aspects of the United States’ engagement with the Middle East did not all fall equally. Our respondents were just as likely to agree that U.S. foreign aid to their country strengthens education initiatives or that it strengthens civil society as they were before October 7.

In fact, respondents in Jordan, Mauritania, and Morocco in our winter of 2023–24 survey were slightly more likely to agree that U.S. foreign aid strengthens civil society than they were in 2021 and 2022. These findings suggest that disagreement with the U.S. government’s policy toward Israel and the war in Gaza, not other elements of U.S. foreign policy, are driving the decline in the United States’ regional reputation.

FRINGE BENEFIT

Despite offering limited material and rhetorical support for Gaza, China has been the primary beneficiary of the United States’ decline in reputation among Arab publics. In its 2021–22 surveys, Arab Barometer demonstrated that Arabs’ support for China was declining. But in recent months, this trend has reversed.

In all the countries Arab Barometer surveyed after October 7, at least half the respondents said they held favorable views of China. In both Jordan and Morocco, key U.S. allies, China has benefited from at least a 15-point increase in its favorability ratings.

When asked whether U.S. or Chinese policies are better for their region’s security, respondents in three of the five countries we surveyed after October 7 said they preferred China’s approach. China’s actual presence in the region has, in fact, been minimal, with its engagement focused mostly on economic deals through its Belt and Road Initiative.

Arab publics in the Middle East appear to understand that China has played a limited role in the events in Gaza: only 14 percent of Lebanese respondents, 13 percent of Moroccans, nine percent of Kuwaitis, seven percent of Jordanians, and a vanishingly small three percent of Mauritanians agreed that China is committed to defending the rights of Palestinians.

It is likely, then, that respondents’ increasingly favorable views of China reflect their dissatisfaction with U.S. and Western policies. When asked more specific policy questions, our respondents gave more ambivalent answers.

Asked if they thought Chinese policies are better at “protecting freedoms and rights,” American policies are better, Chinese and American policies are equally good, or Chinese and American policies are equally bad, a plurality of Kuwaitis, Mauritanians, and Moroccans said U.S. policies are better than Chinese policies.

Respondents in two countries that border Israel, however, felt the opposite: in Arab Barometer surveys in Jordan and Lebanon after October 7, substantially more respondents agreed that China’s policies are better than the United States’ at protecting rights and freedoms.

China’s record on protecting rights and freedoms at home and abroad is poor, but the Lebanese and Jordanian populations now consider the United States’ record to be even worse. This finding reflects a larger trend in Arab Barometer’s data: geography matters. People who live closest to the conflict in Gaza and whose countries have historically accommodated large numbers of Palestinian refugees expressed the lowest confidence in specific U.S. Middle East policies.

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Hafed Al Ghwell

The southern Mediterranean shores are fast becoming a permanent theater for worsening geopolitical tensions and their cumulative impacts on human suffering, especially with Libya’s dual crises of arms trafficking and migration.

This volatile mix, worsened by the country’s protracted political deadlock, has come to reflect the broader security risks facing North Africa, the Sahel, southern Europe, and, by extension, the US.
Historically, the post-2011 destabilization of Libya brought about an alarming proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

The raiding of a massive state military arsenal, once among the biggest in the region, led to weapons ranging from pistols to man-portable air defense systems falling into the hands of non-state actors. This proliferation has been linked directly to the enhanced operational capacities of various armed groups, notably impacting conflict dynamics in the Sahel and Sinai.

For instance, an influx of firearms and munitions allowed Mali’s insurgent factions to increase the intensity of their attacks on state forces, complicating peacekeeping efforts there and, ultimately, leading to an unceremonious French exit from the region.

Recent revelations of Russian military deliveries to Tobruk, defying a decade-old UN arms embargo, are a stark reminder of the surge in illicit activities that continue to thrive in a fractured state. The brazen act signified Moscow’s escalating involvement, as well as the impotence of international resolve.

An embargo, long-declared “totally ineffective” by a UN panel, has consistently failed to stem the flow of arms, sparking new conflicts and inflaming existing ones, as well as empowering warlords such as Khalifa Haftar. His control over eastern Libya, bolstered by external support, has essentially “green-lit” wide-ranging transnational criminality and created new, complex risks that continue to fester as the world’s attention remains fixed elsewhere.

The influx of weaponry worsens an already tenuous security situation across the region. Libya, with its strategic location and porous borders, now functions as a near-permanent hub for trafficking in arms, which feeds conflicts in neighboring countries, such as Sudan, and significantly contributes to the Sahel’s endless turmoil.

Following the end of large-scale skirmishes, Libya remains diced up among countless well-armed groups. Not only do they blur the lines between state and non-state actors, they also leverage their military capacities to engage in, and profit from, Libya’s trafficking economies. This fragmentation and militarization are now potent catalysts for derailing the country’s fragile political processes and resisting counter-trafficking initiatives.

Moreover, the proliferation of arms funds the operations of extremist groups and criminal networks that are deeply embedded in the lucrative smuggling routes crisscrossing North Africa. The ease with which these groups acquire military-grade weaponry is shocking, to say the least — given the impromptu markets for arms on social media, where transactions are openly facilitated.

Early this year, for example, munitions ranging from hand grenades to anti-aircraft cannons were being advertised on forums by militants, with some sellers claiming that the origins of some of their lethal wares to be as far away as the Czech Republic, hinting at the transnational contours of Libya’s descent into an open market for the world’s small arms.

It not only further jeopardizes Libya’s already troubled political landscape, but also heightens the risk of dangerous spillovers and cross-border violence, hampering local and international efforts even to gauge the scope of this crisis.

Another growing worry, especially in Brussels and, soon, Washington, is the intersection of small arms proliferation with sprawling human trafficking operations in Libya, which not only violates human rights but also indirectly contributes to the destabilization of both transit and destination countries.

Moreover, the black market for arms also provides a significant revenue stream that facilitates the trafficking of contraband and illicit substances, including drugs such as Captagon, dubbed “the poor man’s cocaine.” This drug has fueled what remains an enduring crisis across the Arab world, disproportionately affecting its most prolific users — the region’s youth.

The situation in Libya, serving as a hub for such extensive networks, evidently engenders regional instability and compounds challenges facing local and international stakeholders in their quest to bolster the country’s security, governance, and development. The EU’s Operation Irini, launched in 2020 to enforce the arms embargo and stem the flow of weapons, can hardly be called a success.

High-profile seizures, including the interception of almost 150 armored vehicles, for instance, hint at the scale of the challenge. However, the operation’s focus on larger shipments neglects the smaller, yet equally lethal, consignments of arms and ammunition that continue to slip through to cause havoc elsewhere or to fund it.

Europe’s fragmented and often contradictory approach to Libya has only compounded the problem. The lack of a coherent strategy, coupled with individual member states’ pursuit of narrow interests, has sustained a lawless environment that benefits malign actors. Take, for instance, the EU’s reliance on Libyan factions to curb migrant flows, often through dubious deals with local militias. These not only failed to address the root causes, but also legitimized and empowered groups that now benefit both from Brussels’ “generosity” and keeping those very same trafficking routes operational.

Benghazi has become a new source of worries for the US. The city, controlled by Haftar and his Libyan National Army, is witnessing a concerning increase in chartered flights to Nicaragua, intended to facilitate the illicit passage of migrants to the US, by crossing multiple countries, enabled by criminal networks and the tacit approval of involved states. This route has been operational since 2021, with more than 1,000 charter flights landing in Nicaragua, predominantly from regions linked to conflict or economic hardship.

The absence in Libya of a unified government and stable institutions creates a fertile ground for the proliferation of illicit economies and further external meddling. Without concerted efforts to forge an “acceptable” settlement, any attempt to curb trafficking in arms or manage migration will be akin to treating the symptoms rather than the disease.

Key stakeholders must acknowledge that a durable solution lies in robust support for mediation efforts and credible roadmaps, which should prioritize strengthening what remains of Libya’s still-functioning institutions of governance.

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James Brooke

From its new strongholds on the Libyan coast, Russian Kalibr cruise missiles could hit almost any target in Western Europe. May was Russia’s bloodiest month in its 28-month war against Ukraine — 38,940 soldiers dead or seriously wounded.

This mountain of casualties did not stop the Kremlin from sending 2,000 soldiers and thousands of tons of military equipment to the eastern half of Libya, controlled by a warlord in Benghazi.

Libya?

After Islamic fundamentalists murdered the American ambassador to Libya in Benghazi in 2012,  Washington lost its taste for Libya’s cutthroat politics. Moscow stepped into the vacuum. Now, after years of intense courtship, Russia may be on the verge of winning basing rights for Russian Navy warships in Tobruk.

From that point in the central Mediterranean, Russian Kalibr cruise missiles could hit almost any target in Western Europe. Last week, President Putin warned that Russia could provide long-range weapons to other countries so that they could strike Western targets.

“A Russian Mediterranean base in Libya would threaten Europe and NATO’s southern flank,” the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War wrote  in a new report: ‘Russian Outreach Across Africa.’ “The Kremlin’s position in Libya also gives it the opportunity to destabilize Europe by weaponizing migrant flows from Africa, which it now has an even greater influence over thanks to its recent expansion along southern points of trans-Saharan migrant routes in the Sahel.”

In Russia’s hybrid war against the West, uncontrolled immigration is a new weapon used by Moscow. Libya has the longest coastline of North Africa — about 1,100 miles. During the 42-year long rule of Muammar Gaddafi, Europe had an unwritten deal with Libya’s eccentric ruler: you keep Africa from crossing the Med, and we overlook your ‘eccentricities.’ 

However, since Mr. Gaddafi’s overthrow and death in 2011, Libya reverted to the east-west split of the 20th century Italian colonial era. There is one government in Tripoli, the UN-recognized capital. There is another government in Benghazi. With the split, coastal control is a thing of the past. Last year, the EU’s border patrol agency reported that 380,000 African migrants attempted to cross into Europe from Libya — the highest number in almost a decade.

Tobruk, a bitterly contested port during World War II,  is only 175 miles south of Crete, the Greek island. For human smugglers, that boat ride can be done in one night. To the south, Russia’s new allies — Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger — control human smuggling routes out of the heart of Africa.

Over the last two years, Russia and its satellite, Belarus, have pumped undocumented migrants across their western land borders. Migrants are pawns in attempts by Russia and Belarus to fuel anti-migrant sentiment and boost far-right parties in the European elections.

Belarus opened travel agencies in the Middle East offering a new, unofficial route into Europe. After 4,600 migrants without EU visas attempted to illegally enter Lithuania from Belarus, that Baltic nation closed four of its six land borders with Belarus. Finland closed all its land crossings with Russia after 1,700 migrants crossed last fall. 

On Poland’s border with Belarus this summer, as many as 400 migrants a day attempt to enter that EU nation. Increasingly, attempts turn violent with asylum seekers throwing rocks and burning sticks at Polish soldiers guarding the 248-mile  border. On Thursday, Polish soldier Mateusz Sitek, died after being stabbed through the border fence by a migrant. Polish soldiers push back surging migrants  with pepper spray and by firing their guns in the air and into the ground.

In Eastern Libya, the local leader, General Khalifa Haftar, reportedly profits from sending boatloads of African migrants north. “Haftar has explicitly aided migrant smugglers in Libya by granting them security clearances,” the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War charged Thursday in a report: ‘Russian Diplomatic Blitz Highlights the Kremlin’s Strategic Aims in Africa. “Russia’s partners in the Nigerien junta annulled an EU-backed migration law that aimed to stem migrant flows in December 2023.”

Ensconced in Benghazi, General Haftar personifies the failure of American diplomacy in Libya. An American citizen, he lived for two decades in Virginia where he was a CIA asset. Recently, however, he and many of his six sons have quietly moved their money out of American bank accounts.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin reaps the benefits of a long ago Soviet-era investment. In the late 1970s, Haftar, then a rising young officer in the Gaddafi inner circle, completed a three-year degree for foreign officers at the M. V. Frunze Military Academy in Moscow.. A Russian speaker, General Haftar now is the target of Kremlin courtship: a trip to Moscow to meet Mr. Putin last September, and five meetings in Benghazi with Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov, including one last week.

Two weeks ago, the fruits of this blossoming alliance could be seen at a parade in Benghazi marking the 10th anniversary of the defeat of local Islamist forces who may have been involved in the murder of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other American officials. According to Janes, the centerpiece of the parade were rows of  Russian-made Volk, or Wolf, armored personnel carriers, painted in desert camouflage.

The Volk armored personnel carriers are the tip of an iceberg of five shipments made since April 1 to Tobruk from Russia’s Eastern Mediterranean naval base in Tarsus, Syria, the Institute for the Study of War reported May 17. “One shipment in April alone accounted for 6,000 tons of military hardware. These shipments included equipment, vehicles, and weapons, including radar systems, T72 tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery systems.”

Russia is partly using Tobruk to send equipment south, to bolster the countries in the Sahel where Russian troops are replacing French troops: Burkina Faso,  Mali, and Niger. However, many Russian military assets now are spread around Eastern Libya, according to a new report, “Mediterranean Sea Objective for the African Corps.”

“Russian military personnel and equipment have been spotted in at least 10 locations in eastern Libya since the beginning of March,” reads the report, a joint project of independent outlet Verstka and the All Eyes on Wagner project. Wagner, the Russian mercenary group, has largely been replaced by Russian soldiers answering to Russia’s Defense Ministry. Wounded soldiers from Eastern Libya are routinely treated in Russia.

On the financial side, Libya is believed to duck EU sanctions and launder Russian gas for sale to Europe. Last month, at the Russia-Islamic World Forum in Russia, Libyan officials invited the Russian company Tatneft to build an oil refinery in Benghazi or Tobruk. Last month, on a visit to eastern Libya, Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, said Russia plans to open a consulate in Benghazi.

In previous assaults on the government in Tripoli, General Haftar flooded the country with as much as $1 billion in fake Libyan dinars, printed by the Russian state currency printer Goznak. Now, analysts believe the new funneling of arms into Eastern Libya presages more serious Russian backing: for a military assault by General Haftar on the remaining one third of Libya outside his control.

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Michael Robbins, Amaney A. Jamal, and Mark Tessler

October 7, 2023, was a watershed moment not just for Israel but for the Arab world. Hamas’s horrific attack occurred just as a new order appeared to be emerging in the region. Three years earlier, four members of the Arab League—Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—had launched processes to normalize their diplomatic relations with Israel. As the summer of 2023 drew to a close, the most important Arab country that still did not recognize Israel, Saudi Arabia, looked poised to do so, too.

Hamas’s assault and Israel’s subsequent devastating military operation in Gaza have curtailed this march toward normalization. Saudi Arabia has stated that it will not proceed with a normalization deal until Israel takes clear steps to facilitate the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Jordan recalled its ambassador to Israel in November 2023, and a visit to Morocco by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu planned for late 2023 never materialized. Arab leaders have watched warily as their citizens have grown vocally opposed to the war in Gaza. In many Arab countries, thousands have turned out to protest Israel’s war and the humanitarian crisis it has produced. Protesters in Jordan and Morocco have also called for an end to their countries’ respective peace treaties with Israel, voicing frustration that their governments are not listening to the people.

October 7  may turn out to be a watershed moment for the United States, too. Because of the war in Gaza, Arab public opinion has turned sharply against Israel’s staunchest ally, the United States—a development that could confound U.S. efforts not only to help resolve the crisis in Gaza but also to contain Iran and push back against China’s growing influence in the Middle East.

Since 2006, Arab Barometer, the nonpartisan research organization we run, has conducted biannual nationally representative opinion surveys in 16 Arab countries, capturing ordinary citizens’ views in a region that has little opinion polling. After the United States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq, other polls consistently found that few ordinary Arab citizens held positive views of the United States. By 2022, however, their attitudes had improved somewhat, with at least a third of respondents in nearly all countries Arab Barometer surveyed affirming that they held “a very favorable” or “somewhat favorable” opinion of the United States.

But surveys we conducted in five countries in late 2023 and early 2024 show that the United States’ standing among Arab citizens has declined dramatically. A poll in Tunisia conducted partially before and partially after October 7 strongly suggested that this shift occurred in response to the events in Gaza. Perhaps even more surprising, the surveys also made it clear that the United States’ loss has been China’s gain.

Arab citizens’ views of China have warmed in our recent surveys, reversing a half-decade trend of weakening support for China in the Arab world. When asked if China has undertaken serious efforts to protect Palestinian rights, however, few respondents agreed. This result suggests that Arab views reflect a profound dissatisfaction with the United States rather than specific support for Chinese policies toward Gaza.

In the coming months and years, U.S. leaders will seek to end the conflict in Gaza and initiate negotiations toward a permanent settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The United States also hopes to safeguard the international economy by protecting the Red Sea from attacks by Iranian proxies and to cement a regional alliance that contains Iranian aggression and limits Chinese engagement in the region. To achieve any of these goals, however, Washington needs the partnership of Arab states, something that will be harder to get if Arab populations remain so skeptical of U.S. aims in the Middle East.

U.S. analysts and politicians often imply that what they sometimes dismissively call “the Arab street” should be of little concern to American foreign policy. Because most Arab leaders are authoritarian, the argument goes, they do not care much about public opinion, and U.S. policymakers should therefore prioritize making deals with powerbrokers over winning the hearts and minds of Arab citizens. In general, however, the notion that Arab leaders are not constrained by public opinion is a myth.

The Arab Spring uprisings toppled governments in four countries, and widespread protests in 2019 led to changes in leadership in four other Arab countries. Authoritarians, too, must consider the views of the people they govern. Few Arab leaders now want to be seen openly cooperating with Washington, given the sharp rise in anti-American sentiment among the populations they rule. Arab citizens’ anger at U.S. foreign policy could also have serious direct consequences for the United States. Our prior research based on data from opinion surveys in Algeria and Jordan has demonstrated that anger at U.S. foreign policy can cause citizens to have greater sympathy for acts of terror directed at the United States.

Some Arab Barometer findings, however, also reveal that Arabs’ growing skepticism about the United States’ role in the Middle East is not irreversible. Variations in opinion between publics in countries that the United States has treated differently indicate that the United States can change the way it is perceived in the Arab world by changing its policies.

The survey results also suggest specific shifts in approach that would likely improve Arabs’ perceptions of the United States, including pushing harder for a cease-fire in Gaza, increasing U.S. humanitarian assistance to the territory and the rest of the region, and, in the longer term, working for a two-state solution. Ultimately, to win the trust of Arab citizens in the Middle East, the United States must show the same care for the suffering of the Palestinians that it does for that of the Israelis.

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Dr Mustafa Fetouri

The United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Libya (SRSG), Abdoulaye Bathily, resigned his position on 16 April, some 18 months after he took up the near-impossible task of mediating the Libyan crisis.

