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Rival Libya Premiers May Meet to Stop Slide to Violence, UN Says

Mirette Magdy and Hatem Mohareb

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After Prison Escape, Derna Residents Rounded Up

Targeted Unlawfully by Eastern Armed Groups

An armed group associated with the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) arbitrarily arrested at least 50 residents of the city of Derna following a January 16, 2022, prison escape, Human Rights Watch said today. Read More

Dangerous dead end in Libya

After postponing presidential elections scheduled for December, Libya finds itself in a political gridlock that could easily spark more armed clashes.

In a nutshell

  • Libya did not hold elections in December as planned
  • The government and the legislature have not come to a compromise
  • The situation could rapidly degenerate and reignite the conflict

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What a Decade-Old Conflict Tells Us About Putin

Kim Ghattas

One can trace a straight line from the overthrow of Libya’s dictator Muammar Gaddafi to today’s devastating war in Ukraine.

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Libya political crisis deepens

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Libya on the cusp of another decade of chaos

HAFED AL-GHWELL

Before the elections debacle in December last year, it was fairly evident that the prevailing interest among Libya’s political elite was sidelining the will of a plurality of Libyans who sought to choose their representatives in hotly contested polls. Since Muammar Qaddafi’s ouster in 2011, Libya has had at least nine governments and two civil wars but no presidential vote. Read More

Will Libya have two prime ministers again?

Karim Mezran

Libya is facing political turmoil again. On February 10, the country’s parliament, the House of Representatives, voted to sack the current Prime Minister Abdulhamed Dbeiba and appoint Fathi Bashaga, the interior minister in the previous government and main architect of the resistance against General Khalifa Haftar’s attack on Tripoli in 2019. Read More

International Unity Needed To Prevent A Divided Libya

Libya is at a perilous crossroads – again.

On 1 March, the country’s Tobruk-based parliament, the House of Representatives, voted to endorse a new interim government headed by former Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha, giving it the greenlight to take over from the sitting prime minister, Abdulhamid Dabaiba.

The vote’s proponents insist that the procedure was sound, but factions in the capital Tripoli say it was fraudulent. The latter reject the new cabinet and oppose appointing a new executive entirely. As the camps square off, omens of renewed fighting are visible for the first time since an October 2020 ceasefire ended six years of political feuds and intermittent conflict.

Armed groups allied with the Tripoli-based government have already closed Libyan airspace to prevent incumbent ministers from travelling to Tobruk to take part in Bashagha’s swearing-in ceremony. With others gearing up for confrontation, what happens next will depend largely on how foreign powers react.

A splintered international response could encourage an institutional split and military mobilisation. But a united international condemnation of the use of force coupled with a call on Libyans to chart a consensual way forward with UN assistance could avoid this scenario.

The 1 March vote risks breaking apart the unified interim government that formed in the months after a ceasefire declared in October 2020. That government brought together the country’s rival power centres, one based in Tripoli and the other in Tobruk, which formed after contested parliamentary elections cleaved the country in two in 2014.

Efforts to install a new government have been under way since early 2022, after the national electoral commission indefinitely postponed a presidential election that had been slated for 24 December, citing insurmountable legal disputes regarding the candidates running for the country’s top position. Libya’s main political camps have put forward conflicting ideas for resolving the impasse. 

Since then, Libya’s main political camps have put forward conflicting ideas for resolving the impasse. The Tobruk-based group, which includes House speaker Aghila Saleh, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar (who led forces that besieged Tripoli in 2019) and Tripoli-based factions that want to oust Dabaiba, said politicians should form a new government and amend a draft constitution before new elections.

The other, which includes western Libya’s main political blocs, wanted Dabaiba to stay in power until a new legislature is elected and can choose a new executive. Even presidential hopeful Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of the late dictator, who is historically at odds with the second camp, echoed the need to keep the Dabaiba government in place and proceed with a legislative ballot.

The polarisation between these two broad camps deepened after 10 February, when the House appointed Bashagha as prime minister-designate and tasked him with forming a government by the end of the month.

This appointment was the result of a deal among Bashagha, Saleh, Haftar and their respective allies in the House. At first, the agreement also had the approval of Khaled al-Mishri, the chairman of the High State Council, the rival assembly located in Tripoli. But Mishri withdrew his support in late February, seemingly under pressure from several members of the Council he heads, who opposed the move to put a new government in place.

The pro-Dabaiba camp responded to the House’s manoeuvres by announcing that the government was working on its own roadmap to hold a legislative ballot in June. They said the Tobruk-based parliament had no right to appoint a new executive and that Dabaiba would hand over power only to a successor backed by a popular vote.

Divisions among foreign actors mirrored Libya’s cleavages. Cairo and Moscow gave their initial blessing to the House’s efforts to instal a new government, seemingly believing that Libya would benefit from an alliance among former enemies like Bashagha and Haftar.

Beginning in early 2022, Egyptian officials actively supported reaching an understanding between the two and proceeding with the plan based on their deal. Turkey, while maintaining friendly ties with Bashagha, stuck by Dabaiba and called for fresh elections, banking on polls being a better guarantee of long-term stability.

The UAE backed Dabaiba, while its Gulf adversary Qatar, made discreet overtures to Bashagha while still bankrolling its traditional allies aligned with Dabaiba. In effect, the Gulf monarchies’ allegiances have shifted: barely a year ago, Abu Dhabi was aiding Haftar militarily, while Doha was providing diplomatic and financial support to the Tripoli-based authorities. Amid these fast-changing developments, the U.S. and other Western states have adopted a wait-and-see approach.

The UN did not oppose the attempt to replace the government. But the UN Secretary-General’s special adviser, Stephanie Williams, imposed conditions for accepting the move. First, she said, the new government’s appointment should be “consensual” and have the High State Council’s buy-in. Secondly, the confidence vote in a new interim premier should be transparent and meet legal requirements – though her office never clarified what these might be.

Foreign diplomats said the vote would be valid only if at least 50 per cent of House members plus one supported the new government. But House members advanced their own interpretations. Another point lacking clarity was how many lawmakers the House would need for a quorum.

Many of its original 200 members had defected to the Tripoli-based authorities, said they would boycott the proceedings or been replaced. Legislators gave the UN conflicting estimates of the remaining number of parliamentarians, ranging from 164 to 188.

As a result, estimates of the quorum for a valid confidence vote varied between 82 and 94. After the High State Council withdrew its support, Williams knew her first condition would not be met and could not be sure her second condition would be, either. 

