Gregory Aftandilian
Foreign Interference
On top of this, Libya continues to be subjected to foreign intrigue that is aided and abetted by the interests of its rival governments. There are an estimated 800 to 1,000 Russian mercenaries in Libya supporting Haftar’s forces.
Once part of the now defunct Wagner group, they are now believed to be under Russian government authority, rebranded as part of Russia’s Africa Corps.
Russia sees Libya as an important transit route to Central Africa and views Haftar as an ally. Reports have surfaced that Russia may seek to develop a naval base in Tobruk In the meantime, Haftar has allowed Russian airplanes to land and refuel in al-Jufra, an area under his control.
Haftar also has been supported by the United Arab Emirates, because he claims to be fighting Islamists in Libya, and France. Haftar in late February flew to Paris where he was received by French President Emanuel Macron, who referred to Haftar’s “central role” in Libya’s “political process and stability.”
Egypt used to favor Haftar because he keeps Libyan Islamists at bay and helps to protect its shared border from infiltration by extremists such as from the so-called Islamic State. Since 2024, Cairo has sought to reach a diplomatic solution to Libya’s divisions and to be neutral among its fractious politicians.
Meanwhile, Italy—the closest European Union country—continues to support the GNU. In January Italy went out of its way to shield an official from the GNU from the International Criminal Court (ICC).
This individual, Osama Anjiem, also known as Osama al-Masri, had an ICC warrant against him for war crimes and crimes against humanity. After he was briefly detained in a jail in Turin, Italy, the government of Prime Minister Georgia Meloni decided to release him over a “legal technicality.”
Italian opposition parties and human rights organizations charge that the Meloni government essentially caved and put al-Masri on a plane back to Libya because it relies on the GNU to patrol the Libyan coast to prevent migrants from trying to reach Italy, and because it feared that Libyan militias would unleash boatloads of migrants if al-Masri was not released.
Many believe that without the Turkish military intervention, Tripoli would have fallen.
Turkey also backs the GNU.
In 2019-2020, Turkey played a crucial role in helping the government of western Libya beat back Haftar’s attempt to take Tripoli. Many analysts believed that without this Turkish military intervention—that included drones, officers, and Turkish-directed Syrian mercenaries—Tripoli would have fallen.
But Ankara has exacted a high price for this support. It got the GNU government to endorse Turkey’s expanded claims of territorial waters in the Eastern Mediterranean, and on August 12, 2024, Turkey disclosed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) it signed with the GNU Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah.
In this MoU, Dbeibah agreed to allow Turkey to restructure Libya’s security sector in return for granting legal immunity and full autonomy to Turkish forces in the country and for financing from the Libyan treasury.
The MoU also gave Turkish forces unrestricted access to Libya’s territory, airspace, and territorial waters. One Libyan analyst described the deal as turning “Libya into a military base for Turkey.”
The UN Security Council has imposed an arms embargo on Libya in 2011, but Turkey obviously has flouted it, as have others.
Sadly, More of the Same
On February 15, 2024, the then-chief of the UN Support Mission for Libya (UMSMIL), Abdoulaye Bathily, addressed the UN Security Council in what can only be described as a pessimistic message.
He stated that despite various meetings and tentative agreements, “Key Libyan institutional stakeholders appear unwilling to resolve the outstanding politically contested issues that would clear the path to the long-awaited elections in Libya.” He underscored that the status quo “seems to suit” these stakeholders.
As mentioned, he resigned a few months later, citing the “selfish resolve of current leaders to maintain the status quo through delaying tactics…at the expense of the Libyan people.” Bathily was especially frustrated that he could not get the long-delayed national elections back on the agenda.
The new UNSMIL team, headed by Hanna Tetteh, a former foreign minister of Ghana with extensive experience in African diplomacy, seems competent and dedicated. But the team is likely experiencing the same level of frustration as Bathily and his predecessors did.
On March 11, 2025, UNSMIL hosted an online platform for 29 Libyan young people that was revealing in what they expressed. According to the UN readout, the 10 female and 19 male participants overwhelmingly emphasized political stability as a fundamental requirement for economic recovery.
Many also highlighted the urgent need for improved governance, stronger accountability, and decisive measures to curb widespread corruption.” As one young Libyan said, “I am a graduate with no job, no car, and don’t benefit from fuel subsidies.” Undoubtedly aware of how these subsidies are part of an elaborate corruption scheme, he added, “We need clear guidance from the government on how to address [their] removal.”
Instead of heeding the advice of these young people—Libya’s future—the rival factions continue to enrich themselves and to maintain their fiefdoms. Unless they change course, they will have alienated a whole generation of young people whom they need to rebuild and unify the country.
As for the international community, it needs to keep a spotlight on Libya and impose penalties on governments that, instead of pressing the two factions to unify, want one side to prevail or simply maintain the status quo with arms and economic support.
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Gregory Aftandilian is a Nonresident Fellow at Arab Center Washington DC. He is a Senior Professorial Lecturer at American University where he teaches courses on US foreign policy. He is also an adjunct faculty member at Boston University and George Mason University, teaching courses on Middle East politics.
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