Mr. Bathily was SRSG number nine since the UN got into the Libyan mess it helped create back in 2011, by first authorising military intervention by any willing state to protect Libyan civilians against the alleged brutality of their own government. The story of what really happened and how it continues to unfold is now well-known history.

In his last briefing, the envoy told the UN Security Council (UNSC) that his attempts to address the concerns of different Libyan power-hungry factions were met with “stubborn resistance, unreasonable expectations and indifference to the interests of the Libyan people. These politicians, he said, have over the years entrenched their positions, thanks to “divided regional and global landscape, perpetuating the status quo”, subjecting Libya to further insecurity.

He accused all involved politicians of hypocrisy and deliberately creating disagreement after they themselves agree to some plan to move forward. He described this behaviour as lack of goodwill on the corrupt politicians’ part.

Commenting on the situation after tendering his resignation, Mr. Bathily was more candid about the UN’s future role in the country. He said “under the circumstances, there is no way the UN can operate successfully.” Why? Because the Libyan protagonists are selfish and they put their “personal interests above the needs of their country” he said, while predicting that the world body has no “room for a solution in the future.”

This is a very blunt and true statement from a UN diplomat wishing to justify his failure, that of the UN and his own resignation, all at once.

With Bathily gone, his number two in the UN Mission in Libya, Stephanie Koury, took over the difficult task of political mediation of the UN mission—a task exclusively given to the Special Representative which usually requires UNSC decision.  Since the Council is unlikely to agree, in the foreseeable future, to appoint that person, Ms. Koury is likely to remain as Officer-in-Charge of the UN mission, with little prospect of successfully cracking the problem she inherited, mainly forcing Libyan factions to agree to both presidential and legislative elections.

In reality, the UN can do very little when the parties it is mediating between do not want a solution, and this is exactly the case in Libya. The main institutional actors, to use Mr. Bathily’s words, are still there and they are the ones Ms. Koury is supposed to deal with, but none of them has the intention or the goodwill to change the status quo. The five institutional actors who are holding Libya back are: the Parliament in the East, the Higher Council of State, the Government of National Unity and the Presidential Council in Tripoli. All topped by General Khalifa Haftar, the de facto power, in the Eastern and Southern regions.

Since the “five devils” do not want it, elections will not happen. Unless they are gone or, somehow, forced to accept elections, the entire nation will continue to be held hostage to the very few and will not vote to elect its president, representatives and government. Against this background, it is hard to see what progress, if any, Ms. Koury could make when the very people delaying any progress are still around and she still has to deal with them.

Besides, what kind of initiatives could Ms. Koury bring to the table to satisfy all “five devils”, who are a very wily bunch willing to do whatever it takes to keep their positions and privileges, particularly financial gains they personally make at the expense of the estimated seven million Libyans?

Over the last 13 years, since the country was plunged into an abyss by the NATO bombardment and Western-backed armed rebels, almost every imaginable idea of compromise has been tried but failed. At the same time, over the same period, the “five devils” have perfected very precise tactics and wicked strategies to kill any political idea presented to them.

They have been doing so, thanks to their regional, international backers and local armed militias. Since the 2014 elections, for example, foreign meddling in Libya’s internal affairs has been, and continues to be, behind almost all UN failures in the country. But, now, that destructive role is being played by the local proxies, including the decade old Parliament whose legitimacy, like the other four actors, has long since been lost.

Working against Ms. Koury, also, is the regional and international political environment. Russia and the United States, for one, the powers with a significant role in Libya, disagree about almost everything. Both are veto powers and are able to bring the UNSC to a halt, as they have been doing for the last few years. And if, magically, Ms. Koury successfully brokers a universally accepted compromise among the Libyan factions, she still needs the Security Council to endorse it and make it work. The Council is unlikely to agree. On top of that, the US is in election mood now, with little room for Libya to be acted upon.

In terms of geopolitics, Libya is now another potential theatre of confrontation between Moscow and the West, which means solving the Libyan crisis is not a priority at all. Add to that the ongoing Israeli genocide in Gaza and the war in Ukraine, neither Moscow nor Washington have the luxury of focusing on Libya with the aim of ending its misery.

All this means that elections in Libya, with the potential to end the long transitional period, are still far off, and reaching that point will involve bypassing some major potholes on a road already difficult to navigate.

One day, Ms. Koury will leave her position and move on, but the “five devils” will only further cement their positions, while perfecting the art of delaying and disagreeing.

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Emanuele Rossi

Libyan ports are back in fashion. There are the deep sea ports of Tobruk and Susan which are popular with Russia and the USA, while China appears. Profazio (Ndcf/Iiss): “There is a return of strategic competition in Libya”

According to a Benghazi website, Saddam Haftar , son of the militia leader who controls the city of Cyrenaica, Khalifa Haftar , was in Rome in recent days to discuss investment opportunities in eastern Libya with American businessmen. The site may not be reliable, and for now none of the sources contracted by Formiche.net – neither in Italy nor in the United States – can confirm the news.

However, what is interesting, in a world in which information is constantly altered and directed according to the narrative, is precisely the dynamic behind the publication of the news – which is worth as much as its truthfulness, indeed at times it makes it seem relative. Why should a media based in Benghazi (where the Haftar family exercises mafia-like control, ranging from military control to business in the area’s economic trafficking, starting with migration) talk about Saddam Haftar’s contacts with the USA?

In recent weeks that side of Libya has been particularly under the international spotlight due to information – in that case much more truthful, but always circulated with the aim of narration – which described the increase in Russian involvement in Cyrenaica. Moscow, thanks to the agreements made with the Haftars (with the father in the past, and now inherited by the children, a very active part of the family business), is using eastern Libya as a logistical-tactical hub to push the strategy of Afrika Corp – as it is now called the Wagner Group surrogate, which effectively returned under the management of the Ministry of Defense after the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin .

For example, yesterday Yunis-Bek Yevkurov , Russian Deputy Defense Minister, landed at Benina airport, Benghazi, welcomed by Khaled Haftar , who is considered Russia’s link point in Libya. A role that is often portrayed in competition with that of Saddam, who was more inclined to dialogue with the Americans. As in every family of power there is an internal struggle for succession – and everyone seeks external support for their legitimation.

In the midst of this context, the question is: perhaps Saddam Haftar’s elusive Roman contact was used by his pro-US son to boost himself in intra-family competition, or does it serve to describe a rebalancing of this excessive exposure of the warlord of ‘Libyan East towards Russia? According to Umberto Profazio , an analyst at the IISS and the NATO Foundation, it is not surprising if it was all an information maneuver to demonstrate interest in the Americans’ relations, after AfriCom has been targeting Haftarian activities with Russia for years.

“In any case it reveals the desire to try to play on multiple fronts. Interestingly, there is a return of strategic competition in Libya. which in this multipolar phase intensifies where there is a void, a deficiency, internal as in North Africa or the Sahel: and Libya is one of the main interests of a challenge that particularly concerns Europe and above all Italy”, he comments Profazio. However, he underlines that the issue is also one of internal Libyan politics, “where the issue is also linked to Khalifa’s succession: they are looking for different paths, one of his sons, Belqasim Haftar , is for example setting up a fund for the reconstruction of the region ( tragically hit by cyclone “Daniel” , ed. ), other more active in the activities of their militia and in certain relations with the outside world”.

If the general situation were not enough, this of the Haftar family is another problem for Libya, also because it brings various issues to the table. For example, at this moment in which maritime geopolitics is becoming central again for the balance between Mediterranean and extra-regional countries, Libya also has its value. In particular, we are talking about the port of Susah, once among the cities of Pentopoli Cyrenaica and a commercial port (as the port of Cyrene) since the times of ancient Greece. Texas-based Guidry Group had already landed a contract to build a couple of billion-dollar deep-sea port in Susah, which is expected to become a multi-purpose container port, making it the region’s largest deep-sea logistics hub. as it is expected to handle 1 million TEU in the first phase.

But it was a period before the current one: the agreement dates back to 2012, the feasibility study to 2013 and subsequently – with the explosion of the first phase of the internal conflict that has divided the country for ten years and of which the Haftars have always been protagonists – the path had become complicated.

A master plan had resurfaced in 2018, named among the best projects at the Global Infrastructure Forum in Montreal in August. Seven months later, Haftar launched the most important assault on Tripoli: also aided by the Russians, he intended to overthrow the UN government led at the time by Fayez Serraj .

Subsequently, a year after the failure of the Haftarian military plan, in the spring of 2021 there was a revival of the idea of ​​the port of Susah, with a long-term joint venture agreement between Guidry Group and the Greek Archirodon.

Investing in infrastructure works in Libya was a complicated project at the time like now, even if the Roman meeting would have served to relaunch the business and projects like Susah, according to information from Agenzia Nova obtained from an anonymous source in Cyrenaica. In fact, among the businessmen met by Saddam there was also the head of the Guidry Group. 

These days the investment search activity is also widespread on the other side of Libya. Prime Minister Abdelhamid Dabaiba left Tripoli to attend the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum in Beijing, and had a reserved slot with the Chinese Party/State’s foreign policy chief, Foreign Minister Wang Yi .

There was talk of the reopening of the Tripoli embassy and the activation of economic agreements that had remained dormant due to the destabilization. China is also interested in having a place (and a port) in Libyan reconstruction. When will that be, because the process is still far away, given that the country is effectively divided in two, with Dabaiba governing according to a UN mandate that expired a couple of years ago, but there is no ability to remove him.

The other half of the country is under an informal (and unrecognized) executive led by Osama Hammad and militarily pressured by Haftar. The diplomatic-military support that Moscow provides them is linked to a composite interest, which also involves the port dimension: the Russians in fact aspire to Tobruk, another deep-water port of call, which would become a further point of support in the middle of the Mediterranean, after Tartus in Syria. Tobruk is located approximately 200 kilometers from Susah. The interests of the great powers intersect.

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Angelo Boccato

In-depth: Italy’s ambitious new development plan aims to revolutionise its ties with Africa. But is it just about energy deals and stopping migration? Enrico Mattei was a leading figure in post-war Italy who went down in history for relaunching the Italian petroleum agency Agip, founded by Benito Mussolini, into state oil giant ENI (National Fuel Trust).

A partisan leader and a Christian Democracy (Democrazia Cristiana) MP, he turned ENI into a global player that broke up the oligopoly of the world’s largest energy companies dominated by the UK, the US, the Netherlands, France, and Belgium.

Mattei secured ENI contracts across the Middle East, the Gulf, and Africa, treating countries as equals with 50/50 cuts of their profits from oil. As a result, he drew the ire of rival energy nations and made powerful enemies. It is not surprising, therefore, that Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni would choose Mattei’s name for her government’s new strategy for Africa, officially announced at the beginning of 2024.

Part of a long-term vision to reshape Italy’s foreign policy strategy in the African continent, the Mattei Plan is ambitious and could see billions invested in partner nations. But beyond evoking Italy’s former soft power and influence on the global stage, what does it entail, and how will it impact the countries targeted?

The Mattei Plan beyond nostalgia

The Mattei Plan will initially focus on nine pilot projects across Mozambique, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and includes five key pillars of education and training, agriculture, health, energy, and water. Beyond this, however, details remain scarce.

“We still do not have many details of what the Mattei Plan will look like. The plan was presented in January, during the Italy-Africa summit, a steering committee was gathered, in addition to the legislative tools to define the structure of the plan,” Aldo Liga, a Research Fellow for the Middle East and Africa at ISPI (Institute for the Studies of International Politics) told The New Arab.

“However, the Mattei Plan so far seems to be a way to repack and rebrand the Italian approach to international cooperation and development, also seen by the fact that Libya, recently visited by PM Giorgia Meloni, is not one of the countries included in the plan.”

Meloni’s Libya visit in early May seemed to be more connected to expanding Rome’s plans of pushing back migrants in cooperation with the rival UN-supported Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli, led by Abdul Hamid al-Dbeibeh, and the National Stability Government in Benghazi, led by Osama Saad Hammad Saleh and backed by General Khalifa Haftar.

“The relationship between Italy and Libya is a historical one. Italian governments have pushed for the rehabilitation of Libya on the international stage in the early 2000s and have always tried to have a role after the 2011 revolution,” Liga added.

“There has been strong action on the migratory side and several economic interests, mainly in the energy sector. Libyan gas exports, almost in their entirety, are directed to Italy, while ENI produces electricity which is then distributed across Libyan electric networks.”

The Russian invasion of Ukraine forced Italy, like other European nations, to decrease its dependence on Moscow’s gas, pushing the country into further developing its energy relationships with Libya and other countries in the region, like Egypt.

ENI’s role in Italian foreign policy

There are several key issues at stake in the Mattei Plan, with analysts raising questions about ENI’s role in the strategy and its impact on migration, climate change, as well as the historic power imbalance between Italy and its partners in the project.

“Italy’s soft power has decreased. While it is true that projects of cooperation in sports, research, university, and agriculture will be part of the Mattei Plan, we have seen that ENI defines Italy’s foreign policy historically,” Italian-Tunisian journalist Leila Belhadj Mohamed told The New Arab.

“ENI is one of the global players in Oil and Gas, alongside Total, and is monopolising Africa. In Pemba, Mozambique the Eni-Total gas plant is responsible for emissions calculated to surpass French yearly emissions by five times.”

As foreign minister until 2022, Luigi Di Maio’s trips to the Middle East after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine were often accompanied by ENI managers, proof of the fossil fuel giant’s political influence, Mohamed says. This trend has continued since Meloni was appointed prime minister in 2022. “When it comes to deals between the Global North and Global South countries, these are never between equal actors,” added Mohamed.

“There is always a stronger actor, a European one in this case, and on the other side we mainly have autocracies that to keep their power over their people, decreasing public debt, etc…accept a typology of investments that is counterproductive and has the main focus of trying to manage migratory flows.”

Italy has been unable to maintain its historic relationships in the region, despite being one of the closest European countries to North Africa, the journalist says, and has failed to manage its ties following the Arab Spring revolutions that deposed Ben Ali, Hosni Mubarak, and Muammar Gaddafi.

“There is a lack of vision, while during Italy’s First Republic, politicians, regardless of their political alignment, were able to find the most advantageous positioning for Italy,” Mohamed says.

What next for the Mattei Plan?

“In terms of convening power regarding the Italy-Africa Summit and the Italian, European, and African partners involved, I believe it is possible to give a positive evaluation. However, this also raises the stakes,” Lorena Stella Martini, Policy Advisor in Foreign Policy at ECCO, the Italian climate-focused think tank, told The New Arab.

“Four months after the Italy-Africa Summit we still have to understand what this will entail beyond single projects, like the one announced with Kenya a few days ago (focused on biofuel production).”

Martini observes that while single initiatives and projects have been announced and pinpointed by Meloni and her ministers during visits to African countries, a strategic framework for the plan is still absent.

“The Mattei Plan is intended, according to what the government is saying, as a response to the migratory matter. For this reason, the absence of a focus on climate in the plan has an additional value,” Martini adds.

“Following Cop28 and Italy’s commitments, we would have expected that this would have been reflected in the plan. There is a tendency to talk about climate only in contexts like the Cop, not only when it comes to Africa, but with the whole Italian foreign policy lacking a collective and strategic vision on climate.”

The nexus between migration and climate change, and the rise of climate migration, is an element rarely discussed in the Global North. Moreover, when it comes to far-right parties there is often climate change denial, or downplaying the issue, as part of ongoing ‘culture wars’.

A recent investigation, Desert Dumps, published in May by different international media, including the Italian IRPI Media, shows how clandestine pushbacks of African migrants from Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia in the Sahara desert have become part of a framework of European policies which aim to turn North Africa into a hostile border outside of Europe for African migrants.

While the full extent of the Mattei Plan is still to be fully grasped, this form of migration management could be part of it. “Migration is not our tragedy, but rather an issue that we are unable to manage. It is instead a tragedy for African countries,” researcher Aldo Liga said.

“The fact that our only interest seems to be to reduce migration not only shows a general lack of empathy, but in the long term anti-migration policies risk jeopardising the very base of the relationships between North Africa and Italy.”

***

Angelo Boccato is a London-based freelance journalist. His work has appeared in publications like the Columbia Journalism Review, The Independent, and Open Democracy. He co-hosts the podcast Post Brexit News Explosion.

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Jawhar Farhat

3. 166th Battalion

• Commander: Colonel Ayoub Al-Ferjani
• Ministry Affiliation: Libyan Arab Armed Forces
• Headquarters:  Al-Berka,Benghazi, Libya

3.1 Activities

-Units from the 166th Infantry Brigade participated in searching for missing persons on the beaches and areas near Derna after Storm Daniel on September 5, 2023.

This comes in addition to their work in securing the Derna Gate and organizing the entry of relief convoys and rescue teams to contribute to alleviating the repercussions of the Mediterranean Storm “Daniel” crisis.

– On 14 January, Conclusion of the tactical course on the combat use of the M/D missile (Kornet) in the 166th Infantry Brigade.

-On 21 November , the second batch – Special Tasks Course 1.7 – graduated from the 166th Infantry Brigade, after completing field training in storming, securing, and rescuing hostages.

The graduation ceremony witnessed the presence of the Chief of Staff of the security units and several officers of the 166th Infantry Brigade.

-On 10 March, within the framework of continuous patrols, the reconnaissance company of the 166th Infantry Battalion launched its patrols from the city of Ajdabiya to Jalo and Al-Sarir, all the way to Al-Kafra. After that, the Subul_Al-Salam Battalion joined with it and carried out joint patrols on the borders linking neighboring countries.

4. 302 Battalion

• Commander: Issa Guesbsi
• Ministry Affiliation: Chief of Staff of the Land Forces
• Headquarter: X2R5+26, Benghazi, Libya

4.1 Activities

– On 8 November, Colonel Issa Dhawoud Al-Qabsi, Commander of the 302nd Thunderbolt Battalion, led a military delegation comprising  officers, non-commissioned officers and field commanders on a strategic visit to the Marada region.

– On January 14, the 302nd Infantry Battalion gathered with key leaders, including the Chief of Staff of the Land Forces. High-ranking officials present included Lieutenant General Amraja’ Al-Amami, Major General Saddam Khalifa Haftar, and Brigadier General Hassan Al-Zadma. Other leaders included Brigadier General Omar Amraji, Brigadier General Ghazi Al-Shatiti, Brigadier General Ali Ableblo, and Brigadier General Amhamed Al-Jali. Colonel Anas Al-Zayani and several officers from the Armed Forces also attended.

The meeting was regarding the restructuring of the 302nd Battalion after it joined the Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces and its rearrangement and organization.

