By Lisa Watanabe
This study looks at several types of key Islamist actors. Among the political Islamists, it examines mainstream Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya, who have gone the furthest in terms of accepting democratic norms and principles, and are the most pragmatic with regards to the application of sharia law.
PART SIX
“Quiestist” Salafis (Madkhalis)
Background and Objectives
The quietist Salafi strain in Libya is largely composed of followers of the Saudi sheikh Rabi bin Hadi Al-Madkhali. The latter shuns participation in parliamentary democracy, as well as armed resistance, in favour of strict loyalty to rulers and observance of Islamic practice.
In the 1990s, the Saudi government promoted Al-Madkhali’s teachings in the Kingdom as a means of discrediting the domestic Muslim Brotherhood-inspired Sahwa movement, and jihadi Salafism.
While his influence has declined domestically over the years, with the religious establishment distancing itself from him, he is likely still viewed by the Saudi government as useful thanks to his unquestioning support for the established rule in Saudi Arabia. His position within a government-funded Islamic university in Medina is indicative of this.
Al-Madkhali has also developed a following abroad, including in Libya. Advocates of Madkhalism were invited to Libya by Qaddafi in the 1990s to counter the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood and the LIFG. Over the years, the movement has gained traction in the country.
Support for Madkhalis in Libya was channeled through Qaddafi’s son, Saadi Qaddafi, who was the point man between Madkhalis and the regime. Not only did Madkhalism take root during Qaddafi years; its adherents managed to infiltrate the security services.
When the uprising began in 2011, Al-Madkhali urged his followers not to join the rebels and to stay at home, declaring that participation in the uprising would cause fitnah.
As a result, many of his followers did not side with the rebels, although some did participate in the uprising in Tripoli, which began on 20 August 2011.
After Qaddafi, Madkhalis formed “anti-vice” squads aimed at enforcing Madkhali moral precepts. They also destroyed Sufi shrines and mosques, due to their opposition to Sufism’s veneration of saints and the dominant Maliki School of jurisprudence.
Within the context of the civil war, Madkhalis joined opposite sides in the conflict, with some aligning with the Libya Dawn coalition and others joining the Libya Dignity coalition. Their subsequent alliances with the UN-backed GNA and Haftar’s LNA has increased their influence in the country.
National Alliances
Several armed groups that are influenced by Madkhalism are allied with the GNA. The powerful RADA Special Deterrence Force, led by Abdel Raouf Kara, a key Madkhali figure in Tripoli and based in the capital, is the most prominent of the western-based Madkhali brigades. RADA began life as one of the anti-vice squads set up following the uprising.
It falls under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior and operates out of a base at Tripoli’s Mitiga airport, where it runs its own prison. The force is thought to count approximately 1,500 in its ranks, amongst which are former army officers opposed to General Haftar.
RADA not only opposed Haftar and the LNA, but also the cleric Sadiq Al-Ghariani, who backs the National Salvation Government in Tripoli and is reported to have ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.
A RADA sub-unit, the Crime Fighting Apparatus (CFA), which is also based in Tripoli and has ties to Madkhalis, was believed to be responsible for the 2016 kidnapping of Sheikh Nadir Al-Omrani, a member of Al-Ghariani’s now closed Dar Al-Ifta and critic of Al-Madkhali’s fatwas.
Another Madkhali-leaning and Tripoli-based brigade is the Abu Salim Central Security Force, led by Abdul Ghani Al-Kikli. It controls a detention centre in the Abu Salim neighbourhood of Tripoli. Like RADA, it is loyal to the GNA.
It is also allied to another powerful Tripoli Brigade, the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade, once led by Belhadj and now commanded by Haitham Al-Tajuri, which also backs the GNA and recently expelled El-Ghwell’s National Salvation Government from its headquarters at the Rixos hotel in Tripoli.
The 604th Infantry Battalion is another Madkhali influenced armed group allied with the GNA. It was formed following the murder of a Salafi cleric, Khaled bin Rajab Al-Firjani, who was killed by IS militants for condemning the group.
Al-Firjani’s brother fled to Tripoli and established the group, with the support (including the provision of arms) of RADA. The group is estimated to comprise some 450 fighters (as of the end of 2015) made up largely of Misratans, although it also includes fighters from other parts of the country, such as Sirte, Bani Walid, Tripoli, Zintan and Sabha.
The 604th Infantry Battalion participated in Operation Al-Bunyan Al-Marsous, the anti-IS operation launched in 2016 against IS in Sirte by brigades loyal to the GNA.