The 1 March parliament confidence vote made matters worse. The House speaker counted 101 members in attendance, and 92 voted in favour. This number was close to or higher than the earlier quorum estimates. But video footage showed fewer attendees than 101, and only 88 names were read out during the roll call for the vote. The number of parliamentarians who pronounced the word “confidence” (thiqqa) was unclear because they did not speak into microphones.  
On 2 March, parliament clarified that the discrepancy in numbers came about because eight lawmakers had dialled in from remote locations for security or health reasons, while others preferred to cast their votes anonymously after receiving threats from pro-Dabaiba armed groups. The House also changed the total number of those in favour of the new government to 96, adding to the confusion.
Bashagha said the ballot was “clear and transparent” and vowed to take office in Tripoli in “a peaceful manner”. The next day, however, Dabaiba called the vote a “coup” attempted through fraud. On 3 March, Bashagha and most of his ministers took the oath of office in Tobruk. On that occasion, House speaker Saleh listed all 96 names of the lawmakers who had supported the new executive, in one last attempt to dispel doubts about the vote of confidence. [The power struggle] risks undermining reconstruction efforts and the wider economy. 

The power struggle could disrupt the calm Libya has enjoyed since factions signed the October 2020 ceasefire agreement. It risks undermining reconstruction efforts and the wider economy. Political rivals are also becoming more dependent on armed loyalists. Gunmen allied with the Tripoli-based government reportedly detained two new ministers, preventing them from assuming their duties.

It is unclear how Haftar-led forces, who control the east of the country and are allied with the Bashagha cabinet, will respond. The risk of war depends both on the answer to this question and on what the sides’ foreign backers decide to do. For now, the foes in the civil war appear unlikely to take up arms again, due to general war fatigue. Neither do outside powers seem eager for renewed conflict. That said, rising animosity between the two governments could change this calculation.

Geopolitical shifts could also affect tensions in Libya. The precarious balance between Turkey and Russia, both of which have military personnel in Libya, could be rapidly upended. Turkey is allied with the Tripoli-based government. Russia deployed fighter jets and the Wagner Group’s private military contractors to support Haftar-led forces in the 2019-2020 war, and while it has subsequently sent some of its assets elsewhere, it retains a presence on the ground alongside Haftar.

As fighting in Ukraine intensifies, there is a risk of spillover that could drag Libya into a new proxy war. For now, Moscow is the only foreign capital to officially welcome the Bashagha government. The Kremlin’s confrontation with the West over Ukraine makes its strategy in Libya unpredictable.

Other capitals have thus far kept a deafening silence, perhaps waiting to see how the UN responds. On 2 March, the UN Secretary-General said the vote “fell short of the expected standards of transparency and procedures and included acts of intimidation prior to the session”. This wording is likely to push foreign powers in the direction of refusing the new government recognition, which would be a blow to those backing the Bashagha-Haftar deal.

Notwithstanding their divisions, external actors should speak with one voice in pressing all Libyan parties to show restraint and condemning the forcible detention of the new government’s supporters. Such a minimum international consensus should be attainable, given that outside powers have a common interest in preventing a return to a divided Libya or a relapse into civil war at a moment of already great geopolitical upheaval.

The two sides in Libya should accept UN mediation to break their deadlock and return to negotiating a realistic political roadmap for the way forward. Finding a consensus between the two rival governments admittedly will not be easy, but for each there are good reasons and incentives to accept external mediation: the Bashagha government will be short-lived if it does not receive broad international recognition or, alternatively, gain access to state funds (both of which will be difficult without the UN’s support); the Dabaiba government risks losing out if member states begin to gradually flip their recognition in favour of the new executive.

The UN’s Williams should call on the parties to refrain from violence and urge them to accept her good offices for mediation. Foreign governments should follow her lead in calling for negotiations.

***

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Libya crisis worsens as rival government takes oath

A standoff between two rival governments in Libya worsened on Thursday with the risk of fighting or territorial division, as the parliament in the east swore in a new administration while the incumbent in Tripoli refused to cede power, Reuters reports. Read More

Could Libya Finally Have a Chance at Lasting Stability?

Alessandro Bruno

The Libyan Parliament’s decision to oust the interim GNU Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah may offer the first real chance at stabilizing Libya since the 2011 revolution. There’s still uncertainty to overcome, and this time one of the obstacles is the UN.

As happened between the years 2014 and 2016, the Parliament seated in Tobruk appointed a new prime minister. This time they designated the former interior minister, Fathi Bachagha, to replace Abdul Hamid Dbeibah as head of the interim government on Thursday, February 10. Dbeibah, who, in early February, was almost assassinated in an ambush, had been appointed interim PM back in March 2021. Now, he refuses to leave his post.

At the end of 2020, shortly after warlord and ex-General Khalifa Haftar’s failed attempt to take over Tripolitania, Cyrenaica’s strongman signed a ceasefire agreement, leading to a United Nations-backed peace process. As part of this process, Dbeibah was appointed to lead a new transitional Government of National Unity (GNU) with the mission of unifying the institutions and leading the country to presidential and legislative elections. Both were initially scheduled for December 24, 2021.

Due to the lack of consensus among the many Libyan factions, the elections were postponed indefinitely.

Due to the lack of consensus among the many Libyan factions, the elections were postponed indefinitely, weakening the position of the GNU. The alliance between Haftar and Bachagha allowed for the latter’s nomination by the Tobruk parliament (dominated by supporters of Haftar) as prime minister on February 10. Currently, it remains to be seen how the balance of power between Dbeibah and Bachagha – both born in Misrata – will evolve. Both have the support of very influential armed groups in western Libya. However, their alliances remain inconsistent and reversible.

Dbeibah’s Weak Support Base

Before traveling to Misrata, Bachagha arrived at Tripoli-Mitiga airport on a plane chartered by Haftar’s son on February 10. There, he held a press conference under the protection of the Zawiya militias and other Misrata groups. With the airport being just a few miles from downtown Tripoli, a recalcitrant Dbeibah could count on the muscle of the “444” militia and Misrata Brigades. Yet Dbeibah’s support is precarious. Should the Misrata militias deployed in Tripoli switch sides in favor of Bachagha, it’s over for the GNU prime minister.

Of course, the power struggle is less about personalities and more about control over territory, access to Central Bank funds, oil, and international recognition. Generally, armed groups and traffickers support Bachagha with an eye towards challenging the system implemented in Tripoli by Turkey since June 2020, which disturbs their interests. In other words, Bachagha benefits from instability.

Meanwhile, even as the UN continues to support Dbeibah, the Bachagha maneuver appears to have implicit political support from Egypt, France, and Russia – all unsurprising given the Bachagha’s generally favorable relations with Haftar.