5. Benghazi Security Battalion

It is stationed at the headquarters of the “formerly Al-Fadil Bou Omar” battalion in Benghazi, under the command of Jaafar Omar Abd Rabbo. The “Al-Fadil Bou Omar” battalion was founded by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi.

• Commander: Colonel Jaafar Omar
• Ministry Affiliation: Libyan Arab Armed Forces
• Headquarter: 4534+G53, Benghazi, Libya

5.1 Activities

– The third batch graduated from a special tasks course for members of the Benghazi Security Battalion.

-On 28 January, Within the framework of raising the level of security and combat power among members of the Special Task Force of the Benghazi Security Battalion.

The force underwent training  in a sniper course inside the battalion’s training center to fully prepare  for any military orders.

-On 13 January, the Benghazi Security Battalion, officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers participated in donating blood for the Red Crescent Blood Donation Unit.

6. 155th Brigade

The 155th Infantry Brigade is stationed in the southern region. Sites belonging to the 155th Infantry Battalion in the Jabal Al-Akhdar area, east of Benghazi.

Commander: Mahdi Nour Eddine Cherif

Ministry Affiliation: Libyan Arab Armed Forces

Headquarter: Fourth Ring Rd Banghazi, Libya

6.1 Activities

On July 26, the 155th Infantry, stationed in the city of Al Bayda, caught a drug smuggler in possession of 15 large bags containing hallucinogenic Captagon pills during a large patrol on tankers.

-Based on the decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces No. 170 of 2023 AD,
The name of the 155th Infantry Battalion was changed to (155th Infantry Brigade).

– On 13 March 2023, following instructions from the Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces, the Al-Jawf commercial convoys, affiliated with Al-Watan Company, were set in motion. These convoys, safeguarded by the 155th Infantry Battalion and the Subul Al-Salam Battalion, commenced their journey from the arrival point at the Benghazi sea port to the Al-Jawf Free Zone in the city of Kufra. From there, they embarked on a mission to establish a commercial crossing line to Africa. Notably, this marks the first convoy since operations ceased in 2011.

7. 73rd Battalion

Commander: Ali Al-Qatani

Ministry Affiliation: Libyan Arab Armed Forces

Headquarter: 3338+4JM, Benghazi, Libya

7.1 Activities

– On 12 February, the 73rd Infantry Brigade and the Security Directorate of the Joint Security Room in Murzuq conducted a night march into the city of Murzuq for the Libyan Arab Armed Forces.

-On November 13, Major General Ali Saleh Al-Qatani, Commander of the 73rd Infantry Brigade, presided over a graduation ceremony for the Kornet and 120mm-81mm mortar trainees. However, the trainees passed both the theoretical test and the practical exam with a grade of 92% and received certificates of success upon completing the course.

-On 20 July, The combat companies/608th Infantry Battalion of the 73rd Infantry Brigade concluded an intensive refresher course at the brigade’s training center in the Saluk area . Additionally, the course included dealing with light and medium weapons and mortar artillery of various sizes, simulating the defense situation and how to maintain medium weapons while the vehicle is moving and while stationed, in order to reach the highest level.

8. Conclusion

The landscape of armed groups in Benghazi reveals a mosaic of power dynamics, historical affiliations, and strategic maneuvers within Libya’s fractured political and military landscape. Haftar’s forces, epitomized by entities like the Tariq Bin Ziyad Brigade, wield significant control over eastern Libya, exerting authority through a mixture of tribal allegiances and military prowess. Furthermore, this dominance is not without controversy; reports of egregious human rights violations tarnish their reputation and underscore the volatility of the region.

Ultimately, the armed groups of Benghazi represent microcosms of Libya’s larger struggle for stability and sovereignty. While some embody the dark underbelly of conflict with their alleged atrocities, others symbolize aspirations for order and progress within a fractured nation. Consequently, the interplay of these forces underscores the intricate challenges facing Libya as it navigates a path towards peace and reconciliation.

Furthermore, militant factions in Benghazi play a pivotal role in shaping the region’s dynamics, with entities like the Tariq Bin Ziyad Brigade exerting significant influence over eastern Libya. Despite their power, reports of human rights abuses tarnish their reputation and highlight the region’s volatility. Similarly, the 106th Brigade’s involvement in political incidents raises questions about their adherence to the rule of law. Amidst these complexities, institutions like the Al Karama Training Center strive to professionalize Libyan armed forces, offering a glimpse of hope amidst turmoil. In summary, the armed groups of Benghazi represent microcosms of Libya’s struggle for stability and sovereignty, underscoring the challenges ahead.

Jawhar Farhat is an ALL source analyst with a Level 6 diploma (CSMP) in Security Management and a master’s degree in Military Sciences from the Military Academy of Tunisia.

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Jawhar Farhat

Armed groups in Benghazi lie within the shadows of the cities urban landscape. Notably, the significant presence of these armed groups in Benghazi weaves a narrative of power, politics, and conflict in post-revolutionary Libya.

Among these groups, the presence of various militias and factions further complicates the scene. Allegiances shift, and the line between friend and foe blurs. Additionally, allegations of human rights abuses and forced evictions cast a chilling shadow over their influence.

Sharp contrasts are visible with the aspirations for stability epitomized by institutions like the Al Karama Training Center. Consequently, as Libya grapples with its fractured identity, the armed groups of Benghazi, including the myriad of fighters and factions within the city, offer a glimpse into a nation’s struggle for sovereignty amidst the chaos of conflict.

At the forefront stands the enigmatic Tariq Bin Ziyad Brigade. The Benghazi Armed Forces incorporate the unit. And, notably, its actions reverberate with tales of both valor and villainy.

1. Tariq bin Ziyad Brigade

The Tariq Bin Ziyad Brigade is one of the largest and most influential armed groups operating under the Libyan Arab Armed Forces. Notably, it is a notable entity amidst the myriad of armed factions in Benghazi. Moreover, this brigade is made up of a mix of professional soldiers who fought alongside Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. And, fighters from tribes allied with the Libyan Arab Armed Forces. This mix highlights the complex blend of loyalty and ambition within Benghazi’s martial landscape.

“Unlawful killings, torture, and other ill-treatment, enforced disappearance, rape, and other sexual violence, and forced displacement — with no fear of consequences” are some of the alleged terrifying acts carried out by the Tariq Ben Zeyad Brigade. Notably, their brutality is underscored, showing the reality faced by those caught in the crosshairs of armed groups in Benghazi.

Since late 2021, the TBZ is implicated in the forced eviction of thousands of residents from Sabha and its environs. Notably, this displacement is a testament to the extensive reach and influence of these groups beyond the immediate battlegrounds.

Between 2014 and 2019, the Libyan Arab Armed Forces conducted military campaigns to seize control of the eastern Libyan cities of Derna and Benghazi. In essence, the operations underscore the pivotal role of armed groups in Benghazi, like the Tariq Bin Ziyad Brigade, in shaping the outcomes of conflict and governance in Libya. Furthermore, these campaigns not only resulted in the forced relocation of Libyan families but also highlighted the enduring power struggles and the fraught path toward sovereignty and stability in a nation marred by conflict and division.

• Commander: Saddam Haftar (son of Khalifa Haftar)
• Ministry Affiliation: Libyan Arab Armed Forces
• Headquarters: Benghazi, Libya

1.1 Activities of the Armed Groups of Benghazi

• On 12 September 2022, the Libya Crimes Watch reports the Tariq Ben Zeyad Brigade set fire to the house of activist Senussi Al-Mahdi. The arson was a response for criticizing the violations taking place in the Buhadi area south of Sirte. 
• On 19 December 2022, Amnesty International accused the Tariq bin Ziyad Brigade l of committing war crimes.
• On 22 August, the official spokesman for the Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces, Major General Ahmed Al-Mismari, confirmed that Major General Tariq bin Ziyad Al-Muazzaz is deployed inside the city of Sabha with the 11th Infantry Battalion. Moreover, Al-Mismari added that the deployment of the 11th Infantry Battalion came based on instructions from the Southern Operations Force Command. Additionally, the spokesman explained that the battalion’s deployment included its main entrances and the roads leading to it. The aim, was to of secure the city and its surroundings, according to the plan to secure the southwestern region.
• On 20 August, the forces of Tariq bin Ziyad chased the remnants of Chadian rebels inside the southern Libyan border. Some Chadian factions opposed to the military authority in N’Djamena are taking refuge in southern Libya. The common Libyan border with Chad is described as a starting point for rebels who launch operations inside Chad.

1.2 152nd Battalion 

The 152nd Brigade, under the command of Major General Tariq Bin Ziyad Al-Mouzaz, stands as a formidable force in ensuring the security and stability of southeastern Libya. Notably, tasked with combating the scourge of smuggling, this battalion, led by Colonel Abdul Hakim Amazeb Al-Saadi, operates diligently under the directives and decisions of the Armed Forces’ Commander-in-Chief and the Ground Forces’ Operations Commander.

Moreover, The 152nd Brigade patrols the extensive Libyan-Egyptian border from Al Salam (Gate 60) to Jaghbub. Remarkably, the border totals a distance of 600 kilometers. Additionally, Colonel Al-Saadi prioritizes stopping criminal gangs in the Libyan desert to maintain security for Libya and its people.

Endowed with the authority to enforce regulations and laws within the Libyan Arab Armed Forces, the 152nd Brigade is equipped and prepared to combat smuggling activities. This ensures accountability for those involved in such illicit practices. Faced with persistent threats, this brigade remains resolute in its mission to safeguard the nation’s borders and uphold its integrity.

• Commander: Colonel / Abdul Hakim Amazeb Al-Saadi
• Ministry Affiliation: Libyan Arab Armed Forces- Tariq bin Ziyad Brigade
• Headquarters: Ajdabiya

2. 106th Brigade

The 106th Brigade, also known as Awlia Aldem in Arabic, serves as a key military faction within the Libyan National Army. Remarkably, its command is held by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Initially formed as the 106th Battalion in 2016 from militias acting as Haftar’s personal security detail, it evolved into a full-fledged brigade by 2018 through amalgamation with various other units.

Furthermore, engaging in its first combat experience during the 2018 Battle of Derna, the brigade subsequently played roles in significant events such as the capture of Sabha in January 2019. Additionally, it was involved in the ill-fated Tripoli offensive in April of the same year. Notably, during this offensive, the unit encountered setbacks leading to numerous soldiers being captured by Government of National Accord forces. Additionally, the brigade garnered attention for its alleged involvement in the abduction of Libyan House of Representatives member Seham Sergiwa in Benghazi in July 2019. Recently, in May 2022, the 106th Brigade deployed to the Chad–Libya border region.

• Commander: Khaled Haftar (son of Khalifa Haftar)
• Ministry Affiliation: Libyan Arab Armed Forces
• Headquarters: Rajmah, Libya

2.1 History and Disposition

The Libyan Arab Armed Force’s largest organization in terms of personnel, gear, and area of influence is Brigade 106. Initially, it began in 2014, when Haftar’s personal safety was its responsibility. Subsequently, it formally established itself as a battalion in 2016 and grew to become a brigade comprising at least ten battalions from Adjabiya and Benghazi in 2018.

Notably, Brigade 106 is a highly skilled military unit that occasionally relies on support from eastern tribes and Salafi organizations. Furthermore, since 2016, it has consistently received graduates from the military college. And, it has been well-supplied with weapons and equipment, fitting the impression of a contemporary force Haftar wishes to convey.

2.2 Al Karama Training Center

The Al Karama Training Center, within the 106th Brigade of some armed groups in Benghazi, serves as a pivotal institution dedicated to the preparation and enhancement of military personnel. The center trains soldiers in combat readiness, fitness, and self-defense, creating highly skilled soldiers. Brigade leadership aims to enhance officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, building a robust and resilient armed force.

The center’s new sports facility shows its commitment to holistic fitness. Further, the Al Karama Training Center enhances the Libyan military’s readiness. Ultimately, it ensures its preparedness to safeguard national security and uphold peace and stability within the region.

• Commander: Khairy Al-Tamimi
• Ministry Affiliation: Libyan Arab Armed Forces

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Jawhar Farhat is an ALL source analyst with a Level 6 diploma (CSMP) in Security Management and a master’s degree in Military Sciences from the Military Academy of Tunisia.

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Tarek Megerisi

A diplomatic disasterclass

As these powers have dysfunctionally risen and destabilisingly fallen, the international community’s own lethargy, unilateralism and opportunism were captured in the office of the UN’s SRSG Abdoulaye Bathily. Having been appointed in late 2022 during a period of growing international momentum behind a new electoral process, he eschewed the prepared plan, partially due to pressure from predatory powers fearing change may disrupt their plunder and partially due to a myopic interest in his own pet projects.

These projects include a security-sector dialogue, a national reconciliation process, and eventually his own political process; they were substantively light, involving little expertise, no process and no clear goals, thus only undermining all the efforts which preceded him.

The lack of a cohering UN vehicle empowered unilateralism in a familiar way. Ankara stepped up efforts to mould Libya into a useful tool to enhance its energy, financial, and geopolitical needs. Italy helped deepen Libyan fragmentation through its desperation to manage migration and profit from Libyan energy. Almost everybody looked to profit from Libya’s vulnerable oil industry, general lawlessness, and the flood of capital exiting its shores.

In an eerie example of how Libyan history rhymes, for the second time in five years, the UN envoy has departed to be replaced by a US deputy named Stephanie whose nationality is weaponised by American rivals to denigrate her but not leveraged by DC or its allies to enhance any process.

The weeks preceding and following Bathily’s resignation have been forebodingly marked by stepped-up Turkish and Russian weapons deliveries. Meanwhile, Washington seems to be mimicking Bathily, squandering its geopolitical gravity to fixate on futile, hyper-focused, yet poorly thought-through policies like joint patrols between eastern and western forces—essentially trialling new deck chair arrangements aboard a sinking Titanic.

These changes have shaken the broader international community out of its disinterest in Libyan politics, only for them to relapse back into familiar camps. Those ineffectually trying to maintain the status quo and those seduced by Haftar’s military dictatorship and hoping to see it implemented nationwide. The former seeks to re-invigorate UN-sanctioned relics of their past processes, like the Joint Military Committee, which was supposed to maintain a ceasefire, evacuate foreign forces, and unify Libya’s military or the GNU itself.

These efforts range from dialogue processes that live and die completely detached from on-the-ground realities to cynical displays of realpolitik. Here, diplomats surreptitiously attempt to create the environment needed for elite bargains, like another Haftar and Dbeibeh deal, or for Dbeibeh and key allies-turned-enemies like the central bank governor to repair ties.

This is the geopolitical equivalent of trying to mate pandas. The latter camp is those either predisposed to desire dictatorships in the Arab world or diplomats who became enamoured during their guided tours through Haftar’s Potemkin villages, showcasing reconstruction and his new order. Regardless of what triggered their love for the frumpy field marshal, they believe that his style of military dictatorship is the best route to stabilising Libya.

The wheel turns 

The end of Libya’s cycles always looks suspiciously like their start. Against the backdrop of escalating skirmishes between armed groups and military buildups by intervening powers, Libya’s politicians play out a familiar pantomime as they promote a new government from amongst themselves to replace the incumbent. 

This time, they say, the government will lead to elections, though they never have a roadmap to a vote. This time, they say, the new government will unify the country while all actors tie themselves ever tighter to outside powers, and Haftar never looks any closer to genuine cooperation. This time, they say, they will fight corruption and restore governance as they prepare mock cabinets of over thirty ministers but never any actual policies.

The previous cycles have ended in war and financial meltdown, and if the diplomats do not now try something new, things will surely end the same way this time around. The only way to drag Libya out of its spiral is to begin reversing it.

To return to the planning that preceded Bathily, a medium-term political process that goes through elections is needed to restore popular Libyan sovereignty over Libya’s economics and politics. This process is backed by and involves key legitimising states from the US to Europe, key interventionists like Turkey, and regional actors.

For diplomats, this seems daunting and like a lot of hard work. But, if Libya’s elite capture is not broken, we know where it will lead. The city of Derna, destroyed last September through accumulated political negligence and now suffering the ignominious corruption of a pretend reconstruction, hovers over the country as the ghost of Libya’s future. This future can only be averted if the international community choose to push for change rather than vouchsafe another cycle.

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Tarek Megerisi is a senior policy fellow with the Middle East and North Africa programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations. His work mainly addresses how European policymaking towards the Maghreb and Mediterranean regions can become more strategic, harmonious, and incisive – with a long-term focus on Libya.

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Tarek Megerisi

Thirteen years after its revolution, Libya is divided between east and west, each with its own respective administrations, foreign backers and tribal rivalries. Since the 2011 revolution, Libya has been in a spiral. Its domestic politics, security situation, and international relations are stuck in destructive cycles, eroding Libya’s economy, social fabric, and overall prospects with each iteration.

Thirteen years on, the country is deeply divided, and not just by the military line dividing east and west. There are parallel administrations, rivalling international interventionists, and rifts within and between cities, tribes and regions. Attempts by different Libyan groups and international actors to wrest Libya out of this spiral and stabilise it as the democratic market economy many Libyans once hoped for, or the client dictatorship many predators long for, have, at best, failed and at worst, supercharged the spiral.

Today, many of these cycles are concurrently coming to an end. The political lifecycle of Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, appointed in 2021 to lead Libya to elections, seems to be crashing. Security setups are fracturing, and the economy is breaking down. Foreign forces are ominously accumulating, and the UN Special Representative has just resigned.

After years of neglect, the broader international community is renewing its interest in a Libyan political process, but it is seemingly gearing up to repeat all its past mistakes. It is an ominous moment for the North African lynchpin, given concerns over how many more of these cycles Libya can endure. But the end of these cycles also presents the opportunity for something new.

Dbeibeh’s rise and fall

Like all his post-revolutionary predecessors, Dbeibeh rode into office on a wave of false optimism and false promises. Appointed via a UN process designed to end in elections after just ten months, countries sponsoring that process considered his upcoming administration a vehicle for stabilisation and change, despite him allegedly presenting them a two-year governance plan—for his 10-month mandate—with a conspicuous lack of electoral planning.

The representative of a Libyan family who present themselves as construction moguls but are accused of corruption (which they, of course, vehemently deny), many hoped Dbeibeh would at least get business flowing. With a presidential running mate hailing from the same eastern tribe as Libya’s national hero Omar al-Mukhtar and a behind-the-scenes deal with eastern Libya’s military general Khalifa Haftar to secure his appointment, many believed the country would finally be reunified.

Given that he had flown to Cairo before the ink was dry during his appointment and that his family had good ties with Turkey, the UAE, and the UK, it was considered that the international competition around Libya would finally end. However, none of these hopes came to fruition.

