Vassilis Nedos
Greece’s fragmented foreign policy in eastern Libya contrasts with Turkey’s methodical approach of the region.
Before the end of June, Greek Foreign Minister George Gerapetritis will travel to North Africa again. This time, he will make two stops – one in Tripoli and one in Benghazi, to meet with both Libya’s United Nations-recognized government in the west of the country, under Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, as well as with the eastern-based House of Representatives, under Aqila Saleh and the Libyan National Army (LNA) of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, who has appointed his son, Saddam, as the leader of the armed forces.
Until recently, the difference between the East and the West Libya, at least as far as Greece was concerned, was that the eastern part of the country was firmly anti-Turkish. This offered Athens extra reasons to reject the 2019 Turkish-Libyan maritime agreement as the deal had not been ratified by the national assembly initially based in Tobruk and now in Benghazi.
Haftar now appears open to discussing it, as Turkey has taken several steps to approach Benghazi, in a methodical manner. The Turkish charm offensive was facilitated by Greece’s failure to follow a foreign policy that would provide results, from the very next day of Haftar’s visit to Athens in January 2020 onwards, despite some initial activity.
The first two years were marked by highly symbolic steps. Greece, as of July 2021, was one of only three countries to have a consulate in Benghazi (along with Egypt and Italy). Benghazi started making a series of requests, most of which Greece failed to satisfy. Haftar’s side had requested some old-style ammunition (artillery and bullets), which Athens was hesitant to provide.
There had been some further discussions on economic cooperation, most notably covering some of Eastern Libya’s needs for consumer goods, through ships that would travel from Greece to the port of Benghazi. In fact, Greece financed, through the UN’s World Food Program, the rehabilitation of part of the port of Benghazi (a container warehouse and a corridor connecting two piers), as an entry point for humanitarian aid to the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa.
There were attempts to revive contacts with eastern Libya on a commercial level, initially with a proposal for a coastal ferry connection, or an airline to Crete or Athens, but these efforts have also failed.
The failure in the Greek government’s efforts over the past five years to revive trade or other economic relations is largely due to the Greek business community, which is extremely skeptical of taking risks in a country that is divided into two. In addition, there are unpaid debts that Libya owes to Greek businesses since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi and the early years of the civil war.
Especially after February 2023 and the gradual normalization of Greek-Turkish relations, which made it look like investments in hydrocarbon exploration by American giants in the southwest of Crete would continue, Athens somewhat relaxed contacts with Libya.
It is also a given that Greece’s failure to assist Benghazi when Storm Daniel swept through eastern Libya in 2023 destroying the city of Derna and leaving thousands of dead, also played a very important role. Greece at the time attempted to organize a small aid mission, which ended in the death of three Greek soldiers and Angela-Moira Mandalios and Philip-Antonios Mandalios, two local young Greeks, on September 17, 2023. On its side, Turkey sent tankers with about 400 personnel, set up mobile hospitals and supported Haftar’s faction intensively.
Then, in November 2024, Turkey reopened its consulate in Benghazi, with a much larger presence than before. Many Turkish construction companies are active in the country, while last April saw the first visit of Haftar’s son, Saddam, to Istanbul. The Turks have also expressed their willingness to train soldiers from the militias of Eastern Libya, which Greece has also been extremely hesitant to do.
Lieutenant General Saddam Haftar, is also seen by the West as the official representative of the armed forces of Eastern Libya, which is why last Monday, June 2, he was in Toulon, following an invitation from his French counterpart, General Pierre Schill, Chief of Staff of the French Army, to a symposium of his Mediterranean counterparts. In his speech, Haftar did not mention Greece’s role but had many positive things to say about Turkey.
Since the beginning of last month, Tripoli has asked the UN Security Council not to renew resolution 2733, which provided for the surveillance of the movement of ships to Libya, to comply with the arms embargo. To this end, the European Union had launched a naval mission in the Mediterranean Sea, dubbed Irini, aimed at enforcing the arms embargo. Turkish ships had repeatedly bypassed or even refused to be inspected by warships of EU member states.
In mid-May, the French proposed to Dbeiba that the mission receive a technical rollover of six to nine months, something the Italians also agreed with. Turkey is the only country to have deployed land, sea and air weapons systems in Libya, while it has been training Tripoli’s forces since 2019. For Ankara, this is about acquiring significant experience in intelligence gathering missions, as well as promoting the value of its weapons.
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