The Bachagha maneuver appears to have political support from Egypt, France, and Russia.

Libyans, along with the rest of the world, had hoped that the elections would have established a new era, one free of bloody internal conflicts and aimed at working towards “democratization.” In reality, the Libya that was about to hold elections on December 24 lacked the conditions for stability – let alone democracy.

Conflicting foreign interests, intersected by local power struggles, create an insurmountable obstacle for a free and credible electoral process. Since Colonel Muammar Qadhafi’s demise in 2011, the only certainty in Libyan politics is that militias will challenge each other – often with weapons – and occasionally find precarious agreements which inevitably break down. Ending this “rinse and repeat” cycle remains the elusive goal since no political arrangement has ever worked, regardless of whether it is backed by the UN, the EU, Russia, or the United States.

One of Libya’s main problems has been its lack of institutions. Qadhafi purposely avoided giving civil organizations any real power – except for the management of the oil economy. Without stability and institutions, and in the context of a historically divided country (artificially united by Mussolini in the 1930s to facilitate colonial administration), the focus on democracy is more of a hurdle than an ideal.

Libyan writer and political analyst Fayez al-Araibi has accused the militias in Tripoli “of obstructing the unification of security institutions as they refused to transform the management of institutions into professional elements that lead them.” Al-Araibi observed that security is an essential factor in achieving stability in the country, stressing that the former head of the Libyan intelligence service, Imad al-Trabelsi, has been accused of several infringements.

“Consequently, it is in the interest of the [obstructing] militias . . . to hand over power to the head of the new agency appointed by the presidency.” Clearly, the resulting political unpredictability and insecurity have hindered the efforts of successive leaders who have attempted to rebuild Libya. The post-Qadhafi system – or lack thereof – has failed to meet the Libyan people’s basic needs. This failure explains the rising popularity of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi. Al-Araibi explains that tribal and community leaders see the former leader’s son as the best chance for national reconciliation.

The pursuit of an elusive democracy is preventing Libya from leaving the chaos behind.

The pursuit of an elusive democracy, rather than of stability, and the West’s encouragement of said pursuit, is the main obstacle preventing Libya from leaving the chaos behind. Upon first glance, the emergence of Bachagha may appear as another source of turmoil, and yet it could help Libya achieve some much-needed stability.

Bachagha’s Appointment Has the Potential for Stability

Days before the scheduled – and already compromised elections – on December 24, Bachagha went to Benghazi where he met Haftar, head of the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) on December 21, 2021. This meeting ­– at Haftar’s invitation no less – was remarkable. Its remarkability can only be explained by noting that in April 2019, Haftar launched the “Flood of Dignity” campaign to liberate Tripoli from the militias and Brotherhood-dominated Government of National Accord (GNA) — the original internationally supported transitional Libyan government — arresting all members of the Muslim Brotherhood and dissolving the political movement.

That same December, Turkey’s ambassador to Tripoli met Aqila Saleh of the House of Representatives, the Haftar-affiliated Libyan parliament in Tobruk. Around the same time, a delegation of GNA members from Tripoli flew to Turkey and met President Erdogan himself. This series of unlikely meetings suggests that Turkey and Haftar have reached a tactical agreement to soften their differences in order to stabilize Libya.

Turkey has decided to change its game: it is no longer interested in staying in and controlling  Libya.

Evidently, Turkey has decided to change its game: it is no longer interested in staying in – and outright controlling – Libya. Erdogan calculated that Turkey’s continued presence in Libya created a problem for fellow NATO allies (Italy, France, and the US) which are eager to increase stability in North Africa, halt the flow of migrants, and secure important energy sources.

This situation parallels that of Tunisia, where Erdogan maintained ties to Rachid Ghannouchi and the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Ennahda, and where the political cards have also been shuffled with the dismissal of parliament by President Kais Saied. Therefore, a shift in relations between Ankara and the Muslim Brotherhood has occurred in the Mediterranean. And without Turkey’s backing, the movement and its political representatives have been weakened.

Was it a Coup?

Technically, Bachagha’s appointment does not represent a coup. Indeed, as in all democracies, the executive governs with the trust of the parliament. And the “institution” in Tobruk that appointed Bachagha is Libya’s official parliament, elected by the people in 2014. That said, the militias in 2014 were affiliated with Bachagha, implying that any objectives the new prime minister sets toward stability should be easier to achieve.

Meanwhile, following the indefinite postponement of the elections, Turkey and Russia – until then rivals over Libyan matters — moved closer, building a common front and incubating the alliance of former enemies Haftar and Bachagha. This is especially impressive given that Bachagha fought against Haftar two years ago. Despite this ideal situation – for what could be more conducive to peace than a mutually beneficial alliance between two former enemies – there is an unlikely obstacle: the United Nations. Indeed, the UN has made it known that it does not recognize Bachagha and will continue to recognize Dbeibah.

The UN’s position represents a real and counterproductive interference in Libya’s internal affairs.

In the current circumstances, which could lead Libya out of its darkness, the UN’s position represents a real and counterproductive interference in Libya’s internal affairs. Until recently, the government in Tripoli had the support of the UN, but not of the parliament. Today, the situation is that of one UN-backed prime minister and another prime minister who enjoys the support of the Libyan parliament. If the Misrata militia close to Bachagha has allied itself with Haftar’s LNA – the two single most powerful armed organizations in the country – the intensity and amount of fighting may also decrease drastically.

As for elections? They may or may not happen this year – or even the next. But there’s no denying the fact that perhaps for the first time since 2011, Libyans have more or less come together. Bachagha is in an unprecedented position to build a unified Libya, and the current scenario is one of renewed diplomacy. If the UN and the West care about elections and democracy, they should welcome these new arrangements as they will lead to more stability and only then, encourage a vote.

Bachagha has the potential to unite the country, even if some suspect him to be Haftar’s Trojan horse. The UN could be more productive and save face by encouraging a scenario that supports the Libyan parliament’s decision to back Bachagha while keeping Haftar at bay.

***

Alessandro Bruno is an analyst at Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy. He is a frequent guest on BBC, CBC, and CTV. He holds an MA in International Relations from the University of Toronto. Bruno has worked abroad as a United Nations officer in Libya and was a sustainability/ESG analyst at one of the pioneering firms of sustainability investing.

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Libya has two prime ministers after parliament vote

Libya found itself with rival governments on Tuesday after parliament approved a new cabinet in a challenge to unity premier Abdulhamid Dbeibah, who has refused to cede power until elections.