Dbeibeh’s greatest achievement in economic reform was to systematically take over the various financial controller offices which lubricate Libya’s monstrous public sector. Despite spending no less than $20bn a year, he has little to show for it beyond superficial maintenance projects. His deal with Haftar stayed true to its foundational nature. The public benefits never materialised as the surly dictator claimed Dbeibeh broke promises by refusing Haftar control over Libya’s ministries of defence and finance—the keys to the kingdom.

Yet, behind the scenes, the families have cooperated on various financial projects, often brokered by Abu Dhabi and often focused on Libya’s oil sector, rotting the heart of Libya’s economy. These range from the emergence of shady brokers for crude sales along with shady new developments, reselling existing concessions, creating new energy enterprises, and most notoriously of all a fuel-for-crude swap-system that shrouds Libya’s most crucial, and lucrative, enterprises (the sale of crude and purchase of fuels) in opaque transactions.

As a new order ossified and Libya’s shadow economy continued brutally cannibalising the regular economy, those who were left outside the order started to rankle. A moment that traditionally marks the end of a new cycle’s hopeful era and its descent into rancour.

By 2022, the Dbeibeh family’s economic colonisation was fomenting resentment. Outsiders of the patronage network formally known as the Government of National Unity (GNU) tried to counter, and mimic this by appointing their own prime ministers. Attempting to manufacture a civilian face and parallel patronage network to administer and financially irrigate lands under Haftar’s military domination.

Meanwhile, militias throughout Libya constantly try to co-opt or counter this new status quo as Haftar and Dbeibeh continuously seek to one-up each other. Today, Dbeibeh is more politically isolated than ever before, while relations have broken down with the other oligarchs of western Libya. Most damningly of all, Libya’s central bank governor has cut off the profligate prime minister, citing his need to protect Libya’s economy as a liquidity crisis, currency crisis over forged notes, and high price inflation concurrently wrack Libyans.

Secured insecurity

These political, economic, and security dynamics have simultaneously roiled under the surface throughout the current political cycle, becoming apparent in public skirmishes that plot the descent from the post-war security order of 2020 to a more fragile consolidation under the new status quo and now, the disorder Libya is descending into.

Haftar’s post-war consolidation was marked by mass-arrest campaigns against local tribes disgruntled at Sirte’s transformation into the new frontline city of their post-war order under Russia and as Haftar’s son Saddam moved to dominate lucrative smuggling routes across Libya’s borders. Consolidation and expansionism were entirely dependent on Russian military muscle.

In western Libya, militias around Tripoli attempted to consolidate by leveraging Dbeibeh’s reliance on them to capture the state and then attempt to progressively colonise armed groups in the towns and cities bordering Tripoli and beyond. This new order strengthened after they defeated attempted putsches by a coalition of groups from Libya’s western coastal region, with crucial assistance from Turkish drones. Demonstrating that just as Russia underwrote Haftar’s consolidation, Turkey was maintaining Dbeibeh’s new order.

Typically, for these security cycles, initial alliances and consolidations failed to manufacture, let alone keep any real peace. Tribal and other forces continue to plot against the Haftars and challenge their order across the cities and borderlands from the southwest to the northeast. 

Despite projecting the image of strongman stability to the world, the Haftars’ anxiety is evident in the detention and murder of prominent civilians who challenge their narrative and a battle in their capital, Benghazi, after a prodigal former defence minister Mehdi al-Barghathi simply mis-choreographed his return to the city. This skirmish was a massive overreaction involving an Israeli-style telecommunications blackout.

Though it ended in a victory, Saddam was left embarrassed, given the overwhelming force required to beat a considerably smaller and weaker actor in a conflict instigated by his own insecurity, which unnecessarily ended with torturing and murdering al-Barghathi and his kin. Meanwhile, the deterrence of Dbeibeh’s drone power is clearly waning, as seen by recent challenges to his authorities across the regions west of Tripoli from the nearby town of Zawiya to the border with Tunisia.

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Tarek Megerisi is a senior policy fellow with the Middle East and North Africa programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations. His work mainly addresses how European policymaking towards the Maghreb and Mediterranean regions can become more strategic, harmonious, and incisive – with a long-term focus on Libya.

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Canan Atilgan / Veronika Ertl / Simon Engelkes

Outlook

What does Libya’s future look like in the face of these manifold political, economic and social challenges as well as the latest political developments?

Despite international support, the Government of National Accord under al-Sarraj has not been able either to guarantee the country security or to build up support within the population.

Instead, Haftar has consolidated his territorial control and ensured security for the people, brought oil fields under his control and consolidated his demands for legitimacy. Initially anxious to marginalise Haftar, the international community increasingly finds itself in a situation that makes his inclusion in the political process unavoidable. Haftar has won acceptance in Europe with his credo of “Stability instead of chaos” and his fight against IS.

If the plan that al-Sarraj and Haftar agreed on in July in Paris can actually be implemented in this form, the de facto failed unity government – and the two other rival governments – would be superseded by elections at the start of 2018. The demobilisation of the numerous armed factions would be carried out based on the agreed ceasefire. However, the chances of success of this agreement remain low – the potential losses for

diverse groups are too great, who, in the absence of strong national structures, have appropriated territorial, economic and political control and are prepared to defend this. In addition, an agreement between the two largest warring factions, the GNA and Haftar, does not appear to be inclusive enough to serve as a point of departure for a comprehensive peace and transition process, and would once again mean the exclusion of a broad spectrum of relevant actors.

An alternative to this is a more in-depth and inclusive renegotiation of the LPA that, alongside the political process, also involves key questions surrounding the organisation of the security sector and the allocation of financial resources; and which includes all the important actors.

In the context of the weakness of the UN mission in Libya, there ensues a key role for regional actors such as Tunisia and Algeria to lead such negotiations. The risk of a renewed escalation of the conflicts in Libya and the serious consequences of instability on these countries, also provide a clear incentive to take on such a role.

At the same time, the involvement of regional and international actors in the context of political and territorial fragmentation in Libya is associated with numerous risks. In the absence of a strong central government, their support of various groups and warring factions led to significant power shifts that have contributed to further conflicts and fractionalisation, impeding the peace process as a result.

Any strategy for Libya by external actors should take these risks into account if a further escalation is to be prevented and the stabilisation of Libya is to be made possible.

What Libya needs is a solution for the fragile to non-existent state monopoly on the legitimate use of force that, through the continuing instability, enables the spread of extremist factions and trafficking and smuggling networks, which destabilise the Mediterranean region beyond the borders of Libya itself.

A solution of this kind can only be created through an inclusive transition process that establishes a viable power balance between Libyan actors. In order to facilitate effective support for this type of process, the approaches of international actors must be broadened beyond the current focus on migration and terrorism, and enable the construction of stronger state structures.

While Russia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt have contributed significantly to shifting the balance of power in the favour of Haftar, the EU and its member states – too preoccupied with controlling migration flows – appear to be left without a long-term strategy regarding Libya’s future.

The fact is, however, that short-term policies fail to go beyond treating the symptoms. This is also true in terms of the uncontrolled migration from the Sahel to Libya. Libya must become a nation-state again. It is therefore imperative that the European states come to a consensus on the priorities, goals and partners in Libya and show greater engagement.

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Dr. Canan Atilgan is Head of the Regional Programme for Political Dialogue Southern Mediterranean of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung based in Tunis, Tunisia.

Veronika Ertl is Research Associate at the Regional Programme for Political Dialogue Southern Mediterranean of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung based in Tunis, Tunisia.

Simon Engelkes is Project Coordinator at the Regional Programme for Political Dialogue Southern Mediterranean of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung based in Tunis, Tunisia.

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Canan Atilgan / Veronika Ertl / Simon Engelkes

Egypt is similarly affected.

The loss of economic advantages for Cairo from its neighbour has further exacerbated the country’s economic plight. At 770 million euros at the end of 2014, bilateral trade therefore represented only a fraction of the 2.1 billion euros revenue prior to the Libyan revolution. In 2015, there was an estimated decline in Egyptian exports to Libya of 75 per cent.

Furthermore, the situation for Egyptian migrant workers in Libya is uncertain. Repeated kidnappings of Egyptians and the execution of Coptic Christians by IS have forced many to flee. Before 2011, 1.5 to 2 million Egyptian migrant workers in Libya sent around 28 million euros back to their homeland each year. In 2015, there were only 750,000 migrant workers remaining. A drop in these return remittances harbours the potential for social unrest and further destabilisation in Egypt.

The Role of Regional and International Actors

In addition to the wide-ranging challenges that Libya is facing through political and economic collapse, regional and international actors have also taken on an increasingly active role in the conflict in terms of mediation talks about a peace process, but also through military and political support to the individual warring factions.

Although almost all states involved have pledged themselves rhetorically to the “Libyan Political Agreement” and the unity government, in many cases it is evident that they are promoting their own interests, thereby impeding the peace process. Just as in other countries in the region, the U.S. policy of the Trump administration is still unclear with regard to Libya. Based on the statements made by the President and his

advisors, U.S. commitment is expected to be restricted to supporting the fight against terrorism and, concomitant with this, a convergence with Haftar, who presents himself as the leader of the war against Islamist and terrorist factions. The recent meeting between Haftar, the US ambassador and the US-AFRICOM commander in July 2017, appears to confirm these expectations and takes place only one day after the announcement that a new diplomatic and military US strategy for Libya is due to be finalised before long.

Meanwhile, in the absence of a clear U.S. policy, other international actors have established themselves as major players and, in doing so, have had a decisive influence on the political and military power relations. With their support for Haftar, Russia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have facilitated his military successes and territorial expansion. For Egypt and the Emirates in particular, the ideological component plays a central role here: the two governments see the GNA as linked with Islamist-motivated groups and have grave concerns about this playing a stronger role in Libya’s future political system.

Haftar’s decision to reject and fight against Islamist-motivated factions is thus an appropriate fit with both countries’ priorities. In the case of Egypt, its geographical proximity and shared border also play a key role, since Egypt sees itself as having a central part in the shaping of Libya’s future due to its security concerns and close economic ties.

From the perspective of el-Sisi, too, it is important to prevent a government coming to power that is affiliated with Islamist factions. Russia has established itself as a further actor in Libya filling the vacuum left by the U.S.; its role has grown in particular over the course of the last year. While Russia nominally supports the internationally recognised unity government, deepened contacts with Haftar and the HoR in the east have become increasingly evident.

Haftar has visited Moscow a number of times to campaign for the weapons embargo on Libya to be lifted and to solicit support in the fight against Islamist factions in the east of the country. A UN weapons embargo, in place since 2011, prohibits the export of weapons to Libya, with the exception of the channels controlled by the GNA. However, the visit by Haftar at the start of the year to the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, fuelled rumours of arms treaties being transacted and plans for the establishment of a Russian marine base near Benghazi.

According to international media reports, Russian military advisors and technical personnel are located in Libya. For many observers there is no mistaking that Haftar could secure not only the backing of Egypt but also of Russia. Without this, shifting the balance of power in Libya in his favour would be out of the question.

In this conflict situation, the EU has limited room for manoeuvre in Libya. The EU is in fact the greatest advocate of the LPA, yet its activities are focused for the most part on regulating the flow of refugees in the Central Mediterranean. This prioritisation by the EU is evident not only through its allocation of significant financial resources to migrant-related projects in Libya via the EU Emergency Trust Fund, but especially through the EU NAVFOR MED Operation Sophia, which began in June 2015.

The goal of the operation is to disrupt the business model of trafficking networks and people smuggling rings in the Central Mediterranean area and, in doing so, to reduce the migration flows heading towards Europe. After the second extension until the end of 2018 and a renewal of its mandate, the operation now also includes training the Libyan coast guard, monitoring the waters to suppress illegal oil exports from the country, as well as helping to implement the UN weapons embargo in the waters off the coast of Libya.

While positive results were reported pertaining to saving human lives and capturing smugglers, one current study shows that the aspired destruction of the smuggler networks’ business model has not yet been achieved. Thus, in 2016, there was again a surge of 18 per cent recorded in irregular migration to Europe via the Central Mediterranean route compared to the previous year’s figure; and the first six months of 2017 saw another rise of 19 per cent.

The second EU mission in Libya, the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM), provides training and advice with the aim of increasing the capacity of the Libyan authorities to secure the borders, and developing and implementing a strategy for integrated border management in the longer term. The mission is, however, severely restricted by the security situation and the limited room for manoeuvre of the GNA. With regard to migration, the southern member states, Italy in particular, feel abandoned by the rest of the EU countries. In reaction to repeated warnings of overload, in early July the EU Commission adopted an action plan to support Italy for greater solidarity in handling the refugee problem in the Central Mediterranean.

Furthermore, a stronger role for the EU seems to be obstructed by discrepancies between its member countries and partially unclear strategies for supporting the peace process. Due to Italy’s key role in the migration issue, but also to the historical and commercial links between the two countries, the former colonial power is the leading actor of European diplomacy in Libya. Efforts to curtail migration flows by means of agreements with Libyan stakeholders have proven to be problematic, however. For instance, an agreement made in February 2017 between Italy and the GNA was annulled by a Libyan court. In parallel to this, Italy is conducting talks with tribes from the south of the country to try to find allies for better control of the southern border regions.

The most recent meeting of al-Sarraj and Haftar under the direction of Emmanuel Macron was accordingly met with disapproval in Italy, since the country feels that its diplomatic role is at risk. So far, the EU has not been successful in positioning itself as a strong geopolitical actor in Libya. The EU has so far been unsuccessful in positioning itself as a strong geopolitical actor in Libya. In fact, some European countries are following different goals because of their disparate priorities.

This is most evident in the dealings with General Haftar. Since the start of 2016, France has supported Haftar’s LNA by passing on intelligence information in the fight against Islamist factions in Benghazi. Other countries, too, increasingly see Haftar as a strategic component of a political solution. This dynamic ultimately culminated in a meeting between al-Sarraj and Haftar in July 2017, initiated by Macron. The resulting agreement implies the admission that the GNA has failed and that Libya’s political future is only conceivable with Haftar in a key role.

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Dr. Canan Atilgan is Head of the Regional Programme for Political Dialogue Southern Mediterranean of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung based in Tunis, Tunisia.

Veronika Ertl is Research Associate at the Regional Programme for Political Dialogue Southern Mediterranean of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung based in Tunis, Tunisia.

Simon Engelkes is Project Coordinator at the Regional Programme for Political Dialogue Southern Mediterranean of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung based in Tunis, Tunisia.

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Five Years After the siege of Tripoli

Illicit Economies and Human Rights Violations

Militias in Libya, empowered by an extensive state-delegated security role, have demonstrated a flagrant tendency to abuse power, resulting in severe violations of human rights including arbitrary detention, extra-judicial killings, enforced disappearance, forced displacement and abductions committed in a country with a discredited judicial system that has impeded any chance of reaffirming justice and the rule of law.

These armed groups have exploited that veneer of legality to engage in more illicit economic activities including human smuggling and trafficking especially of migrants and asylum seekers who are trying to reach the European continent.

For the eastern authority, migrant smuggling across the eastern coast has served as a lucrative business which has culminated in one of the deadliest shipwrecks in years that sank off the coast of Greece taking the lives of hundreds.

Additionally, based on a UN report19 issued in 2023 by the Independent Fact-Finding Mission investigating severe human rights violations allegedly committed since 2016 against both Libyans and foreign nationals.

Migrants, in particular, have been the target of systematic torture as they were ‘enslaved in official detention centres’ where they were subjected to inhumane and degrading treatment, including sexual assault, forced labour and denied access to basic life necessities like food and water.

These acts, while they amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity under international law, they are being executed under the auspices of government-affiliated agencies like the Libyan Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration and the coast guard who still benefit from technical and financial assistance from the EU.

While it is challenging to ascertain precise figures, the IOM reported20 as of 2023, more than 17,000 of migrants were intercepted by the coastguard, and returned to war-torn Libya where many of them get detained in investigation facilities while a severe lack of transparency remains regarding their whereabouts, the reason, and the conditions of their detention.

The same investigation has also uncovered a widespread tendency of the Libyan authority to encroach on the work of civil society associations and stifle any expression of opposition through various forms of intimidation and the use of force exercised against defenceless civilians, journalists, and human rights defenders.

The report discloses that between January 2020 and March 2022, more than 581 civilians, both nationals and migrants, were either tortured to death or executed in detention facilities by law enforcement agents and militias; an indiscriminate violence with total impunity that have become the new normal.

Although civilians enjoy protection under international humanitarian law and are considered illegitimate and unlawful targets of armed hostilities, the use of force in Libya has been one of an indiscriminate nature where lines are blurred and distinctions between combatants and noncombatants are omitted.

Between April and June 2020, the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) reported a 173% increase in the number of civilian casualties (which include deaths and injuries) reaching 358 of men, women and children affected by the major escalation of armed hostilities and arbitrary deployment of heavy weaponry, explosive remnants of war and airstrikes on civilian populated areas.

The Way Ahead

Restoring justice and ending the grip of militia rule in Libya is a complex task that demands a multifaceted approach. In order for elections to effectively materialize, there needs to be concerted action to confront human rights abuses and disentangle criminally linked actors from Libyan institutions who are at the centre of blocking any prospect for security sector reforms: a status-quo that only preserves impunity and obstructs reconciliation.

The recent and abrupt resignation of the UN Special Envoy to Libya, Abdoulaye Bathily, and the postponement of the reconciliation conference that was planned for April, all highlight the complex trajectory facing the North African nation.

While the lack of political will from Libyan leaders is a focal factor for the failure of the democratic transition, the unabated international interventions and interference in the country’s domestic political and security affairs further undermine any potential of finding a viable solution to the Libyan crisis.

Although 2024 marks the 10th consecutive year since Libyans went to the polls, the first quarter of the year has only confirmed that the environment is still inconducive for holding parliamentary or presidential elections.

Deep fractions over the control of key oilfields and allocation of profits have been the striking theme since January, with protests erupting in many regions in the country, notably the Al-Sharara field that is the biggest in Libya, demanding the equal distribution of wealth and development projects.

Such political tension is also clear from the recent public disagreements between the newly unified Central Bank of Libya (CBL) and the GNU over the government’s expansive financial expenditures and fiscal policies that have led to the re-emergence of country-wide liquidity crisis, and which prompted the bank to alter the exchange rate and devalue the Libyan Dinar.

The path to democracy hinges on the acknowledgment, investigation, and prosecution of those responsible for egregious abuses during the three civil wars, as well as those implicated in alleged cases of corruption and mismanagement of the vast oil revenues that have further reinforced the state of underdevelopment in the country.

