Despite no longer being the focus of media attention, Libya continues to be a source of instability in regional and international dynamics. In March, under UN direction, Libya’s key institutional leaders reached a compromise on organising presidential and parliamentary elections. However, the ongoing stalemate appears insurmountable, as these leaders seem more concerned with preserving their power than with setting a date for these crucial elections.
This political impasse also affects the economy of the country, particularly the energy sector. The division of the country into two governments hampers the activities of the National Oil Corporation (NOC), which struggles to reach its production targets. Moreover, the presence of external interferences continues to fuel the political impasse, turning Libya into a theatre of international rivalry.
While Russia’s presence in Libya is well established, the US and its allies are striving to strengthen their role to counterbalance Moscow’s influence. In this context, last week’s visit by Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni to Libya reinforced Italy’s stance in the country, aiming to play a more significant role in the stabilization process.
For Italy – as for other European countries – the necessity to limit migration flows remains the key issue in the relationship with Libya. While migration has allowed Libya to be re-integrated into regional and international dynamics, it has also exacerbated the country’s fragmentation, adding another layer to the already numerous sources of Libya’s instability.
Experts from the ISPI network discuss the current situation in Libya.
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The deadlock of Libya’s political process: the role of external interference
“Unfortunately, Libya has been subject to more or less constant external interference since 2011, when the first civil war broke out. Since then, numerous nations have violated the country’s sovereignty, also facilitated by a local political class totally unable to curb these intrusions and to fulfill the fundamental interests of its citizens. The result is that the natural process for the selection of the Libyan political class has not happened: on the contrary, many of Libya’s actors have anchored themselves to the privileges they gained precisely because of foreign intervention, barricading themselves behind the utopia of elections for which it is clear there are no preconditions.”
Federica Saini Fasanotti, Senior Associate Research Fellow, ISPI
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Migration: another piece of Libyan instability’s puzzle
“Libya’s role as a major migratory thoroughfare to Europe has changed the way Europeans interact with it and provided more avenues for engagement with regional actors. Leading Europeans, like Italy, are sacrificing long-term comprehensive policies to manage progressive change in Libya to try and cement externalisation deals that are decreasingly effective. Meanwhile, antagonistic powers like Russia, help the Haftars traffic migrants across the Mediterranean due to its destabilising effects on European politics. At this point, all North African states have migration deals with Europe, and they cooperate to maximize their leverage. Now that Niger has once again begun facilitating migrant flows, this has also opened up a new avenue of relations between Niamey’s new government, its counterpart in Tripoli, and Libya’s people smuggling militias. As such, the migration phenomenon in its current guise is helping Libya’s destabilization and fragmentation.”
Tarek Megerisi, Senior Policy Fellow, ECFR
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Meloni in Libya: more than just migration
“The Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni went to Tripoli on this last occasion to reinforce Italian support for Tripoli’s government but also, rumours say, to emphasize a point that the US Administration holds high in its list of things to take care of soon that is, the large expansion of Russia’s presence in Libya. The same content Meloni went to refer to Haftar in Benghazi. Does this mean that Italy has become the messenger of the US? On the contrary, this trust given by the Americans to Meloni empowers the Italian PM to exercise a wider role not only in the issues of direct interest of Italy such as migration and criminality, but also to extend its efforts towards defining a plan and action for the stabilization of the whole of Libya. And this would be a story to follow closely.”
Karim Mezran, Director of North Africa Initiative, Senior Research Fellow, Atlantic Council
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The hindered potential of Libya oil industry: the other side of political divisions
“Libya’s division impacts the oil industry’s present and future. The sector’s health is often influenced by politics with Khalifa Haftar using oil production as leverage to topple his rival, Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibeh. The most recent blockade ended in 2022, but only after the US pressured Haftar’s backers in the UAE who brokered a deal that now distributes Libya’s oil wealth between the Haftar and Dbeibeh families, dangerously politicising oil production and its future contingent on their divided political presence and unified greed. Whilst the National Oil Corporation underwent unification, having two governments makes it hard for the NOC to secure funds for necessary investment since both sides spend recklessly. As a result, the NOC will struggle to reach its target of producing 2 million barrels by 2025. The persistent division, and absence of a unified legislature and executive impedes Libya’s oil industry growth and critically its potential.”
Anas El-Gomati, Director General, Sadeq Institute
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Russia’s presence is growing stronger in the East
“Since Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s military defeat near Tripoli in mid-2020, Russia has maintained a clandestine armed presence in Eastern and Southern Libya. Because the Haftar family considers their presence indispensable to survival, it has given the Russians significant monetary and material benefits. In addition to Wagner’s replacement with other semi-private entities like Redut in 2023, the Russian State has become officially involved in Libya, drastically increasing its military presence, armament, and diplomatic activism. Unlike four years ago, when Libyan and Turkish forces were willing to hurt Russians, no such opposition exists now. Conversely, the Russian Armed Forces – busy solidifying their military footprint in Haftar-held territories – are not preparing a war of territorial conquest. There is no sign of any intention to attack Tripoli or Misrata in the foreseeable future. But the Russian Armed Forces’ apparatus in Eastern and Southern Libya has become vastly more powerful than a few months ago.”
Jalel Harchaoui, Associate Fellow, RUSI
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General elections: yes, but when?
“The odds of Libya holding elections over the coming year are dim. Although months ago the House of Representatives formally approved laws that are supposed to govern presidential and parliamentary ballot, and the High National Electoral Commission stated it is ready to implement them, disagreements persist between Libya’s rival factions on the sequencing of elections and candidacy requirements. Another thorny issue is whether a new interim government should be appointed before the election time clock starts ticking, as the laws envision, or not. It is difficult to envision Libya’s rival political factions resolving these disagreements any time soon, assuming they ever genuinely wanted to. Unfortunately, it looks like those currently in power favour keeping the country divided into two rival governments rather than hedging their bets on high-stake elections that could remove them from power.”
Claudia Gazzini, Senior Analyst, International Crisis Group
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