In a vote some fear could help tip the conflict-scarred nation into another round of violence, the cabinet of former interior minister Fathi Bashagha was approved by 92 of 101 members present, speaker Aguila Saleh said.

The House of Representatives (HoR) in the eastern city of Tobruk had designated Bashagha as prime minister earlier this month.

It had tasked him with forming a government to replace that of Dbeibah, based in the capital Tripoli in the west of the country and deemed by Saleh as having outlived its mandate.

But Dbeibah has repeatedly said he will only hand power to an elected government.

The construction tycoon had been appointed a year earlier as part of United Nations-led efforts to draw a line under a decade of conflict following the 2011 revolt that toppled dictator Moamer Kadhafi.

He was to lead the country until elections in December, but they were indefinitely postponed and Saleh, a rival presidential candidate, argued that Dbeibah’s mandate was finished.

On Tuesday, the cabinet of 29 ministers, three vice-prime ministers and six ministers of state — including just two women — was put before the legislature.

Each lawmaker was asked to vote “confidence” or “no confidence” when the names were read out, but Saleh announced the government had been approved before all the names were announced.

– War of words –

Dbeibah’s government swiftly issued a statement condemning what it said was a “blatantly” fraudulent vote.

“Several members of the HoR said they were not in Tobruk but were counted” among those present, “which still didn’t reach quorum”, it said.

But in a video message, Bashagha insisted the vote had been “clear, transparent and public”.

“The most important things we are working for today are reconciliation, participation and stability,” he said, adding that his government would “take over its tasks in the capital Tripoli peacefully and securely”.

Dbeibah’s office responded with a second statement, vowing to continue its tasks and accusing the legislature of threatening Libya’s stability.

It added that it would take legal action and “hold accountable anyone who dares to approach any government building”.

– Return to armed conflict? –

The legislature had earlier issued a statement condemning “death threats targeting many members of parliament and their families” prior to the vote.

Elected in 2014, its eastern location contrasts with that of Dbeibah’s administration, which sits in the capital Tripoli in western Libya, reflecting the deep and complex divisions that have plagued the country in recent years.

The emergence of Bashagha’s government once again gives the country two prime ministers, as was the case between 2014 and a landmark east-west ceasefire in 2020.

It is a major challenge to Dbeibah, whose statement Tuesday repeated that his government intends to hold legislative elections in June.

Bashagha, a 59-year-old former fighter pilot trainer from Misrata near Tripoli, is backed by eastern military chief Khalifa Haftar whose disastrous 2019-2020 attack on the capital ended in defeat and a return to UN peace efforts.

During Bashagha’s stint as interior minister in 2018-2021, he worked to reduce the influence of militias and bring fighters into state-run forces.

He is one of the few major Libyan actors to have good relations with foreign powers backing rival sides in the country.

But Libya analyst Wolfram Lacher wrote on Twitter after the vote that “what I can’t see is how (Bashagha’s cabinet being approved) can bring stability.”

“By contrast, the potential for renewed conflict is real, even if it builds up over time rather than erupts immediately.”

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The revolution that turned into a civil war

Is there a reason for Libyans to be optimistic about the Bashagha government?

Mohammed El Huni

February 15, 2011, will remain engraved in the minds of Libyans, especially the inhabitants of Benghazi. On that day, Fathi Terbil, the lawyer for the victims of Abu Salim prison, was arrested. The families of the victims and their supporters came out calling for his release.

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Plan B for a Democratic Libya?

Cambridge forum presents ‘plan B’ for Libya

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The Tradeoff Between Promoting Unity and Reducing Opportunities for Conflict in Libya

Khaled Zeo

 The breakdown of talks in Geneva as well as Berlin held under the auspices of the UN comes after a series of failures on the part of Libyan stakeholders to find common ground. This has been seen in regard to a series of significant issues, including the format of the now delayed December elections, and the formation of a cohesive government in the new Libyan state. Read More

What is fueling Libya’s instability?

Analysts fear the country could plunge into further chaos after a failed bid to hold a presidential election in December.

A year ago, Libya looked to be on a fragile path towards democracy after more than a decade of civil war. Now, it appears to be sliding back towards strife and division. Read More

Libya Fast Facts

CNN Editorial Research

Here’s some background information about Libya, an oil-rich country in North Africa bordering the Mediterranean Sea and Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Chad, Niger and Sudan.

About Libya (from the CIA World Factbook)

Area: 1,759,540 square kilometers (slightly larger than Alaska)

Population: 7,017,224 (July 2021 est.)

Median age: 25.8 years

Capital: Tripoli

Ethnic groups: Berber and Arab 97%, other 3% (includes Greeks, Maltese, Italians, Egyptians, Pakistanis, Turks, Indians and Tunisians)

Religion: Sunni Muslim 96.6%, other is 3.4%

Unemployment: 30% (2004 est.)

Other Facts

Libya has proven oil reserves estimated at 48.4 billion barrels, the most in Africa.

Moammar Gadhafi ruled Libya from 1969 to 2011. In the 1970s and 1980s, he was known for supporting Palestinian terrorist groups. In the late 1990s, Gadhafi made steps toward rapprochement with the West.

A Libyan civil war began in 2011 with clashes between the government and rebel forces, and that fueled a second war that is still ongoing. The administration of General Khalifa Haftar, in eastern Libya, is often at odds with the Western-backed government based in Tripoli, the Government of National Accord (GNA). There are also multiple tribes competing for control of Libya’s dwindling oil wealth, as well as militant groups, including ISIS, scattered across the vast country.

According to the UN International Organization for Migration (IOM), there are 316,415 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and 567,802 total IDP returnees from 2016 to 2019. (as of October 1, 2020)

Timeline

1911-1912 – Italy gains control of the area comprising modern day Libya from the Ottoman Empire.

1940-1943 – During World War II, Axis and Allied forces battle in Libya. After the Axis troops are defeated, Italy withdraws, and Libya falls under French and British control.

November 1949 – A United Nations resolution calls for the establishment of a sovereign state of Libya by January 1952.

December 24, 1951 – King Idris I proclaims the independence of Libya.

1959 – Significant oil reserves are discovered.

September 1, 1969 – A group of army officers led by Gadhafi overthrows Idris.

1977 – The General People’s Congress (GPC) replaces the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which has led the country since the 1969 coup.

1979 – Gadhafi resigns as secretary-general of the GPC but remains the de factor ruler of Libya.

August 1981 – US Navy jets shoot down two Libyan fighters in a confrontation over the Gulf of Sidra.