Crucially, transitional justice depends on the establishment of a robust and impartial judiciary capable of fairly addressing grievances and holding perpetrators accountable. The reinforcement of Libya’s rule of law stands as a critical obligation not only to honour the suffering of victims but also to establish a foundation of trust necessary for any functioning democracy.

It is imperative to ensure that international support directly contributes to the growth of lawful institutions and the rule of law and not empower the wrong entities. In this endeavour, foreign actors like the EU should apply more stringent regulations to ensure that their financial assistance does not inadvertently prop up criminal networks.

Funds intended for development, reconstruction, and stability must be closely monitored and audited to prevent their diversion into the hands of those perpetuating violence and human rights abuses.

Recommendations

In recognizing the complexities of Libya’s current state of affairs, it is essential to understand that the way ahead should be guided by a multifaceted approach driven by the constructive engagement of both the international community and national authorities with the ultimate goal being contingent upon safeguarding the well-being of the Libyan people.

The International Community:

• Should acknowledge the fallacies in its engagement in Libya and reassess its approach to arms control in a way that prioritizes the interests of the Libyan people and takes into consideration the need for genuine and lasting reconciliation.

• Should accord significant attention to judicial reforms and work to strengthen the domestic legal institutions in order to achieve accountability for all human rights violations and ensure justice for all victims.

• Should rally support for an international and independent investigation mechanism, along with the establishment of an ad-hoc court to prosecute every individual accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity.

• All international donors, notably the EU, should implement robust monitoring schemes and apply strict human rights due diligence in their funding to ensure that financial aid does not inadvertently support criminal networks.

The Libyan Authorities:

• Should develop effective incentives to encourage the disarmament, dissolution, and reintegration of former militia group members into society, while offering skill training and alternative employment opportunities to facilitate their transition to civilian life.

• Should take full ownership of the process of reforming the security sector, ensuring that it becomes unified, professional, and accountable.

• Should put aside self-interests and political considerations, actively and collectively work towards the creation of a positive and transparent civil society environment conducive to democratic and equitable election processes.

• Should commit to achieving a balanced economic development strategy that encourages the incentive for diversified investments and reduces dependence on oil revenues, deters the recourse to illicit forms of economic transactions, and guarantees a fair distribution of profits across the whole country.

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Ferhat Polat

Bathily’s resignation highlights the challenges of working towards peace, and stability in Libya, which has been grappling with conflict and political instability since 2011 when Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown.

Abdoulaye Bathily, the United Nations (UN) envoy for Libya, resigned from his position at the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) after just 18 months. This move was expected due to the lack of progress in the stuck political process in Libya. This resignation is expected to deepen the existing diplomatic crisis and intensify the political stalemate.

Behind the scenes of Bathily’s resignation

Bathily’s resignation highlights the challenges of working towards peace and stability in Libya, which has been grappling with conflict and political instability since 2011 when Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown. His exit not only signals the complexity of the situation but also highlights the immense challenges that lie ahead in reconciling the opposing sides.

Over the past few months, he has been engaging in shuttle diplomacy, attempting to persuade the opposing sides to participate in high-level discussions. Unfortunately, he has not been successful in bringing them together.

The current political leaders include the speaker of the House of Representatives, Aguila Saleh, the so-called leader of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalifa Haftar, chairman of the High Council State, Mohamed Takala, president of the Libyan Presidential Council, Mohammed Yunus al-Menfi, and Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, internationally recognized government’s prime minister based in Tripoli.

These leaders have failed to engage in meaningful discussions to find common ground, especially Khalifa Haftar, who sees the political process as threatening his interests. Libya’s weak state institutions, especially security, combined with increasing armed groups, have increased the incentive to compete for power.

As a result, the ongoing political deadlock continues to work in favor of military figures such as Haftar. Meanwhile, armed militias and foreign fighters with vested economic interests continue to operate freely, undermining any sense of central authority. Despite significant division among rival parties, both sides usually find common ground to share the profits when distributing oil income.

From time to time, if there is no agreement, then the eastern side, where most of the oil fields are located, which is under the control of Haftar, blocks the oil terminals from operating until a decision is reached. Haftar has been using the oil blockade as leverage against the UN-backed governments. For instance, in 2020, militias under the control of Haftar blockaded eastern Libya’s main oil terminals for 8 months, and the estimated cost of these oil blockades was around $11 billion.

Therefore, the dysfunctional state’s control over the resources benefits the current political status quo and their militia groups. They have been using the weak state institutions for their benefit. Simultaneously, institutions have become tools to deepen the division and entrench the conflict rather than reconcile the needs and demands of parties with those necessary for state building. Thus, 13 years after the Libyan conflict, the most critical component is that the country’s restoration primarily relies on uniting governmental institutions, particularly security and economic institutions.

Conditions for stabilization in Libya

The United Nations mission in Libya and other members of the international community have underscored the significance of conducting elections to establish stability in the country in recent years. However, it is essential to carefully consider the potential consequences of rushing into elections without first addressing the underlying issues that contribute to instability.

The lack of a constitution remains a central issue in Libya’s challenges, leading to disagreements among parties regarding election laws and key candidate eligibility. Furthermore, the lack of security across the country adds another layer of complexity to the situation.

Any postponement of a political process has its price and impact. This is no different in Libya. While it is good to make sure that everything gets organized and settled, in the Libyan case, the international community must prioritize providing security, strengthening the rule of law, fostering a sense of national identity, and promulgating a new constitution in Libya.

Elections should not be rushed at the expense of long-term stability. Without addressing the key issues first, holding elections will not effectively solve existing problems in the country. Over the past few years, the failure to find effective ways to address these issues has caused widespread disappointment and a loss of faith in the current political leaders as well as the international communities.

The incoming special representative to succeed Abdoulaye Bathily will face a challenging task in addressing the existing political dynamics in Libya. To promote a more inclusive political system, it is crucial that the new representative challenges the influence of those in power and advocates for broader participation.

The UN must refrain from perpetuating an elite-centric approach, and sanctions should be considered for individuals obstructing progress. Without these measures, the cycle of political turmoil will continue to benefit the ruling class while neglecting the needs of the Libyan population.

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Ferhat Polat is a researcher at the TRT World Research Centre. Holding an MA in Middle East Studies from the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies at the University of Exeter, he specializes in North African geopolitics and security, with a particular focus on Libya.

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Five Years After the siege of Tripoli

Picture a nation caught in a relentless cycle of turmoil and uncertainty, where the echoes of a historic uprising have given way to a protracted civil war. Libya, once a land of promise, now bears the weighty label of a ‘failed state’ within the global community while international efforts to achieve peace and reconciliation have been met with domestic opposition.

For four decades, the country was ruled by an entrenched regime, but the 2011 uprising brought an end to that era, marking the beginning of a tumultuous period that continues to shape its state of affairs. As we delve into the complexities of Libya’s current standing, we will explore the pressing issues mainly generated by its appalling militia rule and offer recommendations aimed at restoring peace, stability, and democratic governance.

Contextualizing Libya’s Current Crisis

Libya’s post-revolution narrative has been one of perpetual instability. Conflict has become ingrained in its very fabric, with fragmented and polarized institutions confined in a perpetual state of chaos and an obsolete judicial system that has exacerbated the culture of impunity in the country.

The discordant confluence of militias vying for control coupled with the persisting interventions of foreign and opposing actors, all have left a trail of destruction, particularly for its civilian population. Thousands of civilians are constantly the victims of sporadic episodes of violence that have arisen between different armed groups throughout the years.

This month marks the fifth year of the military assault on Tripoli that was initiated by Khalifa Haftar in 2019 to take control of the capital leaving thousands between injured and dead and extensive material destruction. The incidental re-emergence of tribal hostilities, although they have significantly contracted in frequency and severity over the past two years, they only mark the state of insecurity that has plagued the country for more than a decade now, while aspirations to hold fair and transparent elections in the hopes of restoring peace and stability remain feeble.

As it stands, international efforts invested to establish a unified civilian government failed in 2021 with the indefinite postponement of elections and the consolidation of the current state of political cleavages we see today in the North African nation. The country is still divided between two parallel administrations with overlapping structures and functions, each legitimized by an association of foreign actors and supported by opposing paramilitary systems. But how did Libya arrive at this complex juncture?

The Militarization of Society

The NATO-backed overthrow of former leader Moammar Gadhafi has advanced the establishment of the militia rule in Libya. The heavily armed groups with unchecked reach and omnipotence that we know of today are the direct descendants of a multitude of civilian groups who, in their pursuit to fill in the power vacuum left void by the then-toppled regime, they managed to tighten their control and maintain security over their communities through self-weaponization and mass civilian mobilization.

Young men, faced with negligible employment prospects, are the labour force driving these militias. As regional fanaticism started to spread, youth were recruited in scores and trained to serve these statefunded armed groups who now constitute one of the most vital financial reassurance for the thousands of Libyans desperate to secure a stable source of income in midst of years of economic stagnation.

At the onset of the revolution, the number of fighters was put at around 25,000, yet after the establishment of the first transitional government, this number surged dramatically by tenfold to approximately 250,000 fighters just a couple of months later.

Additionally, disturbingly, reports from the US State Department indicate that over 6,000 children were also allegedly recruited by both proregime forces in 2011 and the Special Deterrence Force in 2020, a paramilitary police force operating under the UN-recognized Government.

An Internationally Maintained Internal Schism

More often than not, manpower is derived from within the Libyan society and neighbouring countries, gun power however, rests as an introduced externality. As it stands, countries like France, Italy, Egypt, Russia, Türkiye, and the UAE have all contributed to and even altered the course of the conflict in Libya either through financial and diplomatic support accorded to the warring factions, or through direct military engagement within the national borders of the country rendering the conflict a state of war by proxy.

During the first year of the conflict in 2011, small and heavy arms were dispersed across different channels after they were pillaged by local militia groups from Gaddafi’s armament depots that had been controlled away from the hands of the civilian population for decades. However, the country soon became a ground for foreign military equipment illicitly shipped from abroad in large quantities, reaching in 2016 a staggering 20 million pieces of arms in the North African nation of 6 million people (counting roughly 3 weapons for each person).

The stream of weaponry received for years has been maintained by a plethora of foreign actors who carry out the covert -sometimes even overt- supply of the opposing militias; a practice that comes in defiance of the UN-instituted -now deemed ineffective- arms embargo that was designed in 2011 to stop the proliferation of weapons with the aim of ending the civil war.

Presently, the country remains chronically split between two rival governments who compete for legitimacy: the UN-recognized, Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU) on the west, and the Government of National Stability (GNS) led by the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk and loosely affiliated with warlord Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) which is under his command.

Since 2014, the state of parallelism has been an appalling component of Libyan politics that has only been reinforced through foreign intervention. In fact, the contrasting interests of different domestic and international actors conceive an unpredictable arrangement of shifting alliances in the country. Currently, the GNU is backed by UN member states who provide it with diplomatic recognition and material support notably from Turkey and Italy, while the eastern government is backed by Egypt, UAE and Russia.

A precarious balance of power is preserved with both Turkey and Russia establishing military presence in the western and eastern regions respectively since 2019. As per UN estimates, there were roughly 20,000 foreign fighters and mercenaries, namely from the Wagner Group, Chad, Sudan, and Syria, who were deployed in Libya in 2020 following the UN-brokered ceasefire.

The thwarted attack on Tripoli that was initiated in April 2019 by Khalifa Haftar is just one of the manifestations of Libya’s protracted state of deadlock. The political and military status quo, reflected through Haftar’s defeat and his retreat eastward, was advanced by the engagement of a heterogeneous coalition of international actors, with Turkey’s intervention and military support for the western militias of the GNA being a decisive factor that broke off the 18-month-long civil war in Tripoli.

Consolidating Irregularity: Libya’s Informal Security Architecture

The profound institutional disunity in Libya arises from the lack of a cohesive national army, dedicated solely to the nation and holding exclusive control over the use of force. Various poles of power have subsequently emerged across different territories where the most resourceful armed groups have succeeded to consolidate wealth and influence over the people and the state itself.

These paramilitary networks have become deeply entrenched within the security apparatus of the state, either within units or ‘brigades’ operating under the ministries of the interior and defence, or through more explicit links where former militia leaders are promoted to senior government positions. The recent designation of Imed Al Trabelsi as Minister of Interior of the GNU, who is formerly associated with the “Public Security and Security Positions Apparatus,” is just a case in point of such reputation laundering of those accused of criminal acts in the past.

The security landscape in the country is that of overlapping hierarchies and structural hybridity. As ‘private armies’ have undergone a process of institutionalization, they slowly infiltrated state constituencies and started taking on official law-enforcing responsibilities like arrest and detention, surveillance and intelligence, border security and migrant control.

The professionalization of these armed formations has been conducted through the assistance of foreign security institutions who have operating in the country for years. As of 2024, LAAM Network has reported the presence of at least 12 international security institutions in the country, 8 of them being western European companies, namely France, Ireland, and the UK, while the remaining are from Russia, Türkiye, Canada, and the US.

Now, well-established militias continue to receive considerable amounts of funds to execute such activities that are usually the sole prerogative of the state, while they remain strategically independent from any kind of state control. This conferred formality has only strengthened militia’s political influence and solidified their legitimacy as a more effective source of security especially in light of an increasingly weaker political standing of the current leaders.

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Wiesław LIZAK

Consequences of The Crisis For The Stability of Libya and Its International Environment

Contrary to the hopes of both the participants of the Libyan revolt and the intervening coalition of states, the process of rebuilding the structures of political power after the overthrowing of al-Qaddafi’s dictatorship did not proceed as expected.

Regional differences, ambitions of local leaders, tribal divisions, different visions of the future of the state, striving by local political and military forces to control territories and maximize their possession, efforts to take control of the oil extraction sites, transport routes and oil exports facilities – all this lay at the background of the gradual evolution of internal situation in the country towards anarchy. This was favoured by the weakness of the central authorities elected as a result of electoral procedures (aimed at legitimizing the new authorities) and the resulting lack of efficient and effective military forces.

The inability to form a strong army encouraged local groups, usually formed on the basis of tribal loyalty, to manifest their own interests. The first elections after the collapse of the al-Qaddafi regime, carried out on July 7, 2012, brought hope for stabilization of the political system, nevertheless the political disputes in then National Assembly caused by different views of the form and future of the state (including works on the new constitution) led to pre-term elections ( June 25, 2014).

Lack of consent by some political forces to such a resolution led to the contestation of newly elected authorities and, consequently, to the formation of two rivalling decision-making centres and, although the peace negotiations held subsequently under the auspices of the United Nations led to the formation of the National Unity Government (agreement of December 17, 2015), many influential groups and their leaders refrained from accepting the adopted solutions.

As a result, Libya found itself under the control of rival power centres that, apart from their mutual rivalry, had to face the expansion of jihadist forces and regional and tribal groups. Political chaos in turn gave rise to competition for resources (oil) attracting the interest of external actors.

Libya, during the previous regime, was a state with a relatively well-equipped army. Its collapse with the fall of the al-Qaddafi’s regime due to a lack of armed forces capable of taking control of this equipment led to the proliferation of weapons and radical reduction of the citizens’ security. It was one of the reasons why local militias began to appear in many parts of the country to guarantee the security of local communities.

The country found itself in a kind of a vicious circle: the lack of security and strong power centre enforced the emergence of local military forces guaranteeing to the inhabitants of various regions stability and preservation of status quo, at the same time this factor deepened internal chaos leading to the increasing anarchy of political life. It is worth noting that Libya’s destabilization processes have also affected other countries of the region.

The desert character of most of the Libya’s border areas with neighbouring states facilitated the transfer of people and weapons beyond the borders of the country. This, in turn, facilitated the activities of jihadist groups (such as Islamic State or Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb) which, using the weakness of central government structures, tried to create territorial base for their activity in North and West Africa.

Fundamentalist groups present in Egypt, Tunisia or Algeria took action across the borders of these countries trying to expand their influence, especially during the time when the Islamic State was celebrating triumphs in Syria and Iraq – Libya became another country in which it tried to create the territorial bridgehead of the restored caliphate.

In particular, the central coastal part of the country (with Sirte as the main city) was temporarily controlled at the turn of 2014 and 2015 by the forces related to the Islamic State, eventually repudiated by the coalition of various groups (including AlQaida) in December 2016. Activities of jihadist militia were also favoured by natural conditions – difficult to control areas of the south of the country enabled functioning of the routes leading to sub-Saharan Africa. The instability in Libya constitutes also a factor affecting the situation in western Sudan.

The lack of effective control of interstate borders was encouraged by anti-government groups operating on the territory of Darfur to seek a territorial base in Libya. Through the territory of the Sahara, weapons and combat equipment are supplied to partisans in Darfur and local armed groups support each other’s goals. The destabilization of Libya was also one of the causes of escalation of the conflict in Mali in 2012. It was caused by the tensions between the northern Berber people inhabiting the northern regions (Tuaregs) and the representatives of the Negroid people inhabiting the southern provinces who are politically dominant in Bamako.

The outbreak of another Tuareg insurgence in March 2012, seeking to proclaim an independent state (Azawad), was possible mainly because after the collapse of the al-Qaddafi’s regime huge amounts of weapons were released from the Libyan warehouses to the south supplying rebel troops.

Many Tuareg mercenaries also served in the Libyan army – after its disintegration they joined the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) which set for itself the goal of building the independent state in the northern part of Mali. The training and combat experience gained in Libya increased the military capability of the Azawad partisans contributing to the escalation of the conflict.

The outbreak of insurgency in northern Mali became the starting point for the activation of groups referring to militant Islam. They successfully undertook military effort resulting in taking control of the region and establishing their administration over the areas affected by the conflict.

Consequently, in fear of further expansion of jihadism, France (Operation “Serval”), supported by the military forces of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), launched a military intervention on January 11, 2013 which restored the control of the authorities in Bamako over northern provinces of the state.

However, due to their specific conditions, desert areas are still penetrated by anti-government forces38. Jihadist groups undertook terrorist actions in several countries of West Africa (alongside Mali, also in Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Ivory Coast). The expansion of jihadism in this part of the world is therefore one of the consequences of the Libyan crisis and the progressive dysfunctionality of this country.

This dysfunctionality was to a certain extent “exported” beyond the borders of Libya, contributing to the increase of the security threats in neighbouring countries. At the same time, the anti-Western sentiments in this region were strengthened – both the international intervention in Libya in 2011 and the French intervention in Mali in 2013 encouraged the radicalization of local communities previously marginalized and devoted to religious traditions of Islam in North and West Africa (all Sub-Saharan Africa countries in the geographic region of Sudan are inhabited mostly by Muslim population).

The destabilization and anarchisation of political life in Libya was also the source of threats to the security of Western Europe countries. The proximity of the southern coast of Italy (Sicily) makes Libya the transit state for migrants from Africa seeking to improve their living conditions.