Despite the group’s cooperation with the GNA, its leader does have ties to Haftar, who hails from the same Firjan tribe, raising questions about the group’s long-term loyalties.
Following a 2016 fatwa calling on Madkhalis to join Haftar’s campaign against the BDB, due to its perceived closeness to the Muslim Brotherhood and jihadi Salafis, some Madkhalis have allied themselves with Haftar and the LNA.
Many of the Madkhalis who have backed Haftar militarily, as a result of their anti-Muslim Brotherhood and anti-jihadi Salafi stance, are former members of the Salafist Tawhid Brigade, initially led by the now deceased Izz Al-Din Al-Tarhuni.
Following the latter’s death in early 2015, the Brigade disintegrated. Its members have since joined several units of the Haftar’s LNA, including the 302 Special Forces Battalion, the Marine Special Forces and the 210 Mechanized Infantry Battalion. Another, less prominent Madkhali leaning armed group that is allied with the LNA is the Tariq ibn Ziyad Brigade.
International Allainces
Saudi support for Madkhalis has been reported. The ability of the Madkhali brigades to increase their manpower by offering attractive salaries and to build up significant military capacity is alleged to be at least partly due to funding from Saudi sources. However, this remains speculative.
Saudi government support may take other forms, though, such as support for Madkhali preachers. Saudi Arabia has sent Madkhali clerics to eastern Libya, with the approval of General Haftar, for example.
Madkhali clerics operating in the East include Salem Al-Wissari, Hamed ben Issa, Abdel Al-Qwarsha, Faraj Al-Maliki, Al-Mabrouk Al-Qadi, Massoud Al-Nadhuri and Ezzedine Mouhammad.
Moreover, following the abduction of Al-Omrani, Al-Ghariani claimed that Madkhalis had been directed by their counterparts in Gulf States to murder Libyan clerics.
However, the abduction was reported to have been carried out on the orders of the Egyptian Madkhali Mohammed Said Raslan, suggesting that Egyptian Madkhali networks may also have influence with their counterparts in Libya.
National Vectors of Influence
Madkhalis appear to be using their alliance with Haftar to increase their influence in the East, where they are reported to be gaining support in some sections of society.
Madkhalis not only control many mosques in the East, but are also reported to control the General Authority of Awfaq and Islamic Affairs, the religious authority set up of the Bayda government. Indeed, locals have expressed concern that a state institution is propagating an extremist ideology.
Integration of Madkhalis into LNA units may also be serving to extend Madkhali influence in eastern Libya, which could have implications for a future Libyan army, should LNA units that comprise Madkhalis be integrated into any such unified structure.
In the West, Madkhalis have significant traction on the ground in Tripoli, particularly through RADA, as well as other brigades led by Madkhalis, including the Abu Salim Central Security Force. Together with the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade, the Madkhali brigades largely control much of Tripoli.
The Abu Salim Central Security Force’s influence with the GNA may have been further boosted in March 2017, when it ejected the National Salvation Government from its headquarters at the Rixos hotel in Tripoli. Indeed, the GNA depends on support from these brigades in the capital.
In Misrata, where the 604th Infantry Batallion is based, Madkhalis are also said to exert influence over the Misrata Muncipal Council.
Were Madkhalis to come together to form a bloc, they could wield more influence. However, the fact that not all of them followed Al-Madkhali’s fatwa to unite with Haftar’s LNA, as well as their presence on opposing sides of the civil war, suggests that their local allegiances predominate for the time being.
Although they are not a united force, their alliances with Haftar and the GNA may serve to strengthen an ultra-conservative Salafi strain within Libyan security structures and within the religious and societal spheres in Libya.
Madkhalis also have the advantage of being able to present themselves as security providers, as well as uncorrupt, which could be appealing to a population in dire need of security and good governance.
Their growth is potentially concerning, since Madkhalis are against mainstream Islamists, who are likely to continue to have an important role in Libyan politics.
Madkhalis unquestioning support for rulers could also have implications for stability in Libya over the long run, should undemocratic forces become pre-eminent in the country and seek to gain religious legitimacy by aligning themselves with Madkhalis.
International Vectors of Influence
Madkhali support for the GNA in Tripoli and their participation in the fight against IS does help to boost international acceptance of Madkhali brigades.
In the East, Madkhali support for Haftar’s LNA raises Libyan Madkhalis significance in Saudi Arabia as a potential channel of influence in North Africa.
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To be continued
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Lisa Watanabe – Senior Research Fellow at the Department of Humanities, Social and Political Studies, Institute of Security Studies, Zurich. Specializes in the issues of North Africa and the European Mediterranean.
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