March 1982 – The United States imposes an oil embargo on Libya.

January 1986 – Gadhafi draws a “line of death” across the Gulf of Sidra, which he claims is Libyan territory, and warns the United States and other foreign ships not to cross it.

March 1986 – Libya fires missiles at a US aircraft flying inside the “line of death.” In retaliation, the US Navy destroys at least two Libyan patrol boats in the Gulf of Sidra.

April 1986 – In response to the Libyan sponsored bombing of a German disco frequented by US soldiers, the United States bombs targets in Libya.

December 21, 1988 – Pan Am Flight 103 explodes 31,000 feet over Lockerbie, Scotland, 38 minutes after takeoff from London. Two hundred and fifty-nine people on board the New York-bound Boeing 747 are killed, along with 11 people on the ground.

September 19, 1989 – UTA Flight 772, a French airliner, explodes over Niger. One hundred and seventy passengers and crew members are killed. In 1999, six Libyans are tried in absentia and convicted in a French court.

April 15, 1996 – The United Nations imposes sanctions on Libya over the 1988 Pan Am Flight 103 bombing in Lockerbie and the 1989 Niger bombing.

April 5, 1999 – Libya hands over Lockerbie bombing suspects Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah to be tried under Scottish law in The Hague. The United Nations suspends sanctions against Libya.

January 31, 2001 – Megrahi is found guilty of the Lockerbie bombings and is sentenced to life in prison. Fhimah is acquitted.

September 2003 – UN sanctions against Libya are lifted.

December 2003 – Libya announces that it has agreed to end its program of developing weapons of mass destruction.

September 2004 – US President George W. Bush issues an executive order that ends most economic sanctions against Libya and lifts a ban on travel to Libya which had been in effect since 1981.

June 2006 – The United States removes Libya from its list of state sponsors of terrorism.

January 2008 – Libya takes a rotating seat on the UN Security Council.

August 14, 2008 – Libya and the United States sign an agreement over claims relating to injuries or deaths in the 1986 bombing of the German disco, the 1988 Lockerbie bombing, and the 1989 French airliner bombing.

October 31, 2008 – The United States receives $1.5 billion from Libya, settling claims from the 1980s bombings.

January 2009 – The United States and Libya exchange ambassadors for the first time since 1973.

August 2009 – Convicted Lockerbie bomber Megrahi is released from a Scottish prison on humanitarian grounds. Megrahi, reportedly suffering from terminal cancer, returns to a hero’s welcome in Libya.

September 23, 2009 – Gadhafi addresses the UN General Assembly. In the 1.5-hour speech, he criticizes the United Nations and the Security Council and suggests that they should be moved out of New York.

May 2010 – Libya is elected to a three-year term on the UN Human Rights Council.

February 2011 – Demonstrations break out against the rule of Gadhafi in Benghazi and Tripoli. The protestors are reportedly attacked by security forces, warplanes and helicopter gunships, resulting in hundreds of casualties. These protests spread through the country, igniting the 2011 Libya Civil War.

February 22, 2011 – Gadhafi appears on television to dispel rumors that he has fled the country, vowing he will never leave Libya, and “will die as a martyr at the end.”

February 26, 2011 – The UN Security Council imposes sanctions against Libya, including an arms embargo and asset freezes. The Security Council also refers Libya to the International Criminal Court for investigation of crimes against humanity.

May 16, 2011 – The chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, requests arrest warrants for Gadhafi, his son Saif al-Gadhafi and his brother-in-law, saying the court has evidence that the three committed crimes against humanity during the Libyan civil war.

August 24, 2011 – The National Transitional Council (NTC), the rebels’ political movement, claims rebels now control 90% of the country and plans to move ministries from its base of Benghazi in the east to Tripoli. The NTC will have the primary responsibility for the restoration of law and order when the conflict is over.

October 20, 2011 – Gadhafi dies of a gunshot wound to the head after being captured by rebel forces in his hometown of Sirte, Libya.

October 23, 2011 – Libya’s interim leaders declare the nation’s freedom in Benghazi, where uprisings against Gadhafi’s regime began in February, officially ending the civil war.

October 27, 2011 – The Security Council votes unanimously to end military operations in Libya. The adopted resolution effectively cancels the NATO mission in Libya as of October 31, 2011.

October 30, 2011 – It is announced that two sites containing chemical weapons have been found in Libya. Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril says the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has been notified.

October 31, 2011 – The NTC elects Abdurrahim El-Keib, an electrical engineering professor, as the acting prime minister.

November 19, 2011 – Saif al-Islam is captured after a firefight in southern Libya.

November 23, 2011 – El-Keib names 25 people to the Transitional Executive Board, Libya’s new cabinet.

December 16, 2011 – The Security Council lifts sanctions on the Central Bank of Libya and the Libyan Foreign Bank.

May 20, 2012 – Megrahi dies in Libya at 60 years old, the only person convicted of the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.

July 7-8, 2012 – Elections are held for the 200-seat national assembly; there are more than 3,500 candidates in the first elections in Libya in 42 years.

July 17, 2012 – Results show the National Forces Alliance, a coalition of 58 political parties, wins the most seats in the 200-seat election, 39; the Justice and Construction party, a Muslim Brotherhood affiliate, came in second with 17 seats.

August 8, 2012 – Libya’s NTC hands over power to the General National Congress.

September 11, 2012 – US Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three US diplomatic staffers are killed in an attack on the US consulate in Benghazi. Initially, the cause is alleged to be an anti-Islam video produced by an Israeli-American, but it is later determined to be a terrorist attack.

September 12, 2012 – The General National Congress names Mustafa Abushagur prime minister-elect and gives him approximately three and a half weeks to form a crisis government proposal.

October 7, 2012 – Abushagur is voted out of office with a “no confidence” 125 to 44 vote against his proposed cabinet.

October 14, 2012 – Ali Zeidan is elected as the country’s new prime minister.

October 20, 2012 – Official sources report fighting in the former Gadhafi stronghold of Bani Walid where at least 200 government forces are wounded, and 14 government and pro-government militia members are killed. Among those killed is Khamis Gadhafi, 29, the youngest son of the former leader.

February-March 2014 – Violence levels in Benghazi spike, with assassinations, kidnappings and bombings becoming near daily occurrences. While no group has claimed responsibility for the rising violence in Benghazi, residents and officials blame the violence on Islamist extremist groups.

March 11, 2014 – Libya’s parliament votes Zeidan out of office after months of political infighting. Defense Minister Abdallah al-Thinni, who is sworn in after the vote, will hold the position of premier until a replacement is picked.