Under the regime of Colonel al-Qaddafi, the authoritarian order was able to create an effective mechanism to protect the Libyan coasts and transit routes from Sub-Saharan African countries towards the Mediterranean coast.

Especially after waiving sanctions imposed on Libya by the UN Security Council in 2003 when the authorities in Tripoli were seeking normalization of relations with the countries of the high-developed West (by seeking investments in the oil sector and contracts for the supply of energy resources) one of the conditions of cooperation laid down by European countries was to seal borders and strengthen control over the illegal emigration flow.

These actions proved to be effective – the Libyan routes of migrants to the north were to large extent blocked. After the political changes caused by the so-called the Arab Spring the situation has changed fundamentally. Lack of effective power capable of controlling the entire territory of the state led to the reconstruction of migration routes and the development of illegal smuggling structures controlled by criminal groups.

Transporting people across the Mediterranean is at the same time associated with high risk due to the quality of ships and boats used for transport, excessive burden or, frequently, deliberate actions of criminal structures incapable of ensuring to smuggled persons basic security conditions.

The “Libyan” route became one of the three main directions of the influx of people seeking asylum during the migration crisis which emerged in Europe in 2015 along the eastern route through Turkey (then used to the greatest extent) and the western route between Morocco and Spain. The migration crisis contributed to the rise of nationalist moods in many European Union countries, led to increased tensions between EU member states in connection with the strategy of adapting illegal immigrants and displayed the weakness of the European Union institutions in the absence of effective means and mechanisms to solve the problems generated by the crisis.

This situation made European leaders aware of the need to pursue a more active policy aimed at neutralizing contradictions and threats generated in Africa. It also constitutes a proof of the progressive process of the internationalization of threats generated by dysfunctional states in the modern world. The dysfunctionality of the Libyan state translates also into the stability of the oil markets. The high dependence of extracting operations on the political conditions resulted in large fluctuations in the level of oil extraction and export in Libya.

This further aggravated the uncertainty on the international energy raw material markets and among recipients of Libyan resources, although in the context of low oil prices after 2015 it should be noted that this did not have a huge impact on the level of supply and prices on international markets – uncertain supply from Libya was previously taken into account in the market assessments by experts, intermediaries and recipients of crude oil.

However, stabilizing the Libyan oil market is in the best interest of both importers and exporters of this raw material – as a factor stabilizing the international situation in the sector that is crucial for the global economy. This increases the involvement of third countries in activities aimed at forcing solutions that are positive from their point of view (in particular, Western European countries are involved in such activities due to geographic proximity and prospects of favourable business solutions).

In the long term, however, this may preserve the phenomenon of Libya being objectified by external partners. The involvement of Italy and France in attempts to peacefully resolve the intra-Libyan conflict, the Italian initiative to strengthen the potential of the Libyan coast guard or Russia’s attempts to use political divisions in Libya to rebuild influence in this part of the world indicate the existence of such tendencies.

The dysfunctionality of Libya is a consequence of the presence of at least several factors favouring the destabilization of this country. Among them, the external military intervention must be mentioned, which was decisive for the fall of the authoritarian political regime symbolized by Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi.

Lack of political forces capable of effectively managing the transformation process, in the absence of sufficient interest of external players for its support, contributed to the anarchization of the internal situation, the destabilization of the state and creation of threats to the stability of the international environment.

The example of Libya has become another case for analysis in discussions regarding the rationality of actions aimed at enforcing political change through external interventions even when they are justified by humanitarian reasons.

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Wiesław Lizak – University of Warsaw

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Canan Atilgan / Veronika Ertl / Simon Engelkes

Breeding Ground of Extremist Groups

In conjunction with uncontrolled migration towards Europe, permeable borders and the availability of weapons in the post-revolutionary disorder make Libya a fertile breeding ground for extremism and terrorism. During the revolution, established jihadist factions were already fighting alongside the rebels and, following the overthrow of the regime, took on posts in Libya’s political system next to moderate Islamists. However, the continuing state disintegration opened the doors to another actor: the so-called Islamic State. As in other territories, IS turned the undefined power situation in Libya to its advantage and established a territorial presence.

Returning fighters from Syria formed the first Libyan IS offshoot and were later supported by IS representatives dispatched from Syria and Iraq in the creation of three provinces (wilāyāt) in the east, west and south of the country. IS initially settled in the eastern city of Derna, but was driven out by other jihadist groups. It then moved westwards along the coast and installed itself in the coastal city of Sirte, which became the first region outside of the Levant to fall under the territorial control of IS. Sirte

was considered its most crucial base and was retaken following months of fighting by militias and U.S. air strikes. With regard to the total number of IS fighters in Libya, the estimates fluctuated between 6,000 and 12,000. What is interesting here is that the majority of IS fighters in Libya – up to 70 per cent in Sirte – were made up of foreign fighters, primarily Tunisians. While being displaced from Sirte constituted a heavy territorial defeat for IS, it would be inaccurate to

speak of an ultimate victory over the group in Libya. Moreover, the victory over IS provides scope for other Islamist factions to proliferate, which – unless the country is stabilised and gains political peace – presents an ongoing terrorist risk. Libya’s neighbours face cross-border security challenges as terrorist factions spread, especially through the recruitment and training of fighters by groups in Libya and their return to their home countries after the military defeats of IS.

Attacks by terrorists trained in Libya, for example in Tunisia in 2015 and Algeria in 2013, also show the increased risk of attacks emanating from Libya as a retreat for these groups. For Europe, too, there is an increased risk of terrorism due to the strengthened international jihadist networks. The Tunisian Anis Amri, who perpetrated the attack on a Christmas market in Berlin at the end of 2016, was in contact with IS in Libya. The Manchester attacker had connections to Libyan IS networks as well. Salman Abedi is thus the latest link in the chain between the situation in Libya and the threat to Europe posed by international terrorism.

The continuing state disintegration facilitates the spread of extremist groups in Libya.

Furthermore, Libya’s instability is one of the main reasons behind the internationalisation and growing autonomy of armed factions in the Sahel region. In Mali, the epicentre of Islamist violence in Sahel, in Niger and in Chad, the dissemination of weapons from Libyan holdings fuelled the equipment of insurgencies, which were dominated by Islamists and tribal groups. The tribal areas along the Libyan borders in the south are, moreover, key to regional security. The conflict in Libya has underpinned the crises in Sahel, a region with historically weak governments and widespread zones where the state has little authority.

The lack of state structures in Libya turns the country into a magnet and transfer route for foreign fighters, as well as the logical junction for jihadism in North Africa, given its use as a place for training and retreat for extremists. Unless the situation were to change by means of a political peace process and the construction of a legitimate government with an effective monopoly on power, the activities of terrorist factions will remain a security risk for the region and for Europe.

At the same time, however, it must be determined that IS in Libya has no far-reaching control over territories and populations; local support for IS is relatively low. Experts believe that the strong clan and tribal structures are proving to be an important counterbalance to radicalism. The Libyan localism seems to not only be hindering a democratic process, but also a jihadist expansion.

From Fortune to Bankruptcy

Once the country with the highest per capita income in Africa, Libya is now on the brink of national bankruptcy. The country’s oil reserves are estimated at 48 billion barrels, making them the largest reserves on the continent and the ninth largest worldwide. In 2012, production of crude oil amounted to 70 per cent of Libya’s gross domestic product (GDP), 99 per cent of the nation’s exports and 97 per cent of state revenue. As a result of the escalating violence, however, the oil production declined sharply in the subsequent years and is far from being a stable supply since the oil industry in

Libya has become part of a pronounced wartime economy. In addition to this, there is the dramatic decrease in the global market price of oil. The banking system has likewise almost completely crumbled due to the liquidity crisis. The state budget has been put under considerable strain by the appeasement policy of unproductive salary and pension payments.

40 per cent of budgetary expenditure flows into salaries and subsidies respectively and less than half is currently covered by revenue while the remainder comes from depleting currency reserves. Meanwhile, illegal economic activities, especially the smuggling of people and goods, have developed into a profitable industry. The shadow economy has also been able to greatly expand its capacity by linking criminal networks with territorial access for militias.

The war in Libya has led to a reorganisation of the smuggling cartels and turned the country into the regional hub for illegal trade in drugs, medicine, vehicles and people. The economic collapse of Libya has drastic consequences for neighbouring countries, too. The economic collapse of Libya has drastic consequences for neighbouring countries, too. Tunisia and Egypt are most seriously affected by the developments. The dramatic economic weakness in Tunisia is therefore ascribed in large part to the crisis in Libya. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) estimates that the chaos in Libya cost Tunisia at least 4.3 billion euros by the end of 2015 alone.

After the collapse of the Libyan economy, Tunisia’s GDP sank by 3.7 per cent and 3.8 per cent in 2013 and 2014. Furthermore, Tunisia traditionally satisfied 25 per cent of its oil demand with Libyan oil bought at preferential prices. However, this supply was difficult to sustain following the collapse of Libya’s oil sector. In the tourism sector, Tunisia saw a slump of 30 per cent in the numbers of Libyan tourists (around 1.8 million annually prior to 2011). A further problem is the return of around 60,000 to 90,000 Tunisian migrant workers.

Money transfers from Libya have sunk by one third since 2011. The return of tens of thousands of workers is an additional burden for the country which already has a high unemployment rate. At the same time, informal trade flows between Tunisia and Libya make up almost half of the trade between the two countries. Almost 40 per cent of the Tunisian economy is informal. Smuggling, as well as other illegal activities often represent the only source of income for people in marginalised border areas. With a revenue of 850 million euros, border trade provides a living for approximately ten per cent of the Tunisian population.

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Dr. Canan Atilgan is Head of the Regional Programme for Political Dialogue Southern Mediterranean of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung based in Tunis, Tunisia.

Veronika Ertl is Research Associate at the Regional Programme for Political Dialogue Southern Mediter-ranean of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung based in Tunis, Tunisia.

Simon Engelkes is Project Coordinator at the Regional Programme for Political Dialogue Southern Mediterranean of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung based in Tunis, Tunisia.

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Wiesław LIZAK

The Road To The “Fall” Of Statehood

Libyan state decomposition processes are associated in their genesis with the events of the so-called Arab Spring which led to the collapse of several political regimes in the countries of North Africa and the Middle East.

Anti-government demonstrations began in December 2010 in Tunisia and then spread to other countries in the region. As a result, current political elites were removed from power in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, civil wars broke out in Syria and Yemen and more or less mass anti-government demonstrations were held in other countries of this part of the world.

The developments in Libya were preceded by the resignation from their offices of the presidents of Tunisia and Egypt which had a huge impact on the public opinion in Libya leading to the radicalization of anti-government moods especially in the younger part of the country’s population.

In this context, it is worth remembering that in the economic dimension, in terms of quality and standard of living, the situation in Libya was not bad. Libya was one of the better developed countries of North African in terms of socio-economic indicators with the relatively high standard of living, extensive system of social benefits financed with oil revenues as well as developed and modern economic infrastructure.

It is worth noting that immediately before the outbreak of the uprising in 2011, the country had one of the highest standards of living in Africa and one of the highest indicators of national per capita income, quite well-functioning education and health protection systems (though also benefiting from the imported labour force).

The main driver of social dissatisfaction was the authorities’ authoritarianism preventing the mitigation of existing social tensions. The lack of civil society combined with the efforts to fully control the lives of citizens by the authoritarian authorities and suppressing even the smallest manifestations of opposition activity created the atmosphere conducive to the contestation of the existing political order.

The symbol of the status quo and the ossification of the regime was the then leader of Libya, Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi who, although formally did not hold any official state functions, was the number one of the regime and maintained this position for 42 years (he came to power at the age of just 29 years).

A characteristic feature of al-Qaddafi’s rule was the unpredictability and unconventionality of his behaviour. Original political concepts, exemplified by the content comprised in the Green Book, led to the creation of a specific political system which was based on original solutions and – according to the assumptions of its creator – was to be based on certain forms of self-government combined with elements of direct democracy with strong reference to values such as social justice or basing the country’s development on own resources.

This specificity of the system was to be contained in specific terminology – the concept of Jamahiriya coined by al-Qaddafi was supposed to reflect the uniqueness and specificity of the Libyan development model. Needless to say, behind these slogans lay in fact a local form of authoritarian regime with a strong position of its political creator, leader and ideologist in one person.

The unmasking of the autocratic elements in the political system of Libya, a very long period of colonel al-Qaddafi’s domination and the prospect of family succession as the leader of the state (Sayf al-Qaddafi, was prepared to become his successor) led to progressive delegitimization of the Libyan regime among the inhabitants of the country despite a fairly extensive system of social benefits.

Also in the international dimension, the policy of the al-Qaddafi regime evoked a lot of controversy. Radically anti-Western course in foreign policy led during the Cold War to the deterioration or severance of relations with virtually all countries of the bloc. Libya, during this period, not only continued verbal criticism of “Western imperialism” but it was also involved politically and materially in supporting various forces that could weaken its international position of the West.

This logic led Libya to support various terrorist organizations, especially those which had undertaken spectacular actions, such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army in Great Britain or the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The supply of weapons and explosives to terrorist organizations provided Libya with the label of the main sponsor of international terrorism and Libyan secret service was directly accused of similar actions (such as the attack on discotheque in Berlin in 1986, the above-mentioned attack on the American plane over Lockerbie in 1988 or the attack on an the Air France plane over Niger in 1989.

As a result, the country was subject to international sanctions introduced by the UN Security Council resolution of 1992 which were in force until September 12, 2003 (Libya finally agreed to accept its responsibility for the attacks on planes and paid compensations to the victims which led to the suspension of sanctions in 1999).

Libya’s activities in the international arena were also directed at promoting mechanisms of cooperation with countries that perceived the Cold War international system in a similar way which were engaging in the processes destabilizing and contesting the role of the American power and its allies.

The cooperation with Iran or leftist political regimes in Africa and in the Middle East led to the isolation of Libya on the international forum. The community of interests with the countries of the former Eastern bloc resulting from the rivalry with the West led to the creation of many levels of mutual cooperation although unconventional statements and behaviours of the Libyan leader limited the possibility of allied cooperation, at least on the official level.

The involvement of Libyan authorities in supporting anti-system forces in the Arab states of the region (often under the Pan-Arabic slogans, though filtered through the Libyan interests and specific ideological assumptions promoted by Colonel al-Qaddafi) in that period led to the isolation of the state also in the immediate international environment (which was one of the reasons of the fiasco of the successive initiatives of the Libyan leader aimed at creation of the union of Arab states).

As a consequence of diplomatic failures in the region of North Africa and the Middle East, Libya then reoriented its foreign policy seeking to strengthen its position in relations with Sub-Saharan African countries. The successes of Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi in this field were rather the result of African leaders’ interest in Libyan economic aid (during the oil boom play Libya had budget surpluses at disposal) than real interest in the cooperation model promoted by the Libyan authorities.

Libya at that time tried to “punch above its own weight” on the international forum achieving rather limited results. However, it built a negative image of the country among the main actors in the framework of the then international order leading, as a consequence, to limiting its ability to achieve foreign policy goals. Therefore, after the end of the Cold War, Libya undertook certain measures to change the existing image and normalize relations with the Western powers and proWestern states in its international environment.

The most spectacular proof of this stance was the consent of Tripoli to refrain from further development of the potential of mass destruction weapons (chemical and nuclear weapons) as well as the consent to submit its arsenals to the system of control.

Economic needs have also led to gradual normalization of relations with European countries that are the main recipients of energy resources exported by Libya (Italy and France were particularly interested in developing cooperation in the oil sector). Nevertheless, despite the desire to change the international image, Libya remained the state of “limited reliability” – and this should be probably perceived as one of the reasons for the decision of the Western powers to support the opposition forces after the outbreak of the anti-regime uprising during the Arab Spring.

The outbreak of the anti-government riots in Libya took place in March 2011. The success of anti-government insurgencies in neighbouring countries gave a strong impulse to Libyans dissatisfied with the existing socio-political and economic conditions. Hopes for the change of the authoritarian regime led thousands of protesters to the streets. At the same time, it launched the opposite process of mobilizing pro-government forces to defend status quo.

Aware of the experiences of neighbouring countries, Colonel al-Qaddafi did not want to risk losing his power (attempts to make concessions or compromises seemed only a way to strengthen the demands of the opposition and could be interpreted as a weakness). Consequently, the situation escalated to the conflict in which the government side decided to use the full arsenal of forces and resources being at its disposal. The riots turned into an internal conflict in which the opposition side, as deprived of the access to arsenals of weapons, seemed doomed to failure.

The prospect of victory of the forces faithful to al-Qaddafi’s, however, prompted Western countries to launch the military intervention. Formal pretext, formulated on the international forum, were humanitarian issues, nevertheless the fact that Libya is an oil state gave rise to additional speculations about the real motives of the intervention forces (especially as the initiator of the venture was France, subsequently supported by Italy and the United Kingdom – that is the states economically involved in Libya).

The adoption by the UN Security Council of the resolution banning military flights in Libyan air space combined with the activities of the regime forces – including aviation – gave the pretext to launch an international intervention which in fact supported Libyan opposition. The coalition of Western countries which took the initiative decided to transfer the coordination of operations to the North Atlantic Alliance (Operation Unified Protector). International intervention has reversed the fate of the conflict.

Air support has made it possible to the anti-government forces to gain advantage also in ground operations. As a result, the regime of Colonel Mu’ammar al-Qaddafi was overthrown and the dictator died in fighting, brutally murdered by partisans on October 20, 2011. This started the new stage in the history of the Libya.

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Wiesław Lizak – University of Warsaw

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Marco Giannangeli

Libyan strongman Khalifa Haftar is “so inexorably linked to the Russian state that every decision is now taken in the realm of what Moscow finds acceptable”, warn experts. And this includes weaponising migrants. Western diplomats who engage with Libyan hardman Khalifa Haftar are hindering Europe’s capacity to curb Russia’s growing influence in the North African country, experts warned last night.

And they could pay a heavy price if Moscow chooses to engineer mass waves of migration which could “stretch European infrastructure and unity”. Using Benghazi as an alternative Libyan capital, the General – who received his military training in the USSR – is now completely reliant on Russian military might for his power. There are 2,000 Russian mercenaries employed by the Wagner group in Libya today. They were joined recently by a further contingent of 1,500 regular Russian troops.

Russia’s entrenched presence in Libya already presents several threats to Europe and the UK, in the form of plundered gold and diamonds which bring billions to Moscow’s war chest, Russian oil sales and control of the port of Tobruk from which it can threaten Nato interests just 700 miles away. Now, the weaponisation of desperate migrants offers another, deniable and non-military method of exerting pressure on the West.

It means that Russian leader Vladimir Putin can use Haftar to hold a gun to Europe’s head should he seek leverage in UN Security Council votes or in the event of military setbacks in Ukraine. European leaders and the US have been trying to court Haftar for the last two years.

In March the UK struck a £1m deal to ensure Libya’s formal government in Tripoli stops migrants from crossing into Europe, instead repatriating them to their countries of origin. But this holds no sway over Haftar. Italian PM Giorgia Meloni has twice visited Benghazi, offering valuable concessions and economic contracts in return for Haftar’s pledge to clamp down on migrant flows from Libya. The first meeting last year was followed by a 600 per cent rise in migrant flows from Cyrenaica. And action by Western leaders is offering no deterrence.

On Thursday, Libya’s UK ambassador Dr Martin Longden met with Haftar in Benghazi to “relay the view that all parties should engage in the UN’s political process.” Jalel Harchaoui added: “The UK, US, France, Italy all sent their diplomats to celebrate and honour Haftar’s armed coalition in Benghazi on Thursday – barely weeks after Russian armed forces sent tens of thousands of tonnes of military hardware “At the very same time, the same Western democracies vow to combat corruption and Russia’s expansionism”

When countries like Italy legitimise Haftar and offer incentives, it has a knock-on-effect, he said, adding: “Once Italy becomes engaged with reconstruction projects it can no longer support, say, a British call for sanctions.” And it will not work, because when the West talks to Haftar, it is talking to “someone who is inexorably linked to the Russian state”.

“He considers Russia vital and every decision is now taken in the realm of what Moscow finds acceptable,” said Mr Harchaoui Russia has already used migration as a weapon in 2023, when crossings from Belarus to the EU increased by 62 per cent. Frontex, the EU’s border police, has warned that an increasingly isolated Putin choosing to move migrants to Europe’s doorstep – both along Russia’s eastern borders and through proxies in the south, including in Africa – is a major threat to security for 2024.

Now, Moscow controls the borders around Haftar-occupied Libya including Chad, Niger, Sudan and Egypt. “Imagine if the situation in Sudan worsened and migrant numbers increased and Italy began to panic,” said Mr Harchaoui “It now has to face a power base backed by Russian forces. Options have dwindled.”

Alia Brahimi of the Atlantic Council think tank said: “More than a security issue, this is fundamentally a humanitarian emergency, and short-term deals with human rights abusers erase from the picture the desperate people trapped in an abhorrent cycle of violence involving enslavement, forced labour, sexual exploitation, and organ theft. “Libya is fast becoming a mafia state, where a few individuals own almost all the criminality. The same Russian proxies who run large human trafficking rings are also trading in illegal drugs from Syria as well as vast quantities of fuel stolen systematically and in plain sight from the Libyan state, which ends up with Russia’s allies in Syria and Sudan.

“Haftar is very unlikely to abandon his strong relationship with Russia as this will risk his entire empire. So the Libyan migration crisis is a weapon open to Moscow. “Illegal migration from Eastern Libya has a capacity to stretch European infrastructure and unity. And this is something that Russia is very alive to.”

“The UK, US, France, Italy all sent their diplomats to celebrate and honour Haftar’s armed coalition in Benghazi on Thursday – just  weeks after Russian armed forces sent tens of thousands of tonnes of military hardware. Meanwhile, the same Western democracies vow to combat corruption and Russia’s expansionism”.  Jalel Harchaoui, RUSI

A second meeting in May seemingly heralded results, with transit figures now dropping as Haftar reins in his criminal gangs. While only 100,000 migrants crossed from Libya into Europe last year – compared with a million in 2015 – this situation can change. “If Haftar has the power to crack down on the number of fishing vessels being used to illegally transport migrants from Libya, he has the power to do the opposite,” said Libya expert Jalel Harchaoui of the RUSI think tank. “He can also just send migrants along to Western Libya. “If something happens in Ukraine, or within the UN Security Council, there is the possibility that Moscow will use Libya as part of its tool kit to exert punishment on Italy or Europe.”

***

Marco Giannangeli is the Defence and Diplomatic Editor at the Sunday Express. He covers defence and security issues as well as Geopolitics around the world and is particularly interested in recruitment and personnel, Nato, weapons systems and other innovations.

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Wiesław LIZAK

Libya is an Arabic-speaking country and according to most sources it is relatively ethnically homogeneous. Around 86% of the population are Arabs, and 11% of the population are Berber tribes (including Tuaregs inhabiting desert areas).

At the same time, it should be remembered that a large part of the country has Berber roots and the ongoing Arab conquest in the time of the first Muslim caliphs changed its demographic structure in favour of the Arabic-speaking component (both groups make up approximately 97% of the population and the South is also inhabited by the Sub-Saharan Tubu).

However, until today the tribal divisions, characteristic for communities living in this difficult climate, have survived. It is estimated that about 140 tribes and large families with political significance live in Libya.

Considering the relatively short history of the country as an independent geopolitical unit and additionally its creation as a result of external intervention, it is difficult to expect that the Libyans have become a modern, homogeneous nation. On the one hand, belonging to the Arab world and on the other hand, persistent tribal differences, make Libya a specific state where the loyalty to the central government must compete with loyalty to other reference groups created on the basis of tribal identity.

The ethnic differences also overlap with regional differences resulting from the fact that Libya was created as a conglomerate of two provinces which for the past three centuries belonged to one country (the Ottoman Empire) but retained some distinct features.

These differences date back to ancient times. Historically, Tripolitania was a region of the Maghreb countries (today’s Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco), while Cyrenaica was more integrated with the Arab East (Mashrek) in terms of socio-economic factors.

At the time of the Turkish rule in North Africa this was not a problem – both the east and west of today’s Libya were the provinces of the empire.

The relatively large scope of their autonomy made it easier to rule over the vast territory of the country. The Italian intervention, uniting Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, created the premises for full integration of both provinces, but it required time and commitment to promoting modernization processes. Italian rule in Libya, however, lasted only about 30 years and for the greater part of this period the national liberation struggle (led by Umar al-Mukhtar) continued, so unification processes could not proceed effectively.

Of course, this does not change the fact that the epopee of the anti-colonial insurrection was an important factor in building modern identity of contemporary Libyans in its ideological-political layer. The British and French occupation, which lasted for nearly a decade, was of temporary character, so only after gaining independence on December 24, 1951 Libya could launch building a strong state and modern identity.

However, the challenges faced by the authorities were confronted with factors objectively limiting the effectiveness of this process such as the vastness of the territory and the dispersion of the relatively small population, regional differences and low level of development in the social and economic dimension (the oil deposits were not discovered until 1959 and their exploitation began in 1963).

There were also some elements of rivalry between the main centres of both provinces – the capital of Tripoli and Benghazi in eastern Libya which, on the one hand was an expression of historical differences, but on the other hand – of modern aspirations to play the dominant role in the state.

The political dominance of Tripoli was one of the factors driving the mechanism of this rivalry. The Libyan Monarchy tried to use the religious factor to build a new Libyan identity. This factor played an important role, but was only one of many elements shaping social awareness.

Nevertheless, the political role of the Sanusijja brotherhood in the interwar period favoured the use of a religious factor in the process of building the modern national identity.

Entrusting the role of a monarch to the religious leader, Idris I, and the conservatism of the ruling elite around him evoked reluctance and resistance in some social circles impressed by the pan-Arab and socialist ideas which were triumphant at that time thanks to Egypt’s policy and its charismatic leader Gamal Abdel Nasser in the fifties and sixties of the XX century.

The above created the prerequisites of the fall of the monarchy as a result of the coup by the military group of young officers in 1969 and the transformation of the country from autocratic monarchy into an authoritarian regime led by Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi but also – despite the revolutionary rhetoric – based on neo-patrimonial principles referring to local specificity of tribal and rural communities and political patronage.

Libya is a relatively rich country. The main source of Gross Domestic Product is oil, whose vast deposits were discovered in the Libyan Sahara. With the population of several million, it allowed Libya to achieve a high GDP per capita making it one of the richest countries in the African continent.

The geographical proximity made European countries (mainly from Western Europe – Italy, Spain, France, Germany) the main recipients of Libyan energy resources which in turn generates interest in the development of their mutual relations.

As a result of the geopolitical location and energy resources, during the Cold War period Libya became the subject of influences of the Western and Eastern powers which in turn triggered international tensions resulting from the endeavours to gain influence and control of the strategic resources of the country.

This rivalry continued also after the end of the Cold War, although in another geostrategic and economic dimension. Between gaining independence and the military coup organized by Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi on September 1, 1969, Libya remained in the Western powers’ sphere of influence and close relations with the United States resulted in the location on its territory of the largest US military air base on the Mediterranean coast, where about 4 600 American soldiers were stationed (Wheelus Air Base – near Tripoli).

Libya remained in the orbit of Western influence also in the economic dimension (investments in the oil industry). The radicalism of transformations initiated together with the “revolution of September 1” led to the deterioration of relations with the West. The new Libyan authorities with colonel al-Qaddafi in the lead decided to break the existing external connections and took steps to develop an independent development path.

In 1977 al-Qaddafi published the program of political transformation of the country calling it in the ideological dimension the third global theory constituting in fact a mixture of nationalist (with strong references to Pan-Arabism), socialist and populist slogans as well as elements of the Muslim religion.

The program was comprised in the Green Book which, printed in millions of copies and in many languages, was aimed at dissemination in Libya and in the whole world the slogans of the Libyan revolution as the expression of striving for modernization and development based on own resources and own concepts, competitive to the models offered by the developed world.

The wealth coming from the export of crude oil was to be the source of support for ambitious development programs implemented by revolutionary authorities. The anti-Western course in Libya’s foreign policy objectively positioned the country on the side of the Eastern bloc in the Cold War era, nevertheless the radicalism of actions and the high level of assertiveness in Libyan politics made Tripoli a difficult partner for Moscow and its allies.

His unconventional behaviour in foreign policy made the Libyan leader a controversial partner for other actors, building a wall of reluctance around him and inducing readiness to engage in attempts to eliminate the politician who does not avoid actions negatively evaluated from the point of view of the stability of the international order.

Libya has been among others sanctioned by the UN Security Council for more than 10 years for supporting international terrorism (after accusations of organizing the attack on an American plane of the Pan Am Airways on December 21, 1988 over the Scottish city of Lockerbie, which resulted in the death of 259 passengers and crew members as well as city residents).

***

Wiesław Lizak – University of Warsaw

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Canan Atilgan / Veronika Ertl / Simon Engelkes

A Country of Regional Contrasts

The country’s social divide is crucially important for understanding the political fragmentation in Libya. The east, Cyrenaica, is dominated by tribal groups with links to Egypt and is characterised by a social and religious population that tends to be more conservative.

The west, Tripolitania, is more cosmopolitan and oriented towards the Mediterranean. The south, Fessan, is Libya’s sparsely populated hinterland, inhabited by Tuareg and Tubu people who today fight for control of the lucrative border trade, the oil fields and military facilities.

Long before the start of the civil war, the depoliticising of public life in Gaddafi’s Jamahiriya triggered a strengthening of the tribal structures in the regions. The power vacuum after the end of the revolution further encouraged the rise of armed tribal groups and local militias.

In addition to the historical territorial partitioning of Libya, geographical divisions are based in particular on the distribution of national oil reserves. The majority of the oil reserves are located in the “oil crescent”, which stretches from Ras Lanuf in the east through the central-northern city of Sirte to Jufra in the south. Irrespective of this, for decades the revenue from the oil sector flowed to Tripoli, thereby giving rise to the sentiment in the east and south of being cheated out of their legitimate income. Since the oil sector makes up around 97 per cent of the Libyan state revenue, control of oil exports represents an important strategic variable for the future of Libya and the influence of various groups.

In the negotiations and implementation of the LPA, it is predominantly the divisions between east and west that play a central role. The rejection of the agreement by important factions and key protagonists from the east can therefore in large parts be attributed to the perception of a power imbalance in the negotiations and the structure of the newly created system in favour of western forces. Because of this, instead of working to establish peace in Libya within the framework of the LPA, General Haftar and his allies tried to cement their position of power in the east and expand their territorial control, in part by co-opting militias and replacing elected communal councils with military governors.

The takeover of the strategic oil crescent in autumn 2016 is a clear example of these ambitions, and an important means of political leverage against the GNA.

The Effects of a Lack of State Structures on Regional Security

The context of a lack of state structures offers a fertile breeding ground, especially for the proliferation of extremist groups and, in connection with the country’s uncontrolled and porous borders, for increased and irregular migration flows. The consequences of these dynamics in the form of escalating instability therefore constitute a huge challenge for the future of Libya, but also for regional and international stability. State Without Borders Libya is traditionally a country of migration and, prior to the revolution, accommodated an estimated two to three million legal immigrant

workers from neighbouring countries and the wider continent of Africa.11 Irregular migration, albeit at a much lower level than at present, was regulated under Gaddafi by a system of selective allocation of unofficial control over border sections and smuggling routes. Following the revolution, these agreements were rendered void and the increasing destabilisation of the country contributed to the rise in the number of irregular migrant flows to and through Libya, as well as to a rapid expansion and professionalisation of smuggling, which had suddenly become deregulated.

Accordingly, 95 per cent of the 85,183 people who reached Italy between January and June 2017 via the central Mediterranean route had set out from Libya.12 In addition to the vacuum of state control in Libya, the aggravated conditions on the eastern and western Mediterranean routes put the country at the centre of migration flows in the Mediterranean area.

While UNHCR data speaks of approximately 40,000 people registered in Libya (asylum seekers and refugees), the actual figure is estimated to be considerably higher at between 700,000 and one million people. In the present situation, neither the GNA nor other state or non-governmental groups have the capacity to effectively put a halt to smuggling activities. Both the 1,770 kilometers long Libyan coast, as well as the 4,348 kilometers

long land borders with neighbouring countries remain porous. A higher concentration of smuggling activities are evident in the south of the country, where there is a lack of state control and alternative economic activities. Therefore, the southern borders and coastal regions in the west of the country form an easy point of departure for smugglers due to the collapse of the former security structures and the GNA’s lack of capacities. Since the revolution, this has become a hotbed for smuggling networks to expand, for whom control of this increasingly important economic sector means not only resources, but also securing territorial zones of influence as well as consolidating influence in this volatile power structure.

After the fall of Gaddafi, irregular migration to and through Libya grew enormously.

At the end of 2016, the EU and UN began to train the Libyan coast guard in carrying out rescue missions, combatting smugglers and upholding human rights; and provided them with the equipment to do so.14 What is problematic, however, is that the Libyan coast guard has emerged from revolutionary militias from the Libyan civil war and has no professional staff. According to a UN report, in some cases the units themselves are involved in criminal smuggling schemes.

In July 2017, the number of migrants reaching Italy from Libya fell by half to 11,459 people and, in August, this figure fell again by approximately 80 per cent. The causes for this dramatic decline are not clearly identifiable. According to various press reports and expert opinions, the expansion of the activities of the Libyan coast guard and their approach against the search and rescue missions of humanitarian aid organisations might have led to this.

The withdrawal of international aid organisations has, however, resulted in the operations in Libyan waters becoming even less transparent to observers. International observers and experts accuse the Italian government of supporting an agreement between the GNA and militias that allows for some armed groups to be financed so as to avoid further crossings, and to already intervene on the mainland. Therefore, this decrease appears to be merely linked to the interception of migrants.

This does not, however, provide a sustainable solution; and may have the opposite effect with the emergence of alternative migration routes. A challenge of particular urgency is the precarious legal and humanitarian situation of migrants in Libya, which has been documented and criticised time and again by reports from international organisations.

***

Dr. Canan Atilgan is Head of the Regional Programme for Political Dialogue Southern Mediterranean of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung based in Tunis, Tunisia.

Veronika Ertl is Research Associate at the Regional Programme for Political Dialogue Southern Mediter-ranean of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung based in Tunis, Tunisia.

Simon Engelkes is Project Coordinator at the Regional Programme for Political Dialogue Southern Mediterranean of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung based in Tunis, Tunisia.

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Thousands of Russian fighters are flooding into Libya, raising concerns over what the Kremlin might be planning

Russia has been bolstering its military presence in Libya for the past few months, according to a joint investigation from the independent outlet Verstka and the All Eyes on Wagner project. Libya has been mired in civil war since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, and Russia has long been accused of meddling in the conflict.

Now, the Kremlin appears to be shipping more military equipment to Libya and the surrounding region and redeploying regular troops disguised as mercenaries, along with recruits from Wagner Group’s Africa operations.

‘Tectonic shifts’

In the past three months, Russia has begun actively transferring military personnel and mercenaries to Libya, according to Verstka’s findings. These forces are primarily concentrated in eastern Libya, a region under the control of Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the Libyan National Army and a Kremlin ally. (The western part of the country, including the capital, Tripoli, is governed by the U.N.-recognized Government of National Accord.)

A source within a Libyan security agency reported that at least 1,800 Russian military personnel have arrived in the country in the last two weeks alone. Some were dispatched to Niger, while others remain in Libya awaiting further orders.

One serviceman told journalists that he and several hundred other special forces soldiers were redeployed from Ukraine at the beginning of the year. Several thousand more fighters — both professional soldiers and mercenaries from Wagner Group’s Africa operations — arrived in Libya between February and April. In conversations with journalists, the soldiers themselves acknowledged that their presence in Libya is unofficial. They said that they’re there as part of a private military company, though they didn’t specify which one.

Russian military personnel and equipment have been spotted in at least 10 locations in eastern Libya since the beginning of March. Russian troops are stationed around major military bases, such as Al Jufra Air Base and Ghardabiya Air Base, as well as near smaller ones by Waddan and Marj.

Sources say that some of the newly arrived Russian military personnel are involved in training local soldiers and new recruits from private military companies. Others are carrying out combat missions, such as securing the transport of military equipment.

“There’s never been such a fuss; tectonic shifts are happening here,” one Russian soldier in Libya commented. “I think a big mess is brewing.”

Following the breadcrumbs

Location data from Telegram users show an increase in activity around military sites in Libya. On March 5, a Russian soldier with the username “Andrey” showed up near the Ghardabiya Air Base near Sirte. A few months before, “Andrey” was in Mulino — a city in Russia’s Nizhny Novgorod region where soldiers are being trained for combat in Ukraine. Nearly two weeks after “Andrey” appeared at Ghardabiya Air Base, the Libyan National Army conducted military exercises there.

Soon after, another group of Russian soldiers was spotted in Marj, Libya. On March 17, photos of them were posted on Libyan social media; Verstka and its investigative partners were able to geolocate these photos by comparing the buildings and structures in them with satellite images.

In early May, geolocation data confirmed the presence of two Russian soldiers in Jufra. One of them was the same “Andrey” who’d been at the Ghardabiya Air Base in March. He stayed there until at least April, then moved to Jufra by May.

The second soldier in Jufra was 26-year-old Pavel Vavilov from Russia’s Vladimir region. It’s likely that Vavilov entered the military recently: leaked data shows he worked as a security guard in 2020, and before that, as a taxi driver. He’s faced various legal issues, including a theft conviction. Another Telegram account linked to Vavilov shows a car with a license plate from the self-proclaimed “Luhansk People’s Republic” in the profile picture.

In recent weeks, there’s been a notable increase in shipments of Russian weapons and transport vehicles from Syria to Libya. In photos published on March 30 by the Russian pro-war Telegram channel Military Informant, several Russian Tigr armored personnel carriers can be seen being used in Libyan National Army exercises. Judging by the unit insignia on the front doors, they were delivered to the Libyan National Army’s 106th Brigade.

The channel also released video footage of the exercises. After comparing the terrain, buildings, and landmarks seen in the video to satellite images, Verstka and its investigative partners determined that the footage was shot between Al Jufra Air Base and the town of Waddan.

Russia is shipping a large amount of military equipment to Libya by sea. A source told Verstka that he had personally escorted equipment from a “military port” to various “military bases.” In some cases, the equipment comes to Libya via Syria’s Tartus port. For instance, on April 2, two Russian landing ships — the Alexander Otrakovsky and the Ivan Gren — were spotted in Tartus.

On April 6, the same ships were off the coast of Crete, and on April 8, they arrived at the Port of Tobruk in Libya. These vessels were transporting vehicles and weaponry; one item in the shipment resembled a Soviet-era 2S12 “Sani” heavy mortar system. According to open-source investigators, this marked the fifth such shipment in the last six weeks. Satellite imagery shows that since then, the ships have continued to make trips back and forth.

Jalel Harchaoui, a Libya expert at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) think tank, drew attention to the fact that Russian military personnel are being redeployed to the Brak al-Shati base in Libya. According to him, the number of Russian-speaking personnel at the base has increased by about 25 percent in recent weeks.

Back in March 2024, investigators from the All Eyes on Wagner project didn’t find any Russian Telegram accounts at the base. However, the situation has changed in the last few weeks. For example, in early May, an account registered to a Russian number was discovered near the base. The user, 28-year-old Russian Maxim Kukol, doesn’t appear to have been connected to the military before 2021. But there’s no public record of his employment after this. However, by 2022, his debts had been cleared.

Geolocation data also shows a steady stream of Russian military personnel arriving at the Tartus port in Syria, which has become a kind of redistribution hub for military resources. Among them is 19-year-old Navy serviceman Anton Zaikin, who was stationed in Baltiysk, in Russia’s Kaliningrad region, in early 2024. By early May, he had relocated to Syria.

A strategic move

Turkey, the U.S., and other countries have repeatedly accused Russia of interfering in the Libyan conflict, including through the use of Wagner Group mercenaries. Journalistic investigations have confirmed that Russian mercenaries have been present in Libya since at least 2019, and experts say the Kremlin has been supporting Khalifa Haftar since around 2018.

In 2023, Russian officials and Haftar held their first public negotiations since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In August, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov met with him in Libya, and in September, Haftar met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow. Following this, there were multiple media reports of Kremlin plans to build a Russian naval base in Tobruk, Libya (where Russian military cargo arrives from Syria).

In January 2024, shortly before Russia began sending large numbers of troops to the region, Yevkurov visited Libya again. He met with Haftar in Benghazi; Verstka’s sources say that a new Russian military training base is already operating not far from this city. According to Verstka and All Eyes on Wagner’s sources, the Russian contingent in Libya is controlled by four commanders who were previously in Syria. They, in turn, report to Yevkurov.

“I think the Russians are betting on a war inside Tripoli among the militias, so they’re going to shift gears,” said one military source. Another source suggested that the current influx of Russian equipment and the repositioning of troops are intended to supplant Wagner Group forces in Libya and pave the way for further deployments to other African countries.

RUSI’s Jalel Harchaoui noted that an increased presence in Libya aligns with many of Russia’s strategic regional interests. “Libya offers extremely valuable access to the Mediterranean Sea, acts as a southern flank to exert pressure on NATO and the E.U., and strengthens dialogue with other key Arab countries,” he explained. “Importantly, it also serves as a gateway to Sub-Saharan African countries, offering a strategic route to countries like Sudan, Niger, and beyond.”

According to him, cooperating with the Haftar family allows the Kremlin to achieve these goals while minimizing costs. “Roughly speaking, the Haftar family rewards Moscow materially and financially for doing things that are already in its interest,” Harchaoui believes.

The increased military activity in the region may also have something to do with increased pressure for Libya to hold elections. While there have been several attempts to hold elections, plans have often been delayed or disrupted due to escalations in the military conflict. The U.N. has urgently called for elections to be held to prevent the country from sliding further into war.

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Wiesław LIZAK

Abstract

The developments of the Arab Spring of 2011 extended, among others, to Libya. As a consequence of the armed anti-government uprising supported militarily by the air forces of the Western powers (under the auspices of NATO), the regime of Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi, who has controlled the state since the 1969 military coup, was overthrown.

The collapse of the current regime has initiated the path to the social, political and economic transformation of the Libyan state. However, the rivalry of local political forces which is a reflection of tribal, regional and ideological divisions, prevented the emergence of an effective political system.

As a result, Libya has evolved into a dysfunctional state and the processes of internal destabilization and lack of state borders control generate threats also for the international environment of the country (West Africa, East Africa, Europe).

The developments of the so-called Arab Spring have brought significant political changes to many countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Despite the expectations of democratization and socio-economic reforms, as a consequence of the mass anti-government insurgences, in most countries affected by this process their effects proved to be far from expected.

The social energy released in the process of contesting the existing political order turned out to be insufficient to give to the processes of changes following the fall of political regimes the political vectors aimed at increasing political liberties and economic freedom.

Apart from Tunisia, where the transformation of 2011 has so far resulted in the democratization of the system and the liberalization of political life, in other states where previous regimes have been subjected to contestation the authoritarian regime has been restored (Egypt) or anarchization of the political system lead to the civil war and/or dysfunctionality of the state.

Libya constitutes an example of such developments, as following the overthrow of Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi’s regime it failed to create stable structures of political power and the country gradually plunged into conflict fuelled both by internal contradictions underlying the rivalry of various political-military forces and external influences of regional and non-regional actors pursuing their own strategic interests in this part of the world.

Prerequisites Of Libya’s Dysfunctionality

Libya has the location of strategic importance – located in the northern part of the African continent at the Mediterranean Sea, it has a relatively long coastline (1775 km), which both in the past and today has attracted the interest of the superpowers seeking to control the Mediterranean Sea and adjoining areas.

The mild Mediterranean climate and good conditions for colonization in the coastal area since antiquity attracted consecutive waves of conquerors and settlers – from the Phoenicians, Greeks and Romans, through Arabs and Turks, to the Italians in the modern era.

Libya, however, was not a separate geopolitical entity in the past but rather constituted the part of larger empires that extended their rule over the neighbouring territories. The name of the country comes from the ancient inhabitants of this land, referred to by the Greek with the term Libue (Libyans) – they were a part of the Berber communities inhabiting North Africa since prehistoric times.

The inhabitants of this land were also called similarly by ancient Egyptians and Romans. The name ‘Libya’ appeared in contemporary times on the world map only in the twentieth century along with the change of the legal status of these territories.

In 1912, as a result of the Italian-Turkish war (1911-1912), two coastal provinces of the Ottoman Empire – Tripolitania (western part of the country) and Cyrenaica (eastern part) – were united within the new territorial unit becoming Italian colony. The third province of the country became, Saharan and almost uninhabited, Fezzan.

Officially, since 1934, these three territories were united within one geopolitical entity called Libya, although the name itself had appeared in the area before. De facto (along with the transformation of Morocco into a French and Spanish protectorate in the same year), this ended the process of dividing Africa by the European colonial powers.

The establishment of Italian domination over Libya became an impulse for the birth of the resistance movement. For more than twenty years (until 1935) the struggle for the liberation of the country from the colonial system (mainly in the area of Cyrenaica) was conducted by the partisans (mujahedin) under the command of Umar al-Mukhtar, who – after being captured in combat and sentenced by Italians to death in 1931 – became a national hero and a symbol of the national liberation struggle.

Libya remained under the Italian administration until 1943 when it was taken over by British troops as a result of the wartime allied offensive. Formally, the authorities in Rome waived all claims to this territory in the peace treaty concluded with the victorious allied states in 1947.

During the transition period the administration over the country was held by Great Britain (provinces of Tripoli and Cyrenaica) and France (south-western province of Fezzan). At the same time, it was a period of activation of local political forces striving for the political emancipation of the country.

The question of the future of Libya was the subject of negotiations of the victorious Allied Powers. In the absence of an agreement among them regarding the future international legal status (in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, territories detached from the defeated countries should be included in the UN trust system) ultimately it was decided to grant Libya full independence. Finally, on December 24, 1951 Libya was proclaimed an independent state as a monarchy. Its first (and as it later turned out also the last) ruler was King Idris I (As-Sajjid Muhammad Idris al-Mahdi asSanusi).

He originated from the religious-social movement with Sufi tint called Sanusijja, whose founder (in the 1830s) was the grandfather of the future ruler, Muhammad Ibn Ali as-Sanusi. This movement played a very important role in the history of the country, being one of the birth factors of local nationalism with a strong anti-colonial tinge and the later ruler, Idris, was a de facto inter-war period (while in emigration in Egypt) ideological political leader of the anti-colonial insurrection (Umar al-Mukhtar was the military leader of Sanusijja).

Libya is a country with large territory (about 1.75 million square kilometres) but the vast majority of its area is a desert (about 93% of the area). Only the coastal areas of Libya ensure convenient conditions for their inhabitants. The Mediterranean climate and soils, suitable in some areas for the development of agriculture, make the vast majority of the 6.5 million citizens of the country live there.

The dry tropical climate in the interior entails extreme temperatures.10 Desert areas are characterized by permanent water deficit but also in coastal areas the amount of water available for economic purposes is limited (a characteristic feature of the landscape of these area is the lack of permanent rivers).

In Libya, however, there are huge reservoirs of underground water (in the area of the Sahara) which constitute about 70% of the country’s water resources and are exploited for the needs of coastal cities by supplying them through the water supply system. Unpopulated and inhospitable areas of the interior were in the past and are now a difficult place to control and, as a result, may constitute a shelter for various forces contesting the existing political order.

In the absence of effective central authority this factor becomes even more important. At the same time, communication routes leading to the Sub-Saharan Africa countries go through the interior.

Their control is therefore of strategic importance for the stability of the entire region, especially the areas neighbouring Libya in the south and south-east (Sudan, Chad, Niger – these countries are perceived as highly unstable).

To some extent, this also applies to the eastern and western neighbours of the country – Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria.12 These Arabic-speaking countries lie in similar geographical latitudes, which makes them similar in terms of climatic and landscape factors and makes their borders (especially in the Sahara) difficult to control and thus easy to penetrate (in all directions).

The abovementioned feature of the borders in the region has become even more meaningful in connection with the rapid development of means of communication in the twentieth century.

***

Wiesław Lizak – University of Warsaw

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Canan Atilgan / Veronika Ertl / Simon Engelkes

Ex-U.S. President Barack Obama once described the United States’ and its allies’ lack of success in ensuring stability in Libya following the fall of the Gaddafi regime as one of the biggest failings of his time in office. Indeed, the country is sinking ever deeper into chaos.

Now, the action plan by Ghassan Salamé, the United Nations’ new Special Representative for Libya, is expected to revive the peace process. If this does not succeed, the security situation risks escalating further – with far-reaching consequences both for neighbouring countries and Europe.

Introduction

Six years after the former Libyan ruler Muammar al-Gaddafi was overthrown, hopes of democracy, stability and growth in Libya have not come to fruition.

The country is descending into chaos. Politically and territorially fragmented, with a plethora of rival state-run and non-gov-ernmental actors and alliances, porous borders and little prospect of imminent stabilisation, Libya represents a security threat for its neighbouring countries, the wider Mediterranean region and Europe.

The UN-led peace process, which resulted in the Government of National Accord (GNA) in December 2015 under Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, has so far been unable either to consolidate its control over Libyan state territory, or to make noticeable improvements to the living conditions of the Libyan people.

Furthermore, the government’s authority is openly contested by both of the other self-proclaimed parliaments in Libya – the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk in the east of the country and the General National Congress (GNC) in Tripoli – as well as by a number of non-governmental armed factions. De facto, there is no government that controls the whole of the Libyan territory.

In the absence of a united national army, various actors are competing for power and resources. Armed factions are gaining a foothold at the local level. In many cases, this is accompanied by control over illegal economic activities, especially the smuggling of goods and people.

This all creates a situation that offers room for manoeuvre for extremist organisations too, such as the group known as Islamic State (IS). These organisations recognise and exploit the national power vacuum as a convenient opportunity to expand their activities and even local territorial control in Libya.

Political and Territorial Fragmentation

Looking Back: Revolution and Civil War

In contrast to the rebellions in the neighbouring countries of Tunisia and Egypt, the 2011 protests in Libya escalated within the space of a few days and developed into an armed conflict between the forces loyal to the regime and those rebelling against it. The overthrow of the Gaddafi regime, which was accelerated by the support of the international powers, gave the loose consortia of rebels no opportunity to develop their organisational structure or a programme for the future of Libya and the transition process.

The absence of influential, political and civil society leaders who could have filled the power vacuum after the fall of Gaddafi, contributed to the chaos following the revolution.

The government elected in 2012, the GNC, likewise failed to stabilise the security situation. Instead, the armed groups were integrated into a form of parallel security sector and from that point on received salaries from the state to prevent an escalation of the security situation. To date, none of the three Libyan governments has succeeded in curbing the influence of these informal armed groups and transferring control to a state-controlled security unit.

Libya does not have a unified, nationally controlled army.

Nonetheless, further escalation of the simmering conflicts was prevented until 2014. The fragile stability ended with the parliamentary elections in June 2014, which, marked by violence and low voter turnout, meant a clear defeat for the Islamist forces and which were subsequently annulled.

The elections took place in the context of the simmering conflict between General Khalifa Haftar’s groups from the east, consolidated under Operation Dignity, and the Libya Dawn coalition from the west formed as a counter-response. The confrontation culminated in a civil war that claimed thousands of victims, turned almost half a million people into internally displaced persons and brought the country’s economy to a virtual standstill.

After the defeat of the Operation Dignity coalition around the strategically important airport in Tripoli, the elected parliament, the HoR, moved back to the eastern city of Tobruk. Meanwhile, the GNC reconstituted itself as a rival government in Tripoli.

“Libyan Political Agreement” and Perspectives

The negotiations in favour of a political agreement for the creation of a unity government that would end the conflict between the rival parliaments began in January 2015 under the direction of the UN. This government was set up to guarantee the drafting of a new constitution and the holding of elections; and to act as a trusted partner in the fight against IS.

The process resulted in the signing of the “Libyan Political Agreement” (LPA), which envisaged the creation of a Presidential Council that would assume the formation of a Government of National Accord and, until then, would replace the existing governments. The intention was to involve members of the Tripoli based GNC in a newly created advisory institution: the High Council of State. The HoR in Tobruk was to remain in existence as the single national parliament.

A binding Cabinet agreement by a parliamentary vote of confidence was determined in order to secure democratic legitimacy for the new government. However, some central questions remain unanswered, especially as regards the regional balance of power and the configuration of the security sector.

Due to the ongoing deterioration of the economic and security situation, the danger posed by the spread of IS as well as international pressure on account of increased migration flows, a speedy signing was ultimately preferred to further negotiations. In the following months, these unresolved questions led to a loss of legitimacy of the Presidential Council and the newly formed government.

To date, the HoR has not given the vote of confidence necessary for legitimising the new government. Both General Haftar and the GNC withdrew their support for the GNA unity government, established themselves as rival governments in Tobruk and Tripoli respectively, and consolidated their respective power bases through military initiatives by loyal, armed groups.

Meanwhile, the new government also lost public support in the face of the worsening living conditions in the country. According to UN estimates, 1.3 million people, a fifth of the Libyan population, are dependent on humanitarian aid, while the number of internally displaced persons is rising. Ongoing displacement, a collapse of the markets, and plummeting production have made the food shortage more acute; and electricity and water are also only available in limited quantities across the country.

Additionally, the healthcare system has collapsed: 60 per cent of the infrastructure functions only in part or not at all and there is a lack of medicine and clinical equipment. The public administration has almost completely crumbled and the banks experience a shortage of cash. Due to the unstable security situation, most humanitarian organisations are forced to operate from the neighbouring country of Tunisia and aid services often do not reach all those affected. These daily challenges fuel the conflict further.

More than one and a half years after the signing of the LPA, the implementation of the “Political Agreement” appears to be infeasible in its current form. Renegotiations of the key elements with the involvement of those actors who have so far been neglected, seem unavoidable in order to overcome the political blockade and prevent further escalation of the conflict.

This realisation has sparked a new willingness to negotiate.6 To the surprise of many international observers, a meeting between the GNA Prime Minister al-Sarraj and General Haftar on 25 July 2017 brought about an agreement to hold a ceasefire, as well as parliamentary and presidential elections at the start of 2018.

It is assumed that a structural change to the Presidential Council underlies the agreement, which would reduce the institution to three members and secure Haftar a central role in Libya’s political system along with al-Sarraj and HoR President Agila Saleh.

At the end of September 2017, the new UN Special Representative for Libya, Ghassan Salamé, presented a new action plan for reviving the peace process. The plan envisages a revision of the “Libyan Political Agreement” by a committee, before a national Libyan conference votes on the individuals responsible for the new executive.

The conference under the direction of the UN Secretary-General will aim to bring all previously excluded or under-represented stakeholders to the table. Members of the High State Council and Islamist-spectrum militias allied with the GNA had feared marginalisation within the framework of a renegotiated LPA. It now remains to be seen how successful the renegotiation of the balance of power in Libya will be.

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Dr. Canan Atilgan is Head of the Regional Programme for Political Dialogue Southern Mediterranean of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung based in Tunis, Tunisia.

Veronika Ertl is Research Associate at the Regional Programme for Political Dialogue Southern Mediter-ranean of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung based in Tunis, Tunisia.

Simon Engelkes is Project Coordinator at the Regional Programme for Political Dialogue Southern Mediterranean of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung based in Tunis, Tunisia.

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