Milad Elharathi
Libya is the most predisposed to internal divisions and instability. At the same time it’s also the only North African state to have failed to do away with the ethnic and tribal barriers and to create a national identity.
The main barrier to achieving this goal has been and still is geography and wealth along with the tribal segmentations in the country. This article presents current state of affairs in Libya after the uprising which led by the NATO’ campaign in March 2011.
In other word, the analysis is based on the context of the “Arab Spring”, in which we under the aspects of the current Libya’s military politics, and analyzing the prospects of the ongoing democratic control and the transitional attempts from the revolutionary to the institutional state status.
First of all, by now we are familiarized with the idea that geography 1 plays almost always, if not always, the determining role in how a state evolves internally. The difference between states is that for some geography has a negative impact, while for others a positive one.
Libya is one of those states which is geographically disadvantaged, its territory having no major sources of water, no mountains or fertile areas (like the other North African countries have for example) which to enable large-scale agriculture.
It is simply a desert. In the absence of a geographic element which to inhibit ethnic and tribal differences, isolated communities have persisted (usually formed around sources of water) each with its own identity, in some cases dating back hundreds or thousands of years.
In addition, the only important resources of the country are oil (which for example is of higher quality than the Russian oil) and gas, but neither of those did nothing to contribute in a positive way in homogenizing the Libyan population, mostly because they were always under the control of a small group of people.
In contrast, energy resources have deepened the division within Libya due to the emergence of two producing regions, one producing mainly oil and the other producing mostly gas, each with its own bureaucracy and infrastructure.
Although, until the fall down of the Kaddafi regime in October 2011, Libya was a highly centralized and stable state, the authoritarian apparatus, the army and the political system created by Kaddafi having maintained the status quo for decades.
But none of those contributed in any way in creating a national identity, which is why when the system malformed, the divisions that until than had been more or less dormant, resurfaced.
Of course not only geography played a role in shaping Libya, but also it is the main reason, including its wealth with limited population. Libya is a major exporting oil country in the region In fact; Libya holds approximately (46.4 billion) barrels of oil reserves, the largest in Africa and in close proximity to Europe.
In 2010, Libya produced an estimated (1.8 million barrels) per day bbl./d of the world’s 88m barrels a day of oil of which (1.5 million bbl. /d) was exported. The ousted regime had planned to up its production to 3 million barrels a day by 2020, and further develop its natural gas sector in an effort to stimulate economic recovery against the backdrop of US and international sanctions during the 1980s and 1990s.
France, Britain, Italy and Spain accounted for nearly (85%) of Libya’s oil exports. Of these nations, Italy received over (28%) of its total oil imports from Libya which amount to (370,000 barrels) of oil per day .
Italy’s role was also outstanding as Silvio Berlusconi’s government offered the use of seven air and navy bases for the Libyan operation at the early stages of the military operations .
Regarding France, it receives (17%) of its oil from Libya, along with Britain who receives (8%) of its oil from Libya as well. It is also interesting to point out that France, UK and Italy were the first NATO countries that undertook sorties and military logistical assistance across Libya as part of collective efforts to enforce a no-fly zone during the initial phases of the intervention
Furthermore, Libya is, also, awash in natural gas resources with an estimated capacity (of 55 trillion cubic feet) (TCF) of proven natural gas reserves. According to estimates by the International Energy Agency prior to the upsurge of popular revolution, Libyan production by 2012 could be increased by as much as 50 percent if planned pipelines and gas-fired power plants would have been built, but this is not happened due to the conflict over the oil ports of (Zwetina) and (Ras Alanowf), in the east part of Libya.
The natural resources of Libya attracted NATO members to organize and lead a major military campaign in the beginning of the second decade of this century.
Certain advanced questions remained without imperative answers; and how such NATO’s intervention, in supporting Libya’s revolt that created a large amount of debatable political and economic impacts on Libya’s affairs? The above arguments could explain why the wealth factor in Libya is important as the geographical one.
The Emerged Internal Divisions
One of the ways in which internal divisions resurfaced was the emergence of various well-armed militias in cities like (Musrata, Benghazi, Dirna, Sabah, or Zentan and Tripoli). While Kaddafi was still alive they had a common goal and therefore posed no threat, but when the former dictator was physically eliminated (possibly since before that) differences between these groups and differences between the militias and the new leadership in Tripoli started to take birth.
Ironically, the new government in Tripoli was originally forced to turn to the militias for maintaining internal order, which otherwise would not have been possible. Gradually though, they became the biggest obstacle in the way of achieving internal stability and in restoring the government’s authority. And given the large number of weapons the militia’s posses – weapons which originally belonged to the Libyan army.
It is unlikely that the regime in Tripoli will be able to disperse the militias too soon, not without massive external support.
In a fairly limited manner the General National Congress (the body which theoretically governs the country) managed to put the militias in a position of financial dependence, but this did not prevent the occupation of governmental buildings when pressure on the government was needed.
Moreover, it should be noted however, that since before the civil war Italy was hinting to a possible split in two of the country ( as it had had happened in the past) and the NATO commandment suspected that the militias will refuse to disarm themselves. So the countries that granted aid to the rebel cause were aware of the existing divisions in Libya, so what followed the civil war came as no disclosure.
However, most of the Libyan population is divided into four major ethnic groups: Arabs – the bulk of the population (Berbers, Tuaregs and Tebo (Tibbu). Of these, the Berbers and Tuaregs were the ones with the greatest freedom of action, even during the Kaddafi era.
That’s because it’s virtually impossible to control a group which when it feels threatened can simply pass the border into Mali or Niger or take the road to the Sahara Desert, and later return unhindered.
Again, geography prevented effective control, especially in the southern territories. Such an effort would require the continued presence of substantial military forces, which Libya never had. This did not prevent Gaddafi to recruit and equip Tuareg militants into his army in order to fight against the rebel forces.
It was this way that the Tuaregs came into possession of large quantities of weapons, which after the fall down of the Kaddafi regime, they used to foment a rebellion in northern Mali and perform operations in Chad.
It took a direct military intervention by France to push the Tuareg militants out of Mali. The above mentioned problems are amplified by the existence of two centers of power, one in the west – Tripoli – and one in the east – Benghazi. In parallel, both military and intelligence services had been affected by the internal conflict and thus have a very limited operational capacity.
Also, even within the General National Congress there are competing factions. Or, in the lack of a single powerhouse with effective instruments for the exercise of authority, it’s very difficult to solve these internal problems.
In short, the authority of the General National Congress (elected 2012) in Tripoli is further worn by the fact that within its administration there are people who were once part of the Kaddafi regime.
On the one hand this is due to corruption, but also because Libya simply does not have many people with administrative skills. In other words, there aren’t many who can actually govern the country, or what’s left of it.
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Milad Elharathi – Visiting Fellow, at Clare College, University of Cambridge UK
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