April 13, 2014 – Al-Thinni resigns after an attack on himself and his family. The General National Congress must approve. Until then, al-Thinni says he will continue his work as a “caretaker.”

May 4, 2014 – The General National Congress (GNC) elects Ahmed Maiteeq as Prime Minister. However, some members of the parliament reject the appointment and ask al-Thinni to stay in place because Maiteeq’s appointment failed to reach a quorum and therefore is illegitimate.

May 18, 2014 – Operation Dignity forces storm parliament and call for the suspension of the General National Congress (GNC).

June 9, 2014 – Libya’s Supreme Court rules Maiteeq’s election as prime minister was unconstitutional. Al-Thinni remains the interim prime minister.

June 15, 2014 – Ahmed Abu Khatallah, the suspected mastermind behind the 2012 bombing of the US diplomatic compound in Benghazi, is captured. In June 2018, Abu Khatallah is sentenced to 22 years in prison.

June 25, 2014 – A new parliament is elected.

July 13, 2014 – Islamist militants launch Operation Libya Dawn, in an effort to take control of the Tripoli International Airport, which has been under the control of moderate militias since the fall of Gadhafi.

July 14, 2014 – All air traffic in and out Tripoli is suspended. Also, the United Nations announces that it has evacuated its staff.

July 26, 2014 – Military and civilian personnel from the US embassy are evacuated from Tripoli.

August 4, 2014 – The first session of the new parliament, called the House of Representatives (HOR), is held in Tobruk.

September 1, 2014 – Parliament reappoints Thinni, who resigned just days before, as prime minister and asks him to form a new government.

November 6, 2014 – The Libyan supreme court rules the June elections were unconstitutional and illegal, dissolving the House of Representatives. The HOR ignores the ruling.

January 22, 2015 – Operation Dignity forces take control of the Libyan Central Bank in Benghazi.

February 15, 2015 – Islamic militant group ISIS releases a propaganda video which appears to show the beheadings of 21 Egyptian Christians on a Libyan beach.

February 16, 2015 – Egyptian warplanes stage airstrikes against ISIS targets in Libya in retaliation.

February 20, 2015 – Three simultaneous suicide car bomb blasts kill at least 30 and injure more than 40 in Gobba, Libya. Wilayat al-Barqa, the Libyan branch of ISIS, claims responsibility for the explosions.

May 26, 2015 – While in the eastern city of Tobruk to attend Parliament, Prime Minister al-Thinni survives an attempted assassination.

December 17, 2015 – In Skhirat, Morocco, Libya’s rival warring factions sign a UN-brokered peace agreement to form a national government.

December 17, 2017 – Haftar says he no longer recognizes the UN-backed national government established by the 2015 agreement.

June 2018 – A UN report finds that over the course of two days, 215 people drowned after leaving Libya for Europe. There are between 700,000 and 1 million migrants in Libya, according to the UN IOM. Tripoli’s location at the edge of the Mediterranean makes it a popular checkpoint for those all over the continent trying to escape conflict by fleeing to Europe.

November 5, 2018 – The UN Security Council adopts a resolution that keeps the pressure on suspected human traffickers and sexual abusers in Libya, following an undercover report by CNN’s Nima Elbagir and Raja Rezak that revealed trafficking of women in Libyan camps, as the observed captives were sold to the highest bidder.

April 4, 2019 – General Haftar orders his Libyan National Army (LNA) to advance on the capital city Tripoli, the base of the country’s UN-backed government, the GNA.

April 9, 2019 – In a statement, UNICEF calls on all parties to refrain from “committing grave violations against children” — including the recruitment of children as soldiers — as it warns that more than half a million children are at “direct risk” in Libya as Haftar’s forces advance.

January 17, 2020 – UNICEF releases a statement calling for a durable peace agreement to be reached “for the sake of each and every child.” Tens of thousands of children and civilians in Libya continue to suffer “grievously” amid the violence and chaos of the country’s longstanding civil war.

December 22, 2021 – The Libya High National Elections Commission declares force majeure. The presidential election, scheduled for December 24 is postponed indefinitely due to questions regarding the list of candidates and other issues.

January 11, 2022 – Stephanie Turco Williams, the UN special adviser on Libya, tells CNN that it is still possible for Libyans to cast their ballots by June, in line with the UN-brokered 2020 roadmap towards national elections. “It’s important for us to see an electoral event in this time frame.”

February 10, 2022 – Libya’s eastern-based parliament speaker, Aguila Saleh, declares Fathi Bashagha prime minister-designate, to replace current interim premier Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah, according to a UNSMIL statement. Al-Dbeibah refuses to recognize the vote. Turco Williams meets with both four days later and stresses the importance of Libyan stability and unity.

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A timeline of how Libya got to this point

Many in the country were hopeful during the revolt against the Libyan dictator, Muammar Gaddafi, but time has eroded that optimism.

It has been eleven years since the Libyan people took to the streets and revolted against the country’s long-ruling dictator, Muammar Gaddafi, to have a democratic country that would provide equality, democratic rights and a democratically elected government. Read More

Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa

Influence, commercial concessions, rights violations, and counterinsurgency failure

Federica Saini Fasanotti

ussia is intensifying its competition with the United States in Africa. In its asymmetric race, Russia uses nominally private, but in fact state-linked actors such as the private security company the Wagner Group and the infamous St. Petersburg “troll farm” the Internet Research Agency (IRA). Both are a major threat to democracy and rule of law in Africa and beyond. Read More

Libya’s Rising Leaders: The Unheard Voices of a Generation to Come

Al Jazeera Centre for Studies released a new book entitled, Qadat Libya as-Sa’idun: Aswat Gheir Masmu’a la Jil Qadim (Unheard Voices of the Next Generation: Emergent Leaders in Libya), authored by several writers and researchers in conjunction with the 11th anniversary of the 17 February revolution that ousted Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s rule. Read More

Libya’s Renewed Legitimacy Crisis

Ben Fishman

Washington and Europe need to clearly signal that they will not endorse any new governing arrangements until all local actors peacefully adhere to a negotiated political roadmap.

On February 10, Libya’s House of Representatives (HOR) hurriedly voted to appoint former interior minister Fathi Bashagha as the country’s next prime minister. He is slated to replace Abdulhamid al-Dabaiba, who has served as head of the internationally recognized Government of National Unity (GNU) for just over a year.

HOR chairman Aguila Saleh orchestrated the vote, arguing that the current GNU’s tenure expired in December after planned presidential and parliamentary elections were postponed. Bashagha now has two weeks to submit a cabinet for HOR approval.

Dabaiba has remained defiant, however, reiterating that he will not step down until he can hand power to a nationally elected government. He also pledged to submit a new election timeline that would see voting take place in June and suggested that the parliamentary election could precede the presidential vote (the debate over sequencing them helped stymie the December vote). At the same time, the HOR approved a new fourteen-month transition timeline whose details will be specified later by a designated committee.

Depending on the balance of political and security forces in Tripoli—where Bashagha arrived shortly after being tapped by the HOR—the coming days could produce a shift in government. To ensure that the latest developments advance rather than exacerbate Libya’s stalled transition, the United States and its partners should forestall any recognition until a clear, consensual electoral timeline is established.

Lack of Agreed Roadmap Leads to Electoral Chaos

Libya’s decade-plus transition has been marred not just by lengthy civil wars, but also by the lack of an agreed roadmap with clear timelines to establish constitutionally based elected bodies. Absent this roadmap and a functioning judicial system, multiple executive and legislative institutions have claimed legitimacy and challenged their rivals.

Technically, Libya still operates under an amended version of the interim 2011 Constitutional Declaration drafted by the self-appointed National Transitional Council, the political body that opposed Muammar Qadhafi during the revolution. An elected sixty-member Constitutional Drafting Assembly produced a draft constitution in 2017, but that document remains controversial, as does a subsequent referendum law.

In late 2020, the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) set December 2021 as the next election date, but its efforts to design a constitutional basis for holding that vote stalled due to ineffective UN leadership, and later due to the controversial manner in which Dabaiba was appointed last February amid accusations of buying HOR votes, which damaged the forum’s credibility. In September, Saleh spearheaded the approval of an elections law that would have created a super-empowered president and a weak parliament, among other controversial aspects.

A rush to run for president ensued, with over 100 people seeking the nomination amid limited vetting standards and judicial reviews regarding the qualifications of the most controversial candidates—in particular, Gen. Khalifa Haftar, Qadhafi’s son Saif, and Dabaiba, who had previously pledged not to run for president. That scramble, among other logistical issues, made it impossible for the elections commission to adequately prepare for voting in such a compressed timeline.

Alternative Paths Ahead

The most immediate question provoked by Bashagha’s appointment is whether Libya will revert to split governments—which last year’s creation of the GNU had sought to resolve after years of division—or, worse, military conflict. In the longer term, the country needs to negotiate a new political roadmap, but no one has set forth a clear path to get there.

Technically, the original LPDF roadmap extends through Dabaiba’s proposed June election date. On February 13, he tasked his justice minister with proposing a new elections law, which would include the prospect of holding a constitutional referendum. But organizing and running both a referendum and national elections in four months is unrealistic.

The HOR’s preference—lengthening the election timeline to fourteen months—would give more space for these processes, but it also runs the risk of indefinitely delaying the parliamentary and presidential votes if the constitutional referendum stalls. Presumably, Saleh’s preferred scenario is to have Bashagha serve as prime minister while he remains chair of the HOR—a position he has held for seven years and seems content to occupy indefinitely if he cannot contend for the presidency.

One plausible option is a hybrid approach in which the parties negotiate a limited constitutional basis for holding elections as originally envisioned by the LPDF. This would require drafting an interim constitutional document delimiting the key institutions of government, their respective authorities, and candidate qualifications while leaving broader legal issues (e.g., citizen rights) for a later process. The eastern-based HOR and the consultative, Tripoli-based High State Council could agree on such a path, but their on-again, off-again relationship makes this unlikely without active UN mediation.

Significant International Leverage

Despite their current preoccupation with the Ukraine crisis, the United States and its European partners can and should intervene diplomatically to prevent Libya from re-dividing and bring the country back to the electoral track. In a February 11 statement, Secretary-General Antonio Guterres “took note” of the HOR’s vote to adopt the new fourteen-month timeline and appoint Bashagha as prime minister “in consultation with the High State Council”—a reaction that indicates the rival bodies are already in active negotiations. Beyond this wait-and-see approach, Washington and Europe should adopt a four-part strategy to restore the prospects for legitimate, constitutionally based elections.

First, the GNU remains the internationally recognized government, so the HOR cannot replace it just by holding a single legally and procedurally dubious vote. Western officials should make clear privately and publicly that their views of the GNU will not change unless all local actors accept a peaceful handover to a new government—otherwise, the result will be an unrecognized government with limited authority and, most important, restricted financial viability.

Second, the West should support a UN-mediated process to establish an agreed constitutional basis and timeline for elections. Regardless of the HOR roadmap committee’s pending recommendations, these elements must be negotiated with the High State Council. If the rival bodies fail to agree on a process, then the UN should be empowered to strike a compromise between Dabaiba’s four-month proposal and the HOR’s fourteen-month timeline. Any UN proposal would be limited to outlining the sequence and timing of elections; the nearly 3 million citizens who are registered will ensure that the elections process remains “Libyan-owned.”

Third, Libya’s supporters must preserve current momentum on the economic and security tracks. The dialogue aiming to unify the Libyan Central Bank with its breakaway eastern branch could restore economic well-being to the country and end certain practices that have sown division, such as paying armed groups through illegitimate means. Further, unity cannot occur without bolstering the security dialogue that has aimed to solidify the October 2020 ceasefire, remove foreign forces, and restructure a unified, national armed forces. A split government would jeopardize these steps forward.

Finally, Washington should push for broader international acceptance of an agreed transitional roadmap by taking advantage of the thaw in relations between Turkey, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates—key actors that have been on opposite sides of Libya’s recent conflicts. Although the post-Qadhafi legal vacuum has produced yet another legitimacy crisis, each of the above diplomatic interventions can help steer the transition back on course.

***

Ben Fishman is a senior fellow in The Washington Institute’s Program on Arab Politics and former director for North Africa on the National Security Council.

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Libyan tyre merchant wheeling and dealing for power

Coming days will test political agility of one-time militia leader and politician, now prime minister

Sean Mathews

In the op-eds he is prone to write in western newspapers, Libya’s newly appointed premier Fathi Bashagha strikes a conciliatory tone. He says he wants to bring a “diversity of voices” to factious politics and put the oil-rich country on “a path to unity”.  Read More

Turkey rethinks Libya policy

Libya’s rekindled power struggle has left Turkey in an ambivalent position and might force it to review its alliances.
Fehim Tastekin

fehimtastekin.jpg

Libya’s interim prime minister, a close ally of Turkey, has been rejected by parliament in a rekindled power struggle in the war-torn country. But his replacement is no stranger to Ankara and might help it make peace with eastern Libya.
The latest political twist in Libya saw adversaries of Turkey team up with allies of Turkey to unseat interim Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, Turkey’s man in Tripoli. The House of Representatives, based in the eastern city of Tobruk, chose former Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha to form a new interim government Feb. 10 on the grounds that Dbeibeh’s mandate ended Dec. 24, when elections were supposed to be held under a UN-brokered peace plan but failed to go ahead. The Libyan National Army of eastern commander Khalifa Hifter supported Bashagha, who is expected to form a new government in two weeks.
Earlier in the week, the House of Representatives approved a road map to hold elections within 14 months. The UN Secretary-General’s special Libya adviser, Stephanie Williams, has sought to convince the parties to have the elections by June. 
Bashagha was a prominent ally of Turkey in 2019 and 2020, when Hifter’s forces, backed by Egypt, Russia and the United Arab Emirates, marched on Tripoli, and Ankara lent military support to the Government of National Accord to break the siege. But in the ensuing UN-sponsored process, in which the warring parties agreed on a new interim administration, Bashagha engaged in close dialogue with Egypt, France and the United States, shrugging off his image of “Turkey’s man.” 
Bashagha was a vocal opponent of Dbeibeh’s presidential candidacy during the preparations for the failed elections. Eventually, he aligned with Hifter and Aquila Saleh, the House of Representatives speaker, to pave the way for the Feb. 10 move against Dbeibeh. Bashagha’s machinations may be harming his credibility in Turkey’s eyes, but Ankara has refrained from any open reaction.
Counting on the support of Turkey, the United States and several European countries, Dbeibeh defied the parliament’s move, arguing that a parallel administration will derail efforts to unite Libya. He vowed to hand over the mandate to an elected government only and sought to keep Tripoli’s military forces on his side. Fawzi al-Nuwairi, the deputy parliament speaker who appears to align with Ankara, convened a meeting with 40 parliamentarians in Tripoli Feb. 7 in a bid to form a bloc against Saleh. Several civic groups also lent support to Dbeibeh. 
And on the eve of the vote at the House of the Representatives, Dbeibeh reportedly survived an assassination attempt in Tripoli. 
How long Dbeibeh’s resistance can continue depends on the foreign powers that recognized the incumbent leadership in February 2021. Williams has urged the Libyan parties to focus on holding elections rather than forming a new interim government, which meshes with the priorities of Ankara and Washington. 
But the international actors who now favor Dbeibeh staying on until elections might change tune in the face of developments on the ground.
Another key factor will be the military forces and militia in Tripoli. Government-paid forces and some rival militia might cause trouble for Bashagha, and Bashagha’s loyalists in Tripoli and Misrata might cause trouble for Dbeibeh. Some claim no premier could take hold in Tripoli without Turkey’s blessing.
Many have argued that Dbeibeh’s defiance would result in a parallel administration, reverse the process of uniting Libyan institutions and even rekindle armed conflict. Still, the Misrata clique, the staunchest opponent of the Saleh-Hifter pair, is not monolithic. Ahmad Maiteeq, a prominent Misratan and former deputy chair of the presidential council, allegedly struck a deal with Hifter and Saleh to withdraw from the contest for prime minister in favor of Bashagha.
In fact, Ankara had already realized that the Tripoli-Misrata camp was becoming too unstable to rely on. The main criticism Ankara faced over Libya at home was that it became a party to the war and put all its eggs in one basket, jeopardizing national interests. After all, Ankara has failed to guarantee the two critical deals on military cooperation and maritime borders that it signed with the Sarraj government. Saleh, who has denied parliamentary ratification to the deals, is now at the forefront of the move for a new government. Tripoli is no longer a place from where Turkey could sway the course of events. 
Khalid al-Mishri, the head of the High State Council who has been close to Ankara, appears to be readjusting his position as well. Speaking after a secret meeting with Saleh in Morocco in early February, he cautioned that any new government installed unilaterally by the House of Representatives would be “stillborn” and unable to operate in Tripoli. Nevertheless, he added, “We agreed in principle on replacing the government, though this is not a priority for us.”
Dbeibeh, for his part, charged that a thirst for “power and money” was driving an alliance between the military (Hifter) and the Muslim Brotherhood, which have traded accusations of terrorism in the past. 
On Feb. 8, Dbeibeh joined Turkish commanders at a military graduation ceremony in Tripoli, giving the impression that he retains Turkey’s backing. His quest for support took him also on a secret trip to Cairo, but he reportedly returned empty-handed. According to Africa Intelligence, Dbeibeh met with his Egyptian counterpart, but his requests to meet with the influential foreign minister and intelligence chief remained unanswered.
A day after greenlighting a government change, Mishri held talks with Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu — a likely sign that Ankara is flexible on government options. In its Feb. 10 session, the House of Representatives decided to also form a commission to draft constitutional changes, a move in line with Mishri’s call for constitutional amendments before elections. 
Amid the shifting dynamics in Libya, dialogue with the eastern camp has become inevitable for Ankara. Turkey’s ambassador to Tripoli met with Saleh in al-Qubah Jan. 19. He then visited Benghazi, Hifter’s stronghold, accompanied by members of Turkish-Libyan business groups. Benghazi’s mayor welcomed the guests.
A Libyan parliamentary delegation, led by Nuwairi, visited Ankara in December, meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Parliament Speaker Mustafa Sentop and Cavusoglu. The delegation included two parliamentarians said to be close to Hifter. The two sides agreed to set up a parliamentary friendship group. 
The thaw between Ankara and eastern Libya is important both in terms of healing Libya’s divisions and broadening Ankara’s maneuvering room in post-war Libya.
Turkish political and military influence may stand out in Tripoli, but Ankara seeks to also salvage economic ties with the east, including myriad construction projects in Benghazi, which Turkish contractors were forced to abandon due to the conflict. Preparations are already under way to resume flights to Benghazi. Turkish exports to Libya increased nearly 65 percent to $2.4 billion last year, according to Turkey’s Foreign Economic Relations Board. Restoring friendly ties with the east could push the figure much higher. 
But whether Ankara’s problem with Hifter is resolved remains uncertain. Ankara may hope that Bashagha will care for its interests, but none of its calculations could be guaranteed in a new government equation involving Hifter.
The critical question now is this: Will Turkey protect Dbeibeh or encourage Bashagha to forge ahead? Or will it let things slide? For now, Ankara appears far from its hawkish, interventionist stance in 2019. If protecting Dbeibeh proves costly, it may well opt to go with Bashagha and make peace with